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The following dissertation project seeks to answer the question what it means to call a thing 
rhetorical.  Contemporary rhetorical  theory currently places more emphasis upon the relations 
between speakers, hearers and act or form of speaking itself,  rather than the things of which 
speakers and hearers speak about. Such an orientation makes the relation between speaking and 
the things with which we deal and of which we speak unclear. I argue, in contrast, that rhetoricity, 
or a thing’s capability of being-rhetorical, indicates a spoken relation to things that can become 
otherwise  in  shared  time.  The  spoken  relation  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  symbols  or 
representations; it  expresses and makes manifest speakers’ and hearers’ concrete, present and 
immediate relation to the world. Rhetoricity expresses human beings’ existence and experience 
with things as they are in everydayness initially, generally and for the most part. 
The dissertation applies an analysis of temporality, elucidated by the early (1919-1929) 
hermeneutic, phenomenological philosophy of Martin Heidegger, to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I then 
perform a critical reading of Heidegger’s later “Dialogue on Language” (1954), in which the 
philosopher rejects rhetoricity as a fundamental way of relating to the world in speaking and 
seeks to escape into a philosophico-poetic mode of language. The critical reading illustrates the 
conditions under which speaking engages with things individually in terms of sameness over 
time, rather than as embedded in shared matters of pressing temporal concern for everyday life. 
The  dissertation  closes  with  a  reflection  upon  a  recurrent,  recursive  conversation  among 
rhetorical theorists over the past 40 years on the methods, objects and aims of rhetorical theory. I 
iv
suggest that a re-orientation toward things in their concrete, material relation to everyday life 
offers a stronger foundation for the study of rhetoric looking into the future.
v
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PREFACE
While fiddling with some final lingering edits, I was searching the Internet for the citation of a 
quotation  from Heidegger  and stumbled upon a marvelous  bit  of ephemera.  A question was 
posed to Yahoo! Answers, a tried and true source for grammatically,  logically,  ethically and 
aesthetically  raw  and  uncut  public  inquiry.  Questions,  from the  surprisingly  existential  and 
moving (“How Can I Get Taller?”)1  to the Dadaist  (“I have a Sun in Leo moon in pisces and 
cancer  rising  describe  my personality  please  !!?”)2 solicit  answers  that  themselves  span  the 
enlightened and the deeply dubious. “Jamie’s” question, however, was a beautifully absurd gem: 
“Is the past, present and future happening all at once?”3 The basic gist of the following 300 pages 
is “yes.”
In the work that follows, I argue that things do not simply exist in isolation—they arise in 
the course of doing. This dissertation is no different. I have received a great deal of support, 
1 From “Yawn” (“How Can I Get Taller?” errors in original): 
im a 14 year old girl, and im 5'7ish i really want to be tall, to help me be a goaly, and I have 
trouble with kids at school, and well no one will think of hurting me as long as im taller 
my mom is 5' 4 and 3 quarters my father is 6'5 or taller 
I really just want to be tall
2  The substance of “Cheryl’s” question was brief (“My sun is in Leo…”): “My birthday is August 16th”
3 “Jaime” is more interested in whether or not the simultaneity of past, present and future would explain déjà vu and 
pre-cognition: 
An interesting idea to think about...what if it is? 
"time is eternally present, that is, that past, present and future are all happening together in some 
way" -the person who wrote about this [J.W. Dunne, An Experiment with Time], claims that this is 
why we have deja vu, its a weird way of thinking about time... 
Dunne believes there is a particular individual experience of time and an enlarged objective time, and that 
humans can access this time in pre-cognitive dreaming, which sadly is not the position this dissertation 
defends.
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inspiration and friendship through the course of writing,  at  both the University of Pittsburgh 
where I studied and the University of Rhode Island where I worked.
We begin with what came before. First must go to my parents, because they have put up 
with me for far longer than anyone else, and sometimes did so beyond all rhyme and reason. To 
my father John Morrison, who always encouraged my stubborn woolly studiousness, even when 
this  daughter  of  a  psychologist  became a wild-eyed humanist,  and beamed when a new Dr. 
Morrison joined the family. To my mother C. Denise Dinnen, who taught me to accept nothing 
but the very best I could do or be, and to demand the best from others. I also want to thank my 
excellent  friends  and  mentors  at  James  Madison  University,  particularly  Roger  Hall,  who 
brought  out my creativity as a  playwright,  Andrew Cohen who demanded rigor as a  radical 
economist.  Michelle Lancaster was both my devastatingly talented debate partner and closest 
friend. And thanks most of all to Peter K. Bsumek, in whose footsteps I proudly followed. I 
would like to extend my gratitude to the entire intercollegiate debate community, who became 
my family over the course of four years (and another three years while coaching), and who are 
(fortunately for me) so numerous that I do not have room to list names. A collective thank you 
must suffice.
Next, deep thanks to my teachers and friends at the University of Pittsburgh Department 
of Communication. I was lucky to be surrounded by brilliant young scholars for five years at the 
University of Pittsburgh, and many of the arguments to come were first seeds planted during 
conversations  in  long van rides  and over  beers.  Thanks to  the  fellow debate coaches  of  the 
William Pitt  Debating  Union,  who taught  me  how to  bring  concepts  and theories  from our 
classes to life in the context of contemporary political and social argument and deliberation: John 
Rief, Matt Brigham, Brent Saindon, Eric English, Steve Llano, Carly Woods, Damien Pfister,  
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Kelly Congdon, as well as the folks who came before my time as an assistant coach: Marcus 
Paroske, Eli Brennan, Ron von Burg, Marci Halpin. In addition, thank you to my friends and 
peers  whose  thought  and  style  influenced  my  own,  in  particular,  Michael  Vacaro,  Michele 
Kennerly, Hugh Curnutt, Carlton Gholtz, and Paul Johnson.
I have also been gifted with incredibly thoughtful teachers. If I have an ounce of Gordon 
R.  Mitchell’s  analytic  ability,  John  Lyne’s  ecumenical  pragmatism,  James  E.  McGuire’s 
erudition, William Fusfield’s empassioned critique, Joan Leach’s elegant balance of breadth and 
depth,  Henry  Krips’  intellectual  adventurousness,  or  Peter  Simonson’s  rigorous  sense  of 
academic responsibility, I will count myself lucky. The thought, but most importantly the larger 
pedagogical spirit that courses through this dissertation is, of course, that of John Poulakos, who 
first encouraged me to aspire to be a iconoclast. A big thank you as well to graduate program 
assistants Brandi Spencer McClain and Janet D’Onofrio, whose professional dedication and care 
for the graduate students in navigating the practical side of the university are equally inspiring. 
Finally, I am deeply grateful to outside reader Erik Garrett for his crucial help at the last minute
—it  is  no exaggeration  to  say that  his  joining  of  the  committee  saved the  day,  and he  has 
provided  important  philosophical  insight  to  the  dissertation,  particularly  in  expanding  the 
dissertation’s ethical claims.
A young communication scholar could find no better place to work than the University of 
Rhode Island Department of Communication Studies, and no better  role models and mentors 
than in its faculty. First and foremost, thank you to Lynne Derbyshire, whose fierce advocacy 
and personal support have been invaluable. Kevin McClure consistently went out of his way to 
provided crucial  guidance and feedback for early drafts,  as well  as much-needed advice and 
encouragement. Adam Roth welcomed us into the URI fold and I look up to him as a perfect  
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model of a dynamic and responsible young faculty member. Finally, to Sandy Baker, who keeps 
the office not just running efficiently, but brings friendliness and warmth to the entire department 
community. 
For the past two years, I have been involved in the Beauty Salon, an interdisciplinary 
working  group  on  aesthetics,  producing  both  research  and  community  radio.  Without  my 
collaboration with the Beauty Salon, the following dissertation would simply not exist. To Karen 
de Bruin, who may have the most  beautiful  relation to language I have ever seen; to David 
Howard, who brings beauty to life in literally in the material, in the folds of fabric and sparkle of 
thread; and to Cheryl Foster, who has mastered the full art of academia as a brilliant scholar, 
unparalleled teacher and skillful navigator of the university. To the three of you, I mean thanks in 
its deepest sense. We are never more aware of our being with one another than when we are 
given the gift of life from others, and Karen, David and Cheryl made my life not simply easier or 
better, but more beautiful. They make me wish to run toward the world and take it up. When 
Heidegger talks about such an experience, he calls it graciousness. The greatest gift we can give 
to one another is grace. Thank you, thank you.
Finally,  to Ian Reyes, who proves that time is elastic, because with him ten years has 
passed in a blink of an eye. When Heidegger writes about the human experience, he does not 
write  about  love.  What  a  terrible  mistake.  He  has  missed  the  most  wonderful  temporal 
experience of all.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE RHETORICAL?
The central, driving question this dissertation seeks to answer is: what does it mean to say that 
something is rhetorical? What does it mean to assert that a discourse, a theory, an image has a 
rhetorical  character,  or  way  of  being—a rhetoricity?  Note  that  I  do  not  ask  here  “what  is 
rhetoric,” but rather what the act of taking up a matter  as rhetorical entails. Such an assertion 
lays  claim to a  certain  kind of  being of  the  thing,  implies  a  basic  relationship  between the 
observer and thing observed, and is thus initially a  research question. The implications of the 
answer, however, reach into the most basic modes of human experience and existence. For the 
beings that live together through speaking, the world is present in the word, be that presence 
rhetorical or otherwise. To ask what makes a thing rhetorical, as a subject of inquiry itself, asks 
how this  world is present rhetorically.  Initially,  generally and for the most part,  I  argue, the 
human being encounters the world rhetorically. Thus, the question before us is one of rhetorical 
theory for the practicing rhetorician, but it is also a question of Being4 itself.
The question of the Being of rhetoric unfolds in three directions, following a temporal 
schema of what projects out toward a thing, what comes before, and how it is present. Most 
4 The terms Being, being/s, and Dasein are used through the course of this dissertation in the following contexts. 
First, I follow along with the Heideggerian distinction between ontological Being as the capability-to-be, and ontic 
beings as particularly extant and present. There is a difference, then, between human Being and human beings. I use 
Dasein to refer  specifically to Heidegger’s  conceptualization of Being.  Thus I use Being when referring to the  
ontological act of concerned existence, Dasein when referring to Being as a philosophical concept, and being or 
beings  when  referring  to  specific  instances  or  things.  While  I  do  not  use  Being-There  to  express  Da-Sein’s  
embeddedness in its world because the phrase is compositionally unwieldy, all uses of Being as act and Dasein as  
concept presume inextricable ties between Being and its surrounding situation—Being and its There. In quotations 
where translators have used different formulations (Da-sein, Being-there), I preserve the translator’s style.
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immediately, an ontology of rhetoric is a methodological concern for rhetoricians insofar as it 
guides  the  thinker’s  orientation  outward  toward the  particular  matter  of  concern.  The 
methodological  orientation  is  underpinned  and  authorized  historically  and  practically  by  a 
hermeneutic concern with interpretation—in how the rhetorical has  already been taken up and 
received, which then shapes how “rhetoric” is applied and projected toward the thing. Taken 
together, then, questions of method are fundamentally about a critical engagement with the act of 
interpreting itself, in its rootedness in what comes before, and projection toward what is not yet 
understood. Finally, an ontology of rhetoric asks a theoretical question: how does the rhetorical 
thing  qua rhetorical  function?  We might  ask  versions  of  the  same question  asked by Dilip 
Gaonkar—is it “rhetoric all the way down” (41)? Is an atom rhetorical? An image? A building? 
An event? How is rhetoricity present in the thing?
I  argue  that  rhetoricity  refers  to  a  temporal  relationship  between speaker,  hearer  and 
matter, what Martin Heidegger calls the temporality of everydayness. When we call something 
rhetorical, we mean that the primary, salient aspect of its being, revealed in a meeting of speaker, 
hearer and matter, is that the matter of concern is changeable in shared time and thus could be 
otherwise. It is not by any means revolutionary to say that the study of rhetoric concerns itself 
with speakers, hearers, matters and how they might be changed. I work through Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle in order to make a far stronger argument. When we claim that some-
thing is rhetorical, rhetoricity is not located in the claim but in the thing.5 I take rhetorical study 
5 I use “thing” in the Heideggerian sense. A Heideggerian “thing” is a meeting or gathering place for being in its 
presence—as physicality, as something in use or for the sake of, as its look and its significance—and, as Graham 
Harman (40) points out, in the thing’s absence as backgrounded, seeming, as once-being and no more, or to-come 
and not yet. Bruno Latour similarly uses “thing” to speak to such a collected sense of being: “Gatherings is the 
translation that Heidegger used, to talk about those Things, those sites able to assemble mortals and gods, humans 
and nonhumans” (Latour 13, emphasis in original). Latour then asks, “[w]hat are the various shapes of the 
assemblies that can make sense of all those assemblages” (14, emphases in original)? To a certain extent, this 
dissertation seeks to explain how rhetorical temporality assembles the thing.
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to be directed towards not talk about the thing, or consciousness of the thing, or cognizing of the 
thing but directed toward the thing, specifically, the way the thing is grasped in time. There are 
conditions under which an atom is rhetorical, or perhaps more pointedly, times in which an atom 
is  present rhetorically.  Changeability makes  the purchase of shared speaking upon the world 
insecure. Rhetoricity takes up the thing with an eye toward its escapability, directed at a decision 
that itself may yet change. Rhetoricity forms the moving joint between world and word. It is time 
for rhetoricians to begin taking a more confident grasp upon things.
In the following introductory chapter, I lay out the primary ontological question for the 
dissertation,  and  its  implications  for  rhetorical  study  in  terms  methodology, 
criticism/interpretation, and theory. The methodological concern: what is capable of being called 
rhetorical? The critical concern: what are we capable of revealing about the thing by calling it  
rhetorical?  The theoretical concern: what have we claimed about what the rhetorical “thing” is? 
I then situate my approach to the question of rhetoricity in a period of Martin Heidegger’s early 
work where he turns to Aristotle’s Rhetoric to answer a similar question: what it means to say 
something  is  philosophical?  After  reviewing  the  existing  literature  on  early  Heideggerian 
philosophy of language and its influence on rhetorical theory, I describe the three contributions 
this  dissertation makes to contemporary rhetorical  research. First,  this dissertation provides a 
vital and contemporary reclamation of basic Aristotelian concepts capable of extending beyond 
traditional  speech  or  textual  analysis.  Second,  this  dissertation  outlines  and  substantiates  a 
positive account  of rhetorical  being that avoids the facile  distinction between the fact of the 
matter and its rhetoric. Third, while I extend the scope of rhetorical being in its positive sense, 
this dissertation also delimits rhetoricity as a mode of language—though I posit rhetoricity as the 
original way of Being of speaking, it does not follow that all speaking or all Being is rhetorical.  
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To  conclude  the  chapter,  I  outline  the  larger  work  to  follow,  which  deals  in  turn  with 
Heidegger’s  reappropriation  of  Aristotelian  philosophy of  time,  the  role  of  time  in  defining 
Aristotelian rhetorical ontology, an application of the method in critique of Heidegger’s later 
work, and directions for further rhetorical and philosophical research.
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF THE BEING OF RHETORIC
What does it mean for something to be rhetorical? Addressing rhetoric as an art requires either a 
tacit  or explicit  ontology of rhetoric,  for the same reason our research question becomes an 
ontological question. Each case concerns how to speak about a matter with others in the proper 
way towards a particular end. In the realm of rhetoric, however, the central role of otherwiseness 
in determining the nature of rhetoricity makes the question of propriety much more thorny and a 
grasp upon the thing more difficult to maintain. How to delimit a practice which itself makes no 
distinction between what is and what appears to be? What kind of being can also be otherwise? 
1.1.1 Speaking of things and matters
A cursory glance at the history and philosophy of rhetoric indicates the way a thinker approaches 
the  proper  expression of  matters  to  others  reveals  the thinker’s  larger  projective  ontological 
stance toward the world—the speaker’s comportment toward Being (Hariman 38-9). The Dissoi  
Logoi, for example, illustrates the problem of rhetorical ontology: the matters that we call good 
and bad, just and unjust, or true and false are not different, but the same, and are distinguished 
from one another only according to the differing perspectives and temporal situations from and 
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in  which  these  matters  are  articulated,  brought  forth  for  judgment.  Plato  builds  an  entire 
cosmology from the spoken word. Aristotle seats the rhetorical in the practice of everyday talk. 
Augustine models his word on the Word of God. Kant accuses rhetoricians confusing a serious 
business with a free play of the imagination, while Nietzsche celebrates the same act. Kenneth 
Burke reveals the ephemerality of substance and concretion of the word. With every philosophy 
of rhetoric comes a system of assumptions regarding how matters are to be taken into expression 
in a way that preserves the matter’s proper being.
And yet, rhetoricians shy from speaking of the matter because of course, the matter is 
open—there is  no rhetorical subject matter (what Aristotle calls the  hypokeimenon) because it 
can be  any matter. What  is rhetorical? Speech, symbol, gesture, act, practice, action, decision, 
representation—each  concept  either  points  toward  and  away  from the  world,  or  re-presents 
amalgamations and interpretations in consciousness. Where, in these speakings or thinkings, is 
the matter?  Where is  the thing of which we speak of,  symbolize,  gesture toward,  act  upon, 
practice with, decide over and represent?
 I ask an old question in a new time, both institutionally and intellectually. In the early 
part  of the 21st century,  rhetoricians  resemble their  early sophistic counterparts  as wanderers 
across territories. This is not a disadvantageous position—throughout institutionalized academia 
we find increased interest in interdisciplinarity, and (at least in word) prize thinkers who have 
honed  the  art  of  wandering  afield.  Yet  these  academic  territories  are  delimited  by  tacit 
assumptions regarding the being of their matters of study, assumptions that proscribe the proper 
relationship of the observer to that matter. What perspectives count? What aspects of the matter 
are relevant for concern? 
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1.1.2 Methodological and theoretical challenges posed by things that can be otherwise
In taking on the discourses of law, politics, science and art, one must keep the initial ontological 
question in mind—what it means for something to be rhetorical—to then deal with the following 
methodological concerns: 1) the traditions and ways of seeing the rhetorician brings to bear upon 
the matter, 2) the determination of what is taken in as “rhetorical” and what is limited out, 3) 
what the rhetorical enables us to see that might be otherwise inaccessible to other branches of 
study. These questions themselves are marked by time: what comes before for us, what is taken 
as present, and what is projected outward?
The answers to such methodological questions respond to institutional structures from 
within  an  intellectual  milieu.  So  what  of  our  own time,  then?  Intellectually,  post-structural 
thinkers emphasize plurality of perspective, the contingency of claim, the priority of everyday 
practice  and,  crucially,  the  importance  of  appearance.  But  they  have  been  arguably  less 
successful at explaining the conditions of the possibility for and structures of that appearance, for 
fear  that  any  generalized  and  theoretical  explanation  will  result  in  calcifying,  reifying  and 
essentializing that which is fluid, constructed and multiple. The otherwise remains outside and 
beyond reach, while the is remains unspeakable. 
The rhetorician’s traditional position outside of rigid disciplinary boundaries presents an 
advantage insofar as the rhetorician maintains an ambivalent relation to these boundaries—the 
rhetoricians speaks only of what appears to be the case rather than what is. The limits themselves 
that  constitute  the  borders  between disciplines  loosen hold  and become matters  for  concern 
rather than categorical definitions of the essence of things. We turn back to an old question in 
order to address two pressing contemporary concerns for rhetorical theory: 1) how to substantiate 
and engage with a study that remains agnostic regarding appearance/being and is directed toward 
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that which could be otherwise (the methodological) and 2) how that appearance itself comes into 
being (the theoretical).
The question of the being of rhetoric, of rhetoricity,  parallels Martin Heidegger’s own 
early  investigation  of  philosophy.  The  inquiries  outlined  above,  regarding  methodology  and 
theory, mirror Heidegger’s questions for the philosopher and what it means to engage with the 
world philosophically. Below, I provide a brief summary of the trajectory of Heidegger’s early 
questioning,  and its  engagement  and disengagement  from the rhetorical.  I  then describe this 
dissertation’s  methodological  approach  in  light  of  Heidegger’s  turn  toward  and  away  from 
rhetoric, and its capacity to address the two main challenges facing rhetorical theory’s access to 
things.
1.2 LOCATING THE RHETORICAL TURN IN METHOD
In order to answer the larger question what it means to be rhetorical, I focus on one particular 
attempt to think about the rhetorical as an ontologically distinct mode of speaking. Throughout 
the  1920s,  philosopher  Martin  Heidegger  struggled  to  address  a  similar  question: 
philosophically,  what do we mean when we say something is? Heidegger abided by the neo-
Kantian  command,  “back  to  the  things  themselves,”  but  was  dissatisfied  by  neo-Kantian 
accounts for what these things  are,  or put more precisely,  how  these things are and  how we 
should say they are. Philosophy, he charged, locks up Being within larger theoretical structures 
that themselves remain outside of concrete experience—complex logical systems determining 
truth and falsity, various architectures of consciousness, psychological impulses, gastric juices, a 
list to which we might today add genetic code, neural composition and eons-old evolutionary 
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development.  Heidegger turned to Aristotle order to both articulate a philosophy grounded in 
everyday human experience, and to show how these basic Aristotelian concepts were taken up, 
reinterpreted and ultimately mangled over the intervening 2500 years of Western thought, as 
logos became logic.
1.2.1 The meeting of Heideggerian phenomenology and Aristotle’s Rhetoric
Heidegger lays out a challenge to his fellow philosophers in the middle of Being and Time: “In 
the  end, philosophical  research  must  for once  decide to  ask what  mode  of  being belongs to 
language  in  general”  (BT  155).  For  Heidegger  in  1927,  the  answer  is  clear.  All  speaking 
expresses time, or more specifically,  temporality. Temporality refers to the way in which one 
encounters and expresses that which has come before, that which is, and that which will be, the 
three  basic  possibilities  of  movement  (what  Heidegger  calls  ecstasies)  of  temporal  being. 
Speaking articulates not bare statements but worlds filled with concerns, fears, goals, memories, 
wishes and most importantly, other beings. For Heidegger, the word is the window to the soul; in 
expressing  ourselves  and  hearing  others  in  the  context  of  moving,  changing,  deciding  and 
making, we show how we ourselves are moved—and, thinking along now with Aristotle, we are 
as we are moved to be.   In all  of these ways  of speaking,  we use one word to express the 
presence and existence of the world: Being. Yet, as the Stranger first observes in Plato’s Sophist, 
we think so little about the word Being, what it conceals and reveals, and when we do our former 
certainty gives way to confusion (244). Aristotle, too, worries about what we call “being.” As he 
writes in the Physics, being is said in many ways. When we say that language is, what way of 
being do we mean?
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Heidegger responds that the mode of being belonging to language in general is not locked 
up in consciousness or tied to grammatical constructions. The mode of being of language in 
general lies before us in plain sight, in everyday talk and its expression of temporality. Prior to 
theories of consciousness or linguistic structures, there is still the basic sort of speaking that one 
engages  in  with  others  about  the  shared  world.  This  basic  mode  of  being  of  language  is 
contingent, partial, public, and is not contained in a single word, but in a meeting of speaker, 
hearer and matter taking place in the flux of everyday life. Heidegger contends that any attempt 
to understand how human beings constitute the world in language must initiate in the everyday. 
After  issuing  the  challenge  to  philosophers  to  articulate  the  mode  of  being  of  language  in 
general, Heidegger turns to everydayness: “taking as our guideline a fundamental kind of being 
belonging  to  discourse,  in  connection  with  other  phenomena,  we  shall  try  to  bring  the 
everydayness of Dasein into view in a way that is ontologically more primordial” (BT 156). We 
shall do the same.
There is something Heidegger does not say in  Being and Time regarding the being of 
everyday speaking. He does not say that there exists already a theory of speaking drawn directly 
from the everyday upon which Heidegger has built is revolutionary phenomenology. No matter. 
He said it three years prior, in the summer-semester 1924 graduate lecture Basic Concepts of  
Aristotelian Philosophy, the text I use as a guide to build an ontology of rhetoric. “Rhetoric is  
nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there [Dasein], the hermeneutic of being-
there itself” (BCArP 77, emphasis  in  original).  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric,  by drawing a theory of 
speaking from out of the everyday, shows “how being-there itself speaks” (BCArP 76). What is 
of  significance  for  rhetorical  ontology  is  not  the  word  on  its  own,  but  how that  word  has 
expressed fundamental Being in a world full of times, beings, doings, matters and things.
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Heidegger’s emphasis on the initial rhetorical nature of language does not last long. In 
Being and Time, the core concepts Heidegger pulls out of Aristotle’s  Rhetoric are still operant 
(pathos as  disposition  or  mood,  ethos as  comportment,  logos as  speaking),  but  he  rarely 
explicitly  acknowledges  their  source.  During  his  final  lecture  course  before  resigning  the 
rectorship of Freiburg University in 1934, Heidegger looks back his challenge to philosophy in 
Being and Time and definitively rejects his prior focus on the speaking of everydayness in favor 
of the silence awaiting speech: 
I  pass decisively beyond what  is  said in Being and Time,  §34, page 164 and 
following. There, language was indeed brought into an essential relationship with 
keeping silent;  the starting point  for a sufficiently  originary conception of the 
essence of  language6 was  also laid down, in  opposition to  the "philosophy of 
language" that has reigned until now. And yet I did not see what really has to 
follow from this starting point: keeping silent is not just an ultimate possibility of 
discourse, but discourse and language arise from keeping silent. In recent years, I 
have gone back over these relationships and worked them through. This obviously 
cannot be explained here  (OET 86-87). 
Heidegger hazards an explanation in the lecture directly following his resignation. In  Logic as 
the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, Heidegger maintains the basic structure of 
language worked out in BCArP and continues to forefront the role of temporality in texturing 
and motivating the human encounter with the world. The temporal origin of language, however, 
is no longer in the rhetorical speaking of the everyday, but in the poetic speaking of a people:
The essence of language announces itself, not where it is misused and leveled, 
distorted, and forced into a means of communication, and sunken down into mere 
expression  of  a  so-called  interior.  The  essence  of  language  essences  where  it 
happens as world-forming power, that is, where it in advance performs and brings 
into jointure the being of beings. The original language is the language of poetry 
(LQCEL 140).
The rhetorical has been written out for the final time, no longer the joint between Being and 
beings. From this point forward, rhetoric’s role in Heidegger’s work is only as an occasional foil 
6 The “originary conception of the essence of language” to which Heidegger refers is the speaking of everydayness.
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against poetry and philosophy, where its capacity to knit together a public is not world forming 
but de-forming and fallen—merely a means of communication.  By the 1944 lecture Introduction 
to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing,7 the origin of language is fixed wholly on Heidegger’s 
particular configuration of the poetic. 
The change in Heidegger’s thinking is not a sudden rupture, but rather a gradual rift that 
opens up along faults already apparent in Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. Heidegger 
makes a clear distinction between everydayness and philosophy:  “Everydayness leaps over and 
so back into itself, not philosophically out from itself” (BCArP 247).  Philosophy must account 
for the everyday in order to fully extricate itself from the uninterrogated assumptions of everyday 
speaking. Only then can one move from a rhetorical, doxastic speaking that remains steadfastly 
agnostic regarding the difference between being and appearing to a philosophical speaking that 
deals with truth, aletheia. “Only in contrast to this average way of speaking (λέγειν τι κατά τινος 
[speaking of matters of concern,  or more literally “speaking about things”]),  can the ξις asἕ  
ληθε ειν  [existing  as  truthful]  assert  itself”  (ἀ ὑ BCArP 192,  bracketed  material  added).  As  a 
philosopher, Heidegger leaps out of the everyday and does not return.
There  is  a  second  significance  here,  one  often  missed  by  contemporary  critics  of 
Heideggerian philosophy. The prevailing criticism of Heidegger’s work is that, in his search for 
origins, Heidegger oversimplifies the vast differences and indeterminacies of Being. I think this 
critique misses the mark, because it misunderstands Heidegger’s goal. Heidegger’s focus, from 
the 1920s onward, is on determining the proper ethos of the philosopher, the comportment one 
must  maintain  to  think  in  what  he  considers  a  “genuine”  or  “authentic”  manner.  This 
comportment is not exclusive with others—indeed, even the greatest philosophers live their lives 
7 Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing was the final lecture Heidegger gave before the end of World 
War II, at which point he was banned from teaching for five years as a part of Allied de-Nazification efforts.
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generally  and  for  the  most  part  in  everydayness.  The  philosopher  and  the  rhetorician  take 
different stances toward the world as it is brought forth in language. 
And yet, Heidegger himself expands what should otherwise be a fairly limited boundary 
as his thinking develops. In IPTP, Heidegger interprets the human being now as the  thinking 
rather than speaking being (5). He argues that only if all human beings are thinkers—are, in their 
essence, philosophers—could we be concerned with distinguishing ourselves as thinkers or as 
those failing to think. All human beings are philosophers, and should use philosophical thinking 
as a way to enrich concerned everydayness. However, as I argue throughout this dissertation, 
Heidegger  is  unable  to  formulate  such an understanding of  philosophical  ethos without  first 
establishing the rhetorical—for it is in the rhetorical that  ethos, one’s basic stance toward the 
world in speaking to others, is itself taken as a matter of concern. Using Aristotle’s  Rhetoric, 
Heidegger is first able to see speaking as a  problem that he will spend the rest of his career 
attempting to solve.
Written  out,  the  rhetorical  yet  remains.  Later  Heidegger  is  still  concerned  with  the 
relationship between speaker, hearer and matter, and how they emerge in time. He still attends to 
how matters come to matter to us as we speak to one another, or said another way, “how being 
becomes appropriate to the human” (IPTP 11). We can see the importance of rhetoric in relation 
to Heidegger’s critical interpretive process of Destruktion. “Phenomenological Interpretations in 
Connection  with  Aristotle:  An  Indication  of  the  Hermeneutic  Situation,”  the  speculative 
introductory chapter for Heidegger’s unfinished book on Aristotle written in 1922, describes the 
process of Destruktion. Heidegger argues that any theoretical framework must start in a critical 
mode, calling into question previous assumptions or interpretations. He writes,
Accordingly,  insofar  as  the  phenomenological  hermeneutics  of  facticity 
endeavors,  in  its  interpretation,  to  play  its  part  in  helping  the  contemporary 
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situation with the possibility of its being appropriated in a radical manner, doing 
this by calling attention to concrete categories and allowing them to be given in 
advance, it sees itself directed to the task of loosening up the reigning state of 
traditional  interpretation  today  with  respect  to  its  hidden  motives  and  its 
unexpressed tendencies  and modes  of  interpreting  so that  it  can,  by way of a 
deconstructive regress, penetrate into the original motivational sources of these 
explications. Hermeneutics carries out its tasks only on the path of destruction 
(PICA 124).
Two years later, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides Heidegger with the hermeneutic stance capable of 
“loosening  up”  the  everyday  in  order  to  reach  the  origins  of  philosophy  that  stand  before 
“philosophy”  as  such:  the conditions  of  the possibility  for  philosophy.  These conditions  are 
contained in how the matter has come before both speaker and hearer, in how the speaker stands 
toward the matter and hearer, and in thinking about and articulating the matter with others; the 
terms are  pathos, ethos and  logos.  Destruktion follows the philosophical  concept back to its 
source in rhetorical speaking, loosening traditional interpretation, in order to clear a space from 
which the philosopher then leaps.
1.2.2 Phenomenology, hermeneutics and method
This dissertation is written from a phenomenological hermeneutic perspective. In establishing the 
need  of  an  ontology  of  rhetoric  for  contemporary  rhetorical  theory,  I  isolated  two  main 
challenges: first, that rhetoricians require a way to substantiate that which is in appearance, and 
second,  that  rhetoricians  then  need  tools  for  interpreting  these  appearances.  By 
phenomenological, I mean that my focus is on how positions, decisions and perspectives arise 
from their fundamental ground in human engagement and undertaking with the world.8 In the 
8 The reader would be right to infer that my phenomenological perspective is distinctly humanist. Because my 
interest is directed toward speaking as a human act, my interpretation is humanistic. I do not deny that other beings 
have distinct ways of Being, but these are ways of being we would not be able to express in dissertations. A rock has 
a Being all its own—and we will never be able to write books about that Being. I am comfortable allowing other 
beings to Be as they are and speaking of Being as it is for me as a being. I take Heidegger’s own later rejection of 
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terms  of  the  first  concern,  I  use  a  phenomenological  vocabulary  to  be  able  to  talk  about 
appearance without juxtaposing that appearance against “real being.” For example, to say,  as 
Aristotle  does,  that  rhetoric’s  business  is  with  appearance  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
appearance is divorced from being. For the phenomenologist, beings must be approached as they 
appear, rather than start out with an initial abstraction.  In terms of the second concern, I use a 
hermeneutic perspective to work from appearance back to the way in which that appearance 
emerges. Again, to say that rhetoric is concerned with appearance is to say that the rhetorical 
deals with the initial constituent elements of appearing. Thus, I am interested in the way that 
matters of concern are made present in shared time in ethos, pathos and logos.
I look to the phenomenological tradition to address rhetoricity as appearance. In other 
words, I begin with the spoken and work back to the situation from which that speaking comes, 
in  order  to  investigate  the  conditions  and  horizons  of  possibility  for  the  occurrence  of  the 
phenomenon.  Conditions  of  possibility  opens  up  possibility  as  possibility—they  provide  the 
initial ground upon which we confront open-endedness in our encounter with the past, present 
and future. The hermeneutic approach then defines and delimits those possibilities within a fully 
present and inter-implicated world already underway. The phenomenologist does not isolate a 
particular characteristic or aspect of a given being but approaches it within its situation (or, in the 
terms I will use in chapters three, four and five, the thing within its matter), understanding that it 
is  the situation  which lays  out  the concrete  possibilities  of action  and being—and calls  this 
presence the phainomenon, appearance.
We can then think of the hermeneutic moment as that which allows us to begin asking 
how a thing comes to be as it is without application of a strict external account of causality. In 
other words, the hermeneutic loosens up the spoken and unspoken assumptions about our world, 
humanism  (LOH 239) to be of a piece with his rejection of speaking as the seat of Being.
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and demands that those assumptions be explained. Thus, the hermeneutic provides us with a way 
to speak to the conditions of possibility for a phenomenon. I work from this perspective using 
two basic animating principles. First, world and word are difficult to untie from one another, but 
are not reducible to one another. The concern for interpretation is precisely the interrelation—
and ultimately the irreconcilable distance—between the word in its world. Were we able to infer 
a transparent, unproblematic relation between the word and world, interpretation as an activity 
would be unnecessary. Second, phenomenologically, I take each aspect of the basic state of all 
speaking to be incapable of isolation into separate parts because each component of the basic 
phenomenon of speaking are required for the appearance to take place. In rhetorical being, there 
is no  ethos, pathos or  logos,  no comportment, disposition or speaking, and no future, past or 
present alone. In response to the curious questioner in the preface, wondering if past, present and 
future are happening all at once, the answer again is yes. We cannot understand appearance in its 
full  phenomenon  if  we  immediately  break  the  phenomenon  into  only  artificially-isolatable 
components. One cannot reach into what a thing is by first defining it as it is not.  
I  build  my  particular  phenomenological  hermeneutic  from  Heidegger’s  early 
interpretations  of  Aristotle.  By early  interpretations,  I  mean  those  from his  initial  scholarly 
writings to the end of his time at Marburg University in 1929, including the publication of Being 
and Time and the immediately preceding lectures. I do not, however, share Heidegger’s own 
position on the ultimate aims of speaking. Heidegger engages with rhetoric in order to renew 
philosophy. His ethos—his comportment or perspective—aims at drawing itself out of rhetoric, 
in both the sense that the rhetorical saying comes first, and that it is left behind. The rhetorical, in 
other words, is present to Heidegger as something to be overcome, even if only for a moment, in 
order to get on the way to philosophy. My ethos is as one who is concerned with appearances. I 
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undertake an ontological project not to strengthen my grasp on “what is?” for the sake of itself,  
but to return better able to articulate “what is here, now?” On this Heidegger and I agree: the 
rhetorical must return to itself—we differ on whether or not that return is a bad thing. Thus, my 
reading of  Aristotle,  at  key moments  in  both the  Physics (covered  in  chapter  two),  and the 
Rhetoric (covered  in  chapters  three,  four and  five)  will  diverge  from  Heidegger’s  own, 
particularly  over  the  role  of  publicness  in  both  time  and  speaking.  My  Aristotle,  as  a 
consequence, is certainly Heideggerian-inflected, but it is not to be confused with Heidegger’s 
Aristotle.
The  following  dissertation  is  written  by  a  rhetorician,  not  a  philosopher,  and  as  a 
rhetorician  returns  rather  than  leaping  out,  it  seeks  to  return  Heideggerian  thinking  to  the 
everyday. Specifically, this dissertation aims to accomplish three main goals: 1) to elucidate the 
Aristotelian rhetorical foundation of early Heideggerian phenomenology, 2) to rebuild a theory 
of rhetorical ontology from this foundation that does not abandon the contingent, incomplete, 
changing  and  public  everyday  for  an  unchanging  philosophy of  being,  and  3)  to  provide  a 
rhetorical  Destruktion of  Heidegger’s  own  later  philosophy,  specifically,  the  “Dialogue  on 
Language,” in order to reveal the rhetorical ground that precedes even a poetic philosophy of 
language. In the following section, I will discuss the state of current scholarship on Heidegger 
and rhetoric and the threefold contribution of this analysis to existing scholarship. 
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1.3 WHAT REMAINS UNSAID: A REVIEW OF HEIDEGGERIAN RHETORICAL 
RESEARCH
After Heidegger received international acclaim for Being and Time, his subsequent works were 
quickly taken up and widely published. The record of his earlier thought, however, remained 
mostly obscure.  In the first  place,  there was less scholarly interest  in this  formative but not 
definitive period in Heidegger’s philosophical thinking. In the second, until  Being and Time in 
1927, Heidegger published nothing. The vast majority of work from this period was not in the 
form of proper manuscripts for publication, but rather lecture notes of varying completion that 
presented  a  challenge  to  editors.  The  official  collection  of  Heidegger’s  work,  the 
Gesamtausgabe,  required  editors  to  carefully  align  Heidegger’s  notes  with  extant  student 
transcripts of courses in order to reconstruct the content of the lecture as faithfully as possible.
The  editorial  problems  with  Gesamtausgabe Band  18,  SS  1924:  Grundbegriffe  der  
aristotelischen Philosophie, were particularly acute. For decades, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian  
Philosophy existed as little more than rumor evidenced by fragmented, incomplete notes hidden 
away in  various  historical  collections.  The  provisional  publication  title  used  in  the  Vittorio 
Klostermann Gesamtausgabe catalogue until 1991 was enough to drive a curious and impatient 
rhetorician  to  madness:  “Aristotle:  Rhetoric”  (BCArP  273),9 constantly  promised  but 
undelivered.  Gesamtausgabe editors  were  struggling  with  a  thorny  problem:  Heidegger’s 
handwritten manuscripts  for the course had a gaping,  Rhetoric-shaped hole in them.10 In the 
9 Reportedly, this is how Karl Löwith, a student in the course at the time, titled his notes for the lecture (BCArP 
273).
10 To be specific, the manuscript contains varying amounts of material for each section up through §9, is missing 
§10-22, and picks up again at §23 to the end in §28. The missing sections cover the transition from Heidegger’s 
treatment of the Nicomachean Ethics and the entirety of his reading of the Rhetoric, picking back up with 
Heidegger’s closing theorization of indigenous concept formation, drawing mainly from the Categories. In §§10-12, 
Heidegger first links conceptuality to the everyday speaking of desirous, political, thinking beings. These sections 
prepare the way for a pivot to the Rhetoric in §§13-22. The missing material contains roughly two-thirds of the 
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delicate phrasing of the editors afterward, “there is only the beginning and concluding parts [of 
the lecture manuscript], which together make up something like a third of the whole,” and of the 
disappearance, “Heidegger himself could not clarify the whereabouts of the missing parts of the 
manuscript during the preparatory work for the editing of the Gesamtausgabe” (BCArP 273-4). 
Having  prepared  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  manuscript,  editors  searched  for  the 
missing portion to complete the volume, but to no avail.  They were left with a gutted work. 
While efforts to locate the section failed, copies of student transcripts of the lecture eventually 
resurfaced. When editors compared these transcripts to the original manuscript, however, they 
found that the spoken lecture differed significantly from the written notes in both content and 
scope. The editors made a major decision to treat BCArP as a special case—rather than patch the 
manuscript’s  gaping hole with transcribed material,  they would compile  a master  text of the 
lecture from three mostly-complete student transcripts, and include what was left of Heidegger’s 
own manuscript as a stand-alone piece in the volume directly following the lecture. The final 
edition was published in German in 2002, followed by Metcalfe and Tanzer’s English translation 
in 2010.
We can call Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy an unauthorized text. In the legal 
sense, the lecture as it now stands was not the entry that Heidegger oversaw, and if the suspicion 
that he destroyed the notes himself is true,11 Heidegger’s reading of the Rhetoric was not meant 
lecture’s content. 
11 In The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, John van Buren writes that the entire lecture on 
“Aristoteles, Rhetorik, II” was one of several missing manuscripts “apparently destroyed at one time or another by 
Heidegger’s own hand” (15).  Following Gayatri Spivak’s use of the phrase, van Buren calls the Marburg period a 
“dangerous supplement” to the Heideggerian corpus that wrests control over interpretation from Heidegger to his 
readers (and hearers—his students). Why is the supplement so dangerous? The line of argument will be developed 
throughout chapters two, three and four, but the upshot is: Heidegger frequently acknowledges changes in his line of 
thinking. Why in this case would he destroy the evidence and remain silent? I contend that Heidegger’s excision of 
rhetoric punches a hole in his phenomenological account of language that his later poetic ontology cannot fill. The 
argumentation in §§ 10-22 isn’t simply wrong—errors can be corrected—it is dangerous. The poetic turn is 
incapable of answering the question animating BCArP: How does the everydayness of thinking, desiring, political 
beings itself come to be? If, as van Buren (echoing Derrida) says, that supplements to an extent supplant the initial 
interpretation of a work or corpus, the danger is in unearthing the rhetorical Heidegger. 
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to see the light of day. It is unauthorized in another, more literal, sense. What one encounters in 
BCArP is an account  produced by the hearer that is free to move beyond the scant trace of 
written notes. The lecture and its manuscript then are positioned in dialogue with one another. 
In following review of scholarly literature, I move from the more specific to the more 
general.  I  will  first  discuss  the  scholarship  surrounding  the  lecture,  then  Heideggerian-
Aristotelian  theories  of  rhetoric,  and  finally  rhetorical  ontologies.  When  dealing  with  the 
intersection of rhetoric, Heidegger and Aristotle, I will follow this same sense of dialogue by 
placing  special  emphasis  on  reconsidering  these  works  in  the  light  of  Basic  Concepts  of  
Aristotelian Philosophy. I will begin by looking at the limited scholarship on the lecture itself, 
then  expand  to  a  larger  discussion  of  attempts  to  articulate  a  Heideggerian  rhetoric  from 
Heidegger’s  philosophy  of  language  and  close  with  a  discussion  of  the  dissertation’s 
contributions  to  broader  formulations  of  rhetorical  ontology  while  addressing  critiques  of 
Heideggerian philosophy.
1.3.1 Heideggerian rhetorics
Commentators  approach  BCArP  in  one  of  two  ways:  as  part  of  a  historical  account  of 
Heidegger’s  intellectual  development  (either  as  a  particular  phase  or  as  the  foundation  for 
Heidegger’s  later  work)  or  in  application  of  early  Heideggerian  insight  to  contemporary 
philosophy and rhetorical theory. In his exhaustive study The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and  
Time,  Theodore  Kisiel  describes  BCArP  as  a  sort  of  crescendo  for  Heidegger’s  work  on 
Aristotle, “provid[ing] us with perhaps the best glimpse into how that book on Aristotle [the 
foundation  for  Being  and  Time]  might  have  looked”  (Kisiel  292).  Arguing  that  Heidegger 
approaches  Aristotle’s  practical  philosophy as an ontology of human Dasein,  Walter  Brogan 
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(188) concludes with a call for further research on BCArP. Brogan’s invitation is well-chosen—
in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Twofold of Being, Brogan argues for further investigation of the 
lecture in order to better grasp the way in which speaking in time binds together the two-fold of 
Being  and  beings.  Stuart  Elden  (“Reading  Logos”  209-210;  Speaking  Against  Number   18  ) 
contends that three types of politics emerge from Heidegger’s work on language, and describes 
Heidegger’s rhetorical politics as opening up the question of how we are to be-together, but does 
not  answer  it  rhetorically—instead  he  turns  to  language  as  polemic  and  poetic  to  avoid 
calculative thinking.
In the vein of contemporary rhetorical theory, Allen Scult made an early attempt to build 
a Heideggerian theory of rhetoric from BCArP, using Walter Bröcker’s student transcripts. In 
“Aristotle’s  Rhetoric  as  Ontology:  A Heideggerian  Reading,”  Scult  argues  that  Heidegger’s 
contribution to rhetoric is to direct attention to moodedness, and how “‘[t]he available means of 
persuasion’  hold  for  us  the  possibilities  for  action  with  others  in  the  particular  case.  Those 
possibilities are ‘given’ to us with mood, along with the different ways of reading/interpreting 
our moods in the words of an appropriate response” (“Ontology” 156). Scult notes that BCArP 
also holds insight for philosophy as a study of how people knit together the rhetorical fragments 
around them, and what the process of this knitting-together tells us about Being. 
Heidegger’s  use  of  everydayness  has  drawn  several  rhetorical  scholars  to  his  work, 
though as I argue in chapter two, the ontological  implications  of everydayness  for rhetorical 
theory remain under-theorized. Expanding upon Eric Ramsey’s call, Susan Zickmund (413-414) 
turns to the early Heidegger to shift scholarly emphasis away from “authenticity” back toward 
everydayness as determinative of Dasein. Daniel Gross and Ansgar Kemmann’s edited collection 
of essays  Heidegger and Rhetoric is invaluable, both as a work of intellectual history and as 
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resource for further study. Otto Pöggeler’s contribution to that volume, “Heidegger’s Restricted 
Conception  of  Rhetoric,”  contains  an exhortation  to  this  project  at  hand:  while  Heidegger’s 
contribution to finding a common center  of human being is  invaluable,  his  attempt to do so 
“exhausts neither rhetoric’s tradition nor its future possibilities” (172). 
P. Christopher Smith’s The Hermeneutics of Original Argument is a particularly striking 
example  of  Heideggerian  philosophy  enriched  by  rhetoric’s  tradition  and  possibility,  and 
provides a model for this dissertation’s hermeneutic approach. Smith follows the Aristotelian, 
rhetorically-minded Heidegger of BCArP to reveal the rhetorical origins of demonstration and 
dialectic  in Aristotle and Plato,  advancing Heidegger’s early path.  As Smith argues, the turn 
from speaking about things to endless talking about talking is no new or unique development: 
this  devolution  of  argument  is  in  fact  not  just  a  modern  or  postmodern 
phenomenon; rather, like the ‘metaphysics’ that condition modernity and, quite 
possibly, postmodernity too, is something that began with the Greeks’ abstraction 
from original argument and that, in some ways at least, was already consummated 
by them (Smith 6).
For Smith, the rhetorical “original argument” is the speaking that deals with contingency and is 
marked by the temporality of everydayness, which then gives rise to procedural systems of logic. 
Smith approaches rhetoric, then, with an eye towards its spoken temporality, which Smith then 
contrasts against the literary temporality of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction. 
Finally, in the work of Daniel Gross we can see most clearly a prospective direction for 
rhetorical ontology. In “Being-Moved: The Pathos of Heidegger’s Rhetorical Ontology,” Gross 
formulates  a rhetorical  ontology of  pathos—what it  means to say that  pathos is  rhetorical—
rooted  in  BCArP.  Gross  argues  that  Aristotle’s  treatment  of  pathos draws  Heidegger  to 
understand Dasein not as the Cartesian organizer of the world, but that which is moved in the 
world through concerned engagement. As Gross argues, Heidegger “thus relocates rhetoric at  
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the heart of his fundamental ontology” (“Being-Moved” 4). Gross then puts this understanding to 
work in his book  The Secret History of Emotion. Gross begins by laying out an Aristotelian 
conception of pathos as a social articulation of a network of concrete and variable commitments 
of  people  to  one  another  and  their  surrounding  world  (Secret  History   41 ).  Gross  uses  the 
Aristotelian  (by way of  Heidegger)  conception  to  then map out  the networks  of  power  and 
investment manifest in different post-Aristotelian theorizations of emotion. 
I want to note how Gross’s use of the early Heidegger provides a crucial corrective to 
later Heideggerian conceptions of moodedness. In the later years, Heidegger is interested only in 
Dasein’s ownmost potential, as separate from its being in the everyday. Thus the discussion of 
mood  becomes  less  and less  connected  to  the  social  and material.  By maintaining  the  vital 
connection between Aristotle’s rhetoric and Heidegger’s phenomenology, Gross is able to show 
how our expression of being-moved illuminates a concrete and historical social  order, where 
some find sympathy and others scorn.
Prior  to  the  widespread  availability  of  Basic  Concepts  of  Aristotelian  Philosophy, 
rhetorical scholars drew together theoretical insights from Heidegger’s expanded body of work, 
with an emphasis most  strongly on the prominent  role of  pathos in  Being and Time. Lenore 
Langsdorf,  for  example,  reconfigures  the  post-structural  sense  of  self  from within  rhetorical 
dwelling, as both constituted by and constituting engaged social practice (“Words of Others” 43-
44; “Why Phenomenology?” 7).
The work of Michael Hyde and Craig R. Smith has arguably contributed the most to build 
a  Heideggerian  rhetorical  vocabulary.  I  want  to  take  time  here  to  illustrate  the  possible 
applications of a Heideggerian rhetoric, but also to flag an important distinction between my 
interpretation and that of Hyde and Smith. Hyde and Smith’s  “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A 
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Seen  but  Unobserved  Relationship”  may  be  the  earliest  comprehensive  articulation  of  a 
Heideggerian rhetorical theory. Hyde and Smith suggest that rhetoric lies at the source of all acts 
of  interpretation  (including  one’s  self-interpretation),  locating  “rhetoric  at  a  crucial  place  in 
ontology and epistemology.  Once this placement  is accepted,  rhetoric becomes an existential 
structure, a defining characteristic, and a determinant of the individual’s consciousness” (363). 
Hyde has since brought this rhetorical-hermeneutic perspective to bear on ethical action, asking 
how one comes to acknowledge or disacknowledge the presence of the Other (Lifegiving Gift  
xiv; “Rhetorically We Dwell” xx). 
Hyde’s 1991 essay (later expanded in book length) “The Call of Conscience: Heidegger 
and the Question of Rhetoric” addresses the disjoint between Heidegger’s early and late work on 
language and highlights the same problems I  will  discuss in this  dissertation (particularly in 
chapter six). Namely, Hyde shows how Heidegger’s later emphasis upon the speaking or saying 
of language no longer engages with the pressing concern of everydayness “Call of Conscience” 
385). Hyde understands that the differing modes of language (poetic and rhetorical) grasp Being 
in different ways. For Hyde, then, the call of conscience joins the recognition of Dasein’s own 
ability to Be with the particular struggles of everyday Being (Call of Conscience   [book] 26 ). The 
deconstructive,  opening capacity  of  poetic  conscience  meets  the  reconstructive,  practical  but 
circumscribed capacity of rhetoric.
Hyde’s tracing of rhetoricity throughout Being and Time holds up very well in the light of 
BCArP,  particularly  in  its  treatment  of  pathos.  Hyde’s  attention  is  drawn  to  pathos, 
understandably given that Heidegger is most explicit about the concept’s origin in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, and to ethos as a question of consciousness of/conscientiousness towards others in the 
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world.12 The influence of rhetorical ethos as comportment rather than consciousness and logos as 
standing  in  for  the  matter  are  more  obscure.  Like  Hyde,  I  am  concerned  about  possible 
difficulties reconciling the Being of a thing taken poetically and a thing taken rhetorically (we 
may also add to this list a thing taken religiously). As previously discussed, Heidegger’s thinking 
on language undergoes a slow but decisive change throughout his career. A synthesis would graft 
the early rhetorical Heidegger, who presumes that the essence of human being is in speaking, 
onto the later poetic Heidegger, who contends that the same essence is in silence. 
Hyde  concludes  the  essay  “The  Call  of  Conscience”  with  a  recognition  that,  even 
charitably interpreted, Heidegger’s later philosophy offers no clear standing for Others (390). My 
concern is slightly different. I think that the Being of things taken rhetorically and the Being of 
things taken poetically are substantially different in their Being. Here is the rub. Hyde has the 
right of both the similarities and differences between rhetorical and poetic speaking, but not what 
they  speak  of.  It  is  not  so  much  the  orientation  toward  the  Other  (or  Others)  that  I  find 
problematic as it is the orientation toward the thing (and through engagement with the thing, the 
extent to which one  recognizes a claim of the Other upon the thing in shared time). In other 
words, who matters depends on the matter at hand. Heidegger maintains the implicitly rhetorical 
structure of speaking throughout his work, while swapping rhetoric out for poetry as the initial 
origin of language, that out of which the thing comes to be in speaking. It is a substitution rather 
than an addition. This is why Hyde sees the poetic impulse as initializing (it is…we are…), and 
rhetoric as returning (thus, we do…), when in BCArP rhetoric is positioned as  initializing and 
then returning to itself. Seating Being in a place outside of the everyday, beyond our region of 
concern, may become possible as a consequence of developing other ways of orienting toward 
12 In Being and Time’s discussion of the pathe, Heidegger argues that the Rhetoric “provides the first systematic 
hermeneutic of everydayness” (130), partially echoing “the hermeneutic of Being-there itself” in BCArP (75).
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the world in order to ask questions that the everyday cannot answer. God, for example, is the 
answer to a question, perhaps the question of why Being and not nothing. The question arises in 
the course of the everyday struggle with existence, when this struggle itself becomes the concern 
for  Being.  Yet  still,  even here,  the  question  itself  initiates  from within  the  everyday  before 
reaching  outward  beyond  it.  The  most  transcendent  of  answers  beyond  the  human  are  still 
answers to questions of human life. It is the rhetorical, not the poetic, which first asks questions 
of is-ness when it addresses that which can be otherwise.
Surely, however, Hyde has full right to do what I myself am doing in this dissertation, 
which is to reconstruct a rhetorical theory using Heideggerian resources while straying from (and 
occasionally  confronting)  the  Official  Line.  In  addition,  I  think  that  a  productive  synthesis 
between poetic, rhetorical and philosophical speaking is certainly possible. The question is what 
significance  does  the  ontological  difference  between  poetic  (and  to  this,  we  can  add 
philosophical and scientific) ways of taking things in speaking have upon who then may claim 
such a thing, and how the claimants may do so.
Calvin  O.  Schrag  has  his  finger  on the  problem.  The rhetorical  and the  poetic  have 
different temporalities—they take up and manifest Being in different ways according to differing 
temporal orientations to the matter and hearer. The problem with the poetic orientation toward 
time is that matters does not press upon one and time is not, from its beginning, shared. What is 
present in the now, in other words, is differently for rhetorical and poetic speaking. Poetic time is 
one’s own, rhetorical time is not entirely one’s own—others lay claim to the same now. The 
latter  is  crucial  for  any form of  responsive  politics,  ethics  or  justice  (Schrag,   Resources  of   
Rationality   156 ). The rhetorical must  precede poetic reconfiguration for there to be any about-
which for one to care.  And the poetic  cannot  turn back to the rhetorical  without becoming-
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otherwise than it is, without opening the secured and protected word up to change and challenge. 
Next, a far simpler argument: we cannot define the poetic as purely projective or the rhetorical as 
purely reconstructive, because the rhetorical is capable of projecting, and the poetic is capable of 
reconstructing. Temporal ecstasies lie fully open to each, but that which lies in them does so 
differently.
Hyde is right to say that speaking should be tied to a “how” of being. This dissertation 
reconfigures that tie, with an emphasis not on the relation between speaker and hearer, but upon 
both to the things that bring speaker and hearer into being as speaking, as hearing about things. 
Both my reading of the Rhetoric in chapters three, four and five, and my critical interpretation of 
Heidegger’s  “Dialogue on Language”  in  chapter  six will  deal  with  the  relationship  between 
rhetorical, philosophical, scientific, and poetic speaking,13 and between an ontology grounded on 
speaking and one grounded on silence. For now, it is enough to say that the figurations of poetic 
speech (from reconfiguration to disfiguration) grow, like philosophical speech, from the ground 
of rhetoric. 
The directions  opened by Smith,  Hyde  and other  Heideggerian  rhetoricians  could  be 
strengthened with an addition of a discussion of things and how they matter in time. Let me give 
an example: In the 1991 piece “Rethinking ‘The Public’: The Role of Emotion in Being-with-
Others,” Smith and Hyde argue (I believe rightly) that Aristotle’s conception of pathos resists the 
Heideggerian tendency to relegate publicness to an inchoate mass. As I will illustrate in chapter 
13 The differences between rhetorical, philosophical and poetic speaking will be explained in greater detail in the 
work that follows, but for the time being the following distinctions should suffice. As I have argued, Heidegger 
merges the poetic and philosophical later in his career, but temporally speaking we can draw a line between the two. 
First, there are differences in the way that temporality of the claim (to what extent it holds), and second the 
expression of being. For the philosophical (and its later variant, the scientific), the claim is non-contradictory and 
being unchanging. For the poetic, the claim is open and the being resolved in disclosure. For the rhetorical, the claim 
is changing and the being possibly otherwise. These modes of speaking are not exhaustive of the different ways of 
relating to things in language (the religious, for example, would be another mode), but are the modes of language 
most directly compared to the rhetorical in both Aristotle and Heidegger’s work.
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four  in  agreement  with  Smith  and  Hyde,  the  pathe form  a  network  of  attachments  both 
temporally and proximally as a public region of concern. These networks, however, shift with 
the  matter of  concern.  Smith and Hyde use as an example Ronald Reagan’s shaming of the 
Soviet  Union over  the shooting-down of  Korean Airliner  Flight  007.  Using an audiotape as 
evidence to prove Soviet denials of involvement false, Smith and Hyde argue that Reagan moved 
“his listeners further along a continuum from indifference to outrage and thereby rally public 
support for what he believed was the proper choice regarding defense spending” (455). What 
particular constellation of the public would be moved by such an event and toward what end? 
Why would such a  public  be moved to include a downed Korean airliner  in their  region of 
concern? To determine  how a public has constituted and who is counted within the public, we 
need to first see what the public has concerned itself with. In other words, who matters depends 
on who the matter matters to, thus we are drawn back to a temporal ontological question: what is 
the matter and how does it matter?
Other  rhetoricians  follow  Heidegger’s  reinterpretation  of  traditionally  Aristotelian 
concepts, for example,  phronesis or practical judgment—a know-how of change, and the mode 
of  action  twinned  to  rhetorical  temporality.  Thomas  B.  Farrell  investigates  the  ontology  of 
rhetoric in relation to phainomena, as that which brings the world to light in specific ways, and 
guides our attempts to take counsel with one another (20). Responding to Norms of Rhetorical  
Culture, Daniel L. Smith (79) suggests that Heidegger seats the positive, constructive power of 
being-with-others  in  the  everyday  inventive  responses  to  the  unexpected  world  guided  by 
phronesis, which are not guided by rule, but occur precisely where the rule has broken, calling us 
to care. Mailloux (“Rhetorical Hermeneutics Once Again,” 458-459) argues that the projective 
dealing  of  phronesis  is  what  Heidegger  ultimately  means  by  “conscience.”  Finally,  Schrag 
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(Communicative  Praxis   214 ;  Resources  of  Rationality   146  )  suggests  that,  in  providing  the 
materials for situated praxis—for engagement in phronesis—rhetoric provides the reconstructive 
space for subjectivity and knowledge, acting as counterpart to Heideggerian deconstruction and 
poesis. 
1.3.2 Heideggerian dissents
Other scholars reapproach Heidegger, but with qualifications. John Durham Peters acknowledges 
that  Heidegger  provides  an  important  contribution  to  the  study  of  communication  as  the 
articulation of Being in the world, but suggests that this contribution still lacks “the full palette of 
colors”  (21).  Heidegger  is  too  concerned  with  the  impossibility  of  fully-understood  and 
transparent communication to care much for its innumerable small successes. Schrag warns that 
poetic dwelling cannot account for the entirety of what he calls the “space of communicative 
praxis” that is contoured by our everyday existence (Communicative Praxis   211  ). Comparing 
Heidegger and Kenneth Burke, Samuel Southwell (42) finds much in the way of similarity, but 
he also argues that there is a wide gulf between Burke and the later Heidegger, particularly over 
whether  or  not  one  might  understand  language  from within  language.  The  later  Heidegger, 
concerned with what language does not say, turns to silence over speaking.
In a more severe dissent, J. E. McGuire and Barbara Tuchanska argue that Heidegger’s 
concern with poesis over praxis overemphasizes individual action and creation at the cost of the 
social—that,  indeed,  “in  Heidegger’s  ontology  there  is  no  autonomous  place  for  the 
sociocultural” at all, and is unfit for interpreting institutionalized socio-cultural discourses, such 
as those of science (70-1). Victor Vitanza charges that Heidegger’s concern with “it is” drives 
him  toward  endless  “negative  essentializing”  (188).  Speaking  can  never  be  fully  authentic 
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because every articulation  of “it  is” is  a simultaneous declaration of what  “is  not.”  Gregory 
Desilet (10) suggests that this blindness to the sociocultural and emphasis on purity of “the is” 
versus “the is not” is driven by the implicit presumption that a transcendent Being lies beyond 
beings. Speaking directly to the distinction between conceptual and poetic modes of language, 
Timothy Crusius (14) contends that Heidegger’s search for the origin of language (contra Burke) 
led him to misunderstand the importance of conceptual thought for practical reason and coping in 
the world.14 Heidegger’s contributions to rhetoric, then, continue to be actively contested.15
The above critiques  are  of  a  piece:  the  everyday,  which  we share  in  with  others,  is 
missing from Heidegger’s later understanding of language as truthful or  alethetic. This is true. 
Heidegger does indeed leap out of the everyday, where small successes make up our immediate 
experience of the world, into the philosophical. The everyday,  however, is not missing in the 
sense of being forgotten, but rather of being abandoned. The question remains how the leap from 
rhetorical to philosophical/poetic can be possible in the first place, and here I argue the rhetorical 
plays a key role in grounding that leap. 
The dissents by and large, then, focus on the under-theorizing, absence or plain rejection 
of everydayness, which I believe is both valid and indicative of a deeply problematic implication 
for Heideggerian rhetoric. Heidegger is profoundly uncomfortable with the shared, rushed and 
partial  publicness  of  everydayness  and  as  a  result,  his  understanding  of  Dasein—which 
acknowledges the essential role of publicness in constituting Being in time—nevertheless has an 
14 Crusius regularly specifies that his critique aims at the later Heidegger, though he does not discuss much of the 
early Heidegger and how that phase of work might be immune to Crusius’ critique. In response, I would say that 
Heidegger’s preliminary design of “indigenous conceptuality” speaks directly to the relation between concept 
formation and the practical decision-making of phronesis. Thus, the arguments in this dissertation function as a 
“friendly amendment” to Crusius’ position.
15 Surveying critiques of Heidegger in a rhetorical vein reveals several contradictory interpretations: whether, for 
example, Heidegger is a transcendentalist per Desilet, an anti-transcendentalist per Hariman, afflicted by negativity 
per Vitanza, or offering “an opening to a better world,” a skeptical deconstructionist per Crusius, or a hermeneutic 
reconstructionist per Hyde and Smith. The answer has to be predicated on which Heidegger one reads, and how one 
reads him.
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airless, ascetic quality.  If we take as our guide the later Heidegger, we find a philosophy of 
language which takes the everyday as a graveyard rather than origin of genuine thinking, and in 
which our relationships with others may be mediated by dialogue but play very little social or 
cultural role in positively strengthening or guiding Dasein. 
Vitanza’s critique is especially pointed. Heidegger’s  alethetic  sense of truth, the proper 
expression of Being, defines being as what remains as it is, what stands resolved amidst change. 
It is a philosophical posture aiming at preserving, saving, and maintaining,  where that which 
changes in time becomes labeled as less-than-being, as inauthentic being. As I will discuss, this 
philosophical  posture—a comportment,  in  Heideggerian  terms,  or  ethos  in  Aristotelian—still 
arises  from  an  initial  rhetorical  posture.  In  short,  Heidegger’s  juxtaposition  between 
everydayness and genuine speaking creates a faulty foundation for rhetorical theory. In BCArP, 
however, we see a different articulation of the relation between speaking and being, in which the 
conditions for the possibility of genuine speaking arise from within the everyday. Any speaking 
of “what is” begins from the presumption that it could be otherwise. Prior to  aletheia, there is 
doxa.
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO RHETORICAL THEORY
By using as a guide Heidegger’s taking up of Aristotle and later turn away to ask the question 
what it means to say that something is rhetorical, this dissertation offers three contributions to 
contemporary rhetorical theory, the first dealing with interpretation, the second with theory and 
the third with criticism. The question—what does it mean to say that something is rhetorical—is 
one of interpretation, and we can understand interpretation temporally,  in terms of before and 
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after drawn together in a now. What lies before in interpretation? Interpretation bears history. 
The first contribution, then, lies in showing how Aristotelian and Heideggerian concepts draw 
from concrete and factical life, and extend beyond simple operational definitions that constrain 
what was, is or could be. This dissertation provides a reinterpretation and appropriation of key 
Aristotelian rhetorical concepts by way of a Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutic that 
forefronts the role of temporality. Second, all interpretation projects outward as theory (theoria 
after all, means to look outward and observe), that is, interpretation provides a location from 
which to look beyond, toward a particular end. Theoretically, then, this dissertation constructs an 
alternative  rhetorical  ontology  from Aristotelian-Heideggerian  grounds  that  holds  on  to  the 
public  and everyday,  and clarifies how rhetorical  research relates  to the objects  of its  study. 
Gathering together what has come before and what lies ahead, interpretation establishes what is 
here,  now.  Thus,  in  the  final  critical  phase,  this  dissertation  distinguishes  between temporal 
modes of language that express the world—which always includes one’s own being, as well as 
that  of  others—differently.  The  dissertation  makes  the  case  for  a  vital,  contemporary 
Heideggerian-inflected Aristotelian ontology of rhetoric.
The three facets of interpretation, theory and criticism address three pressing problems 
for  rhetorical  theory:  first,  how to appropriate  ancient  theoretical  concepts  for  contemporary 
study, second, how to approach claiming a thing as rhetorical (what I call below the “rhetoric of” 
problem) and third, how to circumscribe rather than suborn the study of rhetoric within the larger 
expanse of language or symbolic representation. I seek to make the case that the rhetorical mode 
of being is the origin of speaking, but also provides the conditions of possibility for that speaking 
to change, to give birth to the philosophical and poetic alike. To call the rhetorical original does 
not mean that all is rhetorical. Temporally speaking, things can be taken up in different ways, 
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and the philosophical and poetic modes are distinct from the rhetorical. If rhetoric is everywhere, 
it is nowhere. An acknowledgement of the rhetorical origin of language cannot merely trace out 
the contours of all language, but must articulate the conditions in which a thing can be properly 
called rhetorical.
By documenting  the  crucial  role  that  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric  plays  in  Heidegger’s  early 
philosophy,  as  well  as  in  his  move  away  from Aristotle  beginning  in  Being  and  Time and 
continuing  through  the  Kehre,  or  turn,  into  his  later  work,16 this  dissertation  directly  and 
practically  deals  with  the  problem  of  building  contemporary  theory  drawn  from  classical 
concepts. Second, the dissertation builds on this early foundation to present a positive account of 
rhetorical ontology. By a positive account of rhetorical ontology, I mean one that does not define 
rhetoricity by negation, as though it were just the minor key of being. Instead, using an analysis 
of  speaking  in  time,  I  argue  that  approaching  being  as  being-possibly-otherwise  grounds 
speaking in the world of which it speaks. To call something rhetorical is not to make a claim 
about a claim, but a claim to a thing that is crucially, definitively present—even in its partiality,  
absence  or  distance.  Third,  by  presenting  a  positive  rhetorical  ontology,  the  dissertation 
approaches rhetoricity in its critical mode—as a hermeneutic that returns the conceptual to its 
ground in everyday speaking, in which truth is not guaranteed and exists not in word, but in the 
confluence  of  speaker,  hearer  and  matter.  For  Heidegger  in  1924,  the  Rhetoric provides  a 
16 The Kehre is the term used by Heideggerian scholars to identify an interstitial period in Heidegger’s work that 
occurs roughly in the 1930s, where Heidegger shifts into a new direction of thought. What exactly constitutes the 
turn and when it occurs, however, is heavily debated. Elden argues for a shift from Being and Time to Time and 
Being, with excursions through the pre-Socratics, Holderlin and Nietzsche (Mapping the Present  165  ). John D. 
Caputo contends that the turn is from facticity back to Platonic eidos, and calls for a new kehre back to facticity 
(Demythologizing Heidegger   164 ), a movement in which this dissertation partakes. Gadamer thinks the Kehre is not 
so much a departure as a reconfiguration of prior thought that consistently seeks to answer the same persistent 
question (Heidegger’s Ways  21  ). We will see Heidegger’s own characterization of the change in his work in chapter 
six’s investigation of the Dialogue. In this dissertation, I take the position that Heidegger’s explicit rejection of 
speaking as the foundation of Being is a critical component of the Kehre. By rejecting speaking, Heidegger 
functionally voids the rhetorical ground of Dasein and ends what I refer to as his early period. I use as a rough 
marker for this moment Heidegger’s renunciation of section 34 of Being and Time in the winter 1934 lecture “On 
the Essence of Truth.”
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vocabulary and set of basic structures for speaking from which he can “clear out” philosophy and 
revitalize ancient thinking. Heidegger wishes to begin with simple philosophical claims, and then 
move back to the conditions under which the claim first arises. The movement of  Destruktion 
moves in essence from the philosophical to the rhetorical.
1.4.1 Heideggerianism and Aristotelianism
Why is Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, an almost 90-year-old quickly abandoned foray for the 
philosopher,  relevant  to contemporary rhetorical  theory?  The persistent influence of Aristotle 
(and Aristotelianism) on the field of rhetoric is both a source of concern and hope for rhetorical  
theorists. The concern arises from a fear that, as rhetorical practice moves further away from the 
Athenian  agora,  out  of  date  Aristotelian  theory at  best  constrains  and at  worst  deforms  the 
objects it seeks to study. The hope, on the other hand, is that core Aristotelian concepts have 
persisted  because  they  both  draw  helpful  distinctions  and  maintain  a  flexibility  before  the 
situation to be taken up in many ways. In the 1920’s Heidegger attempted to explain how to 
interpret Aristotle for the contemporary intellectual moment, while keeping in view the concrete 
and factical historical situation in which it was first formulated. By investigating Heidegger’s 
initial  embrace  of  Aristotle  and  subsequent  distancing,  we  can  address  the  larger  issue  of 
Aristotle’s  intellectual  prominence for the study of rhetoric—both in  concern and hope.  The 
question is not whither Aristotle and Heidegger, but Aristotle and Heidegger how?
Interpretations  bear  history,  and  interpretations  of  Aristotle  bear  with  them 
Aristotelianism.  Heidegger  turns  to  the  Rhetoric to  correct  what  he  sees  as  a  pervasive 
misreading of Aristotelian logos—namely, the focus on logos alone, rather than its emergence in 
speaking with one another about matters. This is how we move from talking about things, to 
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talking  about  talk,  to defining the thing by talk about  the thing.  Reading Aristotle  can be a 
queasy affair,  as  translators  concerned  with  maintaining  each word’s  full  fidelity  across  the 
Aristotelian  corpus  pile  amalgamated  concepts  upon  one  another,  a  Romanism  here,  a 
Medievalism there, a Victorianism beside. As Gross has illustrated, the way one takes something 
so foundational  as  pathos is  textured by a  web of  concerns  and commitments  given in  that 
particular period (Secret History   34 ). Reading Aristotelian work presents as much a survey of 
historical and philosophical ideals and anxieties as they do Aristotle or Greek speaking. 
We do not want to throw out Aristotelianism as a whole. Instead, we want to understand 
how  and  why  certain  strains  of  Aristotelianism  remain  active  in  shaping  interpretations  of 
rhetoricity. Why does the split between actor-practice and speaker-hearer continually arise? How 
has the study of rhetoric taken speaking rather than the spoken-of as the most legitimate object of 
analysis?  Why  do  we  worry  about  speaking  and  hearing,  but  dare  not  speak  of  matters? 
Following Heidegger, we can see how the focus on logos alone then shaped a crucial portion of 
twentieth century philosophy. As Steven Mailloux notes in agreement with Edward P. J. Corbett, 
a great deal of modern thought either resembles or owes an explicit debt to Aristotle, and the 
ways in which a thinker invokes Aristotle traces out the contours of that contemporary moment 
(176). In our own, the border between the material and the symbolic is blurred and contested.  
Heidegger looks to Aristotle to describe the purchase of the word upon the material for the sake 
of philosophical research. By investigating how and why Heidegger takes this intersection of 
world  and  word  as  problematic,  but  keeping  our  attention  firmly  upon  the  rhetorical,  this 
dissertation returns to the point of intersection and gives a different answer in order to respond to 
contemporary concerns over the realm and reach of rhetoricity. 
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If Aristotle must be separated from Aristotelianism, Heidegger must be separated from 
Heideggerianism.  I  argue  that  the  Rhetoric  provided  Heidegger  with  a  crucial  piece  of  the 
intellectual architecture for  Being and Time, specifically the point of intersection between the 
concrete-factical  and  symbolic:  Sachlichkeit,  the  fidelity  to  things,  where  the  thing  and  its 
interpretation  meet  in  “a  willingness  to  wrestle  with  the  issues  and  with  oneself  in  an 
interpretation  that  acknowledges  its  own  temporality”  (Polt,   Emergency  of  Being   11  ). 
Heidegger’s early lectures had already drawn the conclusion that any account for shared human 
being had to deal with time as experienced in the everyday, and Being and Time elaborates upon 
the  temporality  of  everydayness,  though  everydayness  is  positioned  as  that  from  which 
philosophy must  break.  Nevertheless,  there are  traces  of the  Rhetoric throughout  Being and 
Time.  Dasein’s moodedness,  the way it  finds itself  already disposed toward the world,  is  an 
elaboration of pathos. Dasein’s cultivated comportment toward the world has its roots in ethos. 
Finally, logos in its rhetorical sense, as a general act of speaking rather than a particular system 
of reason, grounds all being in expression. As explained earlier, the origins of these concepts are 
contained in  an unauthorized  text,  a Heidegger  never  meant  for  public  eyes.  To draw out a 
Heideggerian rhetoric, we must read Heidegger against himself, so that we can see how his own 
logos, that later grounds his thought, remains unsettled.
The relevance of Heidegger’s work for today’s rhetorician is perhaps not so clear as that 
of Aristotle above, but the cleavage between the early and late Heidegger marks a place to begin 
revaluating the literary sense of rhetoricity in the dusk of post-structural thought. Following P. 
Christopher Smith,  I argue that the rejection of speaking in favor of silence misleads literary 
post-structuralism—the turning from speaking to a broken-off text, or signifiers nested in one 
another like matryoshkas. For Heidegger, thinking both philosophically and poetically, Dasein is 
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shaped in its decision to confront the world truthfully in search (or, more precisely in awaiting) 
of aletheia. Rhetoricity, however, remains as that which sets up the decision put before Dasein. 
Rhetoricity thus stands before the text or before the word has broken off, but not in silence—it 
brings forth a decision that is given to others rather than presented to Dasein’s own self, and is 
given in speaking with one another. As argued above, and further in chapters  two and  three, 
deconstruction’s predecessor  Destruktion seeks precisely this prior moment and the movement 
toward the point of decision, beyond and before the concretion of decision itself.  
If I am criticizing Heidegger’s ultimate philosophy of language and rejection of rhetoric, 
what is the good of engaging in an Aristotelian-Heideggerian interpretation? Does this approach 
not simply add bad to good? The goal of this analysis is to augment Aristotelian concepts passed 
down through centuries more or less smoothly, used define and delimit what rhetoric is, in such a 
way that we see instead how the rhetorical is. We want to know about the concrete, factical being
—the sachlichkeit or thingliness—of things taken to be rhetorical. We want to know if an atom is 
rhetorical. Heidegger himself addresses the question of engaging with things rather than recycled 
talk about things at  the beginning of  Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy in a directly 
relevant way for contemporary rhetoricians struggling to articulate new perspectives with old 
terms. Can we engage with Aristotle without being burdened by the legacy of Aristotelianism? 
Can we revive  the  things  of  which  Aristotle  spoke from out  of  the  centuries  of  talk  about  
Aristotle?
1.4.2 The fate of Aristotelian research
There are twin tendencies for Aristotelian definitions of being and the relation to language. One 
tendency takes the matter as it shows itself in concrete, everyday occurrence: how it is for us, 
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how it is used. The second is to then use expression as the basis of definition of that which is, as  
a term or concept. So, in the first case, what is is drawn from what a thing is for us: a house is a 
place in which we dwell. In the second case,  what is is defined by a prior formal definition: a 
house is legally defined as “real property,” falling under the category of buildings affixed to the 
land. In one direction, the definition of what is comes from our mode of access, in the other, a 
particular mode of access is used to define what is.
The question, what do we mean when we say that something is rhetorical, is a conceptual 
question (a mode of access used to define what is), but a concept gains its power to define by 
way of interpretation that secures the conditions under which the concept may arise and take 
hold (defining what is according to our mode of access). Temporally speaking, as I argue in 
chapter  three, the concept arises from what shared speaking claims holds generally and for the 
most part. Conceptual definition points back to a matter through how we have said that it is. The 
question, what it means to say that something is rhetorical, is one of access to the matter at hand. 
To call something rhetorical is to define it, to make a claim as to its being, and this claim 
can be made in one of two ways. First, we can define the matter itself as capable of being taken 
rhetorically,  of  how it  is  to  us  in  speaking.  Second,  we can  define  rhetoric  as  conceptually 
adjacent  to  the  matter  itself,  as  the  matter  and its rhetoric.  The  former  must  be  capable  of 
articulating  how  its  definition  ([x]  is  defined  as  rhetorical)  is  appropriate  to,  and  reveals 
something significant about, thing within its matter at hand. The latter must define rhetoric as 
having  a  being  separate  from the  matter,  tacitly  accepting  and  operationalizing  the  “primal 
ontological”  distinction  between  being  and  non-being  without  explicitly  meting  out  that 
distinction. It is a descendent of Aristotelianism.
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Heidegger  prefaces  his  investigation  of  Aristotle  with  a  curious  line  of  reasoning in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason regarding the relation between logical definition and that which 
logical  definition  actually  defines.  I  will  return  to  this  observation  in  key  moments  of  the 
articulation of rhetorical Being. On the one hand, a conceptual definition (“the rhetorical is…”) 
should be drawn out of our interactions with the thing, but on the other, the procedure of defining 
something is limited to comparing a species to a genus, a particular to a predetermined general 
category (“X is rhetorical”): 
For  Kant’s position,  the two characteristic  aspects  are  (1) that  the definitio  is 
discussed in the doctrine of method and (2) that he determines the basic procedure 
of  the  definitio  in  such  a  way  that  it  does  not  comes  into  play  for  genuine  
definition17 (BCArP 10).
In  the  Kantian  treatment  of  definition,  Heidegger  contends,  “lies  the  fate  of  Aristotelian 
research” (BCArP 11) in both its positive and negative directions.  Kant realizes that logic is 
something more than a system of identification, categorization and verification. The precision of 
our speaking as conceptual definition is judged by the definition’s capacity to show what the 
particular thing, partaking of a general tendency, is. The value of a system of logic is determined 
by  the  extent  to  which  a  general  category  tells  us  something  vital  and  essential  about  the 
particular  matter  at  hand. Conceptual  definitions  must  be drawn from the movement  of life. 
Definition as an act, then, does not cease at labeling what a thing is, but moves beyond to show 
what that thing is for. The business of definition is a methodological business, guiding how we 
say something is. 
Yet the structure of definition then becomes dictated by an external logic of genus and 
species built adjacent to the matter itself. Kant’s definitio  cannot fulfill its assigned task. What 
17 Heidegger retains the Latin term definitio to distinguish between Kant’s particular treatment of definition, and 
Heidegger’s own counter-interpretation. Genuine definition, for Heidegger, means the capacity of the conceptual 
definition to show what the thing at hand is for.
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the matter is becomes defined by way of comparison with what it is not, determined in relation to 
a system of organization and articulation. The rules of procedure determine our articulation, how 
we can say that it is. The logical procedure of definition renders the concept unable to fulfill its 
purpose of bringing matter to word. Heidegger asks a theoretical and historical question: “How 
does it come about that a definitio, which is genuine knowledge of the matter, become a matter of 
logical perfection?” (BCArP 11, emphasis in original).
1.4.3 The “rhetoric-of” problem
We see a similar dynamic at work in that I will call the “rhetoric of” problem, whereby the 
rhetorical is simultaneously positioned as that out of which we access the matter at hand and yet 
is defined by its adjacency to the matter. It is worthwhile to distinguish between the “rhetoric of” 
problem as taken in everyday talk, and the “rhetoric of” problem in academic circles. “Rhetoric” 
is interpreted differently in each case, but rhetoric’s positioning vis-à-vis the world it expresses 
remains the same.
In  everyday  talk,  discussion  of  the  “rhetoric  of”  illustrates  both  the  promise  of  the 
Kantian/Aristotelian interpretation and its downfall. In the everyday sense, rhetoric is positioned 
over and above reality (for example, in the headline: “The Rhetoric of Human Security and its 
Reality”). The rhetorical is acknowledged as guiding one’s access to the matter, but it is then 
juxtaposed against and defined by that which it is not—the rhetorical appears only as its mode of 
otherwise than being, as “seeming” in the sense of looking-so but not being-so. The “rhetoric of” 
move both draws attention to the role of language in our understanding, but also cleaves our talk 
about talk from the matter itself. “The rhetoric of” emphasizes awareness that our access to the 
matter at hand is shaped and mediated by language. Here we have the positive methodological 
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awareness—the matter can be presented in such a way that it changes what we understand the 
matter to be, and what it is for. Yet, in the second move, “the reality,” we have a definition of the  
matter contrasted against the rhetorical that is either explicitly or implicitly privileged. Having 
first addressed its rhetorical being, one then denies the legitimacy of that being and categorizes 
the matter differently. 
In scholarly circles, “the rhetoric of” does not presume that the rhetorical is self-evidently 
subordinate  to  the  real  matter,  but  rhetoric’s  relationship  to  that  which  it  is  “of”  remains 
ambiguous.  The same basic dynamic lays itself out in rhetorical scholarship in two ways. In the 
first, the rhetorical is positioned as adjunct to the matter, in a slightly more sophisticated variant 
of the everyday usage. There is the thing, and then there is talk about the thing, and rhetorical 
research properly directs  itself  toward the talk about the thing.  “The rhetoric of” indicates  a 
separate being, in particular, the being of the word. Logos triumphs. In the second variant, which 
I consider the more nuanced, rhetoricity of a matter shapes one’s encounter with the matter. The 
stuff  of  the  world  is  thus  organized  in  a  sort  of  cognitive/consciousness/conscientiousness 
rhetorical matrix. Here, understanding and its handmaiden speaking are presented as mediatory 
between the twin poles of word and world, each still maintaining their own ground with a bridge 
of consciousness or cognition tossed in between—with “of” still doing the bridging. Sometimes 
this move is made with reference to “representations,” others with “practical judgment.” In either 
case,  the  material  and  sensory  world  is  reconstructed  internally  by  acts  of  conscious 
understanding, and the reconstruction is then judged in its proper accordance with “reality.”
In either case, the relation of rhetoricity to the matter at hand is not explicitly fleshed out. 
There is a persistent ambiguity as to what work this “of” is doing. The rhetorical becomes either 
a product of the matter (the matter and its rhetoric), or the matter a product of the rhetorical (a 
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rhetoric  of  matter).  In  both  cases,  the  status  of  logos remains  both  undisputed  and  under-
theorized.
1.4.4 A positive ontology of rhetoric
The challenge becomes articulating the being of rhetoric conceptually,  while maintaining the 
orientation of rhetoricity  toward the preconceptual.  In other words,  can we give a rhetorical 
answer to a philosophical question? We can, but in doing so, we must recognize that “here we 
offer no philosophy” (Heidegger,  BCArP 4). This dissertation provides a positive ontology of 
rhetoric. By positive ontology, I mean an account for the being of that which is called rhetorical 
that  is  not  defined by deficiency,  as what  we use in  a  pinch when the truth is  unavailable.  
Rhetoric’s value to Heidegger is still of value to us today: in the Rhetoric, Heidegger discovers a 
way of approaching the very real being of language that did not distinguish between being and 
appearing and addressed in the most direct way  what is here now,  how it is here, now.  The 
rhetorical is slippery because, as Aristotle carefully notes, the rhetorical speaks equally of that 
which  is  and that  which  appears  to  be as  phainomena.  Specifically,  I  argue that  Aristotle’s 
rhetoric is crucial because it provides an account of language from the position of how the hearer 
takes  things  to  be,  where  the  “is”  cannot  be  separated  from  the  “appears-to-be.”  A 
phenomenological account here is important because it is the school of thought that deals most 
explicitly with appearance. 
We should  understand,  however,  that  the  tendency  to  separate  out  things  from their 
rhetoric  is  motivated by a  wish to  delimit  the realm of the rhetorical,  and that  wish is  both 
legitimate and desirable. As I said when addressing the importance of our question for research, 
the rhetorician’s move across disciplinary boundaries makes for thorny problems regarding the 
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length of rhetoric’s reach. Drawing a line, for example, between the thing and the talk about the 
thing provides stable ground, but it may not be advantageous ground. First, this ground, as we 
have seen above, gets severed from the world from which and toward which the word addresses. 
Second, what would constitute “the word” itself is not so clear—does this mean all modes of 
expression? Does one count symbols or spaces as having expressive capacities?
As I will argue, I think the better way to delimit the reach of rhetoric is to understand it as 
a mode of temporally relating to things that can be otherwise, encountered in the shared time and 
matters  of everyday traffic  and trade.  Rhetoricians  have long recognized the role  of time in 
defining  and  delimiting  the  rhetorical.  Lloyd  Bitzer’s  rhetorical  situation,  for  example,  is 
centered on understanding rhetoric in the context of things that happen (“Rhetorical Situation” 
3).  By exploring  the structure  of  everydayness  and the  conditions  of  its  possibility,  we can 
extend out from the situation toward the things around which the situation arises.  Similarly,  
Chaim  Perelman  and  Lucie  Olbrechts-Tyteca  emphasize  the  role  of  presence  in  The  New 
Rhetoric as that toward which the hearer attends, yet their understanding of presence remains a 
matter of consciousness (142). I argue instead that the rhetorical is not a matter of consciousness 
but of what presses out from the world in which we live. As I show in chapter two, everydayness 
is no amorphous concept. The expressed relations between speaker, hearer and matter show how 
one has  a  world  in  time.  When matters  are  taken up as  changeable  in  such a  way that  the 
changeability is relevant to people who share a there—a time and a place—we may call these 
matters rhetorical. Rather than split the rhetorical up along lines of whats, wheres and whens, we 
must approach rhetoricity as a how.
Until  this  point,  I have approached the following dissertation from the perspective of 
value  for  a  rhetorician.  I  think,  however,  that  there  is  also value  in  articulating  a  rhetorical 
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ontology  of  things—of  the  capacity  for  something  to  be  rhetorical—for  the  blossoming 
philosophical field of object-oriented-ontology (OOO).  The basic thrust of OOO is simple—to 
build ontologies of not just human being, but of other beings, in part as a response to certain anti-
materialist or anti-realist strains of post-structural thought. It is unclear, however, how one would 
even articulate a thing as an object (objects, of course, are particular types of things) outside the 
remit  of  language—if  there  can  be  an  object  without  language.  One  contribution  of  this 
dissertation to contemporary philosophy is its articulation of the Being of things as taken up in 
speaking. In other words, rather than try to construct a theoretical perspective that effectively 
bypasses the remediation of language and turns the dial too far to the world from the word, a 
focus on how modes of language highlight presence may more productively investigate how the 
joining of the two comes to be. 
Allow me to provide  two examples.  In  his  debate  with Bruno Latour  at  the London 
School of Economics, Graham Harman argues that the position of a speculative realist is not that 
language  or  other  metaphysical  structures  are  immaterial,  but  rather  that  these  explanations 
produce the faulty sense that the word fully expresses the Being of a being, that it is impossible 
to  reduce  the  world  without  remainder.  There  remains  a  “reality  that  escapes  any  of  its 
manifestations. You can never be sure quite what it is, but you can offer some description of 
what the structures of that reality are” (Latour, Harman and Erdélyi 73).  Harman’s argument 
compliments  Gaonkar’s  warning  against  Alan  Gross’  proclamation  that  science  is  “rhetoric 
without  remainder”  (Gross  and  Keith,  6).  However,  while  the  presumption  that  the  word 
expresses  the world—and its  actors—without  remainder  might  be an accurate  description  of 
certain strains of philosophical interpretations of language, it is certainly not a presumption held 
by the majority of rhetoricians—not now, and not initially. Aristotle’s basic distinction between 
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the philosophical and the rhetorical, I show in chapter three, precisely concerns the question of 
remainders;  the rhetorical  deals  with that  which can be otherwise.  As late  Renaissance/early 
Enlightenment thinker Giambattista Vico proclaims, the Cartesian turn toward certainty robs one 
of the ability to deal with the world as it presents itself to the human being most often: as shaped 
by  chance  and  choice  in  otherwiseness  (34).  Harman  argues  that  the  problem  with  quasi-
metaphysical senses of language, whereby the word is essentially an intermediary between the 
subject and object, is a lack of contact (Latour, Harman and Erdélyi 54). Here I agree. Symbolic 
or representational theories require what I call  throughout the dissertation a “detour” through 
consciousness (or conscience), cognition or psychological matrices. In contrast to such detours, 
in  chapter  five,  I  use  the  proximal  term  “closeness”  to  describe  the  relation  between  the 
rhetorical  word  and  world.  Rhetorical  speaking  is  incapable  of  addressing  the  thing  in  its 
unchanging  essence—this  is  conceded  from the  Aristotelian  jump.  However,  Aristotle  (and 
following him, Heidegger) uses the language of tactility to describe the purchase of rhetorical 
speech upon the world. We grasp, take up and keep close. When presented with a choice over 
that  which  can  be  otherwise,  the  hearer  chooses  according  to  which  speaking  expresses  a 
closeness with the hearer’s own everyday life, and the way in which this thing here now appears 
within that context of everyday life.
A second example: In  Alien Phenomenologies,  Ian Bogost is right to point out that a 
singular focus on the symbolic function of language that leaves out the nonsemiotic world gets 
stuck talking about talking, and leaves out possibilities of encountering things by doing (90). The 
rhetorical thing, in contrast, becomes a matter of concern when such doing is interrupted, and 
when that  interruption  reverberates  throughout  a shared region of traffic  and trade (a region 
demarcated  in doing). When the thing is present as a matter of  shared concern arising in the 
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temporality  of  everydayness,  its  accessibility  in  contemporaneous  presence  and  shared 
articulations of possibility moves through language, even if no one speaks a word. By attending 
to how a thing becomes possibly otherwise in shared time, we see how the thing’s “edges of 
experience” are “imagined or explored” (Bogost 56), embedded in matters of concern. Only a 
position toward language that  both works  through language and acknowledges what remains 
beyond is capable of articulating the edge of experience. It is unquestionably the case that when 
humans share time, they share time not just with other humans but with other non-human things, 
and work that seeks to explain our ethical obligations to things that share our time but not our 
speaking is clearly important. It is the rhetorical that deals  most closely with precisely such a 
movement between world and word.
1.5 THE PATH AHEAD: CHAPTER OUTLINE
The  dissertation  moves  in  its  focus  from  time  to  rhetorical  temporality  to 
poetic/philosophical temporality and then returns to the rhetorical. Having established the need 
for a rhetorical ontology that takes not just that which is spoken as rhetorical, but that which is 
spoken for as rhetorical in chapter one, I turn in chapter two to the function of time in revealing 
Being and its world in the present—which is to say in what is present to us, and how it is present.  
After  establishing  the  role  of  temporality  in  structuring  human  Being,  I  move  to  a  specific 
analysis of rhetorical temporality rooted in Aristotle’s Rhetoric in chapters three, four and five, 
each chapter addressing a book of the Rhetoric. Finally, in chapter six, I demonstrate temporal 
differences  in  modes  of  speaking  by  using  the  tools  of  rhetoric  to  unpack  and  loosen  up 
Heidegger’s  later  conception  of  language as  emergent  from poetized  silence  and approach a 
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recurrent—indeed a recursive—theme in rhetorical philosophy by isolating three moments of 
discussion about  the fate  and future  directions  of  rhetorical  research.  Below, I  offer  a  brief 
summary of my preliminary findings.
We  must  first  understand  time.  Chapter  two traces  out  the  Aristotelian  roots  of 
Heideggerian  phenomenology,  from  Heidegger’s  reading  of  the  Physics to  the  role  of 
everydayness in forming a foundation for Heideggerian phenomenology. We approach a time of 
flux  for  Heidegger.  After  spending  years  working  on  a  book  project  to  outline  a 
phenomenological reading of Aristotle, Heidegger abruptly changes course at about the time of 
his lecture on the Rhetoric. Why the shift from Aristotle to  Being and Time? In chapter  two, I 
first  lay  out  the  basic  structure  of  time  Heidegger  develops  throughout  his  early  Freiburg-
Marburg period, drawing on his lectures, manuscripts and  Being and Time itself. I then work 
through the specific character of the temporality of everydayness. I close with an explanation of 
the  challenge  that  Heidegger’s  reformulation  of  everydayness—and  crucially,  the  rhetorical 
speaking of  everydayness—presents  to  Husserlian  and Diltheyan  phenomenology and to  the 
post-Aristotelian trajectory of Western thinking as a whole. 
Second, we must understand how our speaking manifests our temporal world. In chapters 
three, four and five, having established the importance of time and its Aristotelian elaboration, I 
show how Aristotle’s rhetorical theorizing forefronts the role of time. Its selection of matter, its 
structure in form, its way of movement and finally even the end to which rhetorical speaking 
aims are conditioned and differentiated according to time. Along the way, I show how things are 
taken rhetorically, and what that taking indicates about the relationship between Dasein and its 
world. Chapter three addresses the rhetorical thing in its futural horizon, which deals with things 
that can be otherwise, taken up with regard to a shared temporal matter of concern over what has 
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been, is now and will be, projected in speaking toward a decision. Chapter  four deals with the 
rhetorical thing in its past horizon, as given already within a thick network of social attachment 
in disposition, habituated choosing and prior ways of familiar speaking—feeling,  dealing and 
speaking.  Chapter  five shows how the  rhetorical  thing  is  made  present  and  manifest  in  the 
speaking itself, from the voice, to the figure, to the movement of the speaking itself in time, all 
brought before the moment of decision: I have spoken, you have heard, here is what is, now 
decide.
Chapter  six uses  a  Heideggerian-Aristotelian  theoretical  structure  of  rhetorical 
temporality, what Heidegger called “indigenous conceptuality,” to investigate Heidegger’s later 
reformulation of the nature of language. Indigenous conceptuality draws the concept from out of 
concrete facticity, directs that thinking toward a particular horizon and emerges from within a 
shared way of  speaking.  Given the initial  comparison between the differing temporalities  of 
rhetorical and poetic/philosophical speaking, I turn to a fuller  Destruktion of Heidegger’s later 
poetic speaking centered on his  Dialogue on Language. I engage in critique not to somehow 
reveal the  real Heidegger, or for that matter the  real Aristotle, but rather to show how subtle 
shifts  in  the  way  one  approaches  speaking  in  time  fundamentally  change  how  the  word 
illuminates the world. I show how the Dialogue at one level resists the pull of everyday speaking, 
and yet on another must ground its investigation of language in a rhetorical mode of relation. The 
Dialogue proceeds through a series of recursions that slowly alter the speaking that has come 
before, giving the Dialogue a woozy, backwards-facing movement. Despite Heidegger’s attempt 
to sever speaking from its confused, elusive everyday circulation, the circle remains. I conclude 
with  an  alternate  formulation  of  the  Being  of  language  that  maintains  a  sense  of  open 
unfinishedness without a fear of the public.
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Where does this reformulation leave rhetorical theory? I close chapter six arguing that the 
very  Being  of  rhetorical  speaking  forces  rhetoricians  to  engage  in  their  own  recursive 
conversations.  Heidegger’s  path  to  rhetoric  began with  a  simple  Kantian  problem—that  our 
definitions, our names for being, are judged not by the beings the definitions delimit and attempt 
to show but in relation to the structure and system of right-naming.  In other words, that the 
speaking of being becomes a problem of logical procedure. For the philosopher, the stability of 
naming and definition allow one to go very far along a way before needing to look back. As 
Heidegger contends, Aristotle’s initiation of philosophical logos forms a consistent trajectory of 
thinking that extends over two millennia. We do not need to argue about things that cannot be 
otherwise. 
The rhetorician has no such solid ground on which to stand. It is unsurprising, then, that 
we should hear periodic ruminations on the question of whether our methods and concepts are 
capable of showing what beings are, as they are. Rhetorical being changes and must be discussed 
with others who share a region of concern. The conclusion of chapter six isolates three moments 
of scholarly discussion: in the  The Prospect of Rhetoric,  a collection of essays and transcripts 
generated by the 1970 Wingspread conference, 1996’s Making and Unmaking the Prospects for  
Rhetoric, which offers a retrospective look back 25 years later, and finally a third revaluation of 
Wingspread 40 years later in Reengaging the Prospects of Rhetoric. Each volume brings together 
a diverse group of scholars to look back and then forward. These texts are by no means definitive 
of  an  entire  40-year  span  of  thinking,  but  they  offer  glimpses  into  three  key  moments  of 
discussion. First, The Prospects of Rhetoric explores the field of rhetoric’s capacity to respond to 
the social upheaval of 1968. Making and Unmaking speaks to rhetorical theory in light of post-
structural research and philosophy touched off in the wake of  ‘68. Finally, Reengaging perches 
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between the crisis of Wingspread and the exhaustion of the post-structural. I show how in each 
case, the question of upon what rhetoric stands motivates discussion in multiple directions, but 
may fail to grapple with the being of rhetoric in things, and displace Being into either the realm 
of the word alone, in the structures of consciousness that allow us to access the world, or even in 
a complex of acts and practices. I end the dissertation with my own prospective look at rhetorical 
theory engaged not just with words, thoughts and deeds, but with  things themselves as being-
rhetorical.
1.6 CONCLUSION
Is it simply an accident of history that “being rhetorical” comes to mean, in an everyday sense, to 
not-be something? A rhetorical question is not a question, and a rhetorical response does not 
mean what it says. I do not think the curious inversion comes about by chance, for two reasons. 
First,  the  very  Being  of  rhetorical  speaking  is  being-otherwise.  That  which  is  addressed 
rhetorically  is  not  simply  latently  or  passively  possibly-otherwise—its  very  particular 
otherwiseness and changeability in time is precisely of central concern. And thus, we can say one 
thing, while another happens. Second, taking what  is as essential, unchanging and  real in one 
hand, and what is partial, provisional and apparent in the other, the rhetorical word will always 
be outweighed by the heavy pressing mass of the world. In such a problem, too, lies the fate of 
post-Aristotelian research.
Change the phrase slightly, though, and we can begin to think about the problem another 
way: what of being, rhetorical? What is the rhetorical thing, and how is it had rhetorically? By 
first understanding how we account for the world in time, we can then work out a temporality in 
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which the world appears rhetorically.  That appearance is  real;  it  is how a matter  matters.  A 
rhetorical ontology grounded on the temporality of everydayness allows us to express not simply 
what a thing is, but how it is to us. Far from not-being, the rhetorical word illuminates the Being 
of the world for us, as persistent yet  momentary,  concrete yet  fragile,  real  yet  uncertain.  To 
understand why, we first turn to time.
50
2.0 MOVEMENT, CHANGE AND TIME
[O]nly the way back will lead us forward.
(Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language” 12)
Let me save you a great deal of time, should you wish to take my word for it and do something 
else with your morning, afternoon, evening or night. Here are the answers to the questions being 
asked in the next two chapters, and you will say you have never seen a person as brief as I. 18 
What is time? A marking of movement.  What is movement? An account of change. What is 
change? The speaking of Being in time. Why do we speak? Because we hear. Why do we hear? 
Because it could be and it could be otherwise. What do we hear? Both is and otherwise, speaker 
and matter as given in everydayness. Now, I will explain.
2.1 HAVING AND SPEAKING TIME
We are still being guided by the initial question: What does it mean to say that something  is  
rhetorical? Heidegger understands language as an expression of Being: language reveals a human 
world of relations and directions. The speaking that reveals Being does so in a very particular 
way: in relation to time. In chapter two, I investigate how time relates to human being, and how 
18 Wink.
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that being is made manifest in our speaking with one another, and in chapter three, I describe to 
the temporality of rhetoric as distinct from other modes of language. If rhetoric is the mode of 
speaking directed toward and accounting for movement and change, and Dasein is defined by its 
dealing  with  this  change,  in  the  rhetorical  we  have  a  fundamental  speaking  of  Dasein’s 
possibilities of Being, fully engaged not only in thinking but in dealing with a world shared with 
others. We move from word to world to the very being of Dasein itself.
The  investigation  of  Dasein’s  manifestation  in  time  begins  to  answer  the  second 
motivating  methodological  question:  when a  rhetorician  studies  the  “rhetoric  of” something, 
what relation exists between the rhetoric and its thing (or the thing and its rhetoric)? How is the 
rhetorical, as a mode of speaking, related to the world it expresses? In chapter  one, I argued 
placing rhetoric adjacent to the thing implies a distinction between word and matter without 
working out the nature of that distinction. Starting with the structure of time, we will see how 
Heidegger critiques “adjacent” definitions of time and being, and embeds the human experience 
of temporality in all encounters with the material world—that indeed, time is a prerequisite for 
an encounter to occur as such. Matters can matter in many different ways, but those ways are not 
constantly, completely, and simultaneously present. Matters matter  to someone, for something. 
For a rhetorical thing, understood temporally in the context of its matter, the most significant 
aspect of the thing’s concrete facticity is its capacity to be otherwise in the context of changing, 
shared time. 
In the following chapter, I will make a case for reading the early Heidegger as not simply 
an ontologist, but as a  kairologist. By kairologist I mean that Heidegger is concerned with not 
just being, but being and time, and the ways we might access this being through the expression 
of time as an account: as time-for. The mode of speaking that accounts for time and being as it 
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initially  presents  itself—the  origin  of  Dasein’s  speaking—is  in  being-rhetorical.  This 
interpretation  of  time  is  rooted  in  Heidegger’s  lectures  and  publications  leading  up  to  and 
immediately preceding the publication of  Being and Time, roughly defined by a ten year span 
from his  early time as  privatdozen  at  Freiburg through his  professorship at  Marburg (1919-
1929). In chapter two, I will discuss how being-in-movement is taken up in speaking as time, and 
then  turn  to  the  particular  way  of  taking  up  time  that  characterizes  rhetorical  speaking: 
everydayness. 
Language  speaks  time.  The  “Dialogue  on  Language”  begins  with  history,  a 
reappropriation  of  the  past  (in  Burkean  terms,  both  a  selection  and  a  deflection,  and  in 
Heideggerian, a taking up of past and present given a particular now for-the-sake-of-which) that 
prepares the way for questions to come. Surveying his early career, Heidegger concludes that the 
time was not right for him to ask the question of language,
because reflection on language, and on Being, has determined my path of thinking 
from early  on,  therefore  their  discussion  has  stayed  as  far  as  possible  in  the 
background. The fundamental flaw of the book Being and Time is perhaps that I 
ventured forth too far too early (Dialogue 7). 
From where did he venture too early? Heidegger here discards a path. This story of discovery 
and concealment,  of the success  and failure of the word to access Being, will have decisive 
implications for rhetoric’s temporality as distinguished from other modes of language. In short, 
for the early Heidegger, Being speaks and when it speaks it initially and for the most part does so 
rhetorically. For the later Heidegger, Being philosophically waits upon the world in silence, and 
then speaks hesitantly and poetically. This difference is rooted in Dasein’s relationship to time 
and its manifestation in speaking, so it is to time that we first turn.
Time is crucial to what it means to call something rhetorical. The rhetorical is not simply 
posited as adjacent to the thing, but rather expresses the thing in time, according to a distinctive 
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temporality. The thing is not outside of its rhetoric or next to it or surrounded by it. To say that  
an atom is rhetorical is to say that there is something in the concrete, factical realest-of-real atom 
that  is rhetorical. In its concrete facticity, the presence of the thing, what is taken into concern 
and drawn out as relevant for the sake of something is guided by a rhetorical temporality.
First, a brief warning: the following chapter deals with language broadly, and focuses on 
philosophical theories of time. The implications of the concepts outlined below for rhetorical 
study will  be  gestured  towards  but  not  fully  fleshed out  until  I  engage in  a  reading of  the 
Rhetoric in chapters three,  four and five. We need to get key terms out on the table in chapter 
two. The subsequent three chapters will then apply this very particular reading of temporality to 
the context of language in order to show how rhetorical speaking differs ontologically from other 
ways of speaking. The difference lies in Dasein’s way of having and accounting for time, as 
manifest in temporal expression.
2.2 TIME AND TEMPORALITY
Time is not the ticking of a clock or separation of day into hour, minute and second; 
clock-time confuses units of measurement for that which is measured. The capacity to reckon or 
calculate time springs from a more original experience of time in encounters with opportunities 
and possibilities  discovered in the process of caring for the world.  Prior even to “day” as a 
conceptual measurement of time is the observation of sunlight giving way to dusk and dark, 
repeated and made regular. These primordial measurements of movement in time as change are 
motivated by care, and directed toward dealing with the world in our everyday activities.  In the 
experience of time, Dasein is pulled out of itself to encounter its world:
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We first experience the one-after-another in the change of day into night, in the 
movement of the sun, in the way things around us change place, and so on. We 
use  the  sun to  determine  time,  and so,  the  sun is  time.  Time  is  the  sun,  the 
heavens. These statements are not poetic fabrications; they express what one sees 
first of all—as Plato says: Time is the heavens (LQT 278).
In chapter one, I argued that the rhetorical is sometimes defined by adjacency—a thing and its 
rhetoric. In Heidegger’s description of time as a narrative before-and-after first experienced in 
day and night, there has been no adjacency of explanation. Before and after, in light and dark, are 
concrete  and  material.  Time  is in the  heavens.  These  primordial  measurements  of  time  are 
motivated by care, and directed toward dealing with the world in our everyday activities. Time is 
where we say it is, how we say it is.
Rhetoricity maintains an original orientation toward temporality as reoccurrence  that is  
not guaranteed and thus could be otherwise.  The rhetorician is  concerned with time-for, the 
appropriate time: that which, in the present, is essential for history. The rhetorical word refers 
explicitly to this lived time, as already, is and as yet. Kairotic time is time that is given to us and, 
motivated by care,  bids us to find the “right time” to speak. Rhetoricity maintains a distinct 
orientation toward  public time, yet this time is not wholly accessible by all. It cannot become 
fully objectified, open to the eyes of all,  always as it is. Instead, the kairotic seeks to define 
shared, public time as a particular opportune time-for-something.
To understand what it means for Heidegger to say in 1954 that in retrospect, the time was 
not yet right to speak of language, we must first establish the relationship of the word to time—
and  not  any  time  but  the  right  time.  The  opportune  moment  gathers  together  rhetoricity, 
temporality and historicity, and constitutes the “horizon of all rhetorical argument” (Smith 56). 
Initially in the rhetorical horizon, movement becomes understood in another way, as change, a 
shift whereby one thing becomes in some way another. In the survey of temporality, we will see 
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how the thing in movement becomes a thing of possibility, when encountered in a way motivated 
by care for the what and where-for’s of the thing and its movement. This is the moment where 
movement, a simple before-and-afterability, becomes change.
Every account of origins is always already an account of temporality. For Heidegger (and 
for  Heidegger’s  Aristotle),  arche-research  seeks  to  uncover  that  which  remains  constant  or 
endures in beings—persistent being,  not outside of time but in itself  in every moment.  That 
which endures in beings is Being, and that Being is revealed in the very structure of time. In a 
1925 public lecture series on the contributions  of Wilhelm Dilthey to philosophy,  Heidegger 
proclaims that the “fundamental  character  of Dasein is nothing other than time” (Heidegger, 
Dilthey 151). That human beings look to the sun and say there is time reveals Being’s struggle to 
deal with movement as change, and then to seek out what does not change. 
As  Being’s  primary  mode  of  encountering  and  interpreting  the  everyday,  rhetorical 
speaking does not simply add meaning to an extant  and discovered time (the time AND its 
interpretation), because time’s “discoveredness” would indicate that it is already in some way 
meaningful. Instead, the present moment is discovered in the act of appropriating time, making 
movement  and  change  meaningful  as  time-for-something.  There  are  three  key  aspects  of 
temporality: 1) time shows itself in movement; 2) time is structured by care; 3) by taking care, 
Being  temporalizes, that is, Being has time in the form of a unity of past, present and future 
oriented toward a horizon of human action, of “almost, not yet, finally.”
2.2.1 Time as a marking of movement
Let us begin the discussion of time and movement with a brief phenomenological demonstration. 
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Watch as you wave a hand in front of your face. What do you see? The eye does not split the 
sweep of the hand into the presence of a sequence of specific, determinate spatial points, but 
rather  perceives  what  Edmund  Husserl  calls  a  “comet’s  tail,”  the  retention  of  the  past  in 
constitution of the now (32).19 This tail is limited, to be sure, but nevertheless it extends beyond 
itself into the moment before. For the early Heidegger, the question arises: how do we recognize 
this shifting, moving now, and to what extent does the present carry with it both past and future? 
How, in other words, does the present present [Gegenwärtigen] itself? 
It  is  Aristotle,  Heidegger  contends,  who  builds  a  foundation  for  phenomenological 
research by approaching human being and action in such a way that avoids facile distinctions 
between the psychical and the bodily. Time is in movement, present in our immediate experience 
of the world and laid bare in speaking. 
This is to be seen practically, for example, in the way that I move my hand, the 
way that I make a movement with it. One must note that the primary being-there-
function  of bodiliness secures the ground for the full  being of human beings” 
(BCArP 134, emphasis in original).  
Time is not some artifact produced by the human mind; time in the moving hand as moving. 
Time is fully secured to and manifest in bodily, material things.
And  yet,  Aristotle  still  makes  a  distinction  between  the  happening  of  time  and  our 
perception thereof—the representation of time (how we say there is time) versus time itself. This 
distinction,  Heidegger argues, underwrites later,  more radical interpretations of time either as 
subjective  or  objective.  In  Kant,  for  example,  time  is  a  subjective  mental  act  of  ordering 
sensibility (Critique of Pure Reason  370  ). The time of not yet and still to come are products of 
19 The contemporary physiological explanation is essentially that the comet’s tail is a visual artifact: the moving 
hand exceeds the “frame rate” of our visual perceptive apparatus, and thus the moving thing’s definition in space 
blurs. Our eyes are low-def while the world is high-def. If we were engaged in an ontology of modern video 
recording technology, this might be a satisfactory answer, but for my purposes I prefer to see people as people and 
not fleshy metaphorical movie projectors. The comet’s tail is not the marker of absence or visual deficiency of 
human perception as “less than real”—the tail has positive presence.
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consciousness. In this way, Kant follows Descartes in thinking of time as a subjective product of 
the  res cogitans, the thinking being, applied to the  res extensa, objective corporeal being. The 
necessary  ordering  prior to  a  representation  of  the  sensible  both  stands  outside of  the 
surrounding  world  and  precedes that  world.  Moving  along  the  same  basic  path  of  post-
Aristotelian thought, though in the opposite direction, Isaac Newton contends that the constant 
presence of time for human being implies  that  time is  objective insofar as no object  can be 
posited outside of time. Objective calculation of time—progression of eras, ticks of a clock and 
splits of a second—are accessible by all and applicable to all (even if, in the case of milliseconds, 
no longer perceptible by any) and stretch endlessly into past and future. 
For Kant, time begins inside in the marking, for Newton outside in the movement. What 
of the connection, and space, between the two, and the transition between where the self ends 
and rest begins—what William James called “the one great splitting of the universe,” between 
me  and not-me  (41)?  Even  Husserl  draws  an  inviolate  boundary  along  surface  of  the  skin: 
“Between consciousness [res cogitans] and reality [res extensa] there yawns a veritable abyss of 
meaning” (Husserl, cited in Heidegger BPP 124-5). Time is either locked away in the subject or 
always outside as objective physical presence. 
Heidegger’s task is to reclaim time  in movement without relegating time to subjective 
order  or  objective  state.  In  order  to  uncover  meaning  where  Husserl  saw  only  a  chasm, 
Heidegger develops the concept of temporality, of time as account rather than count, a time-for 
in  the place  of  number.  By approaching time as  account,  we will  be in  a  better  position  to 
understand how Dasein accounts for time, and how this accounting demarcates different modes 
of Being and speaking.
Time is as it appears. Time is present to us first of all as movement, a constant transition 
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always in relation to both a before and an after. Time shows itself in the comet’s tail as the relic 
of before (the blur) stretching back from the now (the hand’s position) and even in its future (as 
the eye leads the moving hand, just before). Heidegger roots his initial exploration of time and 
the movement of Dasein in Aristotle’s treatment of time in  Physics Book IV. Drawing from 
Aristotle’s distinction between time, movement, and (ac)counting, Heidegger calls time  “what is  
counted,  showing itself in the following, making present, and counting the moving pointer in  
such a way that making present temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with retaining and awaiting  
horizonally open according to the earlier and later” (BT 386, emphases in original). The present 
is not a particular determination of time, but rather Dasein’s accounting for time determines what 
is present and how it is present. Time is in the counted—the heavens, the hand, the pointer. Thus 
we begin with Heidegger’s “existential and ontological” interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of 
time.20
Aristotle asks: “the 'now' which seems to bound the past and the future—does it always 
remain one and the same or is it always other and other” (Phys.  IV 10 218a9ff  )?  The now is the 
way time shows itself  in experience—the link between the bodily and the psychical remains 
intact,  rather  than  split  off  into  subjective  or  objective  realms:  “[t]ime  is  not  deduced  for 
Aristotle;  both time and its sameness are equally retrieved from the fact of the matter itself” 
(Heidegger, IPR 21). Time is grasped “with an eye to the before and after,” that is, in movement, 
stretching outward (BCArP 198). This movement takes place in a concrete context, a particular 
present that extends out beyond itself to before and after. Heidegger explains that Aristotle’s 
20 Heidegger’s most expansive treatments of Aristotle and time occur in the 1927 summer semester lecture Basic  
Problems of Phenomenology. Section 81 of Being and Time features a condensed version of the same arguments 
(see Kisiel for an extended discussion of the relationship between these two works).  In addition, Heidegger 
summarizes the Aristotelian position again in the summer 1925 lecture, History of the Concept of Time, as well as 
the 1924 monograph “The Concept of Time” (published posthumously) and a shortened public lecture of the same 
name. Heidegger connects temporality to logic as a system of expression in the winter 1925 lecture Logic: The 
Question of Truth.
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condition kata to proteron kai husteron (in the before and after) refers to both time and place, a 
“presented context of places, the point manifold, in the horizon of an ‘away from there—toward 
here’” (BPP 245). For Aristotle, any explanation of time that does not preserve the character of 
movement as dealing with both being and its otherwiseness, from “has been and is not” (there-
before)  to  “going  to  be  and  not  yet”  (here-after)  will  not  hold—these  explanations  cannot 
accurately describe time as it presents itself (as “the fact of the matter”) to human Being. 
Does this otherwiseness of movement from has-been-and-is-not to going-to-be-and-not-yet 
imply that time is “other and other?” Aristotle moves from corporeal argument to conceptual 
argument. Aristotle argues that time cannot be constituted by nows next to one another for the 
same reason that points cannot be laid next to one another in a chain to make a line: points, like 
different nows, are indivisible and without extension, and thus cannot contain a beginning or 
end, before or after.21 There is no span. Pure points cannot extend into space as pure nows cannot 
extend into time. Does this make the now then “one and the same?” If the “now” remains the 
same from one to the next, we would experience the whole of time as simultaneously present. 
Now would be identical with 10,000 years in the past and 10,000 in the future—the now becomes 
pure extension without limit, and again without before or after. We can neither define one “now” 
from the next as pure difference, nor can we call each “now” the same without in each case 
rendering “before” and “after” meaningless.
Aristotle  must  reconcile  the stability of the now extending itself  through time,  and the 
difference between this  particular  now, that which came before,  and that which comes after. 
Time is “both made continuous by the ‘now’ and divided at it” (Phys.   IV    220a  ). This constant 
21 “Nor, again, can a point be in succession to a point or a moment to a moment in such a way that length can be 
composed of points or time of moments: for things are in succession if there is nothing of their own kind 
intermediate between them, whereas that which is intermediate between points is always a line and that which is 
intermediate between moments is always a period of time” (Aristotle,  Phys.   VI 231a21) . 
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transitional marking of movement and change gives time what Heidegger calls a “dual visage”:
To  de  nun  dia  to  kineisthai  to  pheromenon  aiei  heteron,  on  account  of  the 
transition of the moving thing the now is always another, an advance from one 
place to the other. In each now the now is a different one, but still each different 
now is, as now, always now. […] the now is the same with respect to what it 
always  already was—that  is,  in  each now, it  is  now; its  essentia,  its  what,  is 
always  the same—and nevertheless every now is, by its nature, different in its 
now; nowness, being now, is always otherness, being-other” (BPP 247-8). 
As Aristotle notes in Physics Book IV, though moments may be considered separately, because 
they move in succession from one to another, there can be nothing of a different kind in between 
them.  Between “times”  there  is  still  time.  Thus  we can  speak of  a  succession  of  moments, 
understood individually, occurring within a continuum of self-same time.
Though I will expand on the relation between momentary and continuous time later, I want 
to note that continuity and difference in time is a matter of concern for rhetorical practice beyond 
Aristotle. The Sophistic22 Dissoi Logoi is perhaps the clearest example of a temporal ontology of 
rhetoric—that what is, rhetorically, is in the moment. The Dissoi Logoi reinterprets conceptual, 
categorical oppositions between good and bad, honorable and shameful, just and unjust, and true 
and false as ontologically-same rhetorical oppositions—as being the same in dissoi logoi, two-
sided speaking. In the language of this dissertation’s central question: “What does it mean to say 
that the good and bad are dissoi logoi?” Dissoi logoi present the continuity of social expectation 
(the appropriate) and the difference of situation (perspective, time and place, intent, prevailing 
belief) before the moment of judgment: is this, was this or will this be good or bad, honorable or 
shameful,  just or unjust,  true or false? Is it the right act  at the right time? In context of the 
kairotic moment, the conceptual oppositions between good and bad give way to ontologically-
shared  rhetoricity—their  sameness—as  dissoi  logoi.  Like  time’s  expression  in  the  now,  the 
22 Controversy abounds over the proper dating of the Dissoi Logoi, with estimates ranging from the late 5th century 
BC, to the early first century CE, and even a case for the late Byzantine (Bailey 249). It will suffice to say for my 
purposes that the Dissoi Logoi is strongly representative of a Sophistic perspective.
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rhetorical has a dual visage whose Being is Being-other. Good and bad are not the same in the 
sense that things are simultaneously good and bad, or neutral, but rather are  possibly so when 
standing before a decision. Even murder is, in a particular context, acceptable. What stays the 
same in the opposition between good and bad, honorable and shameful, just and unjust, and true 
and false, interpreted rhetorically rather than conceptually, is in essentia that they are capable at 
each moment of being otherwise. Across time and circumstance, the good becomes bad and vice 
versa.
Movement does not move itself, Aristotle reminds us, beings move. At each moment in its 
movement, a being carries in it reference to what it is not, its before (that which it was) and after 
(that which it  becomes).  We mark the transition of something from…towards…, different  in 
each moment, but continuous as being-in-movement. “The συνεχές [the continuous] occurs when 
the limit of the one that touches the other is one and the same limit” (Heidegger PS 79). Each 
now  as  a  now  reaches  into  before  and  after,  without  intermediary:  “Time  is  a  whole  and 
continuous; the past, present and future are linked” (Aristotle   Cat.   VI    5a7  ). Duration is thus a 
product of the continuity of time that stretches from one moment to the next, in the same way 
that  continuity  “makes  up  the  principle”  of  magnitude  in  terms  of  bodies—they  are  both 
“determinations of co-presence.” 
Time and movement are not the same; time is  expressed in motion: “we apprehend time 
only when we have marked motion” (Phys.   IV 11 219a21 ). Aristotle describes even “losing track 
of time,” failing to mark motion, as a definite happening. Time is grounded in the perception of 
motion, and when motion goes unmarked, time  seems to disappear. Even in its disappearance, 
time is. Left unmarked, time was present in such a way that it disappeared from view. 
With movement, time approaches and recedes from the one who marks: “If, then, the non-
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realization of the existence of time happens to us when we do not distinguish any change, but the 
soul seems to stay in one indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has 
elapsed” (Aristotle,  Phys.   IV 218b , emphasis added). We are within-time to such an extent that, 
though time is perceived by us as motion, even our perception of rest happens in time. “Even 
when we are not experiencing something moving in the sense of some entity presently at hand, 
nevertheless motion is taken in the broadest sense, hence time, is unveiled for us in experiencing 
our own self” (Heidegger BPP 254). Losing track of time is a particular way of having time and 
marking  it,  though  what  is  marked  is  ultimately  absence  or  non-realization  (as  when  one 
struggles with forgetfulness).
Time  is  not  the  same  as  movement,  but  neither  is  it  independent  (Phys.   IV 219a2ff  ). 
Movement is an attribute of time insofar as movement is not identical with time but rather is how 
time shows itself, in how the thing appears, most often articulated the form of counting. Time is 
what we call our marking of movement (Phys.  IV 223a25f  ). As noted above, Aristotle relies upon 
we  say about time’s passage, how time is apprehended and expressed in relation to what has 
come before and what lies ahead:
When, therefore, we perceive the ‘now’ as one, and neither as before and after in 
a motion or as an identity but in relation to a ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ no time is 
thought to have elapsed, because there has been no motion either. On the other 
hand, when we do perceive a ‘before’ and an ‘after,’ then  we say that there is 
time” (219a30ff, emphasis added).
Accounting for time embeds the phenomenon not only in the realm of presentation (perception) 
but in articulation (the count). Yet even in the articulation, “now” is simply a manner of speaking 
about transition that seems to hold “now” still: “That time is a limit in the sense that I say that  
motion ceases, stands still, in a now—this is a sumbebekos: it is only an attribute of the now, but 
it does not reach its essential nature” (Heidegger, BPP 251). This essential nature of the now is in 
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transition. “That which is bounded [ ριζόμενον, made definite or limited] by the now we callὀ  
time”  (Phys.   IV    219a30  ).  The  now  marks/bounds/defines  time.  The  now,  in  other  words, 
temporalizes.
Counting off marks time, but the marking-off of hours and days are only how  we say 
there is time, not time itself. Aristotle sharply distinguishes between the determination of time 
and the numbers with which we count: “Time obviously is what is counted, not that with which 
we count: these are different kinds of things” (Physics  IV   219b8f  ).  Time cannot be the sum total 
of movement between fixed coordinates because it lacks a determined beginning or end. That we 
assign a time-code to a particular “now” is not definitive of that now. As Aristotle argues, in the 
same way that the number of horses present in a place does not define “horse,” measurements of 
time in days, hours and seconds do not constitute “time.” Counting-off is a particular possible 
articulation of temporality, time-for-us. As we will see, however, the objective time of the clock 
is  quite  different  from the kairological  temporality  of rhetoricity.  The original  experience of 
accounting for time is made manifest in bodiliness and expression: the taking, making, or losing 
of time in caring for things in a world. This origin is obscured if we mistake time for ticks of a 
clock.
2.2.2 Time and care
If time is that which we count, care makes time count, and further moves Being-there to account 
for  time.  Aristotle  argues  that  time  “belongs  to  movement”  in  two ways:  first,  time  allows 
movement  to  be  marked  as  before-there  and  after-here,  and  second,  time  itself  moves  in 
transition from before to now and towards after. Heidegger defines time as “a specific mode of  
movedness in the sense of a character that not only makes movedness possible, releasing it from 
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within, but co-constitutes it as itself moving in an autonomously factical way” (PIA 103). This 
thing goes from here to there, from and to. We now say it was, it is, it will be. In its moving, the  
world—and our place in it—comes to be in time. 
What  is  this  movement  that  temporality  makes  possible—what  moves Dasein  to  mark 
time? Heidegger calls care “the basic sense of the movement of factical life” that initially draws 
Dasein out of itself toward the world as it “goes about its dealings” (PICA 115, emphasis in 
original).  Temporality  marks  not  just  the  happening  but  the  sense of  movement  in  care—
movement as for-the-sake-of something.  The “being of Da-sein itself is to be made visible as 
care” (BT 53), and this primary movement is articulated as temporality.  Time belongs to the 
movement of care.
There is, however, also no movement outside of temporality, without a marking of before 
and after. Being moves because it is drawn outside of itself toward the world by the ecstatic 
nature of temporality. The “now” has a dual visage: it is constituted by before and after, drawn 
out of itself, and contains both presence and absence. It is for this reason that Heidegger calls 
temporality “the ekstatikon par excellence. Temporality is the primordial ‘out of itself’ in and for  
itself” (BT 302, emphasis in original). In  Being and Time, Heidegger describes Dasein’s two 
primordial  movements,  thrownness  and  anticipatory  resoluteness,23 as  a  pull  and  a  push 
corresponding to before and after, both held within the now. Thrownness, one’s existence in a 
world already underway, pulls Dasein back into what has been (or what has been said). Being 
interprets.  Anticipatory  resoluteness  pushes  Dasein  ahead  of  itself  toward  the  future.  In 
anticipatory resoluteness, Being stands open to the possibilities at hand as the now changes, and 
becomes  otherwise  from moment  to  moment.  Being  awaits.  In  having-been  and  becoming, 
23 “Anticipatory resoluteness”[vorlaufende Entschlossenheit] give way to “openness” [Gelassenheit] in Heidegger’s 
later work, deemphasizing temporality.
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Dasein is directed outside of itself toward its possibilities, as constituted through that which (and 
where) it has been before. What is at issue, then, is how the movement of care temporalizes the 
world by giving an account.
In chapter one, I argued that rhetoricity deals with that which has the capacity to change in 
time,  but  up  until  this  point,  we  have  concerned  ourselves  with  movement.  What  is  the 
relationship? Aristotle distinguishes between movement and change. Change (metabole) is a kind 
of movement (kinesis), but not all movement implies change. Movement  as change expresses 
that something towards which we are already concerned is capable of being otherwise than it is. 
The thing is significant in its capacity to change. To mark change, Being must be able to claim 
that a thing is, but is in such a way that attends to the insecurity of our claim—that it could be 
otherwise as well, and otherwise in determinate ways. Thus Being must attend to and care for 
how something is in time.
Care  has  three  constitutive  factors:  existence,  facticity  and  fallenness.  By  existence, 
Heidegger  simply means that,  as living,  Being takes up certain possibilities of action.  Being 
moves,  does,  copes,  and  cares.  Both  thrownness  (acting  already)  and  anticipatory  resolve 
(readying to act) presume that Dasein  can act,  and moreover is  disposed toward action, be it 
playing catch-up or running ahead. Temporality is not a product  of existence, but is existence 
itself in Dasein’s being drawn out of itself while taking in presence (LQT 168). 
These  possibilities  of  action  exist  in  concrete,  determinate  ways  for  each  being—as 
factical. Care is not experienced without context, as though it were some sort of fog of vague 
apprehension.  Possibilities  are  determinate,  laid  out  before  one  concretely  rather  than  idly 
imagined. Care is directed toward specific situations taken to be objectively present. Care is care-
about and care-for  something. Being-there cares for things that are at hand and close by—that 
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with which Being-there dwells. Dwelling is both regional and temporal, as Heidegger writes in 
the notes to BCArP, 
There = being-present, being-completed, being-here in the now, in a presence, in 
being-present, being-there-having, abiding with…
Abiding, being-in precisely the there of living. A stone does not abide, it 
happens. But an animal: ‘It abides’ in its heart! Θιγε ν and φή:ῖ ἀ 24 primary and 
primitive  being-in.  ‘Dwelling’!  Ο σία,  ‘household’!  ‘In’=’abiding with…,’  cf.ὐ  
Grimm!  Primary  hermeneutical  category not  at  all  spatial  as  being  contained, 
contained in…With-which of abiding! (257-8).
Dwelling then indicates a particular way of knowing and interacting with the things at hand, 
which is not merely in a world but has a world. Dasein presses upon the world, and the world 
presses back (Heidegger, OET 185). Taken together, existence and facticity indicate that Dasein 
is simultaneously “occupied in its existence with this being” and “occupied with its ability-to-be-
in-the-world,” that is, Being-there is occupied with both beings and Being (BPP 270). Heidegger 
refers to this dual structure of care as the twofold. We can see the twofold at work in the earlier 
definition of time as a mode of movedness as both a factical happening (the count), and as the 
ability to say that movement happens (accounting: confronting time in the course of taking care).
Care, as constituted by existence and facticity, is an inclination toward the world. The 
world in which Being-there dwells, however, is not its own—this world is shared, entangled with 
others so tightly that it cannot be fully untied. This entanglement offers the movement of care a 
second possibility or countermovement: Being recoils (Brogan 19).  The recoiling of Being does 
not indicate a lack of care. Rather, avoidance of Being initiates itself in care—one may respond 
to the definite, concrete possibilities of movement by refusing, omitting, overlooking, avoiding, 
delaying. One puts off or delegates judgment. As movement, fallenness retreats from the world 
24 Thigein: to grasp. In the Metaphysics Aristotle uses thigein to describe the disclosive work of noesis (Berti 100). 
As ‘supposing,’ nous has a particular type of grasp upon the world (BCArP.139). Aphe: in the Metaphysics, in 
contact or touching. Motion, for example, is not divisible into discrete acts in contact or touching one another 
(Aristotle  Metaphysics  1016a 5ff  ). As will be discussed later, Heidegger tends to use tactile metaphors when 
discussing nowness as presence.
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at hand, and temporally becomes the slave of the clock. Without a “for-the-sake-of,” Dasein can 
only fill or kill time, second-by-second and minute-by-minute.
While Heidegger is critical of the ways in which fallenness robs Dasein of its possibilities 
(e.g. doing something in a certain way because “that is how it has always been done”), he never 
suggests that fallenness is avoidable. Fallenness belongs to Being-there as its countermovement. 
Appeals to an imagined ideal world of purely authentic Being-there, Heidegger charges, engage 
in the same sort of superficial thinking the appellants claim to avoid: 
This characteristic of movement [fallenness] is not an evil feature of life appearing 
from time to time and able to be eradicated in more progressive, happier times of 
human culture. This is so little the case that such approaches to human Dasein in 
terms of an attainable perfection and a paradisiacal naturality are themselves only 
extensions of this very inclination toward falling into the world. Here one closes 
one’s eyes to the ownmost character of movement belonging to life and views life 
in a worldly manner as an object of dealings able to be produced in some ideal 
form.  That  is,  one views it  as  the toward-which of  simple  concern  (Heidegger 
Dilthey 117).
To go further, though it is marked by a deficiency or absence (an overlooking), fallenness is still  
grounded in Dasein’s fundamental mode of temporality. As fallen, Being-there entirely concerns 
itself with the now, recoiling from what has been and will be, losing itself in the flux of “other 
and other.” In other words, concerns with beings generally and for the most part eclipse care for 
Being-there’s ability to be. One sacrifices Being to the concern with beings. But Being-there 
must be able to move in two ways, both toward and away from the world. Without the possibility 
of recoiling, Being-there would never have to make a decision, never see  this time as right or 
wrong. Without the capacity to decide between approaching or withdrawing, there can be no 
authentic Being. The point of decision is crucial for the rhetorical, which deals explicitly with 
both  the  everyday  language  (and  temporality)  of  what  “they  say”  and  with  the  particular 
possibilities  available  for  decision.  Imagining  Dasein  unburdened  by  entanglement  and 
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fallenness  is  as  fruitless  as  fantasizing  about  human  being  freed  from death.  Despite  their 
fruitlessness, both are rather popular.25
Circumspection (Heidegger’s translation for phronesis) is the mode of care directed toward 
the latter half of the twofold, care toward the ability-to-be (Being). Circumspection cultivates a 
capacity to encounter the present and its possibilities. By being circumspect, Dasein momentarily 
overcomes  (but  never  eradicates)  the  tendency  toward  fallenness.  The  temporality  of 
circumspection addresses the present not as a bare “now” in an endless series of nows, but as an 
opportune moment.  Circumspection attends to the  way in which Dasein actively engages the 
world, so that the “with-which of dealings is in advance grasped as..., oriented to..., interpreted 
and laid out as...” (Heidegger, Dilthey 115). The present is made visible as presence in authentic 
care—the moment is at hand: “Resolute, Da-sein has brought itself back out of falling prey in 
order  to  be  all  the  more  authentically  ‘there’  for  the  disclosed  situation  in  the  ‘Moment’ 
[Augenblick] (BT 301-2). 
In the structure of time, we see the structure of Dasein itself. Taken together, the three 
factors of care illustrate that, as existing, Dasein goes about its dealings in a particular shared 
world. Temporalizing accounts for time-for-something, as something that moves and in which 
Being moves. Here, we have gotten ahead of ourselves. If, by accounting, Dasein temporalizes, 
what makes this accounting possible in the first place? We have established that temporality is 
expressed, but not  how it  is expressed. Entwined, language and temporality bridge Husserl’s 
abyss: “Only where temporality temporalizes itself, does language happen; only where language 
happens, does temporality temporalize itself” (LQCEL 140). In order to isolate the structural 
elements  of  time,  Heidegger  looks to  the  way people speak about  time—how time is  made 
25 Or as Heidegger himself puts the joke: “I stress ‘human’ because in philosophy we really must stop confusing 
ourselves with the good God—unlike Hegel, for whom that confusion is a principle” (LQT 222). 
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manifest in human expression. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger identifies four 
key elements  of  temporality  as  structured  by care:  significance,  datability,  spannedness,  and 
publicness.26 These elements are  necessary conditions for the speaking of time, and  all share 
care’s dual possibilities of movement:  significance, datability,  spannedness, and publicness all 
move toward caring for time or falling away into the They. 
2.2.3 The structure of time: Significance, datability, spannedness, publicness
Expressed time has a “character of for-the-sake-of and the in-order-to,” articulated in terms of 
appropriateness:  “[t]ime  is  always  time  as  the  right  time  or  the  wrong  time”  (BPP  271). 
Heidegger  terms  this  time-for  of  care  and  circumspection  kairological.  As  opposed  to 
indifferently  encountering  an  “uninterrupted  succession  of  nows”  (BT  388),  Heidegger’s 
emphasis upon the right-time-for indicates that Being-there is always already making sense out 
of time using the terms of the world to hand. Past, now, and future are ecstatically present in the 
situation, even if they are present as missing, forgotten, and awaited. Rather than experiencing 
past, present and future as discrete and objective, temporality articulates time as “not yet, as to 
be…for the first time, as already, as approaching, as until now, as for the time being, as finally” 
(OHF  78).  Significance,  datability,  spannedness,  and  publicness  enable  Dasein  to  express, 
interpret and address temporality. 
Significance. As a movement, care draws Dasein out of itself from past to future. But this 
movement is not haphazard—it is guided by a particular “whereto.” This “whereto” interprets the 
world as something that coheres together. Our world is the shared region in which we dwell with 
26 Being and Time includes only three elements: datability, spannedness and publicness. Significance is subsumed in 
the broader concept of care. I prefer to keep significance in view to emphasize that time is already meaningful, and 
it is in the context of this meaningfulness that we date particular moments, observe the span in between, and share 
this time with others.
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things at hand that point out of themselves, as being-for, or being-conducive-to discovered by 
circumspection. “We understand such matters as the in-order-to, the contexture of in-order-to or 
being-for, which we call the contexture of significance [Bedeutsamkeit]” (BPP 165). The things 
to  which  we  are  drawn  immediately  “in-order-to”  mean  something  to  us  already.  By 
contextualizing objects in terms of “in-order-to, what-for, for-that, and for-the-sake-of-which” 
significance  makes a world within the movement of factical life (BT 333). Significance orders 
and gives (or denies) meaning to the other inhabitants of the world, addressing both beings and 
Being. Even encountering objects as bare facts or mere things is possible only within particular 
interpretive schemas:
Objects  are  originally  there  for  one  as  objects  having  significance,  whereas 
objects in the sense of mere things and facts first emerge from the world as it is 
factically  encountered  (i.e.,  out  of  what  has  significance)  within a  multistage 
process of theorizing directed to the world in a particular manner. Factical life 
moves at any time within a certain state of having-been-interpreted that has been 
handed down to it, and it has reworked or worked out anew (PICA 115).
Janus-faced care presents another movement between authenticity and fallenness—confronted by 
a world structured by significance, one may engage circumspectly by attending to interpretation, 
but one may also rely on the interpretations handed down by others. One may deal with either 
one or both of the twofold of beings and Being.
In  the  specific  context  of  temporality,  significance  marks  time  as  time-for-doing-
something: “Time as right and wrong time has the character of significance” (BPP 262). Right or 
wrong time is already meaningful for us as time-for-something. Futurally, Being expresses time 
as “for the sake of” something to come, that which has been as “in the face of,” with the now 
present as “in-order-to” (BT 333-4, see also  BPP 270-271). The right and wrong time express 
dealings in the world as horizonal (directed outward along a ray of possibility), and in doing so 
demarcates both the world, and Dasein itself: “expressed time here is simultaneously that  for 
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which the Dasein uses itself, for the sake of which the Dasein itself is” (BPP 270).
Datability. This investigation of time began with Aristotle’s claim that the now contains 
not a past and future, but a before and after (proteron and husteron). The difference between the 
two, of course, is while “past” and “future” refer solely to the passage of time in the abstract, 
“before”  and  “after”  implies  a  relation  of  time  to  doings  in  the  world.  More  specifically, 
“before,” “now,” and “after” all express time in the context of movement. Datability refers to this 
seemingly self-evident “before-and-afterability” that expresses time in terms of relation. Now is 
neither  an undifferentiated slice of time nor a link in a  chain of succession—it  is  this  now, 
though we rarely ever express this particularity: “every ‘then’ is as such a ‘then, when…’; every 
‘on  that  former  occasion’  is  an  ‘on  that  former  occasion  when…’;  every  ‘now’  is  a  ‘now 
that….’” (Heidegger, BPP 263). 
Datability expresses time as happening: “what is more a matter of course than that by the 
now we mean ‘now, when this or that exists or is happening’” (Heidegger, BPP 263)? We can 
now better understand what Aristotle means by “that which is bound inside the now.” Dating 
expresses presence within time—this now. Past and future are presented within time as well, as 
the former occasion when such and such has happened and or as then, when such and such will 
happen. Each indicates  both present and absent being: that which has come before,  and that 
which  comes  later,  and thus  is  horizonal.  This  happening  is  what  we mean  by the  present  
moment—a  time  at  hand,  available  to  the  factical,  concrete  Being.  Datability  allows  us  to 
experience time, then, as other in relation to other.
Spannedness. The moments expressed as happening in “on the former occasion,” “now,” 
and “then,” are not strung up against one another like beads in a necklace. Even when described 
as a sequence, there is an in-between. Happenings unfold across durations of time. The now is 
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not reducible to a point, but rather “every now, then, and at-the-time not only has, each, a date 
but is spanned and stretched within itself: ‘now, during the lecture,’ ‘now, during the recess’ 
(Heidegger, BPP 264). In saying “on the former occasion,” “now,” and “then” we speak of a 
certain span of time, a transition from and toward the moment articulated as a date. Between the 
former occasion and now there is a “meanwhile,” the now itself stretches out into “during,” and 
between now and then there is an awaiting. This expression of time has its origin in the ecstatic  
character of temporality: 
Since  every  expecting  has  the  character  of  coming-toward-oneself  and  every 
retaining the character of back-to, even if in the mode of forgetting, and every 
coming-toward-self is intrinsically a back-to, temporality qua ecstatic is stretched  
out within its own self (BPP 269-270). 
In other words, each moment in time, we bring what has been into our expectations for futural 
horizons,  as  well  as  a  futural  projection  toward  what  has  been.  Each horizon of  possibility 
stretches outside itself, leaving no pure past, future or present. In marking the beginning and end 
of movement, temporality also marks the span of that movement as duration.
Spannedness  and  datability  are  connected  with  one  another.  The  “now”  is  dated  in 
relation  to  before  and  after,  and  so  extends  outside  of  itself.   Spannedness  constitutes  this 
extension that reaches out into the next moment. This span, too, is datable. What Heidegger calls 
a “primary then,” a particular moment one is awaiting, can be further articulated into other “from 
then…untils” (BT 376). While working on this chapter (primary then), I will now write about 
spannedness and then write about publicness. Dating articulates the span of the now. “Now, in 
the present age” implies a much greater span than does “Now I am waiting for the kettle to boil.”  
The “stretchiness” of time allows it to be accounted for in various ways, but not in infinite ways. 
Now is now-that something is happening, a reference to the now in which “we can articulate the 
stretching out of time always only in specific ways” (Heidegger, BPP 249). “Now, while I am at 
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the  dentist’s  office”  ends  with  my departure  from the  building  when  the  appointment  ends 
instead of extending indefinitely into the future. 
Publicness. The now is expressed, even if not said aloud, when we account for time. But 
accounting cannot happen in isolation. As Dasein’s world is shared with others, so is its time. Up 
until this point, we have seen the ways in which Dasein orients itself toward its ownmost time—
that of its caring circumspect dealing with the world. Time, however, is not an invention of a 
singular being. It is always already before us as significance, already underway as both spanned 
and datable in a shared world filled with other beings.  Others are also in time with us; we can 
talk about now, before and after, and everyone will basically understand what we mean. 
We can express public time because the particular dating, spannedness, and significance 
need not neatly match up with one another. As I write “now,” my now will certainly be dated 
differently from that of the reader, and yet we are both still in the now. Indeed, we are made a we 
in  this  now!  “Although  each  one  of  us  utters  his  own now,  it  is  nevertheless  the  now for 
everyone. The accessibility of the now for everyone, without prejudice to the diverse datings, 
characterize time as public” (Heidegger, BPP 264). The problem arises, however, when public 
accessibility obscures the world-making capacities of spannedness, datability and significance. 
Being-there has time, originally experiencing time as time-for. In contrast, public time seems to 
be  outside  of  us,  assuming  what  Heidegger  calls  a  “peculiar  objectivity”  in  which  the  now 
“belongs neither to me nor to anyone else, but it is somehow there. There is time, time is given, it 
is  extant,  without  our  being  able  to  say  how  and  where  it  is”  (BPP  264).  Time  becomes 
significant  only as  bare  fact,  indifferent  to  span or  date,  ticks  alone.  The abyss  of  meaning 
between the res cogitans and the res extensa yawns again—time moves outside of us.
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It  is  important  to  underline here that  we would be faced with the same chasm were 
temporality  not  public. We are initially and for the most part within public time. Indeed, only 
publicness of time enables Being-there to grasp the now in its ecstatic temporality stretching out 
into meaningful before and after: 
The now is not the sort of thing that only one or another of us could somehow 
find  out;  it  is  not  something  about  which  one of  us  might  perhaps  know but 
another might not; rather, in the Daseins’ being-with-one-another itself, in their 
communal  being-in-the-world, there is already present the unity of temporality 
itself as open for itself” (Heidegger, BPP 270).
To say that we are together is always to say that we are together now, that we are present to one 
another. The publicness of time holds a shared world together. As Heidegger notes in Being and 
Time,  one orients oneself  toward time in taking care,  so “it  must  somehow be available  for 
everyone” (377). Indeed, circumspection demands that one attend to the world as it  presents 
itself in “definite, factical possibilities,” and that includes as public and shared. Even expressing 
time as “right” and “wrong” indicates  that  time lies  before us,  accessible  by all  and wisely 
chosen by some. To go further, any circumspect dealing with time, any heeding the right and 
wrong time, must properly account for publicness—first discovering “what is factically possible 
in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible as one’s ownmost potentiality-of-being in the they” 
(BT 275). Circumspection presumes a capacity to negotiate one’s own public, shared time with 
others, and it is in this shared time wherein Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-of-being” is first 
discovered.
Taken together then, the structures of significance, datability, spannedness and publicness 
provide  the  basic  requirements  for  Being  to  mark  movement  in  time.  First,  attending  to  a 
particular thing-that-moves requires that the thing have meaning already—it must be significant. 
Next, the happening of movement must be attributable to a moment in time as a date to be able to 
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distinguish between “formerly, when the movement started” and “then, when it ceased.” A span 
is implied in between these dated moments (and even within those moments themselves), giving 
movement  a  duration.  Finally,  the  terms  used  to  articulate  movement  must  be  available  in 
advance to Being-there and thus publicly accessible. We do not invent movement, but we mark it 
for ourselves.
2.2.4 Dasein temporalizes: understanding, attunement, entanglement, discourse
Dasein  temporalizes:  it  marks  the  time  of  the  world  through  engagement  with  that  world, 
interpreting the now in such a way that “now” has particular possibilities open to it in the context 
of before and after. Significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness first make it possible to 
address the world as a world in time. In temporalizing, Being-there engages in the interpretive 
presencing  of  the  world:  “[t]he  making  present  that  interprets  itself,  that  is,  what  has  been 
interpreted and addressed in the ‘now,’ is what we call ‘time’” (BT 375). Having, appropriating  
and losing time, encountering a world and undertaking a project are all articulations of the Greek 
middle  voice,  between passive and active,  indicating  that  one participates  in  that  which one 
undergoes. It is both with and before one. It is neither the passivity of determination nor the 
activity of pure agency. In accounting, Dasein can either make or lose time for itself. In this 
section I  will  investigate  the four modes of interpreting and addressing time:  understanding, 
attunement,  entanglement  and  discourse.  Temporalizing,  as  the  fundamental  work  of 
interpretation of time, is how “there” becomes a world, that is, how “there” is opened for Being-
there as a place in which it dwells. When Heidegger says that Dasein is temporality, he means 
that  the  “there”  of  Being-there  always  implies  “there-now.”  Understanding,  attunement, 
entanglement and discourse are modes in which the “now” constitutes its “there.”
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As explained above, the now of temporality is ecstatic and horizonal. Grounded in the 
marking of movement, temporality contains a unity of before, now, and after, which remains in 
transition. Motivated by care, Being is moved out of itself, but this movement is not haphazard 
or random. The ecstasies contain a horizon, a “whereto” for which circumspection provides the 
“wherefore.” Attunement, understanding and entanglement articulate this “whereto” in discourse 
that “concerns the not-yet-present, speaks about what has-happened-already, treats the existing-
there-right-now” (BCArP 90). Each mode of interpretation orients itself to a primary ecstasy of 
time. The primary ecstasy modifies or shapes the unity, constituting “now” and the possibilities 
presently open to it given the concrete situation. The primary ecstasy does not eclipse the others, 
but articulates before, now, and after in the terms of a specific whereto.
Dasein  is  primarily  futural  in  its  orientation—it  encounters  the  now  in  terms  of 
possibilities for being and becoming. Understanding articulates Being’s projection toward certain 
possibilities in terms of “for the sake of something.” In understanding, the now is encountered as 
on the way to or from becoming-otherwise, but the possibilities of becoming belong to Being in 
the now. In other words, “Da-sein always is as it can be” (BT 309). This futural “for the sake of” 
is not  fully determinate. Understanding still takes place in the now and responds to that which 
has been. That for the sake of which one cares may very well prove short-sighted or wanting. 
New concerns may arise, and events may force themselves upon one. In these situations, the 
future does not disappear—it changes, or becomes otherwise.  Given the changeability of the 
future,  Being must  have all  its  possibilities  available  as given in  its  There.   “Understanding 
constitutes the being of the There in such a way that,  on the basis of such understanding, a 
Dasein in existing can develop the various possibilities of sight, of looking around, and of just 
looking” (BT 309).
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Attunement  is  primarily  oriented  toward the  having-been.  As  thrown into  the  world, 
Being-there finds itself already in a particular way. Dasein encounters possibilities “in the face” 
of what has been. This concrete and non-objective having-been Heidegger calls mood. “Mood 
represents the way in which I am always primarily the being that has been thrown” (BT 312). To 
say  that  attunement  is  how  one  finds  oneself  before  the  world,  as  having-been,  is  not 
contradicted  by  Dasein’s  futural  direction  nor  its  existence  in  the  now.  Instead,  “[m]ood 
temporalizes itself, that is its specific ecstasy belongs to a future and a present, but in such a way 
that having-been modifies the equiprimordial ecstasies” (BT 313). One may be disposed toward 
seeing the future as promising or as forbidding.
More often than not, moodedness escapes us because it is preconceptual—mood stands 
before logos. In an elevated mood, being is easy—the future is bright, the now harmonious with 
its past. The world is as it should be. In an anxious mood, being becomes difficult. In the now,  
but burdened by her past, one worries about and attempts to evade the future. The future, for the 
anxious person, is presently worrisome. Because Being-there projects what it has been upon the 
present preconceptually, moodedness can hide behind what one takes to be objective presence. 
We do not  say that  we are  having a  difficult  time  with life,  but  that  life  itself  is  difficult. 
Attunement,  then,  is  a  cultivated  awareness  of  mood.  By  working  with  understanding, 
attunement “gives light to each mood, each passion, each affect” (Heidegger BPP 281).
Entanglement  constitutes  Dasein’s  present.  Depending  on  Dasein’s  direction  of 
movement, the present may present itself as a Moment, or as lost to flux and novelty. In the 
fallen form, understanding and attunement are thinned out into curiosity—a directionless interest 
in the now that  fades quickly with time as Dasein seeks what is always  new. Entanglement 
engages with things here now for the sake of now-ness, not for the sake of the thing, and with 
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change for the sake of change, rather than change for the sake of becoming. As the mode of 
Dasein’s existence in  the present,  entanglement  cannot  be wished away but  must  instead be 
worked through. In entanglement, Dasein is confronted by its own self as lost in the other-and-
other  and  its  always-newness.  Dasein  first  finds  itself  in  entanglement.  Thus,  Dasein’s 
overcoming of  entanglement  must  arise  from  within entanglement  as  the  necessary  prior 
condition.
Finally, discourse is not structured by a particular ecstasy of temporality but, as speaking, 
privileges the present. In the act or happening of speaking, we may address what has been or is to 
yet to come, but this act draws the ecstatic directions of time into the now and in so doing brings 
the present into expression. Discourse gathers together the world in presence, but this world is 
one that is explicitly shared with others. In discourse, we express time as not entirely our own 
but rather as drawing together a unity of speakers, hearers and matters. “A discourse has reached 
its end only when it is taken in communication” (Heidegger, BCArP 84). Discourse itself moves, 
in giving and taking amongst the speaker expressing his/herself to someone about something. 
Dasein is its time: Dasein confronts its possibilities as laid out in factically determinate 
ways,  encountered in  the course of existing,  and expressed as a  process of moving from-to, 
absorbed in concern. “If life, then motion, kinēsis. If motion, then time” (Struever 108). Moving 
backwards, we go from the speaking of time to the primal and original condition of human living
—its Being. In attending to its ownmost possibilities in the given situation,  Dasein becomes 
circumspective towards its time: time can be right or wrong. Dasein sees itself in presence here 
and now, as lost and uncertain amongst others, out of step in time, yet searching for the right 
time. The immediately present is taken into the Moment and opened up, as Dasein is moved from 
entangled concern to genuine care. 
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The discussion of time began with that which initially lies before us and points the way: 
how we say there is time. We say that time contains a before and after contained in the now. 
Before  and  after  are  revealed  in  movement  and  change,  and  appear  in  articulation—an 
accounting for time. Being is moved to account for time by care, drawn out of itself by being 
disposed to action in existence, dealing with the concrete and already-existing in facticity and 
recoiling in fallenness. As encountered in care, time is given to Dasein as temporality, and this 
temporality  is  characterized  by  four  elements:  significance  (for-what),  datability 
(before/now/then-when), spannedness (from-until) and publicness (availability at hand). Dasein 
temporalizes: it brings into presence in taking care, through understanding what is to be, attuning 
to  be  properly  disposed  to  what  lies  before  one  already,  entangling  itself  in  the  now  and 
addressing its shared being in time with others in discourse. Kairos, as a way of having time (as 
right/wrong time or opportune/inopportune moments), expresses Dasein’s being-moved to care 
for  its  own  time.  In  orienting  itself  toward  the  opportune  moment  [Augenblick],27 Dasein 
confronts its entanglement in concern for the now and encounters time in its authentic Being. We 
have not yet seen, however,  how this confrontation is possible in the first place, and what one 
confronts.
27 “Opportune moment” is a non-standard translation of Augenblick, though it better captures the evaluative sense of 
kairos. The majority of translators render this term in English as “the Moment,” or the “instant” (Stambaugh, BT 
xvi; Pöggeler, “Destruction and Moment” 137; Brogan 176; McNeill 44-46), however I have chosen to use Schrag’s 
(Experience and Being   70  ;  Communicative Praxis   206-207  ) addition of “opportune” to emphasize that Dasein’s 
temporality is directed-toward-something. The Moment is always a moment-for-something, as temporality is “time 
for...”  (BT  379),  conditioned  by  the  appropriate.  In  other  words,  “opportune moment”  makes  the  connection 
between  Augenblick, kairōs and  kairological  time  explicit.  And  indeed,  on  the  rare  occasion  that  Heidegger 
translates kairōs into German, he uses Augenblick: 
Schon Aristoteles  hat  das Phänomen des  Augenblicks,  den   καιρός,  gesehen und im VI.  Buch 
seiner  «Nikomachischen  Ethik»  umgrenzt,  aber  widerurm  so,  daß  es  ihm  nicht  gelang,  den  
spezifischen Zeitcharakter des καιρός mit dem in Zusammenhang zu bringen, was er sonst als Zeit  
(ν νῦ ) kennt. (DGP 408). 
[Sheehan translates the passage in BPP to read “Aristotle already saw the phenomenon of the 
instant [Augenblick], the kairos, and he defined it in the sixth book of his Nicomachean Ethics; 
But, again, he did it in such a way that he failed to bring the specific time character of the kairos 
into connection with what he otherwise knows as time (nun)” (288).]
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Heidegger’s account of time leaves us with a bit of a conundrum: what is to be done with 
the present? How can Dasein overcome fallenness without severing contact with the immediate 
and factical? Dasein draws out of itself in the ecstatic reach of time—to the shared, initial and 
open public time, regulated through familiarity and repetition. Time is in the heavens, in the light 
and dark, and in the human struggle with existence. As kairotic, we address time in own being 
and ability to be. We cannot lose sight of presence in the present, or resign the present to status 
of a partial and indeterminate middle-ground between the already and the as-yet.  Presence is not 
a construct of consciousness or a natural, physical essence. Presence is as it is marked by time.
Heidegger finds the genuine being of the present in  kairos—time as encountered in the 
context of concerned dealing with the shared world already at hand, present in possibility and 
chosen in light of Dasein’s futuralness: Time as time-for. When oriented toward the right or 
appropriate moment, Dasein is confronted not only with the factical world, but with Dasein’s 
own capabilities, limitations, dispositions and comportment in given the situation. Care emerges 
from concern.
Kairos makes Dasein’s temporality explicit, not only to others but to Dasein’s own self. 
The  kairological  expression  of  Being  in  time  speaks  to  the  “actualization  of  facticity” 
(Heidegger, PIA 102), an encounter between beings and Being. To see time in its fullness, we 
must grasp both its movement, ecstatic and drawn out of itself in before and after, and as well as 
its gathering a meaningful region into co-presence. The moving outward and gathering together 
are directed in a telos toward a for-the-sake of fulfillment, conducted by a particular how-to of 
Being in time. It is not simply the matter or situation that changes—Dasein confronts its own 
movement for the sake of which, within the context of the factical situation. Dasein is confronted 
by its own Being in a shared and shifting There-when. In the moment, which must come before 
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any given when (the kairotic question is precisely “when?”), the present is seen in its possibilities 
arrayed from the concrete situation. The terms of the now cannot fully encompass this present—
when if not now? Dasein is shaken out of its complacency to take time and presence into its own 
hands, directed toward a particular where-to. We are not fully entangled in our concerns, but 
resolute in viewing the possibilities for the right time. The can-be breaks loose from the always 
already is, bringing the factical world into authentic presence when Dasein waits and gives time 
and presence to the world (Heidegger, PIA 103). Only in this taking up of the factical can Dasein 
“take over its own thrownness and be in the Moment for ‘its time’” (Heidegger, BT 352). The 
opposite of the kairological, then, is not the wrong time (wrong time too exists as an authentic 
possibility of being—not now) but having no time at all. In the case of the later, time is present 
as already lost.
Right-time indicates  that  Dasein  can take  its  own time into  circumspection—concern 
with beings meets care for Dasein’s own ability-to-be. Dasein is confronted with itself, its having 
been and its going toward in this  sudden now calling out. The movement of time meets the 
punctuation  in  a now of change and being-otherwise.  Walter  Brogan describes this  awaiting 
within movement:
This kairos which is other than chronos always involves ceasing, disruption, rupture, the 
breaking off of activity. This metabolic time of the kairos is on the one hand the opposite 
of movement and from that point of view it is rest; but on the other hand it is the essence 
of movement, the concentration of movement in the returning into itself, out of which the 
emergence of being is made possible (Brogan 133).
The now, initially given over in concern, can no longer be simply taken as given and must now 
be addressed. We are moved to give time by change.
Movement and change, in the moment, are characterized by a being becoming-otherwise. 
We may wait for a moment, but the moment draws away. As McNeill explains, there is “no 
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human logos, neither the logos of thought, nor that of a prior knowing or having seen, nor that of 
calculative deliberation (technē), can decide what happens in the moment” (118), thus the taking 
up of the moment should not be thought of in terms of “correct” or “valid” judgment. Correct 
judgment presumes that there is a pre-existing right answer with which the situated judgment is 
brought into agreement as verified. Emphasis here would be on the claim of being as a statement 
to  be  evaluated  as  correct  or  incorrect.  The  opportune  moment,  however,  is  the  preceding 
ontological condition for beings to be brought first into their Being. There is not an external right 
answer against which our taking up of opportune time is to be judged. In the opportune moment, 
the world presents itself to us. Anticipatory resolve toward our for-the-sake-of-which directs our 
encounter with the time that does not hold still. In circumspection, Dasein gathers its possibilities 
from within the factical, concrete, available and shared. Being cannot await forever.
To be able  to  see  Being,  as  it  makes  itself  manifest  in  speaking,  we must  follow the 
movement from concern to care. The task of phenomenology—indeed, Heidegger argues, the 
task  of  all  philosophy—must  be  grasping  the  movement  between  what  has  been  given  and 
toward what we strive. Here all Being, from great to small, first encounters itself.
Only the way back will lead us forward. If Dasein sees its authentic possibilities in the 
opportune moment, it sees from somewhere already and looks toward something with an end in 
mind.  In this  movement,  we can  become overly-attentive  toward the before and after  while 
missing the transition in between:
Motion necessarily includes this indeterminateness, the unfinishedness, the not-having-
come-to-the-end. This character of being under way to something is essential for motion. 
[…] Aristotle explicitly stresses, in Phys. Γ 2, 201b24ff., that this phenomenon of motion, 
namely that it  is όριστον [‘indefinite’], is difficult  to see. For there is a tendency toἀ  
focus only on the two end stations, to allot the main accent to the ends. But the essential 
task is to see the “between the two,” to determine ontologically the transition from one 
thing to the other (Heidegger, BCAnP 235).
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We move back from speaking. To truly see between the stations, to observe Dasein in a way that 
makes it accessible in thought, we must attend toward movement,  expressed and captured in 
temporal speaking. If we are to loosen being from the already interpreted in order to engage in 
original thinking, we cannot simply reject that which comes before.  Kairos draws the already 
into questionability in the moment. By turning our attention to the rhetorical, we will see how the 
possibility  of  going  through  what  is  for  us  already  toward  what  remains  questionable  and 
outside, first arises in speaking. 
Heidegger regards rhetoric as the speaking that interprets and returns to the everyday, and 
philosophy as that which leaps out of the everyday. Having secured Dasein’s initial and general 
being in the speaking of everyday concern (rhetoric), Heidegger can—or  thinks  that he can—
move  to  the  alethetic  speaking  of  genuine  Being  (first  philosophy,  later  poetry).  But  the 
transition  in  between  remains  under-theorized.  The  moment  arises  in  movement,  and  the 
rhetorical is the mode of speaking addressed to that which changes. Rhetoric aims for the kairos. 
And should Being draw itself  from the everyday to the  genuine,  it  must  do so through the 
grasping the opportune moment as it arises from within everydayness.
We have not fully dealt with the world as it appears to us immediately in the already-
meaningful present. Dasein is open to the moment in retrieve and prospect. Not the present as 
present in an isolated and disjointed now (other and other) but as in movement toward and away, 
between stations. We do not reject the now but return to it through prospective aims, moving 
toward something else and becoming something else for-the-sake-of that which is not yet. This is 
how the  Rhetoric  works:  in  addressing the act  of  speaking,  Aristotle  first  considers  the aim 
toward  which  one  moves  (the  moment  of  decision,  where  the  hearer  must  choose  between 
possibilities), then what (and who) stand already before the speaker and who are as they have 
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always  been,  to  only at  the  last  turn  to  the  act  of  speaking itself  and how it  is  capable  of  
manifesting and moving things. All are directed to the moment of decision over a thing that can 
be  otherwise,  and is  so in  shared time with both speaker  and hearer.  Having drawn up the 
moment, in time Dasein returns to the everyday, but the everyday now has been renewed. It has 
changed. There will be more regarding the movement out of and return to everydayness later, but 
we should  note  now that  the  ecstatic  structure  of  temporality  is  present  even  in  Aristotle’s 
definition  of  rhetoric:  The  capacity  to  see  (in  understanding  projection),  in  any  given  case 
(attunement  to  what  lies  before),  the  available  means  of  persuasion  (present  in  the  now, 
entangled in speaking of others). The Rhetoric brings everyday speaking into circumspection, the 
speaking of concern to the remit of care, and reveals Dasein as it exists initially and for the most 
part.
Thusfar, I have established Heidegger’s early phenomenological exploration of time, as 
presented in his lectures and first major published work Being and Time. Time is a marking of 
movement as change from…to… that contains a before and after within the present “now.” As a 
marking, time is characterized by datability,  publicness, spannedness and significance. In this 
way, time is never merely measurement, but always primarily meaning insofar as the marking of 
time  articulates  movement  in  terms  of  change  oriented  toward  some  sort  of  undertaking  or 
completion. Dasein marks time in terms of its doing, as time-for. This experience of having or 
appropriating time as time-for-doing Heidegger calls temporality.  Temporality gives Dasein a 
world,  a  region  unveiled  and  made  meaningful  by  Dasein’s  particular  undertaking.   By 
addressing what “now happens,” temporal expression brings the world to presence by addressing 
the changing world as with us in the now. The temporality of Dasein, its way of having time, 
moves  in  two  directions.  One  may  “take  time”  in  care  for  that  with  which  one  engages 
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thinkingly, or one may “lose time” in fallenness and allow oneself to be a slave to the clock. In 
any case, whether as made or as lost, Dasein has its time.
I have engaged in an analysis of time in order to make the case that temporal expression 
manifests how the world is for us, not as discourse but as concrete facticity and realest-of-real. 
The present presents: what is present is encountered in its most real reality, and in that presence 
extends outside of itself  to the before and after.   Now we are prepared to turn our attention 
toward Dasein’s primary mode of having and marking time—the temporality of everydayness. 
Everydayness is characterized by an expectant concern that interprets, deals with and waits upon 
the  world.  Everydayness  is  crucial  for  understanding  how  rhetoric  as  a  speaking  and  as  a 
theorein, a way of seeing, accounts for time in a way that distinguishes rhetoricity from other 
modes of language. In everydayness, Dasein speaks rhetorically.
2.3 THE TEMPORALITY OF EVERYDAYNESS
In  the  final  two  sections  of  this  chapter,  I  will  first  define  and  elucidate  the  concept  of 
everydayness  as Dasein’s primary mode of being and, second, explain the role everydayness 
plays in grounding Heidegger’s early phenomenological critique of Husserl’s intentionality and 
Dilthey’s lived experience. I will close with some preliminary implications of the temporality of 
everydayness  in  grounding  rhetorical  presence,  that  is,  the  being  of  the  rhetorical  thing  as 
present. This grounding in the point of jointure between the world and the word, I argue, is the 
foundation  for Heidegger’s  early phenomenology and its  later  excision  disconnects  speaking 
from that of which it speaks as it is present in shared, changing time. The rhetorical, poetic,  
philosophical, scientific—these ways of speaking are not confined to categories of things, but 
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rather are delineated by the way that these modes of speaking claim a thing in time. If Dasein’s 
accounting for time makes how Dasein has its world manifest, then the speaking of everydayness 
manifests the way in which the world is for us initially, generally and for the most part as our 
realest reality.
Rhetoricians are hardly ignorant of the role of everydayness in shaping and delimiting the 
reach  of  rhetorical  theory,  but  precisely  what  constitutes  the  everyday—what  and  how  the 
everyday shapes and delimits—remains obscure. Too often, the everyday is used as a foil against 
the specialized, defined tacitly by what the everyday is not and positioning the everyday as less-
than-genuine or less-than-real. It is a way of doing characterized by its ordinariness apart from 
heightened  moments  of  life.  Even  more  problematically,  everydayness  is  juxtaposed  with 
specialized  knowledge, indicating that everydayness is a way of knowing rather than a way of 
being and supposing it as a product of consciousness rather than in present temporal facticity.  In 
these arguments, everydayness is used interchangeably with lived experience as alternative ways 
of knowing. Readings that take the everyday as a category of interpretation (simply the general 
against the specialized) lose its rooting in time, and those that take the everyday as a category of 
experience (a different way of knowing) lose the everyday’s rooting in presence.
2.3.1 The rhetorical temporality of everydayness
Consider two moments in Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy: 
1) “Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there, the  
hermeneutic of being-there itself” (75, emphasis in original). 
2) “Everydayness leaps over and so back into itself, not philosophically out from itself” 
(247).
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These two passages highlight the temporal ecstasies of being in speech, that is, they show how 
the  rhetorical  word  lays  out  past  and  future  within  an  account  of  the  now.  Heidegger’s 
interpretation  of  rhetoric  as  the speaking from and toward the everyday implies  a  particular 
temporal orientation. Everydayness is central to rhetoricity—or, more precisely, everydayness is 
the temporality of being-rhetorical. As interpretation, rhetoric first draws out what is there for 
Dasein  before  or  already.  That  interpretation  is  projected  outward  in  a  very specific  way—
rhetoricity is a speaking that both addresses and returns to concrete Being-there. Claims made to 
everydayness  do  not  transcend  the  beings  of  which  the  claims  speak:  they  can  always  be 
otherwise.  The  speaking  of  everydayness  forms  a  provisional  view from out  of  provisional 
views. Provisionality makes everydayness both difficult to capture analytically and crucial for an 
account  of  language  as  a  phenomenon  that  precedes  any  particular  logical,  grammatical  or 
discursive formation and moves us to engage in such formations in the first place. 
As  a  mode  of  speaking,  everydayness  articulates  the  world  in  terms  of  our  initial 
encounter, drawn from the prevailing talk, the presence to hand, and our projected with-a-view-
to.  The  claim  of  the  initial  encounter  may  hold  generally  and  for  the  most  part,  but  not 
absolutely, because that which is claimed in the encounter changes in time. Dasein is its time, 
that is, the way that we have a world is determined by our relationship (expressed as an account)  
for that which has been, is, and will be. Rhetoricity is the mode speaking that addresses how 
Dasein temporally has its world initially and for the most part, in everydayness. In rhetoricity,  
rather than skip over or leap out of the everyday, Being dwells both in and upon everydayness.
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2.3.2 Rhetorical temporality and phenomenology
It is clearer now why Heidegger proclaims that it is better to have Aristotle’s  Rhetoric than a 
philosophy of language. Aristotle’s account of rhetoric plays two crucial roles in Heidegger’s 
early work, first as a foundation for interpreting Greek philosophy and second as an alternative 
grounding  for  phenomenological  research.  First,  the  Rhetoric provides  historical  context  for 
Greek being as it relates to speech. The concrete and factical context of Greek speaking grounds 
Heidegger’s radical re-interpretation of Greek ontology,  wherein Heidegger’s phenomenology 
becomes  Aristotelian,  rather  than  (with  apologies  to  Hans-Georg  Gadamer  [“Heidegger  as 
Rhetor” 50]) Aristotle becoming a Heideggerian phenomenologist. Second, the implications of 
this  re-interpretation  mark  the  turning  point  for  Heidegger’s  early  philosophy.  Armed  with 
Aristotle’s description of everyday Greek speaking, Heidegger frees phenomenology from prior 
abstract acts  of apperception,  perception or cognition,  and thus from reliance on problematic 
concepts like “lived experience” and “intentionality.” In this section, I will take a closer look at 
how Heidegger’s  investigation  of  everydayness,  and its  manifestation  in  rhetorical  speaking, 
played a crucial  role in shaping his revolutionary phenomenology and built  a foundation for 
Being and Time.
Everydayness is elusive. It disappears into the obvious, the familiar, the real, extant and 
present. As a mode of existing, everydayness draws no attention to itself, because in this mode 
Dasein is absorbed in and attends entirely to dealing with the world. In everydayness, Dasein 
addresses the world as it immediately appears28 to be without dwelling upon how the world came 
to appear this way. By focusing on its concerns in the world, everyday Dasein is blind to itself. 
28 A trickiness of Heideggerian vocabulary: Appearing [Sichausnehemen] and seeming [Schein] are not synonyms. 
Dasein accesses all the world in terms of appearance—appearance is that which “resists διαίρεσις” or division 
(BCArP 209; Grundbegriffe   308 ). Seeming is a particular condition in which the thing is taken as otherwise than it 
is, “to look like…and yet to be” (BCArP 242; Grundbegriffe   359 ).
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Even though Dasein can (and does) overcome everydayness at times, it cannot escape to some 
sort of ideal realm of thought and action. Nevertheless, everydayness is not entirely invisible. 
“Everydayness  itself  is  manifested  within  a  fundamental  basic-structure:  its  temporality” 
(Heidegger,  BCArP 90), made present in expression. We are beginning with the structure of 
expressed time to move back to an examination of Being. As a way that Dasein lives its life,  
everydayness is expressed in its particular way of accounting for time. Speaking in an everyday 
way “concerns the  not-yet-present,  speaks about what  has-happened-already,  [and] treats  the 
existing-there-right-now” (BCArP 90). All Dasein, from the majestic to the mean, lives its life 
initially and for the most part in everydayness. “All that is great in the  Dasein of the human 
being is, at the same time, also small, at the same time diminished and, with that, ambiguous” 
(LQCEL 19). Let us take a closer look at what it means call everydayness a “How of existence” 
(BT 338), in which Dasein lives initially and for the most part.
The  following  elaboration  of  everydayness  is  valuable  for  rhetoricians  because 
everydayness as a temporal, ontological relation to the world complicates several interpretations 
of what precisely constitutes “the rhetorical.” We can interpret rhetoric as co-terminous with a 
type of action or discourse—that where we find discursive exchange, there is rhetoric. We can 
interpret rhetoric in a quasi-spatial sense, as occurring in a distinct sphere of life using a distinct  
mode of communication. We can interpret the rhetorical as a type of occasion, a when certain 
speaking takes place. Taken together, we can define rhetoric according to what it is (an activity 
or discourse), where it takes place, or when it takes place. Heidegger’s sense of everydayness as 
a  temporality,  a  how of  Being,  calls  into question  each of  these ways  of  defining  what  the 
rhetorical thing is.
90
Everydayness is not a what, where or when. It does not describe a category of activities 
(like chores or routines) as a “what” might do. Do not confuse the speaking of everydayness with 
“a discourse.” Discourses are undertakings, not objects: “Discourse is always discourse about 
something  and expressing  oneself  about  something,  and it  is  always  with and  to  someone” 
(Heidegger,  Dilthey  164),  pointing  toward  and  away  from  the  world.  As  an  undertaking, 
discoursing may be undertaken in different ways, and everydayness describes one such way of 
being that expresses itself in discourse concerning the has-happened, the there-now, and the not-
yet. That  there  can  be  something  like  “a  discourse”  at  all  is  due  to  Dasein’s  tendency  in 
everydayness to take the publicly available word—what was said—as a stand-alone object of 
attention, cut off from speaker, hearer and matter. Only in everydayness can the word first be 
taken as self-evident.  Everydayness  also does  not  describe a  “sphere” or place  in  which  we 
engage with the world in an everyday way that ceases when we, say, walk into a conference or a 
laboratory. Dasein encounters its there as a “where” only by orienting itself to its surroundings in 
a particular (spatialized) way, as when reading a map. In everydayness, by contrast, Dasein’s 
there is revealed in undertaking—there where thus-and-such takes place. Dasein accounts for its 
surroundings in terms of appropriateness in-order-to [Um-zu], the nearness and farness to hand of 
the waiting material, the relative remove from a starting point or destination, the distance of a 
loved one.  And while  it  describes a particular  temporality,  everydayness  is not defined by a 
specific “when.” To define everydayness as “the time when I concern myself with the world” 
gets  the relationship  precisely backwards.  By absorbing myself  in concern,  I  have time in a 
particular way already—as time when I am undertaking something. My time is articulated in 
terms  of  concern.  “The  time  when  I  concern  myself  with  the  world”  does  not  define 
everydayness—it presupposes everydayness. By exploring everydayness in greater depth, we can 
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see  how the  whats,  wheres  and  whens  of  rhetorical  speaking  intersect  with  the  things  that 
speakers and hearers share in time.
2.4 EVERYDAYNESS AS A HOW OF LIVING
Everydayness is not seated in a particular word, sphere or time, but in rather how speaker, hearer 
and matter bring the world into being in speaking. Everydayness is a how of existence, “a way to  
be” (Heidegger, BT 339, emphasis in original). In concerned everydayness, Dasein fixes upon 
whats, wheres and whens in the course of living its day in terms of fitness for the undertaking at  
hand. In the way Dasein lives its day, what is a what-for, identified in terms of usefulness. That 
which is seized upon as present in everydayness is, in the positive, ready-to-hand, and in the 
negative, absent or deficient. The relative nearness and farness of the ready-to-hand forms the 
where, a region in which undertakings take place. When is when-something-takes-place: when I 
make the coffee, when I take the dog out… The when of everydayness designates the proper time 
for the undertaking.  But the  how? Dasein is  in everydayness  initially and  for the most part, 
interpreting what is already there and expecting what happens as a rule but not always. In this 
way Being and its There are first revealed.
2.4.1 Initially, generally and for the most part
By initially,  I  mean  that  there  is  nothing logically  or  temporally  prior  to  everydayness.  To 
simultaneously address the logical and the temporal, which both concern what comes before and 
what follows, we could say that everydayness requires no prior conclusion. For the Heidegger of 
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the 1920s, phenomenological destruction finds its terminus in the everyday. There is no prior 
condition  of  human  being,  nor  a  “real”  life  waiting  underneath  the  skin  of  the  everyday.  
Everydayness is Dasein’s “most real reality” (Heidegger, Dilthey 164). When thrown into the 
world already underway, Dasein draws the meaning and significance of its concrete surroundings 
from those public ways of addressing concerns made available through everydayness. This is not 
to say that Dasein begins in everydayness as a child and matures to some greater authenticity. 
Everydayness  is  a  condition  of  possibility  of  all  speaking,  in  which  initially  “Da-sein  is 
‘manifest’  in  the  being-with-one-another  of  publicness,  even  if  it  has  ‘basically’  precisely 
‘overcome’ everydayness existentially” (BT 339). The transcendence of everydayness can only 
initiate in everydayness and is made manifest in everyday public being-with-one-another. Even 
when one waits  upon the  right word,  one  waits  upon the  everyday.  And when the  word is 
delivered, it can only be shared by being made accessible to others—the word  initiates, and it 
does so amidst the everyday.
I am not using “conditions of possibility” here to indicate a sort of abstract intellectual 
categorial  scheme or  cognitive  framework  through which  the  world  can  then  appear.  When 
beginning  an  analysis  of  the  Phaedrus in  Plato’s  Sophist,  Heidegger  explains  that  while 
“conditions of possibility” echoes Kant, he has something different in mind—an elaboration of 
the “elementary conditions of evidence, and of proof regarding its propositions and concepts” 
(PS 223). Conditions of possibility point to the situation in which an occurrence takes place. 
Saying that everydayness  is a condition of possibility for the speaking of Dasein means that 
everydayness provides a “structure of occurrence” for speaking as a happening borne in and by 
the matter. A focus on conditions of possibility and their structures of occurrence eschew airless, 
mechanical  accounts  of  causality  in  favor  of  an  ontological  investigation  of  how something 
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comes to be what it is, as it is, in the context of time. Heidegger emphasizes that the Greek 
legein highlights these conditions of possibility in the context of speaking, showing that there is 
no bare speech but always speaking with others about things, which allow us to then explore 
how speaking occurs in its concretion—legein means “to express oneself about something to an 
other  or  with  an  other.  Thus  definite  moments  of  the  structure  are  intimated;  the 
phenomenological horizon becomes richer and more determinate” (PS 223). These conditions of 
possibility are further articulated in Aristotle’s Rhetoric as the “phenomenal state of speaking,” 
the irreducible relation of speaker, hearer and matter. In terms of the corresponding “elementary 
conditions of proof” that join together world and word, these relations emerge and are made 
manifest as ethos, pathos and logos.
As initial, everydayness provides the grounds for interpretation, so that speaking, hearing 
and dealing with matters are possibilities of occurrence. Everydayness opens up the world to 
interpretation initially in speaking with and about what which is there already, is now and will 
be.  As  a  marking  of  movement  and  change,  this  initial  interpretive  grasp  on  the  world  is 
grounded familiarity, but not certainty.
Interpretation addresses what is, has been or could be everyday in terms of a specific 
modality—as that which holds generally and for the most part. There are two ways to understand 
how everydayness generally and for the most part “‘shows itself for everyone ‘as a rule,’ but not 
always” (Heidegger, BT 338-9). First,  as something that continues throughout the entirety of 
Dasein’s  life,  everydayness  is  pervasive.  There  is  no  great  plane  of  consciousness  or  more 
virtuous  realm of  being  above  the  everyday  that  one  may inhabit.  Second,  the  speaking  of 
everydayness takes matters as given generally and for the most part when Dasein orients itself 
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toward the world in concern for that which is changeable in time.  The everyday has regular 
contours and repetitive occurrences, but is not wholly secure.
Everydayness  is  accounted  for  and  addressed  in  the  familiar  and  expected—in  the 
familiar I already recognize this as that, and in the expected I wait for the familiar to occur, or 
more precisely, to  reoccur. In this way, what is  present in a world changing and underway is 
approached in the context of relative constancy and reoccurrence—gesturing both forward and 
backward in time. But part of the “most real reality” of Dasein is also the reality of change,  
misapprehension or being-otherwise. We are concerned about the world and must attend to it 
because the world does not always do what we expect, and may be taken as familiar when it is  
something different. The particular and the situational are brought into view over and against the 
familiar and expected. But if Dasein is oriented toward the familiar and expected, it tends to see 
what it wants to see, mistaking the provisionally partial for the absolutely necessary.
The possibilities of Dasein are not entirely determined by the limitations of everydayness. 
Dasein can orient itself  toward the world in other ways.  We should note,  however,  that  any 
transcendence of the everyday is, at best, momentary and cannot be brought on by refusal of the 
everyday, but rather by a taking-up. In the kairotic moment, one has opportunities open beyond 
the everyday, but even overcoming everydayness occurs, according to Heidegger, in the context 
of shifting time: “existence can also master the everyday in the Moment,  often only ‘for the 
moment,’ but it can never extinguish it” (BT 339). Even when reaching out of the everyday and 
grasping not time for anyone but this time, this moment, Dasein does not stand still. Mastery in 
the Moment is only for the moment. As we have discussed above, unlike philosophy, rhetoric is 
concerned with not simply the taking-up of the moment, but also the return to the everyday. For 
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rhetorical speaking, aiming toward  kairos means aiming toward making the moment not just 
Dasein’s own time, but the time for all. 
So everydayness is not in and of itself a pejorative term. It is important to emphasize that 
the everyday and the “everyone” are not the same—the distinction is blurry even in Heidegger’s 
own work. Everydayness is the temporality in which the world is first given over to Dasein. The 
everyday is still particular, still factical for Dasein. Indeed, in everydayness we encounter the 
concrete  and  worldly  for  the  first  time.  Rather,  Heidegger’s  consistent  warning  is  that  the 
possibilities laid out before Dasein in everydayness, as it is for Anyone and everyone, should not 
be interpreted as the only possibilities. Dasein is initiated into the world in terms not of Dasein’s 
own making. The world is given over from others, and the temporality of everydayness provides 
the conditions of possibility for this giving over and taking up to occur. One must recognize the 
limits of everydayness, Heidegger admonishes, and not take what is small for what is great, the 
endlessly repeated for the originally created, nor the generally sound for the strictly necessary.
2.4.2 Sharing a world in time
The surrounding world is shared with others. For Dasein’s world to be interpreted in terms of in-
order-to, belonging “to everyday trade and traffic as the soil from which they grow and the stage 
where they are displayed” (Heidegger, BT 354) one must presuppose that these interpretations 
ready-to-hand in relative  ease of access  exist  as an “already-present-something” (Heidegger, 
HCT 199).  As  existing  and at  hand,  the  world  is  accessed  through  and within  terms  made 
publicly available. These terms are before one in both the spatial and the temporal sense—they 
have already been given to you and thus stand waiting and available. What is present is present 
as already-having-been-determined by others. Dasein, in everydayness, lives its life as essentially 
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already accounted for: “our lives are lived in terms of the Others and are lived as it were by 
them.” The Anyone29 is here before us, available without preconditions. This Anyone is not a 
layer on top of Dasein, or group one joins and leaves but is how Dasein lives its day—it “defines 
the primary reality of human Dasein” (Heidegger, Dilthey 164). The world presents itself to us as 
already made sense of, already there and with us. The world is obvious, made self-evident in 
terms passed from hand to hand. Matters and things exist because they are available and are 
available because they exist. They have names, uses, positions and presence in the now, given to 
Anyone from Anyone, Anywhere,  Any time. Evacuated of view, place or time, the everyday 
takes  on a new name—the objective.  We allot  emphasis  to the ends,  I  and  it,  and miss  the 
transition in between: I am, it is…
We will return to this theme when describing the positive critical perspective offered by 
rhetoricity,  but  for  the  moment,  I  want  to  draw  a  distinction  between  public  accessibility 
[zugang,  Zugänglichkeit],  and  public  availability [verfügbar,  Verfügbarkeit,  and  also 
vorhandensein,  being  already-to-hand].  For  Dasein  to  have  a  world  at  all,  into  which  to  be 
thrown in and then deal, that world must be publicly accessible. As discussed earlier, publicness 
is a constitutive element of time. Without a way to say that now is now for all, we cannot even 
begin to account for time, or understand the world and others as co-present with ourselves. For 
me to think and write “now,” and for you to read “now” may imply different nows, but they are 
all of them now. “Now” is publicly accessible, even when it is taken up in different ways and 
follows no regular chronology.  The availability of time for all is taken up in a particular way in 
everydayness. Everydayness, as a mode of being, accesses that which is public in terms of its  
29 There are many possible translations for das Man. I prefer Theodore Kisiel’s (249) use of “the Anyone” because it 
emphasizes quality of Being rather than quantity of beings. Dasein does not become “the They” or everyone simply 
by joining a group. Rather Dasein can be entangled in das Man because participation requires no precondition. The 
only way Everyone can do it is if Anyone can do it. “The Anyone” stresses this state of undifferentiated prior 
availability.
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availability—the publicly available is there already in such a way that anyone can make use of it 
(say, when we call work “the 9-to-5”). The distinction is temporal: the publicly accessible awaits 
interpretation,  the publicly available is already interpreted.  In this way,  the everyday ties the 
being-at-handness of the surrounding world with the being-with of others (Heidegger, HCT 237). 
This question of the modes of access of the world, the jointure we have sought between world 
and  word,  forms  a  constant  through-line  for  Heidegger’s  work—it  is  in  the  play  between 
accessibility and availability that will shift his interest from speaking to silence in his later years.
And  here  we  can  see  where  everydayness  intersects  with  the  rhetorical.  As  the 
fundamental  hermeneutic  of  everydayness,  rhetoricity  addresses  the  process  of  that 
interpretation:  how  is  everydayness  initiated,  born  from  itself?   How  do  we  move  from 
accessibility  to  availability?  Prior  to  objectivity,  the  rhetorical  addresses  everydayness  as  it 
appears—both  as  possible  and  possibly  otherwise,  in  phasis  and  kataphasis,  claim  and 
counterclaim.  In  addressing  how  speaker,  hearer  and  matter  all  speak  for the  world,30 the 
Rhetoric attends to the way in which all speaking draws itself out of, and makes claims upon, the 
everyday.
But  if  the  rhetorical  is  the  speaking  and  interpreting  of  the  everyday,31 it  does  not 
necessarily  follow that  the  rhetorical  is  limited  to  the  speaking of  the  Anyone 32 or  that  the 
speaking of the Anyone is limited to the rhetorical. As in all Being and all speaking, fallenness is 
one of two basic directions of movement. A great many people have been moved to believe what 
30 Heidegger interprets πίστις, “proof,” as that which is capable of or conducive to cultivating πιστεύειν, a view, 
from out of a given concrete situation (BCArP 78-81). Proof speaks for the matter.
31 We should understand speaking and interpreting as co-implied rather than as separate processes. All speaking 
interprets, that is, in speaking one draws out meaning and significance from presence. In turn, interpretation speaks
—in attending toward its interpretation of the world, Dasein is revealed to itself. 
32 Rhetoric does, however, offer a vantage point particularly well-suited to observing the relationship between a 
regional public and the Anyone, how the way for some becomes the rule for all. We can also say the same for the 
relation a regional public to a particular, specialized way of interpreting (the philosophical, religious and scientific 
being but a few examples). Rhetoric accounts for the movement between from and to as it unfolds in possibility.
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Anyone believes, see what Anyone sees and love what Anyone loves. A great many academic 
works have done the same. No way of speaking is exempt from idle talk.33 Heidegger, however, 
does not have a particularly strong grasp of publicness. He places publicness and the Anyone in 
such close quarters that one runs into the other. The Rhetoric, however, suggests that everyday 
speaking is regional, that is, it speaks not to Anyone and Everyone, but rather to those who share 
a world of traffic and trade in everydayness.
The hearer in the Rhetoric is both public and specific. For the rhetorical speaking of the 
everyday, the hearer is not presumed to have a specialized foresight, but is also not Anyone. The 
hearers are instead assumed to be the sort of people we meet as we live our days—they are who 
we are with in the everyday. For Aristotle, the hearers are those we would come across in the  
agora as our business takes us to the Heliaia, stoa, or bouleuterion to deal with past, present or 
future matters. Together, we have a there, a shared place and time constituted in traffic and trade. 
If  the rhetorical  is  the way of  speaking  in  public,  this  public  is  not  unlimited  but  regional. 
Aristotle  observes that the greatness of Athens is  more easily praised before Athenians than 
before Lacedaemonians. The  art, Aristotle says, is in understanding the hearers and how they 
have come to attend to the changing matter in the course of living their lives, for it is the hearer 
who judges between what is and what is otherwise. Neither speaker nor matter determines the 
verdict. The speaker’s comportment or view toward the matter is to be judged fitting or unfitting 
by the hearer in the moment (this is why neither  ethos  nor  logos are separate from the act of 
33 Heidegger’s examples of idle talk consistently mix the newspaper on the dining room table with talk in more 
supposedly serious settings, like the laboratory and the classroom. He saves his driest sarcasm for the academic 
conference: 
For everything which must be done nowadays, there is a first a conference. One meets and meets, 
and everyone waits for someone else to tell him, and it doesn’t really matter if it isn’t said, for one 
has indeed spoken one’s mind. […] There are people nowadays who travel from one conference to 
another and are convinced in doing so that something is really happening and that they have 
accomplished something; whereas in reality they have shirked the labor and now seek refuge in 
idle talk for their helplessness, which they of course do not understand (HCT 272-3).
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speaking).  In the enthymeme,  for  example,  the hearer  actively participates  in addressing the 
matter under discussion. Idle talk does not concern itself with the speaker, hearer or matter, while 
the Rhetoric places the hearer’s encounter with the matter through speaking at the very center, as 
the one who must render an ultimate decision over that which could be otherwise. 
That Aristotle calls human being a speaking-being, the sort of being that lives with others 
through speaking, tells us relatively little of importance if we do not know what he means by 
speaking. Heidegger contends that the Rhetoric addresses and in so doing reveals this concrete, 
factical speaking-being:
How, from Aristotle himself can we get the idea that this speaking-being was the 
basic phenomenon of Greek being-there and in what way it was? We are in a 
favourable position since we possess a Rhetoric of Aristotle’s, which surveys the 
phenomena that are assigned to speaking (BCArP 78). 
Because he deals here with speaking and not language, Aristotle attends to the situation in which 
speaking takes place rather than the word alone. Heidegger wishes to understand how Greeks 
lived in  discourse,  and  the  Rhetoric focuses  on  the  speaking  of  Greek  everydayness.  The 
Rhetoric  brings  the agora’s  speech to  life,  and with it  the hearers and their  concerns.  Now, 
Heidegger has in view the world that draws Plato and Aristotle to speak with others. As Aristotle 
drew proof for his interpretation of time from concrete experience in the Physics, so too does his 
Rhetoric direct  analysis  toward,  and is  built  out  of everyday Greek speaking.  From here,  as 
Smith points out, we can then see how these ways of talking found in everyday Greek speaking 
are taken into philosophical discourse, in essence moving from maxim to premise. As the maxim 
confirms  what  appears  to  be  the  case  for  one,  gained  through  repetition  or  experience,  is 
generally the case for all, the premise confirms that the necessary prevails in the particular. The 
conceptual aims to transcend the limits  of everydayness,  while the rhetorical rearticulates the 
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everyday. To hear the sound of historical Greek speaking, what they say rather than what we’ve 
come to say about Greek saying, Heidegger turns to the Rhetoric.
2.4.3 Breaking from intention and experience
In the early 1920’s, Heidegger searches for speaking. Being is in time, that experience of time is 
as  time-for,  that  time-for  is  initially  and  generally  experienced  as  the  temporality  of 
everydayness,  and  that  temporality—our  dealing  with  changing  time—is  made  manifest  in 
speaking. In short, Dasein shows itself in the speaking of everydayness. Insofar as Heidegger is 
concerned with  everydayness,  he is  concerned with  rhetoric  as  a  mode of  speaking and the 
Rhetoric as the blueprint  for recognizing,  encountering and engaging in this  speaking. If the 
everyday is elusive, the Rhetoric has pinned it down. The Rhetoric plays two important roles for 
the early Heidegger. First, the Rhetoric  shows what Aristotle means by speaking by presenting 
an  everyday  account  of  Greek  speech  rather  than  a  philosophy  of  language  derived  from 
speaking but held at remove. Second, the rhetorical hermeneutic of everyday speaking provides a 
grounding  for  Heidegger’s  challenge  to  philosophy  in  general,  and  a  terminal  point  for 
phenomenological reduction that deviates from the traditional phenomenology of Husserl and 
Dilthey in particular.
The  Rhetoric’s investigation  of  everyday  speaking  did  more  than  simply  illuminate 
Aristotelian ontology for Heidegger. The fundamental relationship of speaker, hearer and matter 
brought together in concern and dealt with in speaking over possibilities forms the backbone of 
Being and Time. Prior to 1924, Heidegger knows that Being dwells in speaking and hearing, but 
not how Being dwells. The Rhetoric gives an account of the how, and Heidegger uses this how to 
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blaze a new path in philosophy. By going back to the word in everydayness, Heidegger is able to 
go forward beyond Aristotle and challenge the foundations of phenomenology. 
Prior  to  Being  and  Time,  there  were  roughly  three  different  ways  to  reduce  human 
experience  phenomenologically:  to  apperception,  perception  or  cognition.  Kant  reduces  to 
apperceptive structures necessary for one to be able to perceptively encounter and consciously 
evaluate the world—what is required for the world to appear as a world? In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant theorizes that the transcendent ordering form allowing for all sensible appearances 
are time and space (181). But, as we have seen above, time arises from, rather than precedes, 
concerned  engagement.  And time  is  not  spatial—it  is  not  merely  a  progression  of  “theres” 
sequentially laid out in a chronological line because “there” makes no sense outside of a context 
of doing. “There” always implies a “there-when-this-took/takes/will-take-place.”
If the apperceptive, the conditions that structure perception, cannot provide a framework 
to make sense of phenomena, then perhaps a focus on the perceptive itself provides more clarity. 
Heidegger  says  no.  As a  being that  lives  in  and confronts  its  own being through language, 
Dasein’s very perception is guided by prior senses of meaningfulness and significance. We are 
given access to the world already before us in the language we use to mark what is here, what is  
relevant, what is necessary. Heidegger describes this process in plain terms in Being and Time—
sight, sound etc, these things are not present to us as pure sensoria. We do not hear noise; we 
hear  a  motorcycle’s  engine  or  a  tap  of  rain  on  the  windowpane  (BT 153).  The  objects  of 
perception are already present to us as something. 
Finally, while the cognitive presents one with a way of interpreting the world, it is a way 
that  is  derived  from  previous  acts  of  cognition—if  we  accept  the  terms  of  cognition,  it’s 
cognizing all the way down. Cognize what and how? At best, we are left with something like 
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Rickert’s  “transcendental  psychology”  to  gather  together  the  cognitive  and the  concrete,  but 
Rickert fails to grasp the concrete in any way that has not already been determined and validated 
by consciousness (Heidegger, Dilthey 158; see also BT 344), that “it is more difficult to grapple 
with  life  than  it  is  to  deal  with  the  world  in  terms  of  a  system”  (Heidegger,  PIE  127).34 
Psychologism as a whole fails to explain the connection between the concretely empirical and 
the conceptually eidetic. The already present world, selected and articulated in terms of Dasein’s 
undertakings, must undergird any attempt to then draw conclusions regarding these presences. 
We are already underway in a world that does not pause for deduction. Cognition cannot affix 
concern  upon  objects  without  already  being  directed  toward  those  objects  for  the  sake  of 
something.  Even the mind  must  be moved.  Descartes’  demand that  all  being be reduced to 
thinking is animated by “a concern [Sorge] for certainty and universal validity” (Heidegger, CT1 
83). As Descartes writes in the Discourse on Method, “[L]ike a man who walks alone and in the 
shadows, I resolved to go so slowly and to use so much circumspection in all things that, if I 
never advanced but slightly, I would at least avoid falling” (10).
The solution is to end phenomenological reduction in the everyday. Heidegger declares 
Aristotle’s  Rhetoric “the  fundamental  hermeneutic  of  everydayness.”  For  this  point  in 
Heidegger’s intellectual career, the claim is bold. Everydayness is the way Dasein lives its day. 
Everydayness is Dasein’s most primordial way of being, not in the sense of being prior to greater 
development, but that nothing precedes it. Reduction and division (diarhesis) go no further. We 
began the investigation of time with the simple guide of how we say there is time. Dasein is 
primarily, initially and for the most part in everydayness. To understand how Dasein interprets 
34 Heidegger comments in “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview” that 
Rickert’s split of history and natural science into individualizing and the generalizing is both “so obviously true that 
it cannot be challenged” and yet “so empty that nothing can be gleaned from it either” (Heidegger, Dilthey 158). 
Such a taxonomy cannot reach how the concrete and conceptual relate in the thing one researches, just that there are 
conceptual differences. And so we find ourselves in a loop between the object of cognition and the act of cognizing 
and with it, between the empirical and the eidetic (LQT 69-71). See also Friedman (45).
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the world is to know how human beings are as they are and in turn the world as it is for them, in 
talking with one another in concern about the world. In everydayness,  Dasein gives voice to 
existence  at  its  most  factical,  concrete  and  worldly.  The  Rhetoric gives  Heidegger  access 
precisely  to  this  sort  of  talk.  Rhetoric  is  the  expression  of  everydayness.  Armed  with 
everydayness, Heidegger can jettison more problematic concepts serving a similar purpose for 
phenomenologists: intentionality and lived experience. Why is it necessary to move beyond these 
two  accounts  for  human  interpretation  of  the  surrounding  world?  At  the  risk  of 
oversimplification,  intentionality  accounts  for  presence  without  time,  and  lived  experience 
accounts for time without presence.
Husserlian intentionality seeks to explain how Being is directed toward the world in a 
particular way.  Intentionality is a preliminary orienting or setting-up of the basic meaningful 
structures of the world. That towards which Being intends is selected from within a larger world 
or context that gives the intended meaning. “[A]ll thinking is a thinking  about something, all 
willing is a willing  of something,  all  experience is  an experience  of something” (Heidegger, 
Dilthey 161). However, this “bare and isolated directing-itself-toward” does not explain what 
moves Dasein (Heidegger, HCT 303-4). Misconstrued as bare motion without a for-the-sake-of,35 
Being intends outside of time (Heidegger, HCT 303). In the bare sense, intentionality directs 
without  content  or  cause.  Being  intends,  and  in  intending,  the  world  is  presented  through 
categorial intuition as a world. Heidegger agrees with Husserl that Dasein is moved by a basic 
35 Heidegger makes this argument gingerly in History of the Concept of Time, without suggesting who misconstrued, 
but the charge is serious. The relationship of priority of time and intention splits Heidegger from Husserl. Heidegger 
claims in the “Dialogue” that he saw Being and Time as a friendly amendment to Husserlian intentionality rather 
than as a critique. His letter to Karl Jaspers on December 26, 1926 suggests the emphatic opposite: 
If the treatise is written against anyone, it is against Husserl, who saw this immediately but stayed 
positive from the very beginning. What I am writing against, to be sure, only indirectly, is 
pseudophilosophy. What I am fighting for is the understanding of what we in philosophy can—
and also must—only repeat as the central possibility. And that, I believe, one cannot make 
difficult enough (HJC 73).
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orienting impulse—Dasein is drawn into the world in care—but warns that this basic movement 
must  be  understood  within  the  context  of  time  and  doing  within  the  world  (van  Buren, 
“Endnotes” 201). When I see the hammer-as-hammer,  I do not intend the hammer as a bare 
object—it is a tool standing ready for my use that I find in the course of, say, making repairs  
around the house. The world of meaning implied by intentionality can only be fully articulated in 
the context of concerned engagement in time. 
Why, toward what and how does Dasein intend? Prior to intentionality is temporality. 
Dasein’s  existence  in  time  gives  intentionality  meaningful  movement  in  a  “unified  basic 
structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in” (Heidegger,  HCT 304).  In the 
context of temporality, “bare” intentionality is enmeshed in human meaning and action—we are 
directed toward the world in our undertakings, and intentionality structures that encounter with 
the surrounding world in terms of those undertakings. This encounter with beings in terms of 
their temporal for-the-sake-of Heidegger calls in 1919 the “formal indication” [formale Anzeige] 
(KNS 97),  and later  “look” in  the  eidetic  sense.  Bare  and isolated  directing-itself-toward  is 
replaced with the temporal movement of concern and care. Phenomenology can now begin to 
grapple with the questions how and why Dasein is moved. Dasein is directed toward the world in 
its undertakings, drawing from meanings made already available within the shared surrounding 
world  in  the  context  of  a  particular  doing  projected  into  the  future.  The  “there  is”  of 
intentionality  marks  time  and  presence.  The  fundamental  “there”  of  intentionality  is  in 
everydayness, its original hermeneutic and expression rhetorical. Intending meets attending.
In lived experience, we get the other side of the intentionality problem: the present taken 
as  time  rather  than  as  presence.  Dilthey’s  work  on lived  experience  raises  the  challenge  of 
understanding history in the context of human life rather than approach human life in the context 
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of history (as points in a chronology). As Heidegger explains, Dilthey seeks to grasp the full 
givenness of life in history, to then pull loose its parts (Heidegger, Dilthey 157). Dilthey does 
not, however, understand the human being in the center of these experiences: “Dilthey managed 
to draw attention to certain structures in life, but he never formulated the question of the reality 
of life itself, namely, what is the sense of the being of our own Dasein?” (Heidegger, Dilthey 
162) What does it means for Dasein to have a history as a way of having time? A collage of pasts 
cannot tell us what is significant in the present or how it is so. Lived experience disappears into 
the cognitive structure of understanding and thus the given becomes subjugated to the process of 
giving. That is, lived experience acts as a sort of homemade categorizing system rather than a 
categorial intuition, but is a categorizing system all the same whereby the determination of being 
is made in consciousness rather than in the world. 
Take, for example, Dilthey’s argument in “The Rise of Hermeneutics.” Dilthey praises 
Schleiermacher  for  refusing  to  split  the  interpretation  of  texts  into  “grammatical,  historical, 
esthetic  and  material  knowledge,”  recognizing  instead  that  all  must  be  co-present  in  the 
interpretation: “These distinctions only reflect the fact that grammatical, historical, esthetic and 
material knowledge must be there if there is to be interpretation, and that the are able to influence 
it at every moment” (Dilthey 244). Up to this point, we are in agreement. Dilthey’s very next 
move,  following  Schleiermacher,  is  to  set  up  a  grammatico-psychological  manifold  through 
which the unity of a work can be expressed, and its general validity assessed: 
But interpretation itself can only be resolved into the two aspects [grammatical 
and psychological—tr.] of the process of apprehending a spiritual act in linguistic 
signs. Grammatical exegesis works its way up through the text from individual 
connections to those larger relationships that dominate the whole. Psychological 
exegesis  begins  by  a  projection  into  the  creative  inner  process,  and  proceeds 
onward to the outer and inner forms of the world, and beyond that to an intuition 
of its unity with the other works in the spiritual stance of its creator (244).
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It is from grammatico-psychological (from word to mind) exegesis that the logos, for Dilthey, is 
finally revealed. The main purpose of this logos—its own teleological for-the-sake-of-which—is 
to “preserve the general validity of interpretation against the inroads of romantic caprice and 
skeptical subjectivity, and to give a theoretical justification for such validity, upon which all the 
certainty of historical knowledge is founded” (244). For Dasein, however, experiences are drawn 
into the context of the present in relation to undertakings—Dasein’s particular occupation or 
concern with things. Experience does not project grammatico-psychological intention onto the 
present to create a unity, “[r]ather things constantly step back into the referential totality or, more 
properly stated, in the immediacy of everyday occupation they never even first step out of it” 
(Heidegger, HCT 187). The unity is not a construct of the mind—it is already there to the hand, 
eye  and ear,  and we never first  step outside.  Dilthey is  right to note that the world,  and its 
interpretation, arise in a unity of grammatical, historical, aesthetic and material interaction, but 
his grammatical systematizing of language and his psychological systematizing of spirit leave us 
focused on talk about talk and not talk about things. Again the speaking of Being becomes a 
matter of logical procedure. 
Lived  experience  cannot  structure  the  present.  Everydayness,  however,  provides  the 
referential  totality of time in the context  of past,  present and future as Dasein is  concerned, 
moved and directed, in its occupation:
These primary phenomena of encounter: reference, referential totality, the closed  
character of referential context,  familiarity of the referential whole, things not  
stepping  out  of  referential  relations,  are  of  course  seen  only  if  the  original 
phenomenological  direction  of  vision  is  assumed  and  above  all  seen  to  its 
conclusion, which means letting the world be encountered in concern (Heidegger, 
HCT 187).
As we saw earlier, temporality accounts for this totality in significance (in-order-to), publicness 
(being with others),  spannedness (movement of before and after)  and datability (now-when). 
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Dasein,  primarily,  initially and for the most  part  encounters this  world in the temporality of 
everydayness. Everydayness is the place where reduction ends. Phenomenology must grasp onto 
this full referential context, “placing oneself directly in the current and the continuity of access of 
the everyday preoccupations with things” (HCT 187). This access is through the speaking of the 
temporality of everyday, the rhetorical.36 
Heidegger writes in  Being and Time  that “philosophical research must for once decide 
what being belongs to language in general,” a grammatico-logical being or a being in everyday 
speaking (Heidegger, BT 155). Heidegger finds the answer to this question—what is speaking 
qua speaking?—in the Rhetoric. It is now time for us to see what that answer is.
36 We could say that, in turning to the Rhetoric, Heidegger extends upon Dilthey. In “The Rise of Hermeneutics,” 
Dilthey notes (echoing Schleiermacher) that the Greek practice of rhetoric provided “a more solid foundation” for 
hermeneutics (234). Dilthey errs in seeing the Rhetoric as a purely literary matter, the text against which Dilthey 
contrasts context—“actual” lived experience. Heidegger identifies speaking in the Rhetoric as rooted directly in 
temporal, concrete concern, the properly historical speaking of life that Dilthey himself wished to hear.
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3.0 SPEAKING TOWARD THINGS
We are lucky to have the Rhetoric, and not a philosophy of language.
(Heidegger,  Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy  , 70  )
3.1 BEING FOR-THE-SAKE-OF
How are matters taken in shared time? Aristotle approaches rhetoric with an eye towards matters. 
Our speaking with one another speaks of things,  and how they are in time. “Rhetoric is the 
counterpart of Dialectic,” the Rhetoric  begins. “Both alike are concerned with such things as 
come, more or less within a general ken of all men and belong to no definite science” (Aristotle, 
Rhet.  1345a1-3  , emphasis added). Before beginning a survey of the Rhetoric, it would be helpful 
to  remind  ourselves  of  what  Heidegger  calls  “the  fate  of  Aristotelian  research,”  to  avoid 
mistaking  our  speaking about  matters  to  others  for  things  themselves.  Recall  that  the  initial 
question opening Heidegger’s treatment of the  Rhetoric is how philosophical speaking of the 
being of things becomes a matter of logical procedure. How, in other words, does our grasp upon 
things come to be determined by what these things are not? That which is here and now become 
a matter to be delineated using conceptual relations between genus and species, as though the 
word stood before the thing, outside and indifferent to temporality. I seek here not to reject the 
central  importance of  speaking  of matters,  but rather break from ontologies  of speaking that 
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remove matters from the realm of factical, concrete human engagement with things (including 
things that hear, and things that speak, and things that matter) in time. 
In chapter three, I investigate the  Rhetoric as a work addressed to the being of matters 
encountered in the everyday, that articulates how the world exists for us here and now, initially,  
generally and for the most part in its projective, futural orientation. We will see how the Rhetoric  
shows  toward  what  we  aim  when  speaking  rhetorically,  how  things  come  to  be  taken 
rhetorically, and how these things are present rhetorically for us. I will first describe the way in 
which  Aristotle  approaches  rhetoric  as  a  fundamentally  time-based mode  of  speaking  about 
things, specifically one concerned with things that change in time and thus with the pressing 
possibility of being-otherwise. I will then look to the doing of rhetorical speaking. How is the 
world made present in speaking with one another about something as ethos,  pathos and logos? 
This  speaking  moves  hearers  to  decision  over  things  by  presenting  those  things  and  their 
otherwiseness in light of the moment.37
The  Rhetoric lays out, in essence, an architecture of spoken presence, the structure of 
appearance of things in the now, taken in an everyday way. As we have seen in chapter two, the 
now has a dual character: punctuated in a moment, extended outward into the before and after in 
continuity from one moment to the next. The  Rhetoric describes how we have matters in the 
now, where continuity is maintained through familiarity and projected outwards in expectation, 
but also punctuated and made a matter of concern by the possibility of being-otherwise, not just  
for me in my time, but for us on ours. I argue that the rhetorical thing, as that which can be 
concretely and factically otherwise in shared time, displays the same temporal character as the 
37 I make a distinction between things and matters (roughly following the distinction between pragmata/tinos and 
hypokeimena), because not all things matter—or put positively, it is through matters that we encounter things that  
matter. We encounter things in the circle of our concerned engagement. A matter extends beyond the particular 
thing, encompassing the thing’s origin, importance, and purpose in the context of shared time, traffic and trade—the 
matter temporalizes the thing. In speaking, we address a matter to ultimately render a decision about things and how 
they are.
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now: the thing is present in its for-the-sake-of, or relation to that which is not yet, in its already-
having-been,  or  relation  to  that  which  lies  before,  and  its  presence  in  speaking.  Rhetorical 
speaking establishes the here and now in everydayness.
The three books of the Rhetoric address the ecstatic temporality of matters made present 
in  speaking.  The following chapter  will  deal  with  Book One,  where  Aristotle  addresses  the 
rhetorical thing in terms what it is for the sake of.  The hearer must determine how a thing in the  
past,  present or future has come to be of concern here and now, in light  of how the matter 
was/is/will be taken in a futural sense (as to be advantageous for the city, as done with criminal  
intent, as being worthy of magnification in praise). In chapter four, we will see how Book Two 
approaches the matter as it already stands before the hearer. The matter of rhetorical concern 
arises from and within everyday dealings already underway. The speaker then must understand 
how our prior affective, habituated and spoken attachments to things change the way we take 
those things to be: how the hearer stands before the matter in decision. If, in our futural direction, 
we project ourselves onto matters in the world, then in our disposition, habituation and common 
ways of speaking, we are moved by matters in the world. Finally, chapter  five addresses Book 
Three, where we see how rhetorical matters are made present in speaking to one another. The 
speaker cannot display the matter in its past or futural directions without attending to the words 
themselves. Aristotle shows how we make rhetorical matters available in the now to others and 
shrink the distance between word and thing. 
In sum, the rhetorical  thing is that  which arises and breaks from everyday existence, 
becoming possibly otherwise, and is brought before decision in speaking to one another. The 
rhetorical thing’s capacity to change in time concerns us, and we address our concern toward the 
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thing in its possibilities: the thing as it is not yet and as it has already been are made present and 
pressing here and now in shared speaking and time. 
By way of review, following the discussion of time in chapter two, we want to approach 
matters in the context of the basic structures of all time—its spannedness, datability, publicness 
and significance as expressed in discourse—and Being’s motivated interaction with these matters 
as matters of concern in the everyday, toward which we pursue and from which recoil. Being in 
the everyday indicates a certain transparency or obviousness. We begin with matters taken at 
their  most  self-evident  and  immediate,  made  problematic  as  that  which  changes  in  time 
according to regular but not guaranteed repetition, encountered in the localized traffic and trade 
of life. These matters may follow with our speaking, but they may also stand outside or become 
otherwise. At best, our grasp is momentary and revisable. The most concrete, immediate and 
realest of real still slips away.
3.2 AIMING TOWARD A DECISION
Contemporary interpreters of Aristotle dispute the central  focus of the  Rhetoric.  Is  it,  as  per 
Garver (192) or Farrell (10) for example, the speaker and how the speaker takes up and displays 
the  matter  put  before  decision  that  brings  a  rhetorical  speaking  “into  actuality?”  Is  it,  per 
Langsdorf (“Epistemology, Tropology, Hermeneutics” 174), a question instead of the hearer’s 
relation to the speaker that “provides a bridge between the interests of the speaker/author and 
those of the listener/reader that is constructed by the former to influence the latter, but is only 
effective  insofar  as  it  responds  to  what  is  of  issue  to  the  latter”  (and  thus  whose  decision 
ultimately governs what that matter “of issue” is)?  Either possibility moves along the path of the 
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word, as initiated in speaking and terminated in the hearer’s act of decision and determinative of 
the  matter  and its  doing,  but  what  of  the  matter taken  up  in  word,  and the  things  we call  
rhetorical? In the traditional civic humanist celebrations of the speaking subject (Garver 18-9), 
the  post-structural  critiques  of  the  centered  subject  (Gaonkar  32)  and  reclamations  of  the 
empowered hearer and decentered self (Bizzell 22, Langsdorf “Words of Others” 35), the things 
with which we deal have gone missing. I begin my reading of the  Rhetoric from the starting 
point of matters and how they are initially,  generally and for the most part for us. The art of 
rhetoric  is  one  of  properly  grasping  the  Being  of  rhetorical  matters,  how they are  seen  by 
speakers, and heard by hearers in their otherwiseness. In this moment of concern for the thing’s 
capacity  to  be  otherwise,  the  concrete  is  in  danger  of  disappearing,  the  immediate  can  be 
obscured and the real not what it seems to be.
3.2.1 Rhetorical matters
Think  about  rhetorical  ontology  in  terms  of  a  triangle,  with  the  three  components  of  the 
phenomenon of speaking, speaker, hearer and matter (Aristotle,   Rhet.   1358a37-8  ) each making 
up a point. Working in a Platonic vein, we can take the problem of rhetorical speaking as one of 
the speaker’s proper positioning, so that the speaker can simultaneously see the matter as what it 
is,38 and can guide the hearer to take up the same position.39 Thus, in the Phaedrus, the measure 
38 “In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to be 
learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform, and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of 
acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the 
case of each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its action is and how it is acted upon and by 
what” (Plato,  Phaedrus   270d )?
39 As the doctor learns first the principles of medicine before being able to practice, 
“[t]he student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then 
be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; 
otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has 
learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon 
such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually 
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of rhetorical art “demand[s] discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of 
mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits” as well as 
determining,
what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes 
upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man 
and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to 
which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a 
certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief (Plato,   Phaedrus   
269b-270a)
Note,  the  temporal  definition  of  here  and  now  is  the  province  of  the  trained  philosopher-
rhetorician.  In order to properly address the world as it lays  itself out to us in speaking, the 
rhetorician  must  take  up  a  very  specific  philosophical  comportment,  whereby  the  factical, 
concrete world, and those with us in that world, are understood by way of relation to the stable 
forms of consciousness. Once we as speakers know what the thing is, and what a soul is, we can 
move this soul here to see the thing properly.  As discussed in chapter two in the context of 
phenomenological  interpretations  of  time,  an  eidetic  relation  to  interpreting  the  world—
represented by Husserl—cannot get at how things are present before us in time, and must instead 
define those things by way of intention toward form, apprehended through categorial intuition. 
The world as it is present to us here and now takes a detour through consciousness.
before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical 
application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or 
belief—when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking 
and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favorable occasions for brief speech or 
pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes of speech which he has learned, then, and not till 
then, will his art be fully and completely finished; and if anyone who omits any of these points in 
his speaking or writing claims to speak by the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the 
better man (Plato,  Phaedrus  , 217d-272b  ). 
The appearance of the particular thus is dependent upon the seeing of the eidos. It is important to note here 
that Aristotle counters with his own medical analogy: that even if we learn the general principles of 
medicine, we never act on a general body. In other words, we learn the principles of medicine generally 
(Rhet.   1356b29-32 ), but not its particular matter, because it does not materialize generally (1355b10-3). No 
principle can restore health entirely, but only insofar as the particular person here and now is capable of 
becoming healthier.
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Working in a Sophistic vein,40 the pivot point in the triadic relation between speaker, 
hearer and matter is that of the hearer. The speaker aims to move the hearer in such a way that 
the matter  lays  itself  out before the hearer  as the speaker  intends.  As Gorgias argues  in the 
“Encomium of Helen,” persuasion is a pharmakon, a drug that affects the hearer’s basic capacity 
to grasp the matter:
The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of 
drugs  over  the  nature  of  bodies.  For  just  as  different  drugs  dispel  different 
secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so 
also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others 
make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil  
persuasion (Gorgias 53). 
Here, we see the faltering of Dilthey’s sense of time, where experience becomes a psychological 
manifold—yet another categorical system—for encountering the matter in the here and now. The 
hearer  is  before the matter,  and the matter  a product  of the hearer’s  past  and psychological 
disposition. The  world  has  taken  another  consciousness  detour.  Plato’s  intending  speaker 
projects too far out over what is present, and Gorgias’ receptive hearer reflects too far backward 
before what is present.  What is real, here and now is defined either through its attendance to 
forms of consciousness or forms of psyche; in both cases, the being of the matter is defined by 
what it is not. And for both Plato in the Phaedrus and Gorgias in the “Encomium,” we find the 
matter taken in word as an impression upon the soul, attending to how the soul is impressed, 
without mention of what thing presses upon the soul in the first place.
In the very first chapter of Book 1 of the Rhetoric, Aristotle rejects both the Platonic and 
the Sophistic positions—or perhaps more charitably, rejects portions of each and takes up others. 
The  determination  of  everyday  rhetorical  matters  is  not  carried  out  by  the  speaker’s  active 
40 In discussing a Sophistic approach to rhetoric, I am limiting myself to Aristotle’s characterization. I do not think it 
is necessarily the only way to interpret the function or tenets of a Sophistic approach to rhetorical theory. My 
concern is with Aristotle’s configuration of the debate over the nature of rhetoric.
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ordering intellect or the hearer’s passive impressionable psyche. The determination must rise out 
of the matter as it is made present to us. The Sophist focuses on the judge, but not the things of  
which the judge decides (1354a16-26). The dialectician, left alone, relies too much upon logical 
structure  and misses  how the  subject-matter  may “differ  from the  syllogism of  strict  logic” 
(1355a14).  Aristotle  rejects  speaking to  the now in the exclusive terms  of  Platonic  idealism 
(reality to the intellect) and Sophistic psychologism (reality to the psyche). Yet, in terms of what 
stands before one rhetorically, Aristotle accepts the Platonic drawing out of the general from the 
particular and Sophistic interpretation of ends as relative to situation. 
Aristotle first subtly rejects the Platonic position by arguing that human beings speak of 
otherwiseness in different ways,  dialectically and rhetorically,  and that they are able do both 
without the explicit guide of specific knowledge or habit (1354a1-6). One does not necessarily 
require a philosophical comportment to understand that the connection between our speaking and 
that  of which it  speaks is  insecure and should be undertaken with care.  One need not  be a 
philosopher to be with things, nor a trained rhetorician to take matters as possibly-otherwise in 
shared time and thus requiring criticism and support, or speaking for and speaking against. Yet, 
that we can engage in such speaking without art does not lead us to conclude,  as in Plato’s 
Gorgias, that rhetorical speaking stands outside of art as a knack (Plato,   Gorgias  462c ). The 
challenge is to think about public matters of concern in such a way that we take all aspects of the 
phenomenon of speaking—speakers, hearers, matters—as themselves matters of concern in their 
very capacity to be, bringing matters of concern under the remit of care. In other words, the 
rhetorical art approaches the basic phenomenon of speaking, a totality of speaker, hearer and 
matter, itself as a thing that can be otherwise. We think and speak of things from matters out, and 
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as matters are capable of being otherwise,  so are the speakers and hearers before which the 
matter stands.
How then does Aristotle answer the Sophistic position? Aristotle contends that by taking 
the art of rhetoric as one of positioning the hearer psychologically before the matter in such a 
way that the hearer believes the matter settled and self-obvious misunderstands the Being of 
rhetorical things (1354b13-21). The psychological thereby presents the thing as nothing more 
than the product of internal, subjective affective reaction or “frame of mind,” to be manipulated 
using compositional techniques in order to produce a consistent result (1354b20). The Sophist, 
Aristotle  contends,  misunderstands  how  rhetorical  matters  are:  the  hearer  stands  before  a 
decision over a thing that can be otherwise. The hearer should, when asked to decide, encounter 
that  matter  as  a  choice  to  be  made  between  possibilities  rather  than  as  the  product  of 
psychological  necessity.  Our  disposition  certainly  influences  how  we  decide  between  these 
differing possibilities, but it does not stand outside of matters, only “warping the carpenter’s rule 
before using it” (1354a25).
3.2.2 Things, matters and time
A matter’s otherwiseness is a function of its being in time: what matters here and now is that the 
thing with which we must deal can, from one moment to the next, change. The form of rhetorical 
speaking, the eidos or look of the matter that directs our interactions with things toward bringing 
about particular ends, is distinguished temporally in terms of our deciding over matters of past, 
present and future. Is it a thing that has been already and is no longer, thing present here and now 
with us or thing to be that is not yet?  The relationship between the hearer and the matter is  
determined by the horizon of possibilities for the thing in time. The judge is involved in either 
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rendering a decision over what has been or initiating what is to be, while the spectator watches 
what unfolds before the eyes. In this way, the rhetorical eidos is derived from engagement in the 
speaking of things rather than by unchanging, abstract conceptual form.
Speaking,  hearing  and choosing  do  not  happen  in  time  alone,  but  take  place  within 
particular situations, and within these situations, it is more or less easy for the hearer to take the 
thing as open to possibility.  Aristotle explains that prior teachers of rhetoric built theories of 
speaking from within judicial settings, where matters are presented in their already-having-been-
done as specific,  direct and immediate,  before a large body of judges who may have strong 
personal, material and affective ties to the thing they must quickly judge (1354a34-1354b27). 
Under these conditions, the Sophistic emphasis on moving the hearer to take the matter as settled 
may be “accidentally” successful because the hearer, so closely entangled with the matter, is less 
open to seeing the matter in terms of uncertain possibilities: “so much influence by feelings of 
friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their 
judgment  obscured  by pleasure  or  pain”  (1354b8-11).  The  pre-judged  thing  is  insufficiently  
rhetorical. The more obvious, unproblematic and unequivocal the thing seems, the less we grasp 
it  in  its  rhetoricity.  In  the  poorest  judicial  decisions  regarding rhetorical  matters,  the  hearer 
entirely  cedes  the  role  of  judge to  pre-judgment,  taking  the  matter  as  already decided,  and 
watches as a spectator entertained by idle talk (1354b33-35). We already know what it is, now 
let’s hear what they say. The matter has been cleaved from the word.
Aristotle contends that we need only look to other venues for rhetorical speaking to see 
where the Sophistic emphasis on moving the hearer fails. When we address matters in the future, 
as in the assembly, we have to speak generally and attend to different directions the future might 
take (1354b25-33). Thus the matter is encountered in such a way that its relevant aspect is the 
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capacity to be otherwise. Have we considered the possible situations over which our proposed 
law  must  preside?  The  matter  is  opened  more  to  change  in  time,  delimited  by  our  shared 
familiarities and projections, interpreted in terms of probability but not ever fully foreclosed as 
necessity. If we could see every possibility and provide for each, the court and assembly would 
close their doors. We can only speak, hear, and decide in light of the moment. In speaking before 
the assembly, one takes the voice (and listens) as a citizen, a very specific kind of public persona 
emerging in relation to the state. The thing is relevant to both oneself and others who, in their 
everyday traffic and trade,  are gathered together as citizens constituting the state.  Finally,  in 
political venues, decisions over matters of the future are rendered over a longer span of time, 
while fellow citizens consult over the decision, allowing the matter time to unfold in possibility.
Using Heidegger’s four-fold structure of time worked out in chapter two, we can see how 
the temporal  and institutional  differences  between judicial  and political  speaking present  the 
matter for decision in different ways. First, in terms of datability (being able to affix time to 
particular moments), the judicial aims at a clearly defined moment in the past when the thing was 
done, brought to decision at another particular moment in the present in a short period of time. 
These moments are localizable and definitive, lending to the matter a certain sense of solidity. 
Contrast  to  the  political,  which  initiates  in  the  present  but  must  account  for  a  multitude  of 
possible future moments, opening up the matter rhetorically. In the judicial, the span between the 
time of the thing done and the moment of decision becomes less important—we are focused on 
that past happening in particular as a localizable moment (1345b5-8). The political must account 
for  what  happens  within  the  span  in  order  to  establish  the  feasibility  of  its  proposed  end, 
explaining how we get from here to there.  Given its  rootedness in a particular  concrete  and 
localizable moment, the publicness of the judicially-determined past act takes place in the light 
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of a thick and complex network of social attachments, judged by a large number of people. In 
contrast,  the publicness of political speaking aims to deal with a large possible public, but is 
negotiated  and brought  about  by a  smaller,  more  regional  and inter-implicated  public  body. 
Finally, in its significance, the past act is concrete and directly relevant to the life of the judge, 
while the political ranges over possibility not simply for the individual representative, but for the 
larger body one represents. Structurally, then, these matters brought into speaking have differing 
senses of presentness, making judicial matters more easily taken as unequivocal and self-evident, 
whereas political matters are more easily—and properly—taken as open to otherwiseness.
There are two important observations to keep in mind regarding Aristotle’s analysis of 
institutional practices and their effect upon the ability to grasp something as rhetorical. First, it is 
not  the case that  matters  presented in  their  specificity to self-involved and atomized hearers 
deciding in a short period of time are less rhetorical. Rather, the situated institutional practices 
governing our speaking matter to how things appear to us. Some court practices make the matter 
more easily recognizable as setting up a choice over that which can be otherwise,  and ward 
against pre-judgment by limiting how the matter is to be discussed (1355a1). 
That  Aristotle  would  spend  so  much  of  chapter  one  remarking  on  rules  governing 
different judicial systems is then not so surprising. The court, the assembly,  the marketplace: 
these are civic spaces that house speaking of changeable past, present and future matters that are 
specifically relevant to a public audience. That is not to say that rhetoricity is defined by those 
civic institutions or their particular historical practices—we would be left in the absurd position 
of saying that we did not speak of public matters in the past until there were courts, or matters of 
the future until there were assemblies, and that before the agora there was nothing present to 
speak of. Rather, these local, specific and temporally-situated institutions created in whole or in 
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part as homes for rhetorical matters act as paradigmata, guiding examples on which to loosely 
base  our  rhetorical  theorizing.  In  their  particular  practices  and  norms  of  speaking,  courts, 
assemblies and public squares are more or less capable of properly housing the rhetorical as a 
speaking of things that can be otherwise in shared time.
Second, Aristotle’s argument also functions as a subtle rebuke of the Platonic position. 
Speaking rhetorically is not simply a problem of the attending to relations between speaker and 
hearer, guiding the soul through speaking, but also of the time and place before one in which the 
matter arises and speaking occurs. Speaking is always speaking here and now, about something, 
to someone. Dialectical speaking might be able to abstract the matter from its place in changing 
time in order to draw out what in it remains the same, and thereby may be judged according to  
unwavering principle, but rhetorical speaking cannot. To properly understand how a thing comes 
to appear one way or another, one must grasp the thing in the context of a matter, a concrete,  
factical social, historical and institutional situation.
 To respond to Plato’s  Gorgias,  judicial  speaking never deals purely with the just,  as 
political speaking never deals purely with the good, but with the relative justness and goodness 
of things. These things can be more or less just/good/honorable/true in the given situation, as 
expressed  using  different  practices  before  a  particular  audience.  Attempting  to  escape  the 
concrete totality of rhetorical speaking forces us to ignore or denigrate its matters and judgment 
as somehow less-than-real, and puts us in the bizarre position of rejecting the most consistent, 
pervasive and immediate—most real reality—of human Being, in favor of an atemporal realm 
beyond human existence. 
The eidetic  Being of beings turns away from things as they appear  in the context  of 
dealing with matters of concern, and covers over how these things arise in the course of our 
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primary interaction with a world that includes those others with whom we speak, and the places 
in which we speak as a people. The determination of what something is here and now, for the 
eidetic,  becomes  a  matter  of  logical  procedure  rather  than  concerned  engagement,  one  of 
dunamis as a logical faculty or ability to engage in procedure, rather than prohairesis or choice 
to speak well of the matter under consideration (1355b18-23). The Sophistic position may fail to 
address political institutions in favor of judicial and epideictic, but the Platonic position fails to 
address  all  three because it  does  not  properly handle things  capable  of being otherwise that 
change in shared time.
The dialectical and rhetorical, rather, work in tandem with one another. The two modes 
of  speaking take  things  in  time  in different  ways.  For  the  rhetorical,  the  space  of  temporal 
relevance is expansive but particularly socio-historically located.  It encompasses “almost any 
subject  presented to us” (1355b33, emphasis added). In other words, rhetorical speaking deals 
with the changeable as changeable in shared time—the changing of the matter  is relevant to 
those who share in everyday life within a region of concern, who may or may not be familiar 
with dialectical argument: 
The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without 
arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a 
glance a complicated argument, or follow long chains of reasoning. The subjects 
of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: 
about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other 
than they are,  nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in 
deliberation (1357a1-7).
The temporality of dialectic interaction, on the other hand, is determined by the participants, and 
can  stretch  out  toward  the  unchanging  amidst  change.  The  ways  in  which  both  modes  of 
speaking take the matters under concern are different. Dialectic skill is only helpful for rhetorical 
speaking  to  the  extent  that  the  dialectician  understands  how  rhetorical  matters  appear  to 
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collective audiences that cannot be known individually and cannot guarantee who, on any given 
day, stands in for the community as judge, member of the public, or representative.
3.2.3 Matters and choice
As the Sophist mishandles the ontology of the rhetorical thing, so too does the dialectician. The 
rhetorician is defined by his or her capacity to take the matter  under discussion in terms of 
prohairesis, a choice between possibilities, rather than as a stable object of knowledge. “Most of 
the things about which we make decisions, and into which, therefore, we inquire, present us with 
alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our 
actions have a contingent character” (1357a24-28). We are, and find ourselves before, things that 
change in time in relation to our own engagement with them. The Sophistic position forecloses 
possibilities of being-otherwise by focusing on manipulating the hearer, and can do so regardless 
of how the matter should properly been brought into being through speaking. The dialectician 
may also take the matter as settled, but whether or not that taking has been correct is determined 
by logical  procedure.  For the dialectician,  one’s initial  grasp upon the matter  is functionally 
irrelevant  because  that  grasp  is  tested  by  and  thus  suborned  to  proper  procedure.  For  the 
rhetorician, however, one’s initial grasp on the matter in its possible otherwiseness is central to 
the speaking itself, and the conclusion cannot be determined by logical procedure. 
The Sophist, in Aristotle’s estimation, is problematic because the Sophist takes both the 
initial grasp and the logical procedure to be irrelevant (the “faculty” and “choice”), as speaking 
and the matter are suborned to the hearer’s state of mind. In terms of our Kantian dilemma, the 
dialectician  solves  the  problem of  grasping the  Being  of  beings  by subordinating  beings  to 
procedure. The Sophist ignores both aspects of definition and severs any connection between the 
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world and the word. Like the bad juror, the Sophist already knows what is, and thus attends only 
speaking. It is the task of the rhetorician to rebuild these connections, and attend to how our 
speaking about Being is rooted in our dealing with beings.
Both  the  Sophist  and  the  dialectician  lack  a  certain  reflexiveness  before  the  matter. 
Unless dialecticians accept that logical procedure cannot secure a rhetorical matter and make it 
self-evident  before  the  public  hearer,  dialectical  skills  are  not  useful.  And  unless  Sophists 
understand that the matter must be approached and presented as a choice, they persuade only 
under limited conditions and even then only by accident. Aristotle has made the case for why the 
matter, and the speaker’s and hearer’s positioning vis-à-vis the matter in the context of time, 
should be taken as the most important end for the rhetorical. The rhetorician places the matter 
that can be otherwise before the hearer in preparation for decision. And the art of rhetoric is the 
art  of  placing,  so  that  the  matter  shows itself  to  the  hearer  in  the  form of  choice  between 
possibilities of being and otherwiseness.
Speaking initiates in the everyday. Aristotle’s opening justification for the importance of 
rhetoric is grounded in basic human experience, in our everyday talk with one another and with 
“the things that come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite 
science”  (1354a1-2).  All  human beings engage in  both rhetorical  and dialectical  speaking in 
order to gain purchase in a changing world. We must be capable of examining and building from 
matters in a shared time and space amidst the claims of others, and we do so with or without 
reliance upon art to draw the word from the matter. Matters taken up in speaking may be taken  
according to rhetorical or dialectical temporalities, and those matters stand before that deals with 
them. If one takes a properly rhetorical matter in a dialectical way, it does not magically become 
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a dialectical matter, but instead in a very earthly way is only a rhetorical failure. We must build 
our way of seeing, our theorien, from views of matters.
3.2.4 Speaking of rhetorical matters with art
From matter, we move to art. If, as I have argued above, rhetorical matters are defined by the 
way they are to be taken in shared time, then the art of dealing with such a changeable matter  
should reflect  this  temporal  condition.  The method must  fit  to  the material.  Indeed,  we find 
exactly such a temporal extension of before, present and after in Aristotle’s definition of the art 
of  rhetoric.  The  rhetorician  sees  the  matter  in  its  temporality,  where  each crucial  aspect  of 
speaking (speaker,  hearer,  matter)  is  brought  into concern  as  that  which could  be otherwise 
(1356a1-4).  The end toward which the rhetorician aims,  that  which stands before already in 
expectation, and the bringing of thing to presence here and now in speaking and hearing are all  
things that change in time and can be otherwise than they are.
First,  the  rhetorician  has  the  ability  to  see.  An  art  projects  outward  toward  its  end, 
through a basis in familiar  technique,  manifest  and present in its material.41 The rhetorical is 
present to the rhetorician as an art insofar as one can see in the matter the possibilities presented 
before one as ends toward which we must strive.  Second, there is a given case, the particular 
matter that stands before us, already underway. The possibilities present before the one who sees 
are only fully present in this here and now, as it has become. Third, we have what stands before 
one ready and publically available  in this  particular  here and now as means of bringing the 
41 Art projects to the end through the material when the craftsperson sees the herm (a carving of the god Hermes) as 
being-in-capacity in a block of wood, which the craftsperson then brings into being.  (Aristotle,  Metaphysics  1017b  ;  
see also Beere 375). Note here the sly play of the craftsperson able to see into and interpret that wood as Hermes, 
who bears the tidings of the gods to human beings and from whom hermeneutics takes its name. We will return to 
this theme in chapter six.
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matter to light in a specific way. Like the dual character of the now, in speaking and bringing 
things into presence as otherwise extends into both the future and the past. The means we have to 
move the hearer  toward a  decision over a  matter  that  can be otherwise are  already there as 
available to this public here and now. The public is neither indifferent (unrelated to the matter) 
nor  undifferentiated  (related  to  the  matter  as  a  homogeneous  mass),  but  concerned with  the 
matter as it intersects with hearers’ particular everyday lives. In Aristotle’s very definition of 
rhetoric, we see the temporal ecstasies of everydayness for human Being in speaking with one 
another about the world—the hermeneutic of Dasein itself. 
Everyday speaking establishes our now, our present and what is present here with us. As 
we have seen in chapter  two, that now has a dual visage—the now is present both in stability 
(time stretching out in continuity from the has been to the not yet) and change (this now here,  
which could be otherwise from moment to moment) What is made present to people in speaking 
in the now maintains this dual character as here in and for the moment, but stretched back into its 
past and forward into its future. The matters made present in such a temporal situation also have 
a dual character, as what could be and be otherwise. As I previously argued in chapter two with 
regard  to  the  Dissoi  Logoi,  the  conceptual  categorical  oppositions  between  good  and  bad, 
honorable and shameful, and truth and falsity when placed before the moment—the temporality 
of Being—become the same insofar as good/bad (etc) can be otherwise in the here and now 
before the hearer. I do not mean that good and bad become a vacuous, meaningless mass, but that 
the conceptual  must  be  realized in  shared time.  It  could be good or bad,  or a  relative  span 
between the two, thus we ultimately must choose which is the case for this matter here and now.
For Aristotle, then, the art of rhetoric centers on proofs (1345a24-25; 1355b36-40). What 
is capable of standing in for things in speaking, or what puts a thing before the eyes, in such a 
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way that the thing is brought to presence, in the present? What, in other words, brings the matter 
before the hearer  in such a  way that the hearer  can see and grasp the thing in its  possibly-
otherwiseness and decide for the moment?42 Asking what stands in and speaks for the matter 
makes our speaking insecure, and the relation of word to world no longer self-evident. The facts 
do not speak for themselves. The speaker’s view of the matter in which the thing is involved is a 
problem. The hearer’s capacity to hear the speaking of the matter is a problem. The way the 
words themselves are able take hold of the matter is a problem. The art of rhetoric, then, is one of 
understanding how things are taken up in speaking, and can take no part of the phenomenon of 
speaking for granted.
Things may still stand outside this becoming in the moment. In contrast to artistic proofs 
that can be brought about in speaking about the matter, there are the already-extant forms of past  
speaking toward matters of concern, in contracts, laws, testimony (1355b37-39). Yet, as Aristotle 
argues  later  with  reference  to  speaking  of  things  past  in  Book  One,  chapter  15  (1375a22-
1377b15), the atechnic proofs may still be brought under the rule of rhetoricity—these things 
that stand in may have already spoken and determined, but not in a way that has settled the 
matter; the matter is still open. Laws, contracts, oaths and testimonies themselves must be judged 
in the light  of time (as themselves  things-past),  and if  found wanting before the moment or 
unable to hold up to the future, they can be abandoned.
42 The sensory metaphors (seeing, hearing, grasping) are intentionally mixed. Our senses have their own temporal 
ecstasies (after all, time is not an abstract concept but is in our sensory experience of the world). Seeing allows for 
projection over a limited, directed span and thus has a futural tendency. One can visually “lead” the moving thing 
and anticipate where it will be. Hearing establishes a surrounding world already under way. It alerts us that 
something outside of ourselves, even that which has not yet been taken as an object of attention, already shares our 
contemporary space. Touch establishes the very proximally-close, what is here-now in its physical and material 
condition ready for use. In sight we project out onto the world, in hearing the world projects back as we are in it, and 
in touch we trace the dividing line between the two. The now, taken aesthetically (or perhaps more properly 
aisthetically), still draws out of itself. The seeing-hearing-grasping person does none of these things in isolation, and 
in the same way both the speaker and the hearer see, hear, and grasp.
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The rhetorician, then, takes a unique position toward the world and how that world is. 
Like the dialectician, the rhetorician plies his or her trade over a wide variety of matters. Like the 
scientist,  the  rhetorician  does  not  deal  with  abstract  principles  but  particular  situations 
(1355b35). Yet unlike the scientist and dialectician, neither the rhetorician’s general rule nor the 
particular matter are secure. Throughout the Rhetoric, Aristotle notes this strange tendency—the 
more specialized the view upon the thing, the less the rhetoricity, and the more rigid the rule of  
principle over determination of the thing, the less rhetoricity (1358a8-9; 1358a25-7; 1359b12-
17). The first, taking the world epistemically, loses the sense of otherwiseness at the initial step 
of  grasping  the  matter  (1395b24-27).  The  scientist  takes  a  matter  as  one  of  nature,  as  an 
unequivocal thing that is as it is regardless of time or observation. The second, taking the world 
philosophically,  loses  otherwiseness  at  the terminal  step of  making a  claim about  the thing, 
which is contingent and only loosely familiar to a general audience (1357a11; 1357a35). When 
making a claim to what “it is,” the rhetorician cannot take the “it” epistemically or the “is” 
philosophically. Rather, “it” is something that can be otherwise and our claim to its being (its is-
ness) is something that can be otherwise as well.
3.2.5 Speaking of matters in their temporality
What sort of general way of seeing, then, is capable of seeing that which can be otherwise in 
speaking to each other as it is present in the now? Claims and ways of reasoning must have in 
themselves a dual character, guided by familiarity but punctuated by contingency. Again, we see 
the dual visage of the now in rhetorical ontology. As that which is in shared time, the guides of 
both familiarity and difference arise out of shared basic commonplaces—those ways of speaking 
developed over a particular socio-historical place and time of traffic and trade. Rhetorical matters 
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are taken and dealt with in terms of tendencies, repeated observation, that something is generally 
the case. 
We have already seen this  sort  of temporal  being in  chapter  two’s  discussion of  the 
temporality  of  everydayness:  that  which is  initially,  generally and for  the most  part.  Such a 
provisional partiality applies not simply to the matter itself,  but to the entire phenomenon of 
speaking. The hearer too is one of whom we can draw rough general rule, as a member of a 
community that shares the same space, concerns, beliefs and experiences. The speaker’s own art 
must remain contingent upon the changeable matter and hearer. What is initially—relations to 
things  without  recourse  to  additional  specialized  knowledge  or  experience,  given  to  us  in 
everyday experience made available by common, shared speaking. What is generally—that from 
these initial experiences we draw out broader consistencies of re-appearance,  and in turn use 
these loose rules to familiarize ourselves with matters in terms of probability. As John Poulakos 
observes,  “the orator,  then,  who understands that  the limits  of  sociopolitical  phenomena are 
furnished by their repetition and regularity, understands rhetorical probability” (Poulakos 180). 
What is for the most part—the positive possibility that what is familiar and general does not 
entirely adhere to or fully grasp the matter as it changes, and thus that our conclusions remain 
contingent (1356b31-1357a8).
The way we take rhetorical matters into word, as logos, must reflect such a partiality of 
particular things that cannot be pinned down and general rules that do not always apply. We are 
speaking of “what is in the main contingent” (1357a15). As argued above, if we take the thing as 
being a particular, specific way in and of itself, we leave the realm of rhetoric, and if we take the 
rule of principle too strictly, we also leave. By arguing for the example and the enthymeme as 
the two fundamental  forms of rhetorical  proving that  can make the unknown more  familiar, 
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Aristotle has presented what we can think of as the initial forms of scientific and philosophical 
modes of speaking, before either have solidified as practice and procedure. 
How do we reason in an everyday way? First, we compare past concrete and specific 
matters  to  present  changeable  matters  by way of  example  (1357a25-28).  The past  stands  in 
loosely for the present, or what is better understood for what is not so well understood. The 
relationship is by way of analogy, “this is like that” rather than a systematic hierarchical logical 
or symbolic ordering of whole-to-part, or genus-to-species (1357a28). The analogic relationship 
may be better or worse, more or less relevant. Example, then, forms the basis for induction, and 
the refinement of induction would entail a refining of the procedure of analogy—in what way 
should the particular case (say, the particular person who is ill) relate to the whole (the illness in 
its scientific definition). 
Second,  we  compare  present  changeable  matters  to  shared  general  principle  in 
enthymeme. The particular matter is measured by a given community’s general rule of thumb 
derived from and confirmed in everyday experience, with contingent conclusions drawn from 
contingent premises (1357a28). The refinement of deductive thinking, then, entails the refining 
of procedure of syllogistic thinking that properly relates the universal principle (what constitutes 
a state of “illness” as opposed to health) to the particular (should the present person be defined as 
ill).
As Smith (56) argues, we should take care here to not presume that the rhetorical is a sort 
of fallen speaking, but rather understand the rhetorical as the initial ground for the development 
of  additional  ways  of  taking  matters  in  speaking.  See  how  for  both  the  scientific  and  the 
philosophical  modes  of  speaking,  the  refinement  of  the  speaking  becomes  a  problem  of 
procedure? The rhetorical cannot avail itself of procedural security, and yet still reasons. To use 
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the epistemic form of inductive logic,  reasoning from particulars,  one must already have the 
capacity to draw together particulars, like-to-like. To use the philosophical form of deductive 
logic,  one must already have the capacity to determine particulars from generals.  In order to 
avoid the problem of Aristotelian logic, we go back to that which lies before logic in logos.
Aristotle’s discussion of enthymeme and example is important for a twofold reason. First, 
as just discussed, the Rhetoric shows how we reason, connecting world and world, in an initial, 
general  and  contingent  way.  Second,  Aristotle  uses  these  two  basic  modes  of  reasoning  to 
theorize the  Rhetoric.  It is no philosophy. Aristotle typically begins with a host of examples 
taken from particular contemporary, immediate, small-ball commonalities of shared life, draws 
from them a general observation,  and then puts that observation to work explaining possible 
horizons of otherwiseness of matters.  He goes from particular,  to general,  back to particular 
again, now understood in terms of its concrete possibilities. In other words, to properly engage 
with rhetorical matters, Aristotle speaks like a rhetorician.
The three books of the Rhetoric speak to the three aspects of nowness or presence: First 
what is present is projected. In Book One, Aristotle deals with how we project upon the matter a  
for-the-sake-of, an aim, through which we then encounter things and speak about them. In Book 
Two, Aristotle deals with the present as it is for us already, as it is  before us in disposition, 
habitual engagement, and in forms of common reason. And in Book Three, Aristotle addresses 
the now as spoken in the present, in sound, image and word. The matter encountered here and 
now, and the things with which the matter deals, arise from where we are going, where we come 
from and what we are making. Book One of the  Rhetoric then begins with the end—with that 
toward which we aim, and the matter as for the sake of something. From the matter and its way 
of seeing, we now turn to its look, the eide of temporal rhetorical things.
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3.3 MATTERS THAT CAN BE OTHERWISE IN TIME
3.3.1 Choices regarding matters in time
First, future matters lay themselves in their capacity to be otherwise regarding things that can be 
done or not done, and the question for the hearers is whether or not these things should be done 
(1358b8-10). It is important here, and throughout, to not confuse the thing done with pure action. 
In other words, we aren’t concerned with doing, but doing something. Rhetoricians sometimes 
make the mistake of taking action as the end itself and not action toward things, undertakings of 
things, or doings of things. What lies before us as possibly otherwise, then, is the thing-to-be-
done (this observation applies equally to things-having-been-done and things-present-here-now) 
that the hearer judges or observes. We judge and watch things (1358b1). We do not simply do 
things, but do things for the sake of something. The projected end toward which we aim, then, in 
future matters is that of the good, and we turn away from the bad (1358b22-24). Finally, we must 
be able to span the distance from the matter as it stands before us, and take the matter in terms of 
its feasibility—how we get from the moment of the decision to the good, or away from the bad 
(1358b22-3). To what extent are we capable of bringing about that toward which we aim, or of 
avoiding that away from which we turn?
Next, “concern with the past” (1358b17) addresses things as either having or not having-
been-done. The hearers judge whether the thing was capable of being done by the one accused of 
doing so.  How, in other  words,  has this  matter  come to be this  way,  and to what  extent  is  
someone culpable for it being so? In deciding, one aims toward justice as a decision over what 
should be, articulated by either explicit law or implicit custom, and the extent to which one is 
responsible for the matter being as it is here and now (1358b24). The question, then, that spans 
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the act and its aftermath that stands before the hearer is how this became as it is, and so the judge 
is concerned with how we have gotten to this point—this here and now—and how the accused 
relates to the thing-done (1358b27). To what extent does the matter here and now abide by what 
we think should be, and to what extent is the accused responsible for bringing the here and now 
about? 
Finally, in present matters, as in the now, we take in the present as stretched out into past 
and future, “since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, 
though they often find it useful to recall the past and to make guesses at the future” (1358b18). 
The rhetorical, I have argued, speaks about matters as present as what might be otherwise. In the 
case of epideictic speaking, the very question is how we should take what is present into word 
(1358b28). Should we praise the thing or denigrate it? Is it worthy of our word? That which is 
taken into word in the present is done so not just so that people here and now might hear, but 
those beyond this moment in time. We speak in memory of, or in hope for something. And the 
matter is taken in significance as that which is worthy either of our praise or our condemnation 
as a contemporaneous community. To what extent is the matter here and now worthy of being 
taken up in speech in praise or condemnation, preserved in memory or projected in hope?
Note that in each case, the question is to what extent is the human being implicated in the 
world as it is? Can we make something so, have we made something so, how should we speak of 
the here and now? What is  relevant  in the matter  is  precisely our slippery and questionable 
purchase  upon  things  in  the  world.  Rhetorical  matters  bring  everydayness,  the  otherwise 
unremarkable  business  of  making  the  world  easy  to  live  in,  to  light;  that  which  otherwise 
disappears  unnoticed in  the familiar,  predominant  patterns  of daily dealings  suddenly comes 
under scrutiny. Something is wrong—it has been made this way, it is being made this way, or it 
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will  be this  way.  In each case,  the thing is brought to presence in speaking: the thing in its  
was/is/will-be goodness or badness. In what way is the thing relevant to the changeable matter 
here and now, how can it be interpreted according to common ends, and how do we span that 
space between now what lies beyond it? Matters contour the significance of things in changing 
time. The rhetorical thing is one whose chief aspect of relevance to us, in speaking with one 
another, is its possible otherwiseness.
3.3.2 Being present here and now as possibly otherwise
If our concern is with presence, it must also be with the presence of otherwiseness. Rhetorical  
things are not to be determined using methods that foreclose contradiction—that the matter is, in 
an  unequivocal  way,  absolutely  as  it  appears.  Rather,  rhetorical  things  are  taken  in  their 
contrariness, in terms of relative extent, probability,  or magnitude (1391b28-1392a1, 1392a8). 
The question of relevance of the thing to the matter at hand is not answered by demarcating the 
matter  and categorizing the thing,  the genus and the species,  but by context.  From within a 
changeable matter, we then define the thing in a fuzzy way—is the thing better or worse, nearer 
or further, greater or lesser? 
If the thing is being taken up without reference to the fully temporal matter’s capacity to 
be otherwise in shared time, then that thing has not been understood in its everydayness but 
instead in a derived manner, for example as philosophical or scientific. In a derived mode of 
encounter, matter is present first as genus, first as species, as whole or predetermined part, as a  
proposition leading to propositions (1356b15) to be then judged in its here, now. It is no longer 
present  as  it  is  present  initially,  generally  and  for  the  most  part;  the  thing’s  presence  is 
established through procedure outside of time, in relation of like and like. Our most immediate, 
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familiar  and prevailing here and now—what you the reader at  this  very moment are seeing, 
hearing and touching around you above and beyond the written word—becomes less real than 
what is derived from logic, formulae and recorded observation. We take the thing-said for the 
thing. Therein lies the fate of Aristotelian research.
Thusfar we have seen how Aristotle builds the Rhetoric from matters and how rhetorical 
matters  differ  in  their  capacity  to  be  otherwise  in  shared  time.  From  the  grounding  in 
otherwiseness,  Aristotle  then  lays  out  the  art  of  rhetoric  as  one  that  mirrors  the  temporal 
insecurity of its matter. Finally, each way of speaking is divided along the lines of having things-
future, things-present and things-past in shared time as possibly otherwise, split into two basic 
directions of movement. What is relevant in the decision is precisely a thing’s capacity to be 
otherwise in shared time. In order to become other than rhetorical, one requires a way to hold the 
thing still,  either through dialectical form that holds through the general or through scientific 
investigation that holds through the particular.  In either  non-rhetorical  case,  the thing is  one 
capable of being singly what it is without contradiction.  Next, we will  see how approaching 
matters  rhetorically  enables  those  matters  to  be  taken  in  the  present  as  otherwise,  awaiting 
decision.
3.4 SPEAKING OF THINGS IN SHARED TIME
If  one  asks,  “what  can  be  otherwise  in  shared  time,”  the  answer  will  be  “anything  and 
everything.”  This  unsatisfactory  answer  comes  from  an  unsatisfactory  question.  Instead, 
Aristotle’s  treatment  of  how  matters  arise  in  different  temporal  situations  responds  to  the 
question  “how are  things  possibly otherwise  in  shared  time?”  We  begin  from  concrete 
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experience, taking things as they appear to us in pursuit of the future, confronted in the present, 
and judged against  the  past,  in  the  same way that  we first  investigated  time in  its  concrete 
experience  (as  before-now-after).  In  what  follows,  I  outline  how each  of  these  temporally-
conditioned matters are taken by the hearer in such a way as to be otherwise than they are. For  
each temporal way of speaking, I will highlight first, how the thing is taken as otherwise in the 
moment, second, that moment’s ecstasies (the ends toward which we are moved in decision; how 
it is in the present vis-à-vis past and future; how it is as already before us in shared sociality), and 
finally what this way of speaking then reflects back upon Being. 
3.4.1 Speaking toward the future
As noted above, the Rhetoric traces out the human ability to change its world. For matters of the 
future, the question presented to hearers who must then decide is this: is this matter, this thing, 
something that is-to-be-done or is-not-to-be-done? The futural aim is tied to particular prevailing 
circumstances. Within the context of everyday life, and in this moment here and now, can the 
thing be done—is it possible (1359a30-1359b1)? Between our aim toward the good and away 
from the bad, we then articulate the possibilities here and now for bringing that aim into being. 
Futural concerns are shaped by dual weighing—a two-foldness of Being and beings—between 
the good toward which we aim and the ability here and now to achieve that aim (1359a37-
1359b1).  The future,  in  this  way,  is  read  through the  conditions  of  the  present  in  terms  of 
feasibility. We weigh feasibility with reference to what has come before, and thus in political  
argument  we  use  examples  from  the  past  to  guide  our  judgment  of  the  present  and  its 
possibilities (1368a29-30). By drawing connections to past experience,  the speaking in effect 
substantiates present possibilities—it can be this way or that, because in the past under similar 
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conditions, the following happened. Matters of political speaking (again, used as an example of 
speaking toward the future, not definitive of all futural speaking), aimed toward the future and 
what  we wish  to  be  or  to  have,  are  grounded in  previous  experience  through  example  and 
brought to decision according to the conditions that prevail here and now. Things are in such a 
way that they are more or less probable to become something toward which we go, or away from 
which we recoil.
We can go toward or away from the world. What do we go toward, and from what do we 
turn away? In the present, the thing of political  speaking is taken as “something-to-be-gone-
toward,”  or  “something-to-be-turned-away-from”  (1360b4-6).  Happiness,  that  which  we  go 
toward, may be different for different people, Aristotle concedes.  For some, it is having and 
choosing well, another independence, another pleasure, another bodily condition—and for all, 
securing these things against changing time. Aristotle begins with the immediate and general 
experience of most people: a long, healthy, happy, and pleasurable life, with many healthy and 
happy children, good friends and family, all possessions that we might need, and esteem from 
others in our community, especially if we esteem those people as well (1360b19-31). These good 
things make the struggle of living a shared world with others for a brief length of time easy and 
enjoyable.  These things make our lives—in a very genuine sense—worth living,  and in turn 
make us care for our own capacity to live. Finally happiness, as projective, makes the capacity to 
live well extend out more securely into an uncertain future. 
The goods toward which we aim are not absolutely available to us always as they are,  
defined by abstract, rigid principle. We are in a world that changes. Contra Plato’s Gorgias, the 
business  of  political  speaking is  not  absolute  good,  but  what  is  better  or  worse for  a  given 
situation. The goods of everyday life extend in time (and hopefully, extend our own pleasurable 
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existence in time, as when we try to hold on to a moment of beauty), but these goods are also 
open to change. One’s fortunes turn. We lose friends. Our bodies fail. Our children live their own 
lives and make their own decisions. Public opinion turns against us. The things toward which we 
aim  in  everyday  life  are  rhetorical,  which  mean  that  they  can  be  lost  as  much  as  gained. 
Happiness can be otherwise. We may aim for good and find bad. At best, rhetorically, we can 
only judge what is good for now, according to our situation relative to past involvement and 
future aims. As the doctor’s general knowledge must apply to the particular body in better or 
worse health, so must general knowledge of the good apply to the here and now in better or 
worse possibilities.
Directed toward things that change in time, good and bad are interpreted temporally. In 
disposition, how we are moved to judge and choose something, we fear to lose the already-good 
and work to preserve it over time (1362b2-4). The good can be here and now. We enjoy its 
presence in shared space and time, and we desire to maintain our pleasurable time with that 
which is good as long as we can (1362b6-9). The toward-good promises something better than 
the  present,  in  relative  distance  to  where  we are  here  and now,  more  or  less  in  our  grasp. 
Directed toward the future, a thing is good-for something or for the sake of something (1362a33-
34). We can have goods as beginnings, goods in presence, goods as ends. 
We determine relative goodness (and, for that matter, badness) in terms of presence to 
hand—the good for-the-sake-of something does not just extend endlessly and indifferently into 
the future, but toward concrete ends that are judged by their relative closeness and feasibility,  
aimed toward being of use for us to thrive and be happy. Our time is not our own—good also 
extended to those in one’s shared time, toward friends and even enemies “[A]ll things are good 
which  men  deliberately  choose  to  do;  this  will  include  […] whatever  may be  bad for  their 
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enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable/possible [dunata]”  (1363a19-
22). Goods are closer or further, in ease or difficulty, to us here and now (1363a23-24). In each 
case, extended into the future, reflected back in the past or enjoyed in the present, the hearer 
judges the capacity to grasp the good in the light of the moment.
The good shows itself in shared time. Political matters bring together citizens to speak as 
a state, demarcating a region of shared time and concern. Aristotle describes the civic body in a 
way that is analogous to the individual constituents of happiness. As individuals wish to manage 
their  business,  get  what  they  want,  maintain  themselves  against  vulnerability,  propagate 
themselves, and attend to the expectations of others, so too does the state require maintenance, 
warfighting  and  defense  capabilities,  allies,  a  capacity  to  sustain  itself  physically  and  a 
constitution to give the civic body its form (1359b19-22). Political speaking projects everyday 
experience  to  a  mass—but  not  unlimited—scale.  The  bases  of  knowledge  for  the  political 
speaker, in other words, mirror the basic goods of the individual by projecting granular everyday 
experience  upon  the  civic  body  as  a  whole.  The  concerns  of  political  speaking  deal  with 
maintaining the state across changing times (ways and means), going after what the civic body 
wants  and does  not  yet  have  (warfare),  defending against  the bad that  may come against  it 
(defense), distinguishing between friend and enemy (allies), regenerating and supporting itself 
from the present into the future (sustenance), and maintaining the health of the political body 
over the passage of time (constitution) (1359b23-1360a35). 
As the good shows itself in shared time, so too do hearers hear not in the singular, but as 
part of a larger socio-political body. In the very form of the government, we see reflected back 
the stance of its people toward hierarchies of values, and with them, differing systems of valuing 
the rhetorical good. In other words, the form of government,  the structure of the civic body, 
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presents a  particular  array of possibilities  that  the public  presumes to be collective,  political 
goods. The form of government manifests which matters matter to the people united in decision-
making toward the future and capable of shaping the world, as “people choose in practice such 
actions as will lead to the realization of their ends” (1365b33-4). Democracies take as matters of 
concern those of the people who are enfranchised and thus constitute its civic body (1365b32-
33). In oligarchy, the primary concern is toward matters of money, faced by and relevant to a 
relative few (1365b33-4). In aristocracy, matters of concern are interpreted with an eye toward 
the preservation and maintenance of social rank (1365b34-5). And in monarchy, the good of the 
monarch reigns supreme (1365b39-1366a1). The things gone after as good reflect back on the 
one who goes and why one goes—how one sees oneself as part of a political collective. 
The pursuer  and the thing-pursued stand in  relation  with one another.  The good one 
pursues reveals the values and desires of pursuer, in both the everyday aims of individual who 
shares time and concerns with others, to the state itself as a particular assemblage of public time 
and concern. “We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way we learn the qualities  
of individuals,  since they are revealed in their  deliberate  acts  of choice;  and since these are 
determined by the end that inspires them” (1366a13-6). As the organization of the state reveals 
what the constituting public body of the state values, so too do we see the one who acts toward 
the world reflected in the things they act toward and how they take those things to be (1366a8-
16).  Democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy—these are systems of governance organized 
around a central value against which the matter will be judged: what is good for the people? 
Good for the production of wealth? Good for the maintenance of rank? Good for protection of 
the monarch? We can see the contours of social desire and directions of movement in the very 
constitution of collective political bodies. 
140
The decision over what we should pursue and recoil  from is always drawn back and 
given in the now. The good must be good for the particular situation (the thing is judged good in 
light  of the matter),  and thus judgment in the moment deals with both the valuable  and  the 
feasible. The feasible delimits the range of value, determining from out of possibility what is 
probable: “what can be got is better than what cannot” (1365a35). The comparison of value and 
act in the moment reveals varying levels of commitment toward the desired in given situations
—“the more a thing is desired, the better it is” in a relative sense in the situation (1356a3). Even 
when we draw major comparisons between goods or virtues, the ultimate verdict does not hold 
absolutely.  We  are  uninterested  in  a  philosophical  colloquy  on  the  comparative  value  of 
temperance or bravery, but the brave or temperate thing to be done, judged from the vantage of 
here and now (1364b35-39). Speaking toward the future illuminates the things that we go after, 
and the reasoning we use in pursuit, manifest in individual and social matters of concern, in their 
possibility to be otherwise before a decision in the here and now.
3.4.2 Speaking toward the present
So then, how do we speak of presentness if speaking always happens in the present? Things can 
be present in different ways.  We should read Aristotle’s discussion of epideictic speaking as 
addressing both the speaking of present matters, and how each act of speaking presents things in 
the context of the matter. We must, as he writes, “know on what grounds” to praise and blame so 
that we might show ourselves to be trustworthy (1366a32-3). For example, epideictic speaking is 
concerned with virtue and vice, and also with the perceived virtuousness or viciousness of the 
speaker. For the speaker, too, is a thing that is present, a person whose own grasp upon the world 
is going to be judged by others in light of the present moment (1366a25-23). In the same way, 
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the epideictic deals with what is worthy of being spoken of with one another, and how we should 
do so, which in turn reveals how rhetorical things in general leap out of the everyday and become 
matters of concern, as things we speak about with one another.
Epideictic speaking takes as its aim matters of virtue and vice precisely in this reflective 
sense of desire, in how one’s expression reveals something about the one who chooses or speaks 
about what is here and now. The virtuous person is judged by the way that person chooses the 
good, what and how they take a thing as good. As Aristotle says, we can see virtue in the doing 
and choosing—the things gone after, taken temporally in the past (the thing done), present (the 
virtue of the thing before us) and future (the aim toward which virtue strives): “it is evident that  
things productive of virtue are noble, as tending toward virtue; and also the effects of virtue, that 
is, the signs and its presence and the acts to which it leads” (1366b25-28). The vicious take the 
good for themselves without concern of others in their shared world, while the virtuous choose 
for  themselves  as  they  would  choose  before  all—they  choose  both  the  desirable  and 
praiseworthy at once (1366a33-4). The concern then, is how the present matter should be taken 
up in speaking, as that which is spoken-of-well, or that which is spoken-of-poorly, honored and 
praised or denigrated and blamed. The speaker is also a thing that can be otherwise, perhaps as  
one who in public chooses one way, but in private chooses another. The choice itself is opened 
up to public scrutiny. For the virtuous, the good is clear in what is here and now. The vicious 
sees a thing good for the individual but bad for the collective in the here and now and goes after 
it. The speaker, who stands present before the hearer, aims at being taken as someone capable of 
seeing, having experienced, and projecting toward the good not just for oneself but for all. The 
speaker must be judged as one able to see, hear and grasp in the matter what is good, what is bad, 
and choose accordingly. 
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Speaking  toward  the  now  aims  at  virtue,  which  provides  and  preserves  the  good 
(1366a36-7).  The  now,  interpreted  in  terms  of  virtue,  stretches  both  forward  and  back.  In 
provision, virtue goes after and secures that which it does not have, and in preservation, virtue 
maintains that which it already has against changing time. What in the present here with us is 
capable of generating and preserving the good? Both provision and preservation are brought into 
the now in terms of what is ready-to-hand and available for our pursuit and preservation of good. 
The virtuous person is not simply capable of determining the good, but of grasping and taking it  
up in the now. Rather than being concerned entirely with the matter, we see the person in light of 
their dealings with matters, in terms of what one chooses to value and how one does so.
Speaking toward the now initially posits the very possibility of sharing a world at all—
that what is here as relevant for me, is so for others as well. What is good in itself and worthy of 
praise  (1366a34)?  In  the  shared  here  and  now,  matters  initially  arise  as  being  worthy  of 
collective  concern.  The examples  that  bolster  our  projections  toward the  future  and support 
general observations that guide our assessment of the past do not materialize out of air. These 
grounds are formed in the course of observing things: events to be remembered as examples and 
old wisdom reaffirmed in light  of  the current  situation,  invested with “dignity and nobility” 
(1368a29). 
In speaking toward the present, we work out what things are important for those of us 
gathered in a here and now. The hearer takes the position of observer—but does not observe bare 
things or indifferent objects. The hearer observes things as great and small, as deserving to be 
called good or to be reviled both now and in the future in collective memory, and things that 
should be forgotten and vanish from collective concern,  even while they stand in our midst. 
From the here and now, we then observe the possibilities present to us in past and future. What 
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has been may be reassessed in light of this day. What will be can be considered in terms of what 
we can see in the present. 
As seen above in the discussion of deliberative speaking, speaking to the future gauges 
the human capacity to collectively shape the world and bring about a desired end. And as we will 
see below, speaking to the past measures out the extent to which the matter that has come to be 
did so as a result of human choice. In the now, the present is manifest in terms of the things 
within it, what they have become or will be, their relative closeness or remove to hand, and their 
variable importance to us in the moment and productive of good. The observing of the present 
then involves not just seeing what is present here and now, but which of these things matters to 
us. 
The present is not present entirely in all of its possibilities all as once, but according to 
which of those possibilities, in the things important and thus relevant to us as present, is good for 
the moment. These relevant matters of concern are judged by past and future, in terms of the 
magnitude  of  pressing  presence—what  is  required,  desired,  and  remembered,  what  is 
superfluous, despised and forgotten. Right now things surround you, and at this moment very 
few of them matter. Speaking toward the now reveals in its moment what parts of this world are 
worth  taking  into  words.  Something  might  be  present  as  small,  meaningless,  unimportant, 
ephemeral, another as large, defining, crucial, lasting. What is worth going after here? What is 
worth keeping? And what is worth letting go, tossing out and forgetting? 
Addressing  what  is  here  and  now  means  not  here  and  now  for  the  speaker  as  an 
individual, but what is here and now in shared time. The now is a public now, one that we are 
seeing, hearing and grasping together.  In that now, the speaker is a thing that is present to others, 
that could be otherwise and changes in time. Of relevance to the hearer is the speaker’s capacity 
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to properly grasp how things are here and now. Is the speaker motivated by what is good, and 
when faced with this matter, can they recognize the good and bring it about? Does the speaker 
take the hearers as things that are good? Virtue itself is defined in relation to publicness. The 
virtuous person goes after the good, even when no one is watching. The virtue,  then, of the 
speaker is possibly otherwise precisely because the speaker is, here and now, being watched. 
Ultimately, the very best of our knowledge of the Being of other beings can only judge how that 
being seems to be. I cannot know for certain how you would deal with matter if you were alone. 
From what I see now, I can at best guess at what you would be if I were not watching. Taken 
rhetorically, the speaker remains a matter of opinion.
Let me take this opportunity to address a strange claim made by Aristotle regarding the 
ethos of the speaker. The judgment of character does not come from prior knowledge of that 
person, but from the act of speaking itself (1356a5). At first blush this seems impossible. Surely, 
because the hearer is a public-hearer, speakers cannot guarantee that they have come before the 
eyes of each person in the past, or that hearers have knowledge or pre-judgments of the speaker. 
It seems to beggar belief, however, that the matters arising in the course of our everyday traffic 
and trade with one another, conditioned by past experience and projected intentions, enmeshed in 
a thick network of social attachments and borne in shared speaking—matters of intense shared 
and localized concern—could be spoken by someone taken as a blank slate. Rather, I would 
suggest Aristotle means that all of these past and projected attachments are taken in the context 
of that moment in speaking. Neither past nor projection can speak for one. Who you are—and 
you may be the subject of much judgment, under watch of many eyes for a long time—is still  
judged in the course of your addressing this matter in this moment, now.
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We can see, then, how addressing the speaking of present matters rhetorically reveals 
matters  raised from the business  of  everydayness  to  a  concern  for  shared life.  As shown in 
chapter two, the speaking of everydayness is the speaking of the present—it is drawn from and 
addressed to the now. Rhetorical speaking deals with the future and past, but it is addressed to 
those who are here and now. Though the matters with which judicial, deliberative and epideictic 
speaking deal may differ temporally, the speaking itself is always done in the now, establishing 
the shared gathering of speaker, hearer and matter in a world with one another.  Speaking in the 
now, then, reveals to us the speaker as one whose comportment toward the world is displayed in 
their pursuit of good, in the matter presented as worthy of collective concern in speaking, and a 
hearer who stands in judgment of the word’s fit to the matter. In virtue, our estimation of how 
others see what is here and now, we see how the speaker is a thing that is present in the here and 
now. 
Speaking to what is here, now unveils what is worthy of being spoken of at all. In the 
present world of things, some things should be brought into the realm of collective attention, 
while others are left out. The act of speaking is itself of concern—both the things selected and 
the way they are brought into word  matters. How is this thing to be spoken of, as reviled or 
cheered? How is it to be remembered and taken as hope? Those things worthy of praise make 
shared life easier to bear: connections with others society, the fair order of law, reaching out to  
friends, the spectacle and promise of wealth and beauty, and wisdom in deciding over public 
matters (1366a3-23). Does the matter present before us here and now make us better than we are, 
or does it help us live up to what we have been? Arrayed outward in hope of what we wish to be,  
and memory of what we have been before, what is present arises as a matter of social concern in 
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terms of its being more or less important—pressing or necessary for the moment—and in extent 
as better or worse.
Virtue’s strange double movement,  as that which one chooses outside of the view of 
others, but judged within the view of others, illustrates the length to which we are not simply 
capable of shaping what is to be, or responsible for what has been, but do so in the presence of 
others and measured by others. Here, Being is revealed in the way one is seen to be relating to 
things in the world. How are we to be seen—how does one present themselves? Dasein, as a 
being in the world, is seen relating to things. Who then judges, and how do they judge? What is  
seen,  and how is it  seen? Each change in region; Athenians esteem different  things than do 
Scythians,  Spartans or—for that matter—philosophers (1367b7-11). We need look no further 
than the goods of virtue, which have already outlined what is worthy of praising, raising up and 
idealizing in presence. We, as beings who live together, value the observation of custom both as 
informal social expectation and explicit law, and judge the presence of others physically in the 
body, by way of our more intimate and particular social connections such as our friends and 
family, and the extent to which our own possessions are also able to be shared by others. As that 
which is present, the valued is present both in its simple spectacle (the speaking as something 
that appears to eye and ear) and its relevance and significance for shared business and doing (its 
use to hand). Aristotle quotes Sappho:
If for things good and noble thou wert yearning
If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning
No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;
What thou with honor wishest thou wouldst say. (1367a11-14)
 One’s shame before others is rooted and revealed in the shameful things one desires. What is 
most important in Heidegger’s interaction with the Rhetoric is this explanation of the speaker—
for Heidegger, Dasein itself, findings itself as just one more kind of things that can be otherwise,  
147
seen and judged by others. The actor becomes suborned by the world in which they themselves 
are implicated. 
We find in the aims of virtue then a negotiation of one’s own good with the larger shared 
and public good determined by the hearers in the moment. Who’s good—yours or ours (1367a1-
7)? In the desired good, the virtuous good, we see what the given people in a shared socio-
historical region will show one another openly without fear (1367a15-16). Speaker and hearer 
are both before one another’s ear in word, and eye in look, dress and comportment; Aristotle 
even  describes  a  speaker’s  character  as  needing  to  “look right”  (1377b26-30).  In  epideictic 
speaking, we both show what is in this moment, here and now, worthy of being taken up and 
borne into history, or worthy of concern and consideration, and through our choices of the good 
and bad, our own presumptions and systems of social valuation. “[W]henever you want to praise 
anyone,  think what  you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of 
anything, think what you would praise a man for having done” (1368a7-8). It is both what we see 
and how we wish to be seen. We show how we are present as a public in what we go after and 
value,  in  terms  of  our  own  interest  and  in  how  we  conduct  ourselves  before  others.  In 
Heideggerian terms, Dasein is not simply an actor amongst things, but amongst beings, and is a 
thing before those other beings. Dasein is a being that recognizes itself in history (as responsible 
for having brought things about), in intention (as bringing things about), and being here and now, 
present before the eyes and judgment of other beings sharing its time. 
Secondly, the very contours of presence itself, of how things matter in the moment, are 
revealed in the speaking of the present. Presence is not absolute or fully and unequivocally given 
to us all at once. Thing are present to greater or lesser extents. Thus, in the speaking of things 
present, we find what is worthy of being spoken of, of being rhetorical at all. Some things matter 
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as rhetorical matters and others are too unimportant to merit concern. The first of something, the 
better,  the  right  thing at  the  right  moment,  the  consistently  successful  and the unexpectedly 
excellent, all heightened against the background of normal, prevailing everydayness (1368a10-
19)  The  present  is,  in  this  way,  present  in  concern  in  terms  of  magnitude,  and  is  open  to 
observation before both ourselves and others. Rhetorical presence of things marks those things as 
more or less worthy of collective concern.
3.4.3 Speaking toward the past
Finally,  we  turn  to  the  thing  done  in  the  past,  judged  in  the  light  of  the  present.  When 
determining guilt or innocence, we judge the thing-done against law or other social expectation. 
If the futural orientation of Being asks to what extent we are capable of making things otherwise 
than they are, and the present orientation asks what things we take up as desirable, useful and 
valuable, the past orientation asks to what extent things in the now are the product of human 
action, within the remit of human temporality, care and concern, and to what extent they have 
been brought about by factors beyond our control or awareness (1368b36-1369a2). As the future 
is open to concrete possibilities of change, so to has been the past, leading up to this moment.  
We judge the act against a collective rule of law, which can be interpreted narrowly as the law of 
the state, or more broadly as individual or socio-cultural expectation (1368b6-9).
How have we gotten to where we are here and now? Speaking toward the past addresses 
simultaneously things as they are now for us and as they appeared to be at the time the things 
were done. Did the accused mistake the bad for the good or misunderstand the law? Was the 
thing done intentional or accidental? In this way, we work out how the past was present as thing 
that could be otherwise than it was—how the past stood before a choice (1368b10). Our present 
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moment is not necessary, natural or inevitable product of the march of time, but has been brought 
into being by particular things done at particular moments. 
We then determine how to address the problem—the thing that should not be as it is—in 
the  present  and  renew our  shared  sense  of  social  expectation.43 As  discussed  earlier  in  the 
chapter,  judgments  of  things-done  are  different  from  those  of  things-to-be-done.  The  past 
judgment  speaks  to  a  particular  moment,  a  particular  action  or  situation  and  a  particular 
community, rather than in the general and open-ended terms of futural decisions, yet it does so 
by approaching past acts in their horizon of possibility in the moment of acting—how did the 
future lie open to one at the time, and what things are people “trying to get or avoid” (1368b28)? 
From here, the hearer is able to judge then the transgression’s level  of severity for both the 
individual and for the community.
The end toward which speaking of the past aims, then, is a decision between guilt and 
innocence. We should note here that the question is not simply was a thing done, but rather the 
relative extent to which the thing-done was both capable of and responsible for bringing our 
current situation into being. The decision projects from the present (how we are now) to the past 
(how it became this way and who bears responsibility) to then aim towards a decision (what 
should we do). Responsibility is interpreted according to temporality as well—was one capable 
of seeing this moment now, to what consequences the choice would lead,  when making that 
choice  in  the  past?  One  bears  responsibility  insofar  as  one  was  capable  of  seeing  what 
possibilities lay open for the thing-done. In a voluntary act, one is able to see the choice one 
43 I use “social expectation” to loosely translate nomos in order to emphasize both the public and collective sense of 
the rule of nomos as well the way in which nomos precedes judgment of the moment. Aristotle approaches social 
regulations and conventions in both their written and unwritten forms, and so I want to avoid evoking the heavily 
formal legal connotations of “law.” I also do not use “convention,” because the term is too static. “Social 
expectation” explains how a convention makes-conventional, that is, how particular norms, values, practices, 
repeated shared experiences, and beliefs guide our interpretations of the present. “Expectation” captures the active, 
particular sense of nomos in time. An expectation is a presumption one uses to interpret the present moment, and the 
way things are or should be in that moment. 
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makes, and possible outcomes of such a decision in shared time and in shared social expectation 
(1368b10).  On the other  hand, the thing-done may be done out of ignorance of what  might 
happen afterward, or what the expectations are in a particular shared place and time. One may be 
forced by others to do the thing, and in that one had no choice, one also bears no responsibility 
1369a31-1369b18). 
The thing done may be judged according to the doer’s understanding and capability at the 
time, but it is also judged according to the unfolding of possibility in shared time. Time is shared 
by more than other people—it is shared with a myriad of things extending outside of our own 
control.  The  very  best  of  human  reason  may  be  betrayed  by  changing  time  and  become 
foolishness. Human capabilities and responsibilities are limited; they do not extend everywhere 
and always, but instead take place under certain circumstances, and are located in between the 
poles of necessity and pure chance (1369a31-1369b2). In the necessity of nature, the thing-done 
always already would have happened, and the present moment is as it always already would be. 
It cannot be otherwise than it is. In chance, rather than being straight-jacketed by the world, the 
thing-done is too prone to change and unpredictability. For either, the horizons that should open 
up to choice are foreclosed, by a time that progresses exactly as it shows itself to be without 
change, or change that cannot be foreseen and judged. In necessity, there is no present moment, 
just an expanse and extension backwards and forwards; time exists as continuity but without 
punctuation in the moment. In chance, all we have are moments, here and then gone, so chaotic 
and unordered that one cannot properly project into the future because it has no foundation in the 
past or ability to meaningfully engage in the present. In necessity, time is all sameness, in chance 
other and other.
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Speaking toward the past maps out the shared realm of everydayness against the borders 
of necessity and chance. To what extent do we matter in making the world as it is, and as we 
believe  it  should  be?  It  is  only  by  taking  the  world  as  it  appears  in  choice  that  one  can 
provisionally project, even then without certainty, and only in choice that one can be responsible 
for the outcomes of the things-done. We cannot  know the future as a necessity,  and we are 
powerless to bring about that which happens by chance. In that choice in the moment, one seeks 
to go after what makes  one’s living easy and recoils  from that  which makes Being difficult 
(1369b33-35). Choice toward things weighs the needs of one’s self against the expectations of 
the shared community, testing the hold of one against the other. The choice, in which the bad 
thing appeared good, reveals one’s network of desire, social attachment and reasoning: Dasein’s 
everyday world in shared time, as expectations that can be either fulfilled or dashed (1369b20-
27).
In judging the thing done, one judges time. We reconstruct how something has come to 
be. From our position here and now, the decision is over how we believe the thing-done was 
present to the doer at the time. The thing-done is present in two ways: first, in how the thing 
stood at the time, and second in how the doer made a decision about that thing. How, in other 
words, was something in the past then present in its horizonal future possibilities at the time,  
“since anything pleasant  is either  present and perceived,  past  and remembered or future and 
expected” (1370a33-35)? In judging the thing done, the judge must consider the thing in its full 
ecstatic temporality. Here, in this judgment, the human being confronts its ability to bring things 
about  in  the  world,  juxtaposed  against  chance  (too  chaotic  to  be  taken  as  temporal  in  any 
meaningful  way),  nature (the happening is  so regular  as  to  be outside our intervention)  and 
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compulsion (the human capacity to interact with the world restricted by other beings with whom 
one shares that world). 
If  indeed the thing-done was present as a choice,  and when given a choice one goes 
toward the good, we must then ask how one came to take the socially bad thing that goes against 
social expectation, in law or custom, as nevertheless in some way good. Why did you not see the 
thing as you should have, and as we see it now? The choice itself took place in time. First, in 
terms of the past, one is disposed or has come to see the thing in a way that opposes social  
expectation. In the most immediate sense, the choice may be driven by sheer physical appetite: 
the human being, after all, is a living creature first who hungers, thirsts and lusts (1370a20-25). 
One may encounter the thing as an object of desire, where one pursues the presence of the thing 
without giving heed to the judgment of others (1370a25-28).  One may also take the matter as 
grounded in past experience and habit,  in a misrecognition affirmed and maintained in one’s 
repeated doing in the world—thus if one has been able to do wrong in the past, one expects that 
this thing done here and now is no great evil (1369b7-8). Finally, one may be able to project into 
the future through reasoning what will happen if one does the bad thing, and may nevertheless 
misjudge (1369b8-11). 
In the face of appetite, desire, habit and reason, the presence of the thing as good or bad 
is taken in terms of one’s dealing in time. The immediately good may be so much so, or in such 
great need, that the later consequences for contravening social expectation have less influence in 
how one takes the thing to be: “you have nothing to lose” (1372a36-7). The short-term good 
outweighs the long-term bad. In habit, one recognizes the possibility of a negative outcome, but 
past experience shows that it need not turn out this way. Projecting outward in reasoning, we 
may judge well, but we may also judge poorly. We understand and misunderstand, judge and 
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misjudge. The hearer who judges the justice of the thing-done moves from the now before a 
decision,  to  the  temporal  situation  of  the  thing-done in  its  own present,  and then  toward  a 
decision to be made over what should be. The hearer, in other words, moves from what is to 
what was to what should be.
Speaking  toward  the  past  traces  out  the  relationship  between  the  individual  and 
community in social expectation—the judgment of others that comes before us and shapes how 
we understand the world and our relationship to it  (and to others in that world). The matter 
becomes relevant as rhetorical, jumps out of the fabric of everyday life, because something has 
become other than it  should be.  Something has broken with expectation,  and there has been 
injury. Now, the world diverges from expectation all the time. Traffic is bad. You forgot your 
keys. The appointment was canceled. The broken expectation, then, must be one worthy of being 
called to the attention of others, and uncertain enough to require outside judgment. We see in the 
choice of legal concerns a sort of economy of social attachments, not just between the doer and 
the thing-done, but also between the doer and those whose expectations the thing-done violates. 
The far away, the relatively powerless, the reviled—people whose share in our world is less than 
others,  and whose  expectations  matter  little—have  less  claim  on  what  the  world  should  be 
(1372b23-1373a27). It is not so bad to do badly by some people, and is even good to treat badly 
those who have wronged ourselves or others (1373a9-16). 
Yet if there are some who are excluded from social concern and whose own expectations 
are not to be honored, there are others who may be wrongly excluded and whose exclusion 
reveals a failure of our social expectations. Aristotle argues that claims to equality expand our 
circle of concern, worked out in our everyday traffic and trade, and call into question whether 
our legal or customary expectations are themselves just to all (1373b3-11). For example, when 
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Antigone  honors  the  expectations  of  the  gods  over  Creon’s  law,  she  expands  the  circle  of 
concern from Creon’s earthly collective state, to divine judgment over all humanity. Thus does 
she bring the desecration of Polynieces’ corpse, literally thrown beyond the limit of concern for 
the state  outside the city walls,  back into the circle  of social  concern as violation of divine 
expectation.  In claims to equity,  which extend beyond the community’s  particular  laws to a 
person or thing not currently considered, where our best attempts at deliberation could not hold 
up to the situation (1373a26-32). Our judgments of one another are themselves judged.
The  relationship  between  the  thing  done  and  its  possible  contravention  of  social 
expectation is temporal, based on the way one is disposed toward the other and the act, the end 
toward which one aims, and one’s capacity to bring it about. One must be disposed in such a way 
as to desire the thing over and against the expectation—you have to be moved to see the thing 
wrongly (1373b36). The thing must be present at hand in such a way that it is feasible to do 
wrong against another capable of being harmed. And one must project the thing’s possibilities in 
such a way that either punishment is likely not a concern, or that the threat of punishment is less 
important  than  the  presence  of  the  thing.  How,  in  other  words,  had  one’s  disposition  and 
projection made this bad thing present as good?
The thing-done reveals, then, a choice between desire and social expectation, what we go 
after, and what stands before us. The desire may be overwhelming, the need in the moment great, 
the recourse for the victim limited, the act hidden or far from the judgment of others, or the cost 
of violating slight. We also see, in the choice of matters of concern, the expectations and desires 
of the community. The matters of concern mark moments of disruption in social life that  have 
become a problem for we who share a time and place, an everyday region of concern, and of  
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those  problems,  which  were  criminal  acts,  and  which  were  forgivable  errors  or  unexpected 
misfortunes (1374a5-10). 
In the moment of judgment put before the hearer, we find ourselves—in our capacity and 
responsibility for bringing the present about as it is, as things that are desired and loved, as who 
we are in what we desire from others in terms of friendship or honor, and how we have others as 
means, for the sake of something. The criminal act, held up for censure and punishment for its 
violation of individual and community expectation, can also be balanced against a willingness to 
forgo punishment:
Equity bids us to be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about 
the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than 
about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his 
intentions; nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a 
man is now but what he has always or usually been (1374b11-16).
In claims to equity,  then, the matter expands and provides new relations to the thing-done in 
question.  Desire,  wonder, and learning all  draw us outward to understand the world beyond, 
determined and limited proximally in our dealings, watched by others and regulated by the rule 
of others.
Judging the thing-done shows what lies before us in  nomos—how the world is for us 
already in expectation, and how we take then the thing, in such a way that we either bend and 
acquiesce to expectation or go against that expectation in light of that present moment. How far 
do each of us extend into the world, filled with things and other beings existing together in 
shared time? Both acquiescence and opposition occur to certain degrees.  One may generally 
reject expectation but judge opposition to be disadvantageous in the moment, and in the other 
direction, one may value social expectation generally but face a moment in which it is better to 
break against others. In both cases, the thing-done is judged in the here and now, narrowly or 
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broadly.  In  our  desires,  we  ourselves  are  revealed  in  what  we  go  after,  and  our  level  of 
attachment to the claims and expectations of others. In what we desire, what we seek to learn, 
what we take in wonder, and pursue for benefit, in the things that are done, we reveal ourselves 
as doers.
From the aims that guide speaking of things-to-be-done, things-here-now, and things-
that-have-been-done,  the  Rhetoric then  turns  to  what  comes  before  the  speaking  itself.  The 
transition between books one and two presents an opportunity to appreciate how the Rhetoric’s  
intricate arrangement illuminates the relationship between Being and beings. In short, the three 
books break down how things are present in a now in aim, expectation and manifestation in 
speaking (the ontology of speaking), and within each of the three books, the things-spoken-about 
are approached in terms of their  own situated temporality (beings that are spoken). We then 
move from how things are as aims—their for-the-sake-of—to how things are already before us 
what we expect of the world, and how those expectations are either confirmed or subverted in 
speaking and dealing with one another in shared time. In all three horizons, speaker, hearer and 
matter arise and converge into the moment of decision.
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4.0 SPEAKING FROM THINGS
4.1 BEING-MOVED: FEELING, DEALING, SPEAKING
Matters present in the now are present temporally, that is, their presence is determined within a 
larger time-conditioned context, holding a before and an after within the now. In chapter three, 
we saw how matters are present in their futural ecstasy—as things to go after, particularly as 
things-to-be-decided, interpreted according to their aim in the moment of decision. Within this 
general futurity, we still see a temporal extension from past and future in the now. Each speaking 
aims toward a decision over a matter that has already come before us as requiring decision, and 
is made manifest and decided in the now. For the rhetorical there is no pure past, present or 
future, but rather a future projected from past expectation, taken here and now in its possible 
otherwiseness in changing shared time. We also see how futurity,  the world and things in it, 
taken for the sake of something, is rooted in the expectations of pathos, in hexis, in logos: how 
we project from mood (pathos,  desire, pleasure), how we project from habit (hexis, as how we 
are in terms of habituated choosing) and in basic patterns of reasoning (logos as connecting from
—toward). These are directed toward matters that themselves are temporally conditioned: future 
matters in the good and bad, present in the greater and lesser, and past in the just or unjust. We 
will see the same temporal extension in how the matter stands before us, in pathos, in ethos and 
in logos.
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The world is already underway when we find ourselves in it. In the previous chapter, 
things were described in relation to their aim—that is, things are present with an eye toward what 
we want to bring about, and the capacity and extent to which we may do so. Now, in Book Two, 
we see how things are always already there, for a hearer who already stands before us. Matters 
are before us in  pathos as that which moves one to care about the particular thing in the first 
place.  Something  raises  the  thing  from  out  of  the  transparent,  there-yet-unacknowledged 
everyday matters of dealing and doing into shared concern. In habit, something interrupts our 
easy doing. In  logos, our recognition of the problematic as problematic is conditioned by our 
repeated, habitual and emotionally textured interactions, raised in speaking.
We find ourselves in how the problematic, could-be-otherwise thing stands before us. For 
Heidegger, Dasein confronts itself—Dasein’s ability to Be—in its attachments to others and the 
way it projects outward from an existent disposition, repeated and observed in the engagement of 
everyday work, and in customary ways of reasoning. Book Two reflects upon on all three aspects 
of care: its moodedness (disposition), its understanding (comportment or habitual choosing) and 
its entanglement (shared speaking with others) to show how the matter has already become one 
of concern to the hearers who have come before the speaker.
In the opening of chapter three, I argued that Aristotle interprets rhetoricity as having to 
do with things. Book One deals with things in prospect. In contrast with an eidetic, Platonic (and 
in our phenomenological account, Husserlian) sense of projection where things are “formed” in 
consciousness,  the  futural  aim of  rhetoric  grasps  the  thing  in  the  context  of  matters  arising 
through the course of everyday life. In Book Two, matters are dealt with in retrospect. In other 
words, Book One deals with the world as on the way toward something, and Book Two deals 
with  the  world  as  already underway.  Rhetorical  speaking  grounds  a  matter’s  past  in  an 
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alternative way to the psychological, Sophistic (and Diltheyian) sense of reflection wherein the 
world as it appears is a product of the concrete material world being reconstructed in psychic 
experience, expressed in grammatical speaking and thus released to history in such a way that its 
validity can then be later confirmed. Rather than suppose that the speaker is able to simply move 
the hearer’s emotions in such a way that the hearer takes the thing to be in a particular way, we 
see how things—again, in the business of everyday life—can be positioned in such a way as to 
change the hearer’s affective relationship with that matter. As Book One rejects the origin of 
things in intentional consciousness for things encountered in dealing, as being worthy of pursuit, 
address  or  redress,  Book Two denies  the  origin  as  in  purely psychological  response to  and 
reconstruction  of  things  from which  speaking then  flows.  Book Two addresses  how we are 
disposed to be moved by things, come to expect things to be according to past experience, and 
judge things  here  and now with borrowed knowledge.  The things  present  to  us  are  not  the 
production of form or psyche. Form and psyche are instead coproduced by our engagement with 
things. Things are there already, and can be there in different ways. We see these things as we 
are moved to see them: the pleasant and good—the things toward which we aim—are pleasant 
and good to us if we already disposed to take the things as such, and that disposition in turn is 
constituted in the concrete interactions of everydayness (1378a3-5).
Book Two divides the pre-existing world already underway as being before us in three 
senses. First, we are disposed toward things, already invested or intertwined with them in our 
daily lives and are moved (or not) to attend to things in different ways. In discussing  pathos, 
translated most commonly as emotion or disposition, and ontologically interpreted by Heidegger 
as mood, we can see how things have become matters of concern that call for speaking. Next, 
Aristotle considers how ethos shapes the way in which people are motivated to take up certain 
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matters of concern and ignore others in terms of progression of time in age, inherited family,  
material  wealth and power, and habituated behavior.  Finally,  Aristotle turns to how our very 
reasoning is  rooted in  shared  logos, routine,  communal  talk,  where what  we already believe 
contours the presence of things and others. For the speaker, and for Dasein itself, confronting 
what stands before one means questioning how one’s mood (good will),  comportment (good 
character), and modes of thinking and relating to things in speaking (good sense) look before 
others, and before one’s own self (1378a6-9).
4.2 EXPECTATION AND PATHOS
Pathos does not refer to feeling, but to feeling about things. The pathe are before us (1378a20-1). 
This does not mean that they must be neutralized for the thing to  be as it really is (indeed, if 
there is no disposition toward the thing, there would be no speaking of it), but rather we must 
understand how to bring the matter before the hearer in such a way that the hearer is disposed to 
take it in its otherwiseness. In the first section of Book Two, Aristotle shows how the pathe trace 
out our expectations, our prior assumptions about the world already underway with which we 
must deal, the temporal and proximal range of those expectations, the relative strength of those 
expectations and in turn the expectations of others toward ourselves. One’s being in the world 
shares that world in time with others, who can be more or less as we expect and who can take us  
in expectation as well. Others in the world are special kinds of things—things like us, who have 
this here and now with us. We can be each other’s means and ends, each other’s desires and 
objects. We, as things in the world, are both valuable and vulnerable to one another.  
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Aristotle, in analyzing pathos, draws together how particular moods disposes us toward 
the world,  the others  toward whom we are motivated  and related,  and how that  response is 
situated in time. The pathe are no fuzzy internal subjective feelings split off from the reality of 
the world, but respond to and are rooted in one’s concrete engagement with others and the world, 
demarcated by a region of concern (Gross,  Secret History  2-3  ). One has been already moved to 
care  about  the rhetorical  matter,  and our  speaking of  the  matter  shows how we are already 
disposed toward things. As Gross observes, the pathe display how matters matter to us: 
Insofar  as  the  pathe are  not  the  annex  of  psychological  events,  but  compose 
instead the ground upon which language grows and to which expressions return 
the  pathe  provide  the fundamental possibilities in which Dasein finds itself and  
orients itself (“Being Moved” 38).
I am one amongst others in the world, others who are the same sort of thing as I and with whom I 
share Being and being. In pathos, we see the ease and struggle with which we share a world with 
others in time. 
We  can  read  the  progression  of  Book  Two’s  treatment  of  pathos as  revealing  the 
increasingly thick network of attachments between Being and its world. These attachments have 
been established prior to taking the matter under consideration and thus prior to our engagement 
with the things encountered within the matter, but were themselves built in engagements with 
matters in the course of everyday life. We have to be moved to care about things, and we care 
about things in different ways and to different extents in particular situations. Heidegger uses 
Aristotle’s treatment of  pathos  in  Being and Time to show how Dasein finds itself as a being 
amongst beings confronted by its own choices, how we move from caring about particular things 
(beings) to our own ability to be (Being). Following along with the progression of the pathe in 
Book Two,  Dasein is  confronted  by itself  as  an agent  that  can both expect  and have those 
expectations dashed, who is open and vulnerable to the world with others who are also open and 
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vulnerable to the world, lives in the sight of others, and judges those others while using the 
judgment of others to measure Dasein’s own self. How do you find yourself?
Aristotle  pairs  the  pathe,  not  because  they  are  the  product  of  psychic  or  logical 
constructions, but because each pair offers a way to engage with the thing as being possibly-
otherwise. When the speaker moves the hearer, it is not through baldly manipulating a psychic 
state, but shifting the relation between the hearer and the matter. The close temporal intensity of 
anger may be counteracted by presenting the thing as far off from our current time and needs, 
and thus unworthy of our concern. Pity may be curdled by contempt, where even those close 
enough  to  touch  us,  in  acute  present  need,  are  exiled  from  the  region  of  our  concern  as 
undeserving  of  even  the  slightest  recognition.  The  pathe are  not  separate  as  an  overlay  of 
irrational distortion, nor an organizing manifold, but are manifest in our engagement with things 
as we are moved to engage with them.
4.2.1 Being-moved toward and away from the world: anger, calmness, love, hate, fear and 
confidence
We first find ourselves in anger. When things are as one expects, the world lays itself out as 
though it were an extension of one’s own will. When one’s will is blocked, however, the world 
breaks with expectation and exposes the disconnect between the desired and the had. In anger, I 
recognize that I cannot will the world into being and that others do not value things as I value 
them. There is a disruption in our shared being-together. Dasein recoils against its own limits, 
and then goes toward rectifying that slight (1378a31-3). The things to which Dasein reacts in 
anger show a second insight into Dasein’s world. Anger implies, to a certain extent, a roughly 
mutual relationship—one reacts to one’s own aim being blocked with anger only if one believes 
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revenge to be possible. I take myself as the sort of thing that is simultaneously capable of being 
hurt by you, and capable of hurting you, as you were capable of hurting me and are capable of 
being hurt by me (1378b3-5).44 The response of anger also indicates a shared relation—one is 
angry because another has not valued things in shared time as one has valued them (1378b10-13) 
In  anger,  we see  the  initial  impulse  towards  justice.  The  broader  social  motivation  to  right 
wrongs against collective expectation are, in anger, rendered in miniature.
 Before going any further,  I  want to  clear  up a possible  source of misunderstanding. 
Disposition, the initial motivation to engage with the matter, and the subtle system of valuation 
that the motivation reveals are not products of conscious thought. If I react to another person in 
fear rather than anger, my disposition toward the authority figure indeed shows that I take this 
person to  have  overwhelming  power  over  me,  against  which  I  am incapable  of  acting.  Yet 
disposition is not a product of calculation. The person is present to me immediately as a thing-to-
be-feared,  projected  out  from concrete,  factical  and  historical  experiences  and  expectations 
formed  in  my  everyday  dealings  with  the  person  and  similar  others.  My judgment  will  be 
directed by the fearful disposition in the way I take the possibilities presented in the matter. I will 
interpret the matter, and things I encounter in that matter, in terms of possibilities for escape 
rather than resistance, and will chose in the face of uncertainty that which seems most likely to 
provide a  path of escape rather  than that  which would provide the means  for counterattack. 
Disposition is before us, before what we think and judge.  Pathos comes before  logos as that 
which calls us first to speak and decide. 
44 The relation needn’t be understood as literally human and social, but when we expand our pathetic interaction to 
the non-human, we are still relating to them on human terms. For example, when I stub my toe on the desk leg, and 
kick it back in angry retaliation, I’m treating the desk figuratively like a person, reacting as though it had intended to 
hurt me. I have not, however, literally mistaken the desk for a person.
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By pairing anger with calmness, Aristotle shows how pathos encounters things in time. 
Anger is bright and hot in the moment, but fades with passing time and changing circumstance, 
either in eventual resolution or removal from concern. Calm returns—this means that the state of 
calmness, of being at ease in the world, precedes anger and recedes from view into the familiar 
movement of life (1380a7). When we have the world in calmness, it is as we expect it to be. 
Nothing jumps out. In everyday living spanned across moments in time, the initial  aim once 
blocked may be eventually fulfilled or simply replaced in significance by more pressing needs 
(1380b5-7).  Shifting  from expectation  to  change,  then  back  again  into  the  re-emergence  of 
everyday patterns of living, Dasein finds the rhythm of collective existence in shared time. If, in 
our initial discussion of time, time was in the heavens, in living together through speaking, time 
is in squabbles and reconciliations of the agora.
Breaks with expectation and returns to familiarity imply that we have a world with others 
who share in our time and region of concern. We are not simply stifled in our aims by existing  
with others,  but can be extended as well  by taking in  others’ stead what  we would feel  for 
ourselves, and in caring about how others care for us. Human beings, after all, are beings that 
live not amongst one another but with one another in speaking. 
Human relationships with things, however, are inconsistent from one thing to another. 
We care very much for some things, and very little for others. Lift your eyes for a moment and 
look around. Your surrounding space will not all be there at once. Your eyes will light upon 
certain objects and linger, pass unseeing over others. Love reveals our strength of attachment to 
things in the world (people, after all, are only one of many things we love), and allows us to be 
disposed toward the world not only in terms of our own needs, but in terms of the needs of the 
loved thing (1380b36-1381a2). We become angry for loved ones. One may love expansively, but 
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the further that attachment stretches, the thinner and weaker its attachment to things becomes. 
We love what is close to us, and wish to keep love close. One builds a surrounding world of  
uneven attachments, and in these attachments Dasein finds itself as desirous and as itself a thing-
loved, to whom others extend themselves (or itself, as in the beholder’s pleasure in the beautiful). 
By extending ourselves in others, we build a region of concern in which we recognize 
that things matter to others as well as to ourselves (1381a 2-6). Time, and the things with which 
we are concerned in time, is not entirely our own—it is shared by others whose concerns we 
share in turn (1381a8-12). Those whom we love in shared time “think the things good which we 
think good, so that they wish what is good for us” (1381a18-19). The regionality of attachments, 
our place of concern shared with others, is also limited by time. One can come in and out of love 
over time, and love itself is a dealing with time—we love those who make the present enjoyable, 
the kind, funny and generally good humored (1381a29-1381b4). As Diotima describes in Plato’s 
Symposium, the very nature of love is to go after the desired thing that has crossed your path, 
maintain the loved thing against the ravages of passing time, and renew or replicate the thing to 
stretch the finite into something closer to infinity. We love those who hold fast to us over time,  
even past death (1381b25-28).
Our region of concern is  also demarcated by what  falls  outside.  Hatred severs social 
attachments and exiles the hated thing from concern.  Note the difference between anger and 
hatred: in anger, we hurt precisely because we have a share in each other’s everyday life. The 
one toward whom we are angry matters to our own capacity to live, and can make that living  
harder—but it is also one whose life we can make harder in return. For better or worse, we share 
our lives and times with one another. In contrast to anger, Aristotle argues, in hatred one feels 
nothing toward the hated thing (1382a13). Hatred is moved beyond even the changing and easing 
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of time: “anger can be cured with time, hatred cannot” (1382a7). By pushing the hated thing 
beyond our shared time and region of concern, we deny any relationship whatsoever between the 
thing and our own ability to be. The hated thing “does not matter,” but in a way different from,  
say,  that toward which we feel indifferent or that which we overlook. We exercise hatred by 
actively refusing to care and denying the thing entry to our circle of concern: “for the [angry 
person] would have the offenders suffer for what they had done; the other would have them 
cease to exist” (1382a15-6). The everyday does not extend endlessly outside of itself. We know 
that there exists something beyond our particular region of concerned existence, and in hating, 
we exile hated things to the place beyond care.
The pairing of love and hate shows both the expanse of our attachments and their relative 
intensity, as well as where those attachments absolutely end and the world beyond care begins. 
These attachments work both ways—as we are extended into others, so too are we vulnerable to 
others. If anger and the return to calm show the very basic rhythm of disruption and return in 
everyday shared life, and love and hate the region shared in concern, then fear and confidence 
show our relative contingence upon others in the changing world. The vulnerability discovered in 
fear, like all rhetorical things, is not absolute. We have a possibility to be saved and escape our 
fate. If one is resigned to destruction, one may be sad or full of regret that such a thing would 
come to pass, but one does not look frantically for a way out. We, as human beings, are things 
that can be otherwise than we are. We can be, and we can cease to be entirely. In fear, we trace 
out the lines of power and dependence beyond ourselves that threaten our being, and we attempt 
to escape. The moment takes on a greater potency toward the future (1382a21-2). 
Fear  measures  both  the  relative  closeness  and  likelihood  of  destruction  in  terms  of 
regional proximity, and the extent to which the future can be rewritten or unmade in terms of 
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temporal possibility. What can be done (1383a7)? In fear, one fears not simply others but time 
itself. Fear lives in its closeness, in time and place, to us, as the heightening of possibility that we 
or the things toward which we care may cease to be (1382a24-27). Dasein finds itself in its 
finitude—its ultimate possibility of ceasing to be—in powerlessness and openness (in a negative 
way) toward others “at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular 
time” (1382b35-6). Fear plays a very important role in Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein 
because it explains how in dealing with the very concrete—the hands of particular persons, in a 
particular form at a particular time—Dasein finds and confronts itself and its Being toward death 
from within the everyday world into which Dasein is thrown already underway. The worst of 
possibilities  opens  up  before  us  in  precise  concretion,  and  in  this  moment  of  fear  we  find 
ourselves, at our own concrete limit, as something that can be otherwise. Shared time will go on, 
my time ends.
In confidence, our future is brighter, and we race toward it, in contrast to fear’s recoiling 
before the future. Dasein finds itself in control, able to grasp what it wants, is sure that it will 
meet its expectations. The world, taken in confidence, unfolds the way one expects. Confidence 
animates a belief, projected toward the future, that the world will be as it should, as we want it to 
be, and that our aim is almost in hand in the “nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or 
remoteness of what is terrible” (1383a17-18). One feels the full power of agency in time to bring 
into being the desired end. Confidence, like fear, also addresses uncertainty. The fearful look for 
the slimmest hope, while the confident answer the slimmest doubt with the belief that one is 
capable of overcoming possible obstacles, either because one has in the past or because one has 
never experienced obstacles to begin with and underestimate the threat (1383a25-7). Together, 
then, fear and confidence show a horizon of possibility in terms of social vulnerability before the 
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world. As horizonal, as possibly otherwise, we can see how Dasein’s possibilities are delimited 
by the relative proximity and power of others in more and less, past experience or lack thereof, 
projection into the future as that to be gone toward or recoiled against, and at-handedness or 
remove of things.
In anger, calmness, love, hate, fear and confidence, the one who undergoes emotion is 
responding to the ways in which one can act in a world filled with others. Each pair reflects a 
primary temporal orientation that leads interpretation of things in the now. We have the reactive, 
mixed, particular anger, the easing of calmness back from the heat of a moment, love extending 
oneself and one’s present outward, hatred marking the limits of the present region of concern, 
fear reflecting one’s vulnerability before the future, and confidence pursuing alternative, desired 
future. Anger and calmness are directed toward the past—when one responds in anger to a slight, 
the thing has already happened and thus must be rectified, and as calm returns the slight recedes 
into the distance as other needs replace it in the course of everyday life. Anger mixes the present 
with a past  slight and future retaliation,  calmness focuses on the present and eases past  and 
future. In love and hate, we determine the expanse of our field of concern in the present, taking 
in the time and needs of others or excluding them absolutely from care. Love takes up presence 
in the moment as being shared by more than you, while hatred removes things from the realm of 
feeling at all. Fear and confidence address one’s orientation toward the future, and the recoiling 
or advancing toward the world as it is here and now, away or toward what we wish that world to  
be.
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4.2.2 Being-moved toward and away from others: shame, kindness, pity, indignation, 
envy, admiration and contempt
The  civic  dispositions  gauge  one’s  standing amongst  and before  others.  We are  not  simply 
beings  that  set  expectations  for our aims,  possess things in the present,  and project  into the 
future.  We do  these  things  with  others  and  before  others  as  well.  The  emotions  of  shame, 
kindness,  pity,  indignation,  envy and admiration  all  address  Being from the  position  of  the 
judgment of others—what they expect, have and desire of us. The second set of emotions also 
display similar relationships to time; as we will see, shame compares the present to prior social 
expectation, kindness and pity address what may happen to those sharing their time with us, and 
indignation, envy and admiration address what we and others have here and now. Each occur in a 
sort of social middle distance, in between those so remote that they fall outside of our region of 
concern, and those who are within our most immediate circle, for whom we directly feel anger, 
love, fear and their contraries. In a limited, regional public, those with whom we interact in the 
course  of  our  traffic  and  trade  are  with  us,  but  only  to  an  extent.  Shame,  kindness,  pity, 
indignation, envy and admiration trace out Dasein’s civic dispositions.
Shame highlights our recognition of the judgment of others, not simply their presence 
with us here and now, but their own expectation, attachment and watchfulness over ourselves. 
We are beings before the eyes of others. We go about our own everyday lives in full view of 
those who share in that everyday time and place while going about their own business. We have 
expectations of others that can be dashed—and others have expectations of us that we can fail to 
meet. When we fall short before the eyes of others whose opinion we esteem, we feel shame at 
that which discredits ourselves or those we love (1383b12). As Aristotle says, “shame dwells in 
the eyes” (1384a33). 
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If  in love we recognize the claim of particular  others upon the present,  in shame we 
recognize a weaker sense of this social claim upon things. We have been seen taking things the 
wrong  way:  shrinking  in  cowardice,  being  lewd,  grifting,  exploiting  the  weak,  refusing 
responsibility,  flattering,  or  simply  being  bettered  by  our  inferiors  (1383b2-1384a10).  Such 
seeing may be present, projected into the future in potential (one might be seen) and after the fact 
(someone might find out) (1384b33-6). In all these choices, our own ability to share the world 
with others comes into question in the course of speaking with one another: “wherever we are 
ourselves to blame for our present, past, or future circumstances, it follows at once that this is to 
a  greater  extent  due  to  our  underlying  badness”45 (1384a14-5).  Honor,  good  will  and  trust, 
attributes of others that we esteem, all make living and interacting with others easier, and shame 
indicates when one realizes one’s own part in making that living harder. Shame also indicates the 
extent to which one is  aware of the views of others in the first place—it is not simply  that 
negative opinions are held toward us, but that  those whom we esteem hold negative opinions 
toward us (1384a24-27).
In shamelessness, one feels no connection to the community and its judgment. In shame 
and shamelessness, we see whose expectations, whose eyes and “opinions of us matter to us” 
(1384b27) and whose do not.  Shamelessness reveals the extent  to which the expectations of 
others can significantly affect our ability to be: the weaker one’s attachments to the community 
are, the less the community’s expectations guide our own actions. For example, the powerful can 
act shamelessly because the opinions of others do not substantially threaten one’s own ability to 
get the things one wants. Here too, the particular middle distance of social disposition—we do 
not only feel less shame in the face of those far off from ourselves, we also feel less shame with 
45 I prefer not to use “moral badness” here but rather want to emphasize that there is an underlying defect with our 
capacity to choose.
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those who are the most close to us, who accept us as we are. In close quarters with another, we 
feel shame only at our ownmost failings, not at contravention of social expectation (1384b25-7, 
see also 1381b30-38)
As we extend our own region of concern to others in love, and cut it off in hate, we see 
ourselves as extensions of another’s concern or community in kindness. Here the basic relation 
of love is extended to one that you do not know, who has no expectation of help but who is 
recognized  and helped nonetheless  (1385a18-20).  In  kindness,  someone  treats  us  fairly  in  a 
moment  of  need  (1385a20-2).  The  kind-thing  is  the  thing  done  for  us,  for  the  sake  of  us. 
Kindness  recognizes  that  we  share  in  time  with  others  with  whom we have  some  form of 
connection,  not  in any particular  way but  because we exist  together  in  a  region of concern. 
Kindness is measured by its response to time and by the lack of personal relationship between 
people—that one had no reason to expect something from you, and yet you provided what was 
needed. The most kind are those who fully understand time as not wholly their own and extend 
their  concern  to  someone  else,  rendering  aid  when  it  is  most  needed  (in  contrast,  consider 
liberality, where one gives to others indiscriminately, indifferent to particular needs at particular 
times) (1385a26-7).
If kindness allows one to recognize the temporal need of another for the sake of that 
other, pity interprets the suffering of another in terms of one’s self. In pity, we feel a slackened 
version of fear (1385b27). Imagining how we ourselves would suffer if we were in the other’s 
stead, we recognize incipient danger for someone else and seek to ease their suffering (1385b13-
15). We pity those whose fortunes are undeserved, and thus pity expresses a simple sense of 
temporal social justice: good things should happen to good people, bad things should happen to 
bad people (1385b35-1386a1). In kindness, we respond to need in terms of the moment, and in 
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pity we respond to need in terms of proximity: those whom we know, but are not closely related,  
when danger is near us, to people like us but not ourselves or our closest loved ones (1386a17-
28). The more strongly we can imagine the suffering of the other—the closer it “hits to home”—
the further our care extends to ease that suffering. We may not be able to restore to the other 
what has been lost, but we may wish them relief from pain, as when we pity parents who have 
lost children. The experience of losing a child, however, highlights the middle-distance of social 
dispositions:  the  parent’s  pain in  losing  a  child  is  not  pity  for  the  lost  child  but  immediate 
anguish at the loss itself, while others may pity the parent by remembering their own loss or 
imagining a loss that might happen in the future (1386a19-23). In all relations within a region of 
concern, the further in the past or the future a bad thing is, the weaker our sense of pity before it  
(1386a28-31).  We care  about  what  is  here,  now, set  before our eyes  and close to  ourselves 
(1386b6-8).
Indignation marks the other side of the rough social justice rule that good things should 
happen to good people: good things should not happen to bad people (1386b13-15). We become 
indignant  when someone  has  gotten  a  good  thing  undeservedly.  Indignation  focuses  on  the 
relation  between  others  and  things—particularly,  others  as  in  our  neighbors  (1386b22),  and 
things that are productive, material  and scarce (1387a13-15). In contrast to the generosity of 
kindness and pity, in indignation we seek to protect things from others who would use things 
poorly, saving the good for those who do good (1386b28-33). Our experience of things present 
to us here and now in shared time acknowledges that there are different levels of claim that 
different  people  have  to  different  things.  Indignation  reveals  one’s  approximation  of  the 
appropriate length of another’s reach into things: “Indignation is roused by the sight of wealth, 
power and the like—by all those things, roughly speaking, which are deserved by good men and 
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by those who possess the goods of nature—noble birth, beauty and so on” (1387a13-16). The 
everyday is not a homogenous sphere where everyone participates fully and equally. We judge 
from a generalized social position toward a relativized particular person and thing: “we think you 
have too much—for you: “it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of good; 
there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness of such things” (1387a27-9) There is no 
Anyone in a region of concern, no indifferent access to things. Our estimation of the claim of 
others upon good things is rooted in past interaction. As Aristotle points out, the long-rich and 
powerful are less begrudged then the newly-rich and powerful. For those in the there and now, 
the long-rich have always had, while in contrast, the new-rich take (1387a18-27). 
Envy reverses the direction of concern of indignation, from the things you should not 
have to the things I should. Envy extends one’s one claim to things in the world, but through a 
prism of the desires and things of others. Indeed, it is not so much that the envious want anything 
in  particular,  but  that  they  desire  the  things  the  other  desires  and  possesses  (1387b23-4). 
Anything that arouses a public regard is open to envy—reputation, honor, fame, wealth (1388a1-
3). Envy publicizes desire. The desire of possession attempts to bring into one’s own exclusive 
proximity the desired from past (in those who have what we once had or wanted), present (what 
one obtains here and now) or future (what we do not yet have). Envy then grows with proximity 
and attachment to others who dwell closest to ourselves: “those who are near to us in time, place, 
age, or reputation” (1388a5-6), people of similar rank, fellow competitors in sport or business, 
even our own family (1387b26; 1388a6-15). Envy recognizes the radical scarcity and finitude of 
things we share with others in the world. 
Finally, in admiration, we seek to become what others in our region of concern already 
are, and interpret the good in terms of plentitude, productive of itself, rather than finitude lost to 
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others and time (1388a30-33). We celebrate rather than begrudge the possessions of the brave, 
good and wise, for the good, brave and wise are all capable of making instead of taking good 
things (1388b10-12). The admired become models for what we ourselves should or could be. 
Dasein finds itself in what it is not, but not in a negative sense of simply being like the Anyone.  
If  envy refracts  one’s  desire  through the  figure  of  others,  admiration  refracts  others’  desire 
through  the  figure  of  ourselves.  Aristotle  finds  admiration  to  be  a  positive  social  emotion, 
drawing people to strive to be more than they are (1388a33-6).  In contempt, in contrast, others 
are marked as those one should never aspire to be, whose own desires should be ignored and 
rejected (1388b21-6). The contemptible desire and deserve bad things. As hate exiles the thing 
from a region of concern, contempt exiles from social desire.
Admiration presents a powerful rebuttal to Heidegger’s contention that Dasein’s tendency 
to see itself in the Being of others with whom one shares an everyday life has a leveling-down 
effect. In comparison with the admired, one does not aspire to mediocrity or take the Anyone as 
a  hero,  but  instead someone within one’s  own region of concern,  who is  similar  enough to 
Dasein’s own self but made better through the capacity to choose well. Admiration shows in the 
acts and things of another what is worth going after one’s self.  Admiration in this way motivates 
one to expand their region of concern and sharpen the capacity to choose rightly in the moment: 
to become more and better than we are. 
In the civic dispositions, we find ourselves in our interactions with others with whom we 
share things in time. My time becomes ours, and the things in my time become ours as well.  
Others strive and fear, possess and lose, become who we ourselves should or should not be, at 
the same time that we have our plans stifled and fulfilled, are drawn toward things in love and 
turn away in hate, shrink away from things and go after them. Rhetorical matters then present 
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things in this already established network of connections and claims, a region of concerns where 
we are moved to attend to things that can be otherwise and change in shared time.
4.3 EXPECTATION AND ETHOS: HABITUATED CHOOSING
Matters come before us in the world underway in other ways as well. Experience in the world 
with the everyday dealings of life over time functions to prefigure matters and draw us to take 
things  in  particular  ways  according  to  different  dispositions.  As  noted  above,  Aristotle’s 
discussion of pathos does not posit emotion as a vague psychological state, but as embedded in 
interaction  with  other  in  time.  Disposition  is  not  shaped in  a  vacuum,  but  in  the  lived  and 
habituated experiences of the one disposed to deal with the world. Different people respond in 
different ways, according to age and personal situation, and thus speakers must position their 
own  selves  and  the  matter  as  the  present,  habituated  hearer  expects. Ethos,  as  a  way  of 
comporting  oneself  toward  matters,  forms  through  repetition  in  time  in  our  dealing  with 
everyday life. The ethos of the hearer is determined according to  pathos and hexis, disposition 
and habituated choosing, and reveals how we are moved to see and deal with things (1388b31-
34). 
4.3.1 Habituated choosing across the span of life: youth, old- and middle-age
It  is  telling  that  Aristotle  first  addresses  disposed  ethos in  terms  of  time.  Given  that  our 
relationship  to  things  arises  from  experience  with  the  traffic  and  trade  of  everyday  life, 
experiences over time affect our grasp upon things and the temporal horizon of the things we 
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encounter as the matter unfolds. Aristotle does not tell a comforting story about aging. The hope 
of youth, that things will be better than they are, slowly collapses under the weight of experience 
that “most things go wrong, or anyhow turn out worse than one expects” (1390a4-5). Things will 
be worse, will fail, will fade, and are not what we believe them to be. Human beings, in the 
course of life, move between two great countersayings toward things here and now, in future 
promise and past failure,  and between our ability to push against the world and the world’s 
ability to push back. 
The temporal horizon of youth, unsurprisingly, favors the future since the young have 
little experience upon which to reflect (1389a20-4). The young care without understanding, and 
expand their  region of concern without limit  for the here and now (1389a17-20). Things are 
present in possibility as what they could or should be, at the cost of concern over the probability 
of bringing that  aim about (1389a31-35).  The young feel  expansively,  untempered by social 
judgment; “they love too much and hate too much” (1389b5). They believe themselves the equal 
(at least potentially)  of the great, yet  still  threatened by the small,  quick to anger when their  
unreasonable expectations are easily dashed and yet open to pity and kindness because the young 
project their own care upon others with few reservations (1389a29-30; 1389b8-10). At the same 
time, the young are also concerned with the views of others, without much discernment for the 
differences of value in those views (1389a35-2).
The old feel almost nothing, their desire slackened and live only in memory—one has 
been humbled and, in seeing no agency before the world to bring the future into being, slowly 
ceases to care about the futural horizons of the here and now (1389b14-15). The old take the 
thing in terms primarily of past experience rather than future possibility, with the thing present 
more as the echo of a fractured past. Toward the otherwiseness of things, the old presume more 
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strongly that things will not turn out as we think—the thing is not perhaps absolutely otherwise 
than it seems, but is more likely than not to turn out that way. We presume this because, at a late 
age, we have seen how common it is to fail, “how hard” things are “to get, and how easy to lose” 
(1389b29). Yet time for the old has become precious, and the old struggle to hold on to what 
remains before it too dissolves into the past and is no longer. The old look to what is useful to 
preserve the winnowing away now at hand, rather then extend outward toward others and what is 
yet  to be, for what is yet  to be is death (1389b24-6). Concerned now with preserving one’s 
ability to be, and desiring only what has been and is no longer save in memory, the old turn away 
from sharing a world with others (1390a6-8). After all, while human beings may share in time, 
no one else shares my death. In old age, we are running out of our own time while shared time 
continues on.
Middle age marks a transitory period in the relationship between Being and its world, in 
which one’s expectations have been dashed enough to weaken hold but have not (inevitably) 
broken under  the weight  of existence.  The things  before one are taken as  having a  roughly 
balanced  temporal  horizon  of  possibilities,  overtaken  by  neither  past  experience  nor  future 
possibility. In the same way, the middle aged still feel, but not in the unlimited sense of youthful  
ardor. The pathe, as we have seen, arise in our dealings with the world. The middle aged have 
come to learn what is worth being angry about, whose judgment carries social weight, and what 
things are deserved by themselves and others (1390a30-1390b7). In the span of a human life, 
middle age is the time in which we are most capable of grasping what is here now, grounded in 
experience still leavened by hope, and a concern with the practical as well as the good. It is when 
we are best able to grasp the otherwiseness of things in time in their dual visage, marked by 
continuity and change. Yet we ourselves, in body and mind, are things that change in time, and 
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our capacity to grasp things in the now inevitably waxes, then wanes and never fully holds on 
(1390b9-10).
The human experience seems to be one of our hopes against our lives. We are brought 
into the world projected into the future, but with a limited horizon that shortens by the day. And 
the things of human experience have the same character, shorter or longer in past and future but 
always split against the now. Age shows the progression through life for all human being, while 
fortunes of one’s life speaks to how the particular journey, beginning with birth, has shaped the 
way one sees and approaches dealing with matters.
4.3.2 Habituated choosing and the fortunes of life: Family, wealth and power
No one  asks  to  be  born.  One’s  life  is  given  to  one  already  underway—and  thus  there  are 
conditions that shape comportment over which we have little control. If one’s sharing a world 
with others begins with what is closest by and radiates outward, the conditions of one’s birth and 
intimate spaces in which one comes to be what one is shapes how one takes the extended world 
to be. As the product of a storied or powerful family, one’s daily dealings are always marked in 
some way by the past and those who came before us (1390b17-22). We project outward to honor 
those great people who came before, of which we are but a part, and value stability across time 
over  change because it  is  precisely this  stable  extension from the past that  secures our own 
standing here and now (thus, why the assembled civic body of aristocracy make futural decisions 
in light of the maintenance of rank).  Yet this standing has nothing to do, Aristotle argues, with 
some sort  of biological  or  hereditary necessity.  Good families  regularly produce bad people 
(1389b25-31).  Rather,  the  comportment  arising  from  noble  birth  is  a  habituated  attitude, 
grounded in everyday dealings with matters in the light of one’s forbearers.
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Comportment  shaped by wealth takes matters  in the now in terms of possession and 
property,  to  be  seen  by  others.  Wealth  lives  in  spectacle,  “on  the  surface  for  all  to  see” 
(1390b32).  The wealthy are disposed to concern over what  things others have in relation  to 
themselves, show their own possessions, and project outward in desire of what they do not yet 
have. In turn, the wealthy find themselves in the desires of others who come to them to share in 
their possessions, which in turn reinforces their own orientation toward the material (1390b33-
1390a12). As Simonides answers when asked if he would rather be rich or wise, “Why rich, for a 
I see the wise men spending their days at the rich men’s doors” (1391a10). Yet given the concern 
that the wealthy have for possessing and having here and now, Aristotle argues that they lack a 
sense of change in time. The wealthy do not take things as that which can be lost, or which must 
be gained with labor and struggle because “there is nothing they cannot buy” (1391a1). In taking 
the  world  in  what  is  good  for  me,  now,  the  wealthy  also  lack  a  sense  of  social  propriety, 
interacting only with those who would desire something of them and caring little for those who 
do not (1391a17-9).
If one’s birth takes matters in terms of what has come before, and wealth takes matters in 
terms of what is to be possessed and seen here and now, then power takes matters as projected 
into the future, aimed at securing ever-greater standing and influence (1391a23-5). Socially, the 
powerful, like the wealthy, expect others to subordinate to their will, but that subordination is not 
a  matter  of  material  transaction.  The  powerful  require  that  others  choose  to  subordinate 
themselves  in  pursuit  of  a  greater  end,  to  take  things  as  the  powerful  person  takes  them 
(1391a25-9). The powerful are able to bring about their own desires, and constantly monitor the 
present conditions that enable or block them from achieving their ends.
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Across the expanse of age,  our dealings  will  be shaped by the fortunes that  we find 
ourselves in. Fortunes themselves, which stand outside and before human Being in the world, 
still have for human beings the same dual character that marks everyday existence. If living—
indeed Being—is too easy, where good things come to us without struggle and the world lays 
itself out as we would desire, we will not properly see how things are as otherwise than we 
expect them to be. We cannot see where the world pushes back and become reckless (1391b1). 
The longer we have spent preserving, possessing and achieving, the more we run the risk of 
misrecognizing that which is lost, withheld, impossible here and now. Yet, when fortunes are 
with us, it is as though we are gods (139b1-4). The rhetorical matter opens itself up in the space 
in between fortune and destruction,  neither communing with the gods nor crushed under the 
weight of existence.
4.4 EXPECTATION AND LOGOS: CUSTOMARY SPEAKING
Thusfar, we have seen how Dasein is already disposed to feel and to deal with things. Now we 
will see how Dasein is already disposed to speak about things. The final section in  Rhetoric,  
Book Two addresses the ways in which things stand in expectation, grounded in the way that we 
speak  to  one  another  about  things.  The  moment  toward  which  we  speak  is  preceded  by  a 
deviation from expectation: something has gone wrong, something here and now is noteworthy, 
something is  coming and must  be dealt  with (1391b8-9).  Our common ways  of  speaking—
whether  we speak  to  others  or  consider  on  our  own—show how things  become  matters  of 
concern: the common topics give voice both to the expectations in a region of concern with 
which the now has broken, and the ways in which we deal with and talk about how to deal with 
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the disruption of everyday life, and more particularly with a disruption in our relation to things in 
the world.
4.4.1 Possible otherwiseness
To take a thing as capable of being otherwise than we expect it to be implies that we have some 
sort of awareness of additional possibilities. Interestingly, Aristotle notes that this concern for 
possible otherwiseness is not the product of differences in human perception, that in my now and 
yours we saw the thing differently, but rather is an attribute of the thing itself. Possibility comes 
from the thing, not talk about the thing. We take things as possibly otherwise even when we do 
not have an opponent or have not even spoken to another person (1391b18-16). Our previous 
understanding of the thing cannot fully address and accommodate the matter as it unfolds, thus 
we  must  deal  with  the  possibility  of  otherwiseness.  Specifically,  in  these  moments,  we  are 
concerned with the possibility of otherwiseness  in time, the relative likelihood of how it  has 
been, is now and will be, and the very extent to which the thing is worthy of concern in the first 
place. 
How do things become matters of concern as possibly otherwise, or impossible to be 
otherwise? In contrast to the principle of noncontradiction that reigns over matters of Aristotelian 
logic,  rhetorical  matters  present themselves as possible in contrariness.  In the temporality of 
philosophical speaking, things cannot be contrary, because such contrariness would give strict 
principle  no  firm  ground  on  which  to  stand.  In  the  temporality  of  rhetorical  speaking, 
contrariness is precisely what is relevant in the rhetorical matter—what makes the thing first a 
matter of concern. Things that change in time are capable of becoming otherwise than they are in 
the moment. In order for something to become a rhetorical matter put forth to decision, it must 
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be open as a choice between possibilities. For the rhetorical, if one contrary is possible, then so is 
the other:  if there is no contrary possibility,  then it  is in turn impossible for the thing to be 
otherwise than it is (1392a8). The thing is as it is by necessity. In the rhetorical, then, contraries 
are simultaneously present in what is here and now, to be judged in relation to one another. 
Horizons of possibility are grounded in the thing as present—how it is available and at 
hand, toward what aim one seeks and how it is already known. The possibility of change in time 
calls  our  expectations  toward  the  world  into  question.  How do  we  draw,  then,  connections 
between  the  thing  in  question  and  our  prior  expectations,  in  order  to  limit  the  horizon  of 
possibility?  We relate  to  like  things,  tie  them together  in  parts,  wholes,  genus  and  species, 
number (1392a29-5). We take them in time and make temporal and causal connections from now 
back, and past to now, from now to subsequent, origins to ends and back again (1392a17-24). 
We also take things as that toward which we move, deal and decide, within time. Things that 
have been, are being,  or will  be are present as desired,  wished and possessed,  reasoned and 
raged, and as done, made and aimed (1392a25-29; 1393a1-9). Finally, the expanse of possibility 
is limited both by our sense of likelihood or probability, derived from experience of repetition 
and return, and by the magnitude of importance of the thing within a larger context of the matter 
at hand (1392b14-35;1393a1-9). Which of these possibilities seems most important, likely and of 
greatest concern will arise from within the situation at hand, thus, as Aristotle says, there is no 
point in drawing out any general rules (1393a9-13).
4.4.2 Being-moved from known to unknown
Bringing the thing into speaking then moves us from what is already said about the thing and 
projects out to a decision over that which we do not yet know. As discussed previously in the 
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chapter, the rhetorical orders using example and enthymeme, and the final portion of Book Two 
addresses both forms of reason in terms of how one is to project outwards from what is already 
known. In example, we have seen a similar thing before, and can use that past experience as a 
guide. The basic presumption of example is that we can carry over the has-been of one thing to 
the being of another, at first in very particular terms. In induction, we think from things out. 
In  example,  we  may  call  upon  particular  concrete  experiences  in  the  past  whose 
conditions we face again in the present, and might guide our judgment toward the future, giving 
a sense from what has happened as to what will be. We may also supply our own constructed 
ground in comparison between general concepts or through fable, which move from particular 
situations to a general conclusion that reigns over a larger class of particulars (1392b25-8). In 
example, we also see the same temporal span of all speaking in the now, from using particular 
moments  that  have-been,  from general  examples  to  a  general  present,  and  in  fable  from a 
constructed example toward the future. Yet because induction is a starting point, it cannot fully 
support itself, insofar as the happening of particulars may not be enough to satisfy a general rule 
(1394a12-13).  Though  examples  lead  our  thinking,  they  somehow  still  follow  behind  the 
happening of things in the world. As starting points, examples establish moments but do not 
secure continuity across time.
Yet our world of things does not simply include material beings but the things of talk.  
From the particularity of repetition in example, we move to the slow accretion and regulation of 
repetition  in  enthymeme,  moving  in  other  words  from common  topics  to  common  sayings. 
Example forms the basis for enthymeme, the application of a prior experience to another, seeing 
this-as-that. Enthymeme then draws out the why and thereby explicates the relationship between 
things, a generalizing gathering of particular things (1394a22). In Book Two’s focus on what 
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precedes the rhetorical moment, we see what comes before the enthymeme and authorizes the 
relations between things that then become shared premises. The rhetorical matter arises in the 
context of what the audience already believes. 
The hearer is disposed already to the thing as a matter of concern within a network of 
affective attachments, and is projected upon by a habituated set of behaviors that deal with things 
in particular ways as “practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided” (1394a25). 
These predispositions come with their own sets of assumptions about the sort of reasoning that 
draws  out  conclusions  from the  world  as  it  presents  itself.  Matters  interpreted  according  to 
maxim  play  off  of  what  we  already  believe  about  things.  Maxims  proscribe  the  socially 
negotiated expectations for how we should relate to things and deal with them in shared time—
what is good and should be desired, what is bad and should be turned away from. Maxims take 
questions of desire and action in terms of fairly simple sayings used to reason about things, in 
inclusion  and exclusion,  or  relations  of  part  to  whole,  or  general  to  particular  (1394b1-24). 
Maxims cannot replace the thing with the word, however. They require grounding in experience 
in  order  to  show something  about  how the  world  is,  or  otherwise  become  empty  assertion 
(1395a2-6). Thus, the old prefer to hear the general observations of their own lives rendered as 
an authoritative account of how the world is. The hearers hear what they believe reaffirmed to 
them in the moment, that we all see the thing this way (1395a11-12). Aristotle calls maxims 
ethical because they acknowledge the shared-ness of thought within a given region, and speak 
out the reasoning for why the matter should be taken in this way. By showing in reasoning that 
the speaker reasons in the same way,  the hearer trusts  the speaker’s view of the matter  and 
capacity to deal with things (1395b8-16).
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Enthymemes  are speaking-things,  and so temporally,  we are concerned with how the 
enthymeme is heard as much as what  to say. Given the fleeting temporal nature of the spoken 
word, the enthymeme must be brief, as we move quickly from one understanding to another, but 
not  so  brief  that  ideas  become  jumbled  together  (1395b24-27).  What  the  enthymeme  then 
expresses  is  incomplete,  broken  off  and  left  open  for  the  hearer  to  reason  in  concert. 
Enthymemes reinforce the limited temporal and regional nature of concern and decision-making: 
not too long, not too short, not too far from what one knows, not to close to explain what is 
already clear.  Aristotle says that the uneducated are often more persuasive than the educated 
because, in being concerned with immediate experience, the uneducated strike upon what matters 
most here and now before the audience, while the educated abstract and generalize (1395b27-
28). Presence lives in directness.
In  order  to  build  an  enthymeme,  the  speaker  must  try  to  capture  some  hint  of  the 
otherwise, building from what we already know to the question of what still remains unresolved. 
First, what stands before the question? We must understand the particular opposition between 
possibilities of otherwiseness in temporal terms: the matter has a history, a capacity here and 
now and an aim for the sake of something (1396a4-8). How can we praise without knowing the 
thing-praised, or accuse without knowing the thing-done of which we accuse? We begin with 
questions about the thing and how it is. We all engage in this sort of thinking, from moving from 
what we have to what we do not, whether strict or loose, given a long time or only a short  
window  (1396a34-1396b3).  We  start  with  the  thing,  what  it  is  taken  in  terms  of  its  prior 
possession, its aim or need and its presence to hand (what it once was, could be and is now) 
(1396b4-11). By starting with the thing as emergent in a broader matter, we focus on talking 
about things, not talking about talk.
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Next, when building an enthymeme, the speaker must identify what is relevant to things 
changing in time, how the things spoken of belong to the matter in its particularity as it unfolds 
and becomes pressing in time. The relevant is what is closest to hand (eggutata) in things as they 
arise in a pressing matter  that stands on the cusp of changing and becoming otherwise.  The 
irrelevant  removed  in  distance  and  time  and  thus  made  general  (koinoi).  The  relevant 
possibilities are delimited and bounded rather than vague and indefinite (ahorista) by what is 
more or less common and expected—what is suited to the matter as one knows it in everyday 
dealing (1396b11-19). In delineating what is relevant to the changeable thing, and limiting the 
possibilities according to what we have encountered in the past, we turn the thing from a matter 
to a matter-for-debate in  apophasis, is/is not, the unitary claim upon the thing as spoken, and 
then in  kataphasis, a countersaying against the saying of the thing.  In posing the question of 
relevance, of what makes the thing what it is, we ask how the thing can be otherwise than it is.  
What is here, now? That the here and now would be preferred is not a defect of the hearer, but  
the better way of speaking about the thing. We must start from what is close—what the thing is 
as it has arisen to concern in dealing with the world, and then build out from this thing here to 
what has been said-here.
If this is how we begin to build the enthymeme (the speaking before), what does the 
enthymeme  then  do  in  the  moment:  what  does  it  show?  Enthymemes  show  both  relations 
between oppositions and relations to things. First, we think in comparison, then, we think by way 
of definition, using speaking to establish connections or oppositions in the former, and then using 
speaking as a guide to illuminate the thing in the latter (1397a6-10). Connections between things
—this is like that, this changes that, this becomes that—all bring one from the possessed to what 
stands outside our reach. Comparison grounds our reasoning between things, in even the simplest 
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and most  abstract  forms:  if  X then Y,  for  example.  From comparison,  we draw opposition, 
similarity, relative relation, more and less, time in expectation and fulfillment, even shared social 
relations (if you say your opponent is a scoundrel, you should not argue in similar ways).
To  access  the  thing  through  speaking,  we  first  make  inductive  connections  between 
things to then show a larger system of relation—from particulars to general, deduction, division, 
previous judgments (of the majority,  the revered, or the proper) of same, similar or contrary, 
parts to whole, analogy (1398b31). From induction,  we move to concretizing and solidifying 
basic general principles. We consider the thing’s relation to time, from effects to cause, change 
of judgment responding to change in time (1398b31-1399a6). Yet our definition of the thing is 
also tied to the dealings of others. Was it possible, easy, useful, bad or good for others (1399b31-
1400a4)? In all of these cases, our interest is, amongst these different ways of grasping the thing,  
determining which best shows how the thing is before us. In other words, even the guidance of 
these basic general principles must be judged against what is here, now and present before us. 
Principle does not fully determine the thing. For example, while one would presume that the 
probable would be more easily taken as likely and present, because it accords with expectation, 
Aristotle  observes  that  hearers  prefer  improbabilities  (1400a5-8).  Probabilities  are  general, 
improbabilities  announce  themselves  as  matters  of  concern—they  are  present  and  real  and 
demanding to us in their overthrowing of expectation.  That which breaks against the general 
seems more real because it leaps out and demands we attend to it here and now, while that which 
accords with expectation fades more easily into the background of existence. 
Enthymemes as speaking things are themselves things that can be otherwise, and may be 
spoken against. First, the very connection between what one says and what is can be refuted. One 
may call into question an appearance against another asserted reality (what you saw seemed to 
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be…) (1400a22-24). Second, one may take up or deny certain directions of reasoning. One may 
reverse the bonds of causality: if cause then effect; if no cause no effect (1400a28-30). The thing 
can  be  presented  to  show  alternative  possibilities  outside  of  those  previously  claimed,  or 
compared in contrariness (1400a35-6). The thing is not as you say it is, is not how you say it is, 
is  more than  you  say  it  is,  or  is  in relation to  other  things.  Again,  Aristotle  stresses  the 
importance  of  the  direct  speaking  toward  things  here  and  now,  as  they  are  closest  to  us; 
refutation seems more vital because it occurs “in a small space,” that is, the region of concern is 
restricted  to  the  saying  and  countersaying  (1400b25).  There  is  a  delimited  space  between 
opponents and possibilities, the better for us to compare in close quarters. The speaker aims to 
keep the hearer  as close as possible,  so the best enthymeme is  that which the hearer grasps 
almost immediately, keeping right along and, in taking the reasoning of the speaker as if it were 
their own, closes the distance between thing and word (1400b28-34).
In faulty reasoning, we see the distance between the word and thing, what seems and 
what is (1400b34-37). We mistake relations between words and things from the very sound of 
the word (1401a12-3), to the faulty combination of that which should be divided or dividing 
what should be combined (1401a24). Each fault ignores the relation between things and draws 
the relation instead at the level of the word—if you know a letter, you know a word, as though 
those two things were the same. By dealing with the relations between things only at the level of 
the word, the speaker does not take the thing in its social, temporal context. In other words, such 
a speaking does not encounter the thing in terms of a larger matter that would give meaning and 
direction to decision. 
Using Aristotle’s example, it might be right in general principle to revenge the murder of 
your father, but wrong if, in the particular situation, such revenge would require that you kill 
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your mother (1401b1-3). We do not reach justice by adding matricide to murder. Arguments in 
this way are not simply logic puzzles, they refer to things revealed in matters—including people 
to whom we have differing strengths of obligation in different circumstances. Exaggerating the 
nature of the thing,  conflating  the sign and the thing,  arguing from accident  or faulty cause 
(1401b4-34):  all  of  these  are  instances  of  mistaking  our  speaking  of  things  for  the  things  
themselves, that exist in situations, according to differing relations, in contexts and ultimately as 
matters for concern in shared time. Faulty reasoning takes a particular happening for a general 
occurrence,  a word for the thing,  a sign for the thing,  an act  for the thing,  pairs two things 
without relation, conflates the absolute and the particular. 
Yet, the rhetorical also does not rely on the particular or specific alone (as we saw in the 
distinction between the thing as scientific and the thing as rhetorical).  Making a special  case 
against  the general only from the conditions of the specific (for example,  in counterintuitive 
argument) justifies without reasoning (1402a9-16). The counterintuitive misleads by presenting 
the thing in its punctuated and momentary look without connecting to our reasoning drawn from 
the continuity of everyday life. Such a temporal world would be chaos—all happening without a 
sense of how the happening came to be, is here now or will become. The specific is the thing we 
are to judge; the general is what lies before to guide us. The counterintuitive makes the present 
too present, too cut off from the patterns of life that give rise to reason.
Proper counterspeaking, then, requires a sense of both how the thing in question is itself 
otherwise, and how the speaking of the opponent may also show the thing as otherwise than it is 
(1402a30-4). Counterspeaking moves from induction to deduction, from the thing to its saying. 
To address the thing, we work out relations of contrariness, similarity and accord with common 
opinion (1402b34-7).  To address  the speaking,  we question  the relations  worked out  by the 
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opponent.  All  aim  toward  a  question  of  probability  or  recurrence:  amongst  the  arrayed 
possibilities, which are most grounded in likelihood? How do our basic principles line up with 
the matter in its particularity? As Aristotle points out, these relations are not of necessity—the 
probable  and  the  necessary  are  different  ways  grasping  matters,  and  the  rhetorical  mode 
ultimately only speaks to the thing that can be otherwise (1402b28-30). Thus the best is to be 
able to root the thing in both its past and its present to then project out into the future, which  
signs alone cannot do as they are always partial.
Finally, things that come before the hearer in speaking are present to greater or lesser 
extents. Amplification and depreciation speak to what is here now and the extent to which it  
matters to the hearer at  all.  Even speaking toward the present functions enthymematically to 
show that a thing is great or small (1403a19-20). Though the thing stands present, the degree of 
its presence in terms of the matter must be drawn from what it is already to what it is to become 
in speaking about it. And it is to how things become present in dealing with matters by speaking 
in the present that we turn in the final section of this chapter, as we shift to Book Three and the  
presence of the thing in shared time, made manifest in speaking.
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5.0 MAKING THINGS PRESENT IN SPEAKING
5.1 SPOKEN PRESENCE
From how things have come to be to us in speaking, how we have encountered and dealt with 
concerns  over  otherwiseness  of  things  before,  we  now  move  to  how  these  things  come  to 
presence here and now. In Book Three, Aristotle builds the connection between the world and 
the word in speaking in terms of our engagement with things. We are to make things present, in 
voice, meaning in the context of life, relation, order and size, in a way that accords with the 
hearer’s  capacity  to  hear,  move  and be moved,  through a progression in  the speaking itself 
toward a decision (1403b15-22). Book Three describes how we bring the world and word close 
to one another by speaking of it as it is in dealing, moving, coping and caring.
We are concerned now with speaking, specifically with how speaking shows things in the 
present—Aristotle says the speaker should focus upon the things that are happening, how they  
are happening, yet these things must be said in ways that accord with the hearers one has here 
and now, not the hearers one wants (1404a3-10). As Aristotle argues, speaking is present first 
simply in sound, then the word, then the sentence. The voiced word is heard in accordance with 
the  hearer’s  expectations  as  style,  formed  in  a  region  of  everyday  dealing  with  things  and 
speaking with others that share a here and now (1404b1-6). Significance, the meaning of the 
thing as that which has disrupted our everyday interactions and calls for attention and concern, 
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arises from speaking with one another and moving from the familiar to the unfamiliar. From the 
way that the thing is present in the now—in the moment of speaking initiated by the sound of the 
voice, we will then move to the larger structure of expectation already before us in the hearer and 
the projective composition of the speech as that which moves the hearer to a decision over the 
possibly otherwise. 
At the very height of the spoken rhetorical art, our speaking and hearing of things in the 
moment of decision takes on transparency.46 It is not that the hearer encounters the thing as 
unequivocal or closed to choice (it would, in such situations, no longer be taken rhetorically). 
The hearer takes the thing in choice, and if guided skillfully, believes that they have decided how 
Anyone would have decided in that situation, for they have taken the thing for what it is, as it is, 
here and now. The distance between a speaking of the thing and the thing has been erased. For 
Heidegger,  rhetoric’s  power  is  in  its  ability  to  make-transparent.  By approaching  the  art  of 
rhetoric as that which produces transparency between the word and changing thing, Aristotle has 
given Heidegger both the structure of spoken presence and the means by which to subvert it. 
Projected for-the-sake-of, disposed toward already, the distance between world and word is made 
invisible in the presence of speaking. First, how speaking captures the moving, changing thing.
5.1.1 Presence and sound
Speaking  is  initially  present  to  the  ear,  in  sound.  I  mean  initially  present  in  the  sense  that 
speaking begins with the voice,  and in that the speaking of others,  the world as grasped by 
language first presents itself to us as human beings (1404a20-2). Things taken into speaking are 
46 In his lecture notes on rhetoric and language, Nietzsche observes that people have a curious tendency to invert 
rhetoric’s relation to naturalness, presuming any deviation from the natural to be the influence of rhetoric, while the 
rhetorician’s art lies in producing naturalness (21). We saw the same inversion in chapter one’s discussion of the 
rhetoric-of problem.
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first made manifest in the very sound of the voice, as we try in some way to take a thing in the  
world and fit the word as closely as possible. Things are manifest in speaking not by the literary 
word, but in sound from quiet to loud, low to high and soft to sharp. The spoken word moves in 
time. In Book Three, we begin with the ways that the word is connected to the world around it,  
and builds relations outward. The very first step, then, is the sound of the word as we bring the 
thing outside of ourselves to the region of shared human concern. From speaking, we then see 
the way that we speak with one another. 
The sound of the voice is not limited in relation to the thing, but to the hearer as well. The 
word can only fit to the thing insofar as it fits, generally, with the way the hearer speaks about 
things. Though this seems obvious, speaking must sound the way we speak to one another, not 
the way we write (1404b8-13). The ability, in other words, for speaking to capture things as they 
are for the hearer must accord with a spoken sensibility and style, following the hearer’s own 
speaking. We say it how it is. And yet, we speak in many ways. The thing is present both in its  
concrete facticity and in how we speak to one another about the thing. How, then, do we speak to 
one another about things in the world such as this one here and now? 
In the same way that things become present in relation to doings and situations—their 
being at hand—the word is heard in relation to how it is at work and shared with others. When 
we hear, we don’t just hear words in isolation, but things here now in doing and being done, as 
we do not  hear  noise but  birds  and wind,  or  here nothing but  that  for  which  we care.  The 
sentence, then, as spoken in time must itself reflect the way things are in the everyday. Things 
are not present in long clauses or runs of hyphenation in the everyday (1406a36-1406b1). They 
do not disclaim or digress. Things jump to concern as we deal: a thing in moving, doing and 
making. Giving voice to things as we have them in everydayness, our speaking takes on a sort of 
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quick staccato, as everyday things quickly join up to our prior expectations and to one another. In 
order to speak of things in such a way that the thing becomes present, the speaking itself must 
capture both what the thing is and how it arises in concern with the direct and plain voice of 
everyday living and dealing.
5.1.2 Presence and style
Speaking as we speak in everydayness requires a certain unproblematic ordinariness (1404b23-
4). In contrast, the poet wishes to beguile with the speaking as spoken, and the writing as written, 
where, in both cases, the matter is not the thing said or thing written but the saying or the writing 
itself  (1404b7-22). The poetic style draws attention to the word. The rhetorical,  on the other 
hand,  must  express  itself  with  an  almost  naïve  directness,  but  one  still  concerned  with  the 
possibility of being otherwise. How is the thing moving, how is it changing? Where does it stand 
out in concern and ease back in familiarity? The rhetorical expresses how a thing is in time, even 
in the very sound and sentence, to keep the thing hewn close to our own speaking and being in 
time.
We speak of things to others. A “style of speaking” refers to a sort of spoken accordance 
with heard expectation that secures a shared claim upon what the thing is in our here and now 
(1404b13-21). In establishing meaning, we share the speaking of things in time with one another. 
We  speak  of  things  in  the  ways  they  arise  in  everydayness—from  our  comportments,  
dispositions and ways of speaking. 
Speaking of  things  that  can  be otherwise moves  from the  familiar  to  the unfamiliar. 
Styles of speaking, then, address the thing from within a familiar, expected way of expression in 
order to then move the hearer to grasp what is, in this case, unfamiliar. The speaking of matters  
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must line up closely with the way that those matters are dealt with in the particular region of 
concern,  without  obscuring  the  clear  or  making  something  great  out  of  something small.  In 
speaking of things, we seek to make our speaking itself inobtrusive, so that the matter seems to 
be as we say.  The inobtrusive clarity of speaking that matches with the hearers’ expectations 
eliminates distance between the thing in speaking and in dealing in the world—to have what is 
here now as it is here and now for us. Hearers listen for the natural, the places where the distance 
between the thing and the thing-spoken seems to be the smallest,  and the thing self-evident. 
When the hearer becomes attentive to the space between the world and word, the speaking on the 
other hand seems an artificial imposition upon the thing.  
5.1.3 Presence and movement
That  meaning  presumes  a  certain  shared  space  and way of  speaking might  suggest  that  the 
system of signification  is  closed—we can hear  and understand only what  we already know. 
Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor,  however, shows how speaking itself  confronts and makes 
manifest that which has broken from familiarity. Metaphor opens up possibility and brings the 
unfamiliar into the familiar without escaping the everyday (1404b32-8). Things are present to us 
in speaking in two basic ways, as extant beings and as doings, as static and in movement, noun 
and verb. In the middle, we have things that can be otherwise—as here, now, most importantly in 
the capacity to change. The thing is something with which we are simultaneously familiar and 
unfamiliar,  and  metaphor  allows  for  such  an  expression  of  things  that  can  be  otherwise 
(1405a34-6).
For Aristotle, metaphor must capture the sense of the thing in movement, the thing doing 
as  we  encounter  it  in  life,  rather  than  as  a  static  word-picture  (1405b11-13).  The  florid, 
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poetic/literary metaphor (where the relevance is the saying or the writing) provides a lovely but 
ultimately static image, open to spectatorly appreciation, but lacking closeness or involvement. 
Cut  off  from the  already  underway  concern  for  everyday  life,  the  poetic/literary  metaphor 
becomes a sort  of  tableau vivant,  made of living things frozen in place.  Metaphor is  harder 
wrought in a rhetorical mode of speaking than the poetic because the rhetorician is concerned 
with bringing the hearer along into the picture, rather than leaving them to wonder at it from a 
remove. We have to create closeness instead of distance, and thus must remain in the intimate 
quarters of existence, with only a small extension into interest and wonder (1405a34-1405b19). 
Metaphor extends the close quarters of what Heidegger would call dwelling by showing 
what stands before us in a new light, pleasurably accessing the senses in accordance with full  
sensorial  human  experience  of  presence,  darkened  yet  by  a  shadow of  obscurity.  Metaphor 
extends  the  familiar  into  the  unfamiliar  without  fully  settling  the  situation,  drawing  in  an 
obscurity that cannot be entirely papered over. Metaphor relates one thing through another to 
show an aspect of what the thing is without a proper act of definition, leaving in its extension a  
space in between word and thing. The range and reach of metaphor is set by 1) the present thing,  
and 2) other better or worse things in relation to the given hearer or community. All these things 
must be in some way already familiar as a part of everyday life within this particular region of 
concern,  and in the juxtaposition of metaphor become possibly otherwise than they are. The 
pirate is a purveyor or a criminal. One makes a mistake or commits a crime. Something is taken 
or ravaged (1405a25-8). 
Speaking cannot  wholly refigure the world—rhetoricity,  after  all,  speaks of things  in 
concrete specificity rather than abstract, unlimited possibility. The value of figurative speaking is 
in bringing new rays of possibility within a matter to the thing that has come before us. The 
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good, the right the beautiful are all determined within the space of the here and now, speaking to 
the situation and the present. The thing  is qua here and now. Even simile, which emphasizes 
distance and draws attention to a relation between distinct things, is grounded in the things’ 
concrete and particular being upon which the relationship is forged (1406b20-5).
Poorly wrought, metaphor deadens a lively world, and arrests the flow of being. Speaking 
rhetorically  draws the connection  between world and word as closely as  possible,  and must 
reflect how the world is for us: already underway, proportional to our expectation, direct and 
sensorial  (14011b21-31).  Aristotle’s  discussion  of  “frigidity”  (psuchra,  dead  and  cold)  is 
particularly interesting, because the proper showing of things in speaking easily escapes notice 
and the speaking takes on a sort of transparency. The failure of speaking to bring things into 
presence reveals barriers between world and word. Compound words call attention to speaking 
as poetic, as do strange words (1405b35-10). Laborious description lacks discernment for what is 
relevant and loses the capacity to bring the thing before the eyes, instead creating a noisy cloud 
of chatter  (1406a11-35).  We talk about talk and not  about things.  The inventive  capacity of 
speaking acts in a close range, perhaps amplified or minimized, but not too much (1406a16-7). 
Our metaphors must speak the way life is lived, in order to make that which can be otherwise 
present before hearers.
To speak to the present, we must understand how things are present in the course of life. 
Liveness in speaking comes from hearing the life in the voice, and showing the thing as it is 
encountered  in  living.  The  voice,  Aristotle  says,  presents  a  liveness  unavailable  to  written 
language because it is capable of movement itself, like the movement of things. Yet this sense of 
movement relies upon shared social life: localized ways of speaking root the capacity to make 
present. Thus one must write for speaking as one simply speaks to others, in its clear stops and 
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starts  (1407b11-13).  Speaking well  does  not  mean speaking ostentatiously;  we wish only to 
speak in such a way that nothing blocks the hearer’s access to the matter at hand. 
The movement of the voice is paired with the movement of the speech as a whole toward 
decision. We describe the moving, changing world in terms of this-then-that, kept close together 
for hearers to follow along (1407a19-30). Presence in time, even of that which can be otherwise, 
is  not  vague or general,  but  datable—then when something happened (1407a35-1407b6).  To 
present liveness of things in speaking, one must address datability:  which then, which here and 
which now, or, futurally, when something will be rather than that something will be. Liveness of 
speaking expresses liveness of things. And this liveness is made manifest in the quick and the 
slow, bigger or smaller, in movement from and to, extended in relation, but cut off when held at 
too far a remove from the thing as encountered in shared life and time (1407b11-25).
5.2 PRESENCE TO THE EAR
As explained above, things are made present in speaking only when our speaking accords to the 
expectation of the hearer who has come before us. The first six chapters of Book Three outline 
the constituents of spoken presence, from the sound and rhythm of the voice, the presence of the 
thing in relation to other things in an extended region of concern, and the specific being of the 
thing as changing in shared time. The bottom line is that presence requires a closeness between 
the thing and word, thus one must choose carefully which word fits the thing so that it appears in 
a  certain  way.  In  the  second  section  of  Book  Three,  Aristotle  explains  with  what  sort  of 
expectation this presence must accord in order to keep close to the hearer.
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5.2.1 Expectations of sound
Propriety expresses the relationship between the word and our expectations of shared speaking. 
In his discussion of propriety, Aristotle follows along with the basic division of the phenomenon 
of  speaking  that  we  have  seen  repeated  throughout  the  Rhetoric:  expectations  arise  from 
disposition, comportment and the matter—pathos,  ethos  and  logos—what stands before, what 
projects outward and how the matter appears in speaking in the present (1408a10-11). Propriety 
toward the matter  requires  a  sense of  proportion.  The matter  may be weighty,  pressing and 
important to the hearer, or trifling and worthy of only minor concern (1408a12-15). Speaking to 
the matter also reveals disposition, not simply in word choice, but in volume, rate and rhythm of 
speaking (1408a16-19). Anger, indignation and reserve are voiced. Finally, the hearer connects 
the way the speaker sees and is disposed to the matter to the hearer’s own sight and disposition, 
determined by both one’s sociohistorical location and habitual choosing (the split  we saw in 
Book Two) (1408a20-32). The speaker whose speaking accords with the hearer’s expectations—
these particular people shaped by both chance and choice—is more believeable. The thing is as 
you say it is (1408a33-36). 
The closeness between speaking and the spoken-of is determined in the context of the 
moment. Propriety grasps the moment, is eukairos, while the improper fails (1408b1). Given the 
dynamic relation between speaker, hearer and matter, all capable of being otherwise before the 
moment, under certain conditions speaking that would normally be considered inappropriate can 
yet  fit  the  situation.  For  example,  under  sway  of  great  emotion,  we  expect  strong  speech 
(1408b5). The speaker so moved by the matter struggles to bring more to the thing, to explain it 
in the fullness of its being as though no single word were enough (1408b16-17). The thing, in 
this  way,  does  not  sit  in  static  isolation  from  our  dealings,  and  our  dealings  are  initially 
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motivated  by  disposition.  To  fail  to  capture  that  sense  of  fulsome,  overwhelming  meaning 
radiating out into others who themselves have been moved to take the matter into concern, is to 
fail to grasp what the thing is for us: a thing of disgust or desire, of loss, or of inspiration. 
Rhythm captures in speaking the repetitive but variable movement of living and speaking 
in time. Rhetorical rhythm is organized, repetitive and progressive in time, but not strictly metric 
(1408b30-2). Note how the very rhythm of speaking mirrors the discussion of time in chapter 
two. Time, taken in metric, chronological terms, is derived from original experiences of time as 
repetition and return without guarantee. The precise meter of poetic composition is, in the same 
way, derived from the basic rhythm of everyday speaking, which unfolds in play of long and 
short, slow and quick (1408b33-1409a9). Aristotle calls for a mixed speaking rhythm, here slow 
and exact, there sprightly and rolling, shifting in and out of time and number (1409a6-11). Most 
importantly,  however,  rhetorical  rhythm accords  with  and just  slightly  heightens  the  regular 
rhythms of everyday speaking of the hearers gathered here and now.
5.2.2 Composing speaking for hearing
Composition of the speech’s overall trajectory,  aiming always toward decision, follows along 
with rhetorical rhythm. We must compose the speech to be heard and voiced properly. Stringing 
together clause after clause in an unending run of recursions gives the hearer a sense of having 
no end in sight, or destination toward which the speech aims. To use Aristotle’s metaphor, in the 
continuous style, the end is so far away that the short-winded hearer runs out of breath (1409a26-
34). In the short style, at each point the hearer grasp something at hand. Extending the running 
metaphor, the direct style is point-to-point in its movement, coming to presence, jumping ahead, 
and then coming to presence again (1409a-351409b-5). Yet if the duration in between is too 
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short, arguments pile up and are not given their proper time to unfold. We stumble over ideas 
(1409b18-21).  How do we create  the balance?  Aristotle  recommends  dividing  and opposing 
contraries (this and this, not this, but this), which both reveal the horizon of otherwiseness and 
draw us to a particular ray. Both possibilities, balanced in equal clauses, are brought close but 
remain separated in division and antithesis (1409b33-1410a1). The thing arises itself in a spoken 
situation, a spoken context, and the very composition of this context lays out differing relations, 
in equality and antithesis. In this way, the very structure of the now is repeated in a balance of 
punctuation and continuity.
Both the rhythm and composition of rhetorical speaking reveal the structure of the now 
for  the  hearer.  In  rhythm,  we hear  the  repetition  of  time  outside  of  a  particular  metric.  In 
composition, we hear the now’s dual visage, to mix a metaphor. Rhetorical speaking toward the 
now cannot be so continuous that there is no end toward which we move, nor so punctuated that 
we cannot see the relation of becoming linking one thing to the next. As we saw in chapter two, 
from the structure of time, we move to the structure of care—how we bring the new, relevant and 
important from out of the familiar, route and unremarkable.
5.2.3 Moving the unfamiliar into the familiar
Wit  (asteia)  is  an  example  of  a  heightening  of  the  reality  of  everyday  speaking—it  is  the 
speaking of the town,  a  concentrated  shared region of  traffic  and trade,  taken into  care and 
refined (1410a5-7). Wit speaks as we speak but better. Perhaps more pointedly, the witty speak 
as we would like to speak ourselves by drawing novelty and particular skill from out of custom, 
giving our expectations a sly, knowing wink. If in propriety we determine the expectations for 
speaking held by those with whom we share time, and accord with such expectation in the sound 
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of the voice, rhythm of speaking, names for things, and arrangement of ideas, in wit we extend to 
what the hearer does not yet have, heightening the style. Human beings enjoy learning things 
through words, and in taking pleasure in wit, the hearer extends into the unknown (1410b10-13). 
A witty metaphor subverts expectation, showing in a single move  both what the thing is  and 
what it is not, both in view. The hearer, directed toward the presence of the thing, likes the 
quickness of metaphor,  that  the thing is  put right  before the eyes  even in its  dual-sidedness 
(1410b20-35). 
Aristotle contrasts the sly speed of wit with the irritating slowness of a poorly-wrought or 
pedantic enthymeme. To borrow a phrase from Petrarch (himself cribbing from Cicero), reason 
without wit “tries hard to keep one eye open,” “yawning drowsily” (521). Most enthymemes fail 
because they belabor what we already know rather than illuminate that which we do not know, or 
are so removed from popular knowledge that the hearer falls behind the speaker—the present 
must lead us, but just a little bit, and must do so by extending the past knowledge into the present 
(1410b21-7).
The efficacy of both metaphor and enthymeme should be judged on temporal rather than 
logical terms, by which I mean that primarily for the hearer, the value of the enthymeme is not in 
its  procedure but in the extent  to which the hearer  is moved to take the thing from what is 
initially believed to being possibly otherwise. Belaboring wastes the hearer’s time, while going 
too fast gives too little time. Finally, while both metaphor and enthymeme aim toward the future 
and move from what one grasps toward that which one does not, speaking of well-held beliefs 
uses the hearer’s previous experience in speaking to guide judgments by applying the opinions of 
those esteemed in this region of concern. The proper time is determined by how the hearers 
gathered in this region speak in the everyday.
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Speaking brings before the eyes, in such a way that in speaking one show not just what 
but  how things are. Speaking brings before the eyes by showing things as they are present in 
dealing (1411b24-5). Dealing is an activity; it is something that we do. Thus the thing must be 
shown in that dynamic sense of activity, as being in act. It is present before the eyes as a doing, 
which brings it life and connects it more intimately with the way that thing stands before us in 
doing. By proportionally connecting things together in terms of movement, action and change, 
relations drawn metaphorically or analogically show not simply particular things that could be 
otherwise,  but  how things  become otherwise  in  a  moving  and changing  world  (1412a9-11). 
People become seasons shifting slowly over time amidst death and rebirth, or stand particularly 
as a concentrated form of an entire time and place. Places, in turn may be present in the people 
who reside within, as possessions to be guarded or looted, or as weapons used to secure our 
desires. Things themselves take on comportments and dispositions, and have wisdom, nobility or 
shame. The active metaphor captures a world in movement, bringing things into a larger context 
of action, doing and dealing.
Putting before the eyes means showing the thing as it is in time—this is what “signifies 
actuality.” Things come before the eyes not as static, for where there is no movement, we mark 
no time, but as already doing and being, as thing with which we have or do business. It is before 
us  here and now in  its  fully  everyday human relationship  rather  than  as  a  bare  object.  The 
foursquare is inert; it is unremarkable to the eye in the course of living and dealing (1411b26-8). 
The blooming, on the other hand, is in the midst of beautiful and temporary becoming, and the 
ranging searches afar for what it does not yet have (1411b28). Static metaphors fail to grasp the 
thing in the context of human life and existence, as something that moves and changes in time 
with us, and it is the thing in the context of life that we must judge in the moment. Even the  
204
lifeless stone is encountered in the movement of life, for “actuality [energeia] is a movement 
[kinesis]” (1412a5).
So, metaphor must show movement and relation between things. We live, however, not 
only  with things but  in speaking about things. Speaking shows the absent, and lengthens the 
distance between word and thing. Speech shows through misdirection, drawing a conclusion one 
would  expect  and  then  breaking  away  to  wrench  the  thing  from  the  hearer’s  expectation 
(1412a18-20). We can say what we do not mean to draw attention to the gap between our sayings 
and the things-said, as in satire (1412a25-7). Jokes challenge expectations and play speaking 
against the things spoken of (1412a28-1412b11). Similes connect while leaving a partial remove 
between things, blurring the strict categories of things in speaking against the more ambiguous 
world  underway.  Where  “is”  falters,  “is  like”  picks  up  (1412b33-1413a14).  Hyperbole 
exaggerates relation, making things not just smaller or greater, but smaller or greater than they 
are  (1413a18-23).  Even  in  distancing  the  word  and the  thing,  the  delimiting  boundaries  of 
rhetorical  everydayness  still  hold.  Speaking that  brings absence to presence may only do so 
within a small compass. The joke is only as funny as it is timely and specific to the thing, the 
simile only as apt as the relation is relevant to the moment. Hyperbole without some sense of 
particular discernment becomes ridiculous.
Thusfar, we have seen how the voice, word and speaking make things present as possibly 
otherwise before a decision, and how that making-present stretches back into what has already 
come  before  into  what  could  be  in  Book  Three  of  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric.  Finally,  Aristotle 
addresses how the speaker must compose and engage in speaking in order to bring the desired 
decision into being. From present, to past, we turn now to futural ecstasy of rhetorical presence.
205
5.3 MOVING TOWARD A DECISION
I have discussed previously how the being of writing and speaking are different. Again, Aristotle 
stresses that the primary necessity for all speakers is, unsurprisingly, a knowledge of speaking. 
One may speak without the ability to write (1413b2-8). The extent to which, then, one considers 
the  speech  compositionally  must  be  directed  toward  speaking.  Writing  lays  out  the  basic 
mechanisms of shared language, but only speaking addresses which situations call for speaking, 
and which for silence. Last, I consider not simply speaking, but oppositional counterspeaking.
5.3.1 Movement in word and composition
Insofar as we must compose our speeches in a written form, then, we must still  capture the 
movement of life and the voice (1413b9-10). Speaking shows comportment and disposition—we 
are not simply communicating an idea, but have been moved to take the matter into concern in a 
particular way, and have a particular comportment from which we view that matter (1413b9-17). 
Take, as an example, the asyndeton, a list of happenings all linked together without connectives 
that bring many things into a small span of time. Things are piled in quickly to one another, 
capturing in the spoken word a sort of desperate, unstoppable movement up into which things in 
the world are caught. In the words of Xenophon, “they were pushing, fighting, killing, dying.” 
The voice moves with the things, slower and then faster, quieter then louder so that the thing in 
its presence jumps up before the eyes and then runs quickly out of the hand, not repetitive but 
building beyond control (1413b21-31). In asyndeton we hear the sound of a world that moves 
and changes with or without us. 
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For each kind of speaking, there is a kind of presence related to its temporal orientation 
before the moment. The forensic deals with the past, which is more concrete, as Aristotle says 
(1414a10-13). We patch together what has been from the particular experiences and observations 
of those who shared the things time and place. The speaker, then, approaches the thing-done at a 
close range. Speaking to the past speaks of particularity, directness, and gives its account within 
already-established  affective  and  material  connections.  The  hearer  in  the  courtroom is  even 
literally close,  requiring that  the speaker lower the volume of the voice.  The progression of 
speaking circles closer and closer to the determined thing-done in its specificity. 
In contrast, speaking to the future presents things as unfinished rough sketches (1414a15-
6). The matter and its hearers are further away, requiring a bigger view and louder voice before a 
larger crowd of people who share in that future. As something that is not yet, our speaking about 
the thing to be is more speculative than determinative.
Finally, for speaking toward present things, one reads significance off of the situation, 
magnifying  and  minimizing  (1414a12-3).  In  all,  we  speak  toward  the  middle  distance  of 
everyday life, between the closeness of a concrete happening and farness of possible horizons. 
Too concise and the thing has no range of possibility, too diffuse and there is no concrete being 
here and now (1414a23-5). Our speaking of the here and now takes on the unproblematic, clear 
and understandable character of things at hand. Speaking toward the present does not merely 
show things here and now, but how we are to relate and deal with those things in shared time.  
We  may  show  in  speaking  things  magnificent  and  agreeable,  things  of  liberality  and  of 
temperance, of pleasure and disgust—our speech need not have these traits as a rule, but only 
with respect to the temporal matters to which one speaks. 
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In all, our speaking shows how the world and things within it are present: in a mix of 
familiarity and unfamiliarity, things can be otherwise. In the rhythm of the voice and progression 
of words, we show how things move and change in time. And in fitting the matter to the hearer’s  
disposition, desire and shared time here and now, we make living in and sharing a world easier.
Speaking  itself  takes  place  in  time.  Arrangement  deals  with  the  speaking  as  a 
progression, through which the matter comes to be taken into concern, and the thing is presented 
as a choice for the hearer. The form of speaking follows from the speaker’s ultimate aim—the 
decision—and the matter before which the speaker stands. In this way, arrangement too reflects 
the basic temporal ecstasies of rhetorical speaking, toward decision and from situation. The basic 
movement of speaking itself  is simple.  We claim, then we prove, for our claim alone is not 
enough to settle a thing that can be otherwise (1414a30-3). The movement of speaking, then, 
moves from what the thing is, to how the thing could be.
Moving from  what the thing is to  how it can be addresses the thing in the context of 
dealing in time, in matters. The question is what is relevant in the thing’s being for the aim and 
problem at hand? The temporal orientation of the matter will determine the particular needs for 
the movement of the speech (1414a36-1414b2). If the issue in speaking of things-done is how 
something has come to be the way it is, the speech will have to deal with the narrative process. 
Narrative  brings  “becoming”  into  word,  from  what  it  once  was  and  is  no  more,  to  what 
something now is. Yet there is less to narrate in epideictic descriptions of how things are here 
now, or deliberative projection into the future about how a thing might be. Speaking toward the 
past, present and future have things in different ways and define them according to different 
relevant aspects in time. For all speaking, however, arrangement follows the larger movement of 
speaking toward decision, from where we being to where we aim—from making the claim upon 
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the  thing  (prothesis)  to  showing  what  speaks  for  the  thing  in  the  moment  in  proof  (pistis) 
(1414b3).
In  order  to  determine  the  proper  movement  for  the  speech,  Aristotle  argues  that  the 
speaker first  must  determine what is  needed for the speech to reach its  aim.   The exordium 
provides a beginning that paves the way for what is to follow. Aristotle likens the exordium to a 
“key note” that gathers and orients musicians before a song (1414b19-25). The exordium guides 
the hearer’s understanding of the matter by establishing the aims, attachments and relations to 
the thing that are relevant to the gathering here and now, and projects outward into the speaking 
to come. In speaking of present things, our beginning grounds the speech, from which we aim 
toward honor or condemnation, guided by past advice toward what is good, better, best, and bad, 
worse, worst, and are nearer to or further from hand for those hearing here and now (1415a5-7). 
To bring the past-thing into the present, the matter must be delimited to both motivate 
hearers  to  position  themselves  toward  the  matter  and attend  to  the  matter’s  own movement 
(1415a7-15). The exordium puts the matter into the hearer’s grasp to then lead back to the initial 
moment of choice in the past. We need a through-line to move from the middle of a story already 
underway to its initial origin in narrative. The exordium establishes that world under way, filled 
with people and things in preexistent differing relations with one another. Because our speaking 
of  things  itself  takes  place  in  time,  the  exordium also  helps  to  limit  and focus  a  long and 
complicated narrative. 
The exordium addresses the entire phenomenon of speaking, and to this end deals with 
not just the matter, but sets a key note for the speaker, hearer and opponent. One speaker draws a 
picture, and brings a person before the eyes, while the opponent cuts into what we think we 
know about the person, opening up possibility (1415a25-33). In accusation and defense in the 
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courtroom for example, the accused’s comportment across time is juxtaposed against the thing 
done,  the  good  person  against  the  bad  thing,  while  the  accuser  calls  into  question  the 
comportment of the accused in light of the thing done, the bad thing against the seemingly good 
person.
Beyond  establishing  or  breaking  open the  relation  between  doer  and  thing-done,  the 
exordium must make the doer and thing-done matter to the hearer. The speaker may aim to make 
the hearer well- or poorly-disposed to the matter, attentive or inattentive (1415b9-14). Within the 
matter, the thing may be present as of concern to the hearer or not, important or unimportant, that 
toward which we are disposed to pursue go or from which we recoil (1415b18-31). In each case, 
the thing is approached in its temporal situation within a matter, as something that  has gone 
wrong,  is important  to  our  moment  here  and  now,  or  will be that  which  we  desire—or, 
countering, the thing is none of these. The thing in its temporality is determined according to 
disposition (already), magnitude (here and now), and closeness to hand (yet to be). 
The exordium projects by showing how the thing is important for the sake of something 
yet to be, and reflects by showing how the thing has come before us and shaped this now, here. 
The exordium,  in  this  way,  presents  how the  world  is  for  us,  in  projection,  disposition  and 
attentive presence. Such considerations extend outside the matter itself to the larger shared time, 
but are ultimately directed toward decision about the thing in the moment. For example, Aristotle 
observes that the speaker must grasp the right moment to sharpen the hearer’s attention on a 
crucial time in the narrative when  something changed, or when otherwiseness opened up. We 
cannot take in the whole story in this way. If everything in the narrative is important, nothing is. 
The story of passing time would be a series of radically unique points which nevertheless remain 
undifferentiated from one another, other and other and other. No point of the story is more or less 
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relevant than another. Such a way of recounting time looks nothing like the everyday world, 
where some moments are heightened while others pass unnoticed within an expanse of time—
split between punctuation and continuity. 
We do not speak to the hearer qua hearer, but qua thing. In other words, the speaker does 
not simply arouse prejudice in the hearer, but arouses prejudice toward the thing-done, here now, 
or –to-be-done, or in the other direction removes apprehensions about the thing. Dispositions are 
directed  toward  the  things  with  which  we  deal  (1415a33-7).  We also  establish  in  speaking 
goodwill between hearer and speaker in friendship and compassion over dealings with things. 
Remember,  that  the  hearer  is  a  particular  hearer  whose  perspective  has  been  formed  in  a 
particular region of traffic and trade (thus are Athenians differently disposed to the greatness of 
Athens than are Spartans. Athenians and Spartans are not irreconcilably different beings, but are 
most certainly differently disposed toward the particular thing that is Athens) (1415a33-1415b3; 
1415b27-32). For the deliberative, the exordium’s meticulous previewing and positioning of the 
matter is less important because hearers have already gathered about it—hearers already know 
that it is of concern and are reacting to that concern by speaking to one another. The hearer 
requires  less  familiarization  and  orientation,  but  the  speaker  must  deal  with  prejudice, 
magnification and minimization (1415b32-38). Even projecting toward the future, the speaker 
must first present the anticipated matter in such a way as to show how things might be otherwise.
In  order  to  open  a  matter  up  to  otherwiseness,  speaking  must  remove  prejudgment. 
Others cannot fully know who we are. We never completely share things in time with others. We 
rely on speaking to show temporal relations to matters, specifically one’s capability to grasp the 
matter at hand. We contest such a grasp in speaking as well: that the thing is not as the opponent  
has said, that it is not important, that it is not so exaggerated, not unjust or only slightly so, not 
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disgraceful  (1416a7-13).  We  dispute  both  the  claims  of  the  is-ness  of  the  thing  and  the 
magnitude of the claims about how the thing is, measuring out concern by degree. The hearer 
judges (and prejudges) both matters and speakers, and so speakers may prejudice opponents and 
their  standing  based  on  the  opponents’  past  acts,  arousing  suspicion,  or  challenge  previous 
claims about ourselves and others or past acts (1416a20-35). 
The  exordium  and  its  creation  and  removal  of  prejudice  capture  present  speaking’s 
orientation toward the past against which the hearer will later decide. The exordium presents a 
pre-delineation of the speaking to come and projects into the future toward decision, prejudice 
addressing what already stands before one in speaking. Now, we move from what comes before 
the speaking, to narrative, which moves the speech to its goal.
5.3.2 Narrative as a marking of movement in time
Narrative functions to show the thing in its temporal being, as a thing within a matter.  That 
matter,  as  we  have  seen,  is  determined  according  to  its  pastness,  presentness,  or  futurity. 
Narrative  may track back from the present  moment  to  the particular  thing-done in the past, 
project from past example to future possibilities for things in the present, or construct a collage 
of past and future within reach of the present.  Narrative joins together the thing outside our 
speaking, and the thing as present in speaking within the remit of art (1416b17-22). We speak of 
the thing in the context of its matter as that which has taken place, is here now to a certain degree 
of concern, and is important for the sake of something yet to be. Time is a marking of movement, 
and speaking marks the thing in time. Narrative takes the thing outside of speech—the bare thing
—and shows its being in moving, changing time: a thing-that-took-place, a kind-of-thing-here-
now, and a thing-to-bring-into-being. 
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Narrative, the movement of things shown in speaking that clads the thing in time, varies 
in length according to the matter it marks (1416b32-1417a3). If we are talking about a datable 
moment, a concrete then that we see from our particular vantage now as in speaking to the past,  
the concern is with how the temporal thing has come to be in its particularity.  Here, we are 
concerned quite directly with narrative, as a displaying of the thing’s coming-to-be (1416b19-
21). If there is general consensus on how the thing came to be, we need very little explanation,  
and more focus on what it now is: how wrong, how important (1416b25-8)? Narrative also marks 
the speaker’s comportment  toward the matter  and the hearer,  because it  shows the extent  to 
which  the  speaker  grasps  the  matter  and  the  path  toward  the  thing,  in  the  face  of  choice 
(1417a16-20). 
The aim of the speaking changes the requirements of narrative to show a thing in time. In 
defense against opponents, the speaker punctuates the continuity of opposing narrative, calling 
into question not the entire span of here-to-there but only key points that disjoin the thing from a 
span in time. Thus the temporality of defense is punctuated in particular moments, in accusation 
as elongated in an intentional here-to-there (1417a7-11).
So, how are we to be toward time in narrative? Hearers stand before time in choice, in 
prohairesis,  gauging the human capacity  to  form the world as  it  is  in  changing time.  Fixed 
systems of signification cut off from the flux of everyday life, like mathematics, do not require 
practitioners  to  take  up  a  choice,  or  to  concern  themselves  with  the  relative  propriety  and 
reasonability of that choice before those who share everyday traffic and trade (1417a18-20). The 
things with which they deal are not presumed open to otherwiseness in changing time, as the 
means and ends of signification are fixed within a system of verification and validation. In the 
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temporality  of  everydayness,  in  which  we  are  our  choices,  our  comportment  toward  things 
matter. So, what is the end toward which we go, and how does it open up a choice before us?
5.4 SPEAKING FOR THINGS
A comportment toward choosing is not the same thing as an intellectual exercise. Rather than 
existing in consciousness or intellect, choice over things that can be possibly otherwise in time 
unfurl  themselves  in  how  the  matter  stands  here  and  now  and  how  we  grasp  at  it,  in 
comportment, understanding and disposition: Are we moved by it? Do we wish it? Do we think 
it good or better? Do we choose our means discerningly and our aims virtuously? The character 
of our narrative, the comportment or view from which one marks the changing thing in time and 
offers a choice in the face of the thing’s possible otherwiseness, reveals how we grasp the thing 
as  useful  and good. It  is  not  a  matter  of  intellect,  nor a product  of  mathematical  or logical  
procedure,  to stand before a choice over that which could be otherwise than it  is  (1417a23-
1417b4). The speaker, in narration, voices how one makes the choice, how one chooses to take 
the thing. And if the perspective or choice goes against expectation, one must explain why.
In marking the thing as a matter in time in narrative, one also reveals disposition: how 
were you at the time, or how another was. We draw inferences about disposition beginning first 
in the sensorial—the voice, look, and body. Glances, tones and gaits all point back to how people 
have taken things to be (1417a36-1417b4).  The choice given to hearers in the same way is a 
judgment of the speaker.  The hearer watches the speaker and from narrative judges how the 
speaker looks and seems to be, how they would choose and live. We get hints of the message  
from the messenger, even before the message is spoken (1417b8-11). In sum, the extent to which 
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the thing’s particular way of becoming and changing is a crucial aspect of grasping the larger 
matter, determines the extent to which narrative us necessary for speaking. From the concrete 
particularity of things in the past, to the fractured and disjointed present, to the future as rayed 
out from past example, narrative marks the movement of things in time.
5.4.1 Speaking for a thing’s presence in proof
If prejudice deals with the choice as pre-determined, and narrative as choice embedded in time, 
proof brings things forward for choosing in speaking. Proof shows something about the thing 
that could be otherwise, ground its possibilities and delimit the horizon of those possibilities 
within a region of concern: proofs stand in for the matter in the moment (1417b21). We can 
make any number of claims about things, but that these claims do not in and of themselves speak 
for the thing. We must show how the thing is, speak for it in this way and let something stand in  
for it. Fact, injury, importance, justice—these are about things and must be tied to those things 
(1417b23-7).
Epideictic speaks to not the concrete existence of the present thing, which is here and 
now with us and before our eyes, but rather the thing’s importance and relevance to our doings in 
the here and now. Will it do us good in use and do us well in honor (1417b30-34)? Proof, in the 
epideictic sense, makes the present present in speaking, and demarcates the region of concern: 
here and now, we are surrounded by things. Which things matter for who we want to be and what 
we want to do? These things become, as it were, more present or rather the present is being 
engaged in in terms of these things; they have marked the now. They leap out of the familiar and 
regular backdrop of everyday life.
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In  deliberative  speaking  toward  the  future,  the  thing  is  here  now  in  its  possible 
consequences—in what it is not yet, and whether or not that not-yet is something we seek and 
desire, or turn away from and renounce (1417b35-1418a1). Proofs prove in time. To stand in for 
the thing as not-yet, speaking must show the thing present here and now as capable of yielding 
that which we seek. In other words, we interpret the thing here, now in terms of its for-the-sake-
of, as it is to in the present, projected in its possibility by what has been in the past (1418a1-2). 
The span is still here: it is right, it is capable, it is worth going after. And yet the thing could, at 
each point,  be otherwise.  Opponents may also be mistaken,  or fail  to substantiate  their  own 
claims. Proof, then, links the world outside of us to our claims about that world and how it has, is 
or will be. Speaking of things in the future links those things present to concrete happenings in 
the  past.  We  ground  the  thing’s  possibilities  in  past  example  and  determine  the  relative 
probabilities of those possible rays of otherwiseness in order to aim toward the future. 
Speaking of things in the past moves from the known in the present to the unknown of 
the past, here and now back (1418a25-6). The thing of the past has already become, and the 
question now is why it has become that way. The general rules of enthymeme guide a tracking 
back from the particular present to the conditions allowing the present to come to be as it is. 
Where  enthymemes  address  how the  thing has  come to be  what  it  is,  maxims address  how 
hearers comport themselves toward matters and deal with things. Maxims address the choice and 
how  we  should  choose  rather  than  the  supply  conclusions  about  the  thing  itself,  shifting 
enthymematic reasoning from being to doing (1418a36-1418b2).
Our capacity to grasp the thing changes the way we address the situation in speaking. The 
thing of the future cannot be an object of knowledge because it  has yet  to be.  The issue of 
relevance is instead how the thing could possibly be and change over time. In addressing the 
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future, the speaker has a weaker hold in the hearer and less control over how the hearer judges 
the speaker’s comportment. It is hard for me to say how you’re taking up the thing of the future, 
how it  intersects with your  own needs and desires.  Our attachments,  projected into a shared 
future, are weaker than those that have developed with past dealings. Epideictic addresses the 
thing in terms of its concrete presence and in light of its past. The generality of enthymemes has 
less purchase upon the thing.  It does not stand before as us as the instantiation of a general 
principle  but  as  a  real,  pressing  and  particular  concern.  In  choosing  and  showing  what  is 
significant in its presence and how it is significant, speakers show themselves in comportment 
and choice. What is most important is not one’s capacity to grasp the present in terms of its 
absence (what it has been and is no more, what it could be and is not yet) with precision, but to 
show the present in movement in a way that accords with the present hearers: as it is here with 
us, not with you or I.
5.4.2 Speaking with one another: Speaking and counter-speaking
Refutation rips open connections between the said and the thing rather than builds them, going 
after the joints between world and word (1418b5-7). To say,  “it is not,” as opposed to “is,” 
requires less specific proof insofar as the concern for the thing is in its saying rather than as in 
itself. Temporally, if we precede the first speaker, the audience will be disposed in a particular 
way, thus the second speaker must push back and create doubt to reopen the matter to choice 
(1418b7-16). We do not want to make our positioning obvious, but instead should emphasize the 
wisdom of doing by others in maxims, shifting the thing from a logical certainty to an ethical 
choice (1418b33-8). What the thing is guides but does not fully determine how we should deal 
with it, because it may be yet otherwise.
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Interrogation shows the thing as revealed not just in talk, but in talk with and against one 
another, a sort of performance of thinking in back and forth. The back and forth in question and 
answer explicates and tests the connections made between things, or between thing and word. 
The interrogator aims to open up the gap between sayer and said (1418b39-1419a16). As in 
composition, in interrogation we cannot be too precise in speaking for fear of leaving the hearer 
behind (1419a17-9). Words fade in the memory while matters remain. Thus while interrogation 
concerns itself will the speaking of the opposition, it must still focus on the speaking of things by 
that opposition, and keep the small compass of speaking and counterspeaking drawn around the 
matter more than the word. 
Questions themselves have a movement toward things—they set up a narrow window or 
span of possibility and have an aim, revealing the “drift of argument” (1419a23-4). In response, 
answers  must  have  their  own  countermovement,  as  both  sides  aim  toward  decision.  Like 
questions, jokes function as a counterspeaking, overthrowing expectation overthrow by playing 
speaking  against  things  and  making  the  distance  between  the  two  more  farce  than  tragedy 
(1419b3-9). Jokes punctuate the otherwise smooth continuity of everyday speaking, revealing 
that speaking to be facile, hypocritical or even dangerous. We can comport ourselves toward the 
thing, in other words, in seriousness and in absurdity.  Irony draws seriousness and absurdity 
together, treating the foolish as though it were of great importance not to efface foolishness, but 
to expose it  through contrast  (1419b13).  In both interrogation and joking, we tear apart  that 
which has been drawn close and continuous by others.
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5.4.3 The temporal horizon in the moment of decision
Aristotle’s discussion of the epilogue functions itself as an epilogue for the  Rhetoric. Hearers 
stand, at the end of speaking, before a choice yet to come. Speaking must, then, prepare hearers 
to come before the choice (1419b10-13). There is a woozy sense of time in this final moment, as 
though the whole movement of the speech has condensed to one final, pivotal now stretched out 
still backward and forward even in its condensation. Directed toward what is not yet, the hearer 
reaches toward good and turns away from bad, relatively or absolutely in the decision (1419b13-
19). Toward the present, hearers look to what is here, now as great or small, toward which we 
reach out or recoil, as being possibly otherwise (1419b20-23). Toward the past, the hearers are 
moved to decide in  disposition,  drawn toward one possibility  and away from the opposition 
(1419b24-7).  In memory of the movement of speaking,  the matter  is brought to the cusp of 
decision (1419a28-36).
As the hearer becomes otherwise in time, so too is the matter over which the hearer has 
come to preside. The thing is now before us in terms of degree, as something that could be 
otherwise.  And it  is  taken up by those already disposed toward it,  which comes before that 
judgment  and will  shape  how we take  this  thing  here  and now to  be  in  its  present  and its 
possibilities. Only once the full temporal horizon of the thing, its aim, presence and past, are 
taken together can the thing be brought to its conclusion through speaking. Only when fully 
manifest in speaking in time do words mean things. 
Considering the progression of the speech itself, an epilogue need not repeat what has 
been established prior if the speaking of things has consistently aimed and oriented itself around 
the thing. If the matter in which the thing has arisen, however, has become overly complicated,  
we must again and again clarify. A confused matter connects things too thickly to the significant 
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and the accidental alike. In these instances, a consistent reiteration not just of what has been said, 
but specifically which relations and connections matter to what the thing is and which do not, cut 
away at the mass of matter to the thing (1419b33-36; 1420a4-1420b1). 
Once prepared, the epilogue brings the thing forth completely, or rather, as completely as 
the rhetorical mode of speaking is able to do: it is probably this way. In retrospect, the epilogue 
reach back to prospect: In the now in which I began, I promised you something—to show how 
the  thing  stands  before  us  here  in  decision.  The  beginning  initially  drew  out  the  rays  of 
possibility for the thing. I said that it is this way, and it is this way for this reason. There are other 
possibilities for the thing, it can be otherwise, but given what has been and what we have here 
and now, such possibilities are unlikely. The rhetorical thing can only become a thing taken as 
what it is in decision. In its final act of becoming otherwise, in decision the rhetorical thing 
becomes otherwise than rhetorical—perhaps only for a moment. Things change. For the moment, 
speaking has taken possession of the thing…it  is…and the movement of rhetorical  speaking 
comes to an end.
The  Rhetoric  closes perhaps the only way that it could, with an epilogue by Lysias. “I 
have spoken;  you  have heard;  the facts  are  before you.  I  ask for  your  judgment”  (1420b4). 
Speaker, hearer and matter, brought forth in time from what has been said, what is present now, 
and the decision to come. And it is at the point of the decision that rhetoric and the Rhetoric both 
end, at the moment where the thing is no longer taken as otherwise. In that moment, the thing has 
changed. Even the order of Lysias’  epilogue follows the arrangement of the  Rhetoric,  as we 
began with the guiding look or aim for speaking in time, the hearer who comes to us already 
disposed toward the matter, and ended with the speaking itself in the here and now, all suspended 
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in otherwiseness before the decision: the ability to see, in each given case, the available means of 
persuasion.
The internal composition of the Rhetoric follows the same pattern. Book One begins with 
the aims of speaking. The futural aim of deciding over future-things is discussed first, followed 
by deciding over present-things and deciding over past-things.  From aiming toward the past, 
Book Two then addresses things as they are already for us in disposition, how hearers have come 
to project upon things through the course of life, and finally how things are taken as present in 
customary speaking. Finally, Book Three deals with presenting the thing in speech here and now, 
accords with the expectations of the hearer, and moves toward a decision. The thing comes to 
presence in the voice, the word and the relation. It is met by expectation, and moves out of itself 
toward a decision. 
In more direct terms, each of the temporalities of rhetorical speaking are approached first 
in terms of a primary temporality and second within a temporal horizon of possibility stretching 
along each ecstasy, in simultaneous futurity, historicity and presence of the thing, laid out in an 
interlocking arrangement: 
Futural orientation addresses the thing in its for-the-sake of, as aimed toward decision
Over things in the future
Over things in the present
Over things in the past
Past orientation addresses the thing in how it already is for us
Past disposition before judgment of the thing in affective attachment
Futural comportment toward the thing, shaped by experience
Presenting things in accordance with past associations
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Present orientation addresses how the thing is brought into speaking
As made present in voice and word
As accorded to past expectation in heard meaning
As composed to move futurally toward a decision.
Rhetoric ends with the decision, where the thing taken as possibly otherwise becomes 
otherwise than rhetorical. Yet, decisions over things that change in time are themselves open to 
change in time. The Rhetoric in a way is itself written in a round, and ends with a return to its  
beginnings, where the matter has been brought into word, but then broken free to be spoken of 
anew. The art of rhetoric, then, is in getting as close as possible to the thing as it is for us in 
everyday  life,  from  its  familiarity  to  its  otherwiseness.  The  business  of  rhetoric  is  with 
appearances—and appearance is how we first have a world, our most real reality. To what extent 
does the appearance of the thing in speaking accord to the appearance of the thing as you have 
encountered it while living, doing, coping and caring? Speaking aims to capture the thing not as 
a bare object, but how it appears to us in the course of our days that moves and changes in shared 
time.
Eireka, akekoate, echete, krinate.  I have spoken, you have heard, here is what is, now 
decide. What does it mean to call something rhetorical? It means to say that what is relevant 
about this thing, what matters here and now, is its possibility of being otherwise in the shared, 
changing  temporal  region  of  everydayness,  textured  by  uneven  attachments  formed  in  our 
dealings  already underway,  projected through our undertakings,  and encountered  in a shared 
space and time. The rhetorical thing is the thing encountered in the temporality of everydayness, 
and the art of rhetoric is the hermeneutic of that life that we live initially, generally and for the  
most part. This movement in time through speaking is captured in the Lysian epilogue, as we 
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move from having spoken,  to having heard,  to being standing before us now, all  suspended 
before the decision yet to come.
The check on proper speaking is not additional systems of speaking through which one 
divines truth from falsity and correctness from incorrectness (a matter  of logical  procedure). 
Rather, the test for rhetorical speaking is the extent to which bringing a thing to word accords 
with the hearer’s experience in this shared space and time of traffic and trade with one another,  
all within a world that we can push out against, that pushes back upon us and is always just  
beyond our grasp. The height of rhetorical art is transparency, but that transparency is produced 
through a close engagement with how this matter here has come  to matter to us now. Is your 
speaking itself alive, sharing in this world with me in disposition, in aim and in what is here 
now? Does it bring to presence the thing as it is  for us? The thing is in a wild world already 
underway with others, present and absent here in bits and pieces, taken up by our desire to be in 
the world and be well, certain only in that one day we will not be at all, when all the speakings of 
all the things in all the world will finally become irrelevant. Only in death does the otherwiseness 
of things no longer matter.
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the place beyond the cares of everyday life, 
reached only in death, is where Heidegger’s 1954 “Dialogue on Language” begins. 
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6.0 THE GROUND OF TIME AND SPEAKING
…it could be the most fruitful of questions…
Carroll C. Arnold, “Wingspread—The Final Session” (181)
6.1 THE MOST FRUITFUL OF QUESTIONS
To  begin  the  concluding  chapter  of  this  investigation  of  rhetorical  ontology,  consider  two 
moments in Heidegger’s life and work, the first from Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy  
in 1924 and the second from the “Dialogue on Language” in 1954.47 The first is rhetorical, the 
second philosophico-poetic. Yet, both passages say the same. Behind each “it is” articulated in 
the moment of decision lays a world of caring and dealing, living and working, traffic and trade 
in time that has come to language. The first, from BCArP, describes how an investigation of the 
origin of the concept in a temporal relation between speaker, hearer and matter, brings one to 
begin with what is said and move back into the matter that called for speaking:
With  this  purpose,  being-there was  explicated,  being-there  with  respect  to  its  
being.  This  explication  was  laid  out  so  that  basic  concepts  would  come  to  
language.  These  basic  concepts  came  to  language  with  the  purpose  of 
immediately serving to make being-there visible and intelligible as the possible 
ground of basic concepts themselves.  The  genuine interpretation  occurs in the 
right way, then, only if it is fulfilled on the ground of explicit conceptuality, if the 
47 Unterwegs du Sprache   (On the Way to Language) , the collection in which the Dialogue first appears, was 
published in 1959, but Heidegger writes in a reference note that he composed the Dialogue in 1953/4.
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interpretation is retrieved, is understood in accordance with the found. Therein, a 
general hermeneutical principle appears, that every interpretation is only genuine  
in retrieval. Only then is it a putting-forward of that which no longer stands there 
(BCArP 184).
The second, from the Dialogue, describes how the Being of language is revealed through the 
course of speaking with one another.
Japanese friend:48 It seems to me as though even we, now, instead of speaking 
about language, had tried to take some steps alone a course which entrusts itself to 
the nature of Saying. 
Inquirer [Heidegger]: Let us be glad if it not only seems so but is so.
J: If it is so, what then?
I: Then the farewell of all “It is” comes to pass.
J: But you do not think of the farewell as a loss and denial, do you?
I: In no way.
J: But?
I: As the coming of what has been.
J: But, what is past, goes, has gone—how can it come?
I: The passing of the past is something else than what has been.
J: How are we to think that?
I: As the gathering of what endures…
J:…which, as you said recently, endures as what grants endurance…
I: …and stays the Same as the message…
J:…which needs us as messengers (Dialogue 54).
To conclude, if the rhetorical thing is that which is capable of change in shared time, 
what is not rhetorical? In BCArP, Heidegger sees the concept as arising from the human struggle 
to  deal  with  its  world—to say  it  is...in  such a  way that  the  world  stands  before  us.  In  the 
Dialogue, the impulse to render the decision it is is given up to instead abide with Being. One 
attempts to reconcile  being and otherwiseness, the other stands open and resigned before all 
being. While I will contrast early and late Heidegger, I do so understanding that what does not  
change in Heidegger’s work is his own struggle to understand the connection between world and 
word.  He  may  leap  philosophically  and  poetically,  but  the  ground  from which  he  leaps  is 
rhetorical.
48 The Dialogue refers to Heidegger’s interlocutor as “a Japanese,” which sounds awful. I will use the additional 
term “friend” to indicate the warm relationship between conversation partners.
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6.2 SPEAKING FROM LIFE
The Rhetoric grasps the dynamic temporality of speaking.49 In a speech’s opening exhortation, 
we speak in the present of things yet to come as here with us already, calling us to speak. If the 
exordium gives a key note for speaking yet to come, the key note for Heidegger’s “Dialogue on 
Language” is missing. Not forgotten or skipped over, but missing as a silent note. That note is 
Goethe’s “Wanderer’s Nightsong II,” first written on the wall of a mountain hunting lodge not 
unlike Heidegger’s own “hut” in Todtnauberg, as the poet took in his wooded solitude (Perloff 
89). 
Über allen Gipfeln
Ist Ruh,
In allen Wipfeln
Spürest du
Kaum einen Hauch
Die Vögelein schweigen im Walde.
Warte nur, balde
Ruhest du auch
O’er all the hill-tops
Is quiet now,
In all the tree-tops
Hearest thou
Hardly a breath;
The birds are asleep in the trees
Wait; soon like these
Thou too shall rest.
(Goethe 53)
The Dialogue opens with death, the silence of the restful grave. Given the way time will 
be treated elliptically throughout the work, beginning a meditation on language with the most 
emphatic of endings seems appropriate. 
J: You know Count Shuzo Kuki. He studied with you for a number of years.
I: Count Kuki has a lasting place in my memory.
J: He died too early. His teacher Nishida wrote his epitaph—for over a year he 
worked on this supreme tribute to his pupil.
I: I am happy to have photographs of Kuki’s grave and of the grove in which it  
lies.
49 A shrewd Heideggerian will note that I continue to use the word “speaking” even when Heidegger has abandoned 
speaking as the seat of Being. I do so because my theoretical framework addresses speaking as the initial concern 
and then works backward. I have no privileged access to psyche, conscience or truth. I can only access the trace of 
the word that speaks of things. More simply, I continue to work the vein that Heidegger left behind. A philosopher 
may deal with Saying, but a rhetorician deals with concerned, everyday business of speaking.
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J: Yes, I know the temple garden in Kyoto.50 Many of my friends often join me to 
visit the tomb there. The garden was established toward the end of the twelfth 
century by the priest Honen, on the eastern hill of what was then the Imperial city 
of Kyoto, as a place for reflection and deep meditation (Dialogue 1). 
The  unidentified  epitaph—the  silent  note—is  Kitaro  Nishida’s  translation  of  Wanderer’s 
Nightsong II, finished shortly before Nishida’s own death in 1945 (Yusa 331). Nishida labors 
long on the immense task of interpreting one of the most famous verses in the German language 
in a way that remains true to the Japanese word, in fitting tribute the student with whom he 
shared a struggle to reconcile East and West. The final version etched in stone reads:
Miharukasu
yama no itadaki
Kozue ni wa
kaze mo ugokazu
tori mo nakazu
Mate shibashi
Yagate nare mo yasuman
Visible far in the distance
are the mountain peaks
At the tree’s tip
no wind blows
no birds chirp
Wait a while,
You too shall rest
(Yusa 331).
As a philosopher, Nishida wrestled with the relationship between logic and nothingness—the 
speaking that exclaims the thing, and that which can never be claimed as a thing. For Nishida, 
the relationship between the tangibly human and the divine that outstrips it absolutely flow out of 
everyday life. Ordinary life has in it something eschatological. In our present there remains not 
just past and future as determined by traffic and trade, but eternal past and future, brought forth 
in what Nishida calls the absolute present (Nishida 111). In “Wanderer’s Nightsong II,” beyond 
50  Tomio Tezuka, Professor of German literature at Tokyo University, on whom the character of the Japanese friend 
is modeled, referred specifically to his conversation with Heidegger about Shuzo Kuki’s grave in “An Hour with 
Heidegger.”  Tezuka had not actually visited the gravesite  and saw it  only in photographs Heidegger  possessed 
himself: 
Heidegger’s interest in Japan appears to have been first aroused by the late Kuki Shuzo, about 
whom he spoke very fondly.  A man from Kyoto,  Uchigaki Keiichi,  had visited Heidegger  in 
Freiburg some time before,  and Heidegger had asked him for a photograph of Kuki’s grave in 
Kyoto. Mr Uchigaki accordingly wrote home and had several photographs sent, which Heidegger 
now  showed  me.  The  natural  stone  of  the  headstone,  the  beautifully  scripted  epitaph,  the 
surrounding plantings—the entire well-planned grave is one of the most elegant I have ever seen.  
In  its  synthesis  of  the  natural  and  the  artificial,  it  conveyed  a  comprehensive  sense  of  the 
refinement of Japanese sensibility (Tezuka 61).
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the birds and wind, there is silence that one hears in the moment before sleep and death that 
gives the wanderer a final home where wandering ceases.
Death,  that  sudden  absence  and  silence,  the  pressing  being  of  nothing,  pervades 
Heidegger’s Dialogue. As discussed in chapter four, the only human time that is fully unshared is 
the time of death.  In Heidegger’s later  philosophy of language,  we find the moment defined 
against death, and speaking countered by silence. The two bear a close connection. Theodore 
Adorno remarks  on Goethe’s  sly irony:  “the seconds before the bliss  of sleep are the same 
seconds that separate our brief life from death” (Adorno 42) The whirl of life is our lot, and the 
approaching hush, the moment of stillness at the very end, is only temporary consolation rather 
than a transcendent realm of essential being. The “subjective spirit is thrown back upon itself” 
(Adorno 42). When the wanderer, defined by the trek away from home, comes home and ceases 
to wander, the wanderer ceases to be.
I turn to Heidegger’s later work to show a span of possibility in which the rhetorical 
functions, and where, at the poles or end stations, it  does not—or in the above metaphorical 
terms, where the rhetorical ceases to wander and ceases to be. I have argued that Heidegger’s 
turn to Aristotle’s  Rhetoric allowed him to move from the calcified speaking of logic (and its 
outgrowth, science) to the moving and changing speaking of life. The definitional capacity of the 
word to  mean things depends upon its ability to capture the thing in its matter,  both already 
underway and projected forward, as it stands here and now, in and for the moment. The Dialogue 
presents a second end-station at the opposite pole from conceptual language stripped of time: 
speaking of things in the shadow of death, where time is fully Dasein’s own for a moment of  
fleeting consolation.
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6.2.1 The ground of speaking in life
I  have  told  two parallel  stories  in  order  to  explain  what  it  means  to  say that  something  is 
rhetorical. First, Heidegger struggles in the 1920s to draw together language, being and time in 
such a way that none remain locked away in consciousness or psychology and become products 
of logical procedure. For the human being, time is a marking of movement born of language that 
is never the less in things. Second, Aristotle describes the basic mode of speaking for the animals 
that live together through  logos—a speaking that one engages in and encounters consistently 
throughout  one’s  life,  with  art  or  without.  Aristotle  demarcates  the  rhetorical  as  neither  a 
deficient earthly mark of the ideal form, nor as a drug that warps human perception of things as 
they  really are.  Heidegger  navigates  between Husserlian  eidetic  intentionality  and Diltheyan 
psychological as Aristotle navigates the Platonic and sophistic. For both, human being unites 
mood, comportment and expression first in the rhetorical speaking about things in everydayness.
In  the  closing  chapter,  I  describe  the  reversal  of  rhetoricity  in  later  Heideggerian 
philosophy of  language,  focusing  on the  “Dialogue  on Language.”51 I  argue  that  Heidegger 
essentially  reverses  the  movement  of  the  rhetorical,  from given  situation,  to  guiding  claim, 
culminating in speaking with others. In the Dialogue, Heidegger consistently begins with shared 
speaking, then breaks the speaking apart in the face of what has been and will be, evacuating a 
51 My interest in the Dialogue is aimed toward what the Dialogue says about Heidegger, not its claims about 
Japanese thought. As Lin Ma explains, Heidegger’s grasp of Japanese philosophy is tertiary at best. “Japan” in the 
Dialogue functions as a model for possible oppositional speaking. Confusing the Dialogue with a documentary 
account of Japanese Being creates a hall of mirrors. The Dialogue bears little resemblance to the actual hour’s 
conversation with Tomio Tezuka. Heidegger’s recounting of his early philosophy bears little resemblance to the 
lecture texts. The discussion of Iki bears little resemblance to Kuki’s iki, embodied by the courtesans of Meiji-era 
Kyoto. The Structure of Iki bears little resemblance to either “authentic” Japanese aesthetics or to the historical lived 
experience of courtesans. Rejecting the word in favor of the “real” being of the world makes the same metaphysical 
mistakes that this dissertation (and the Dialogue, for that matter) criticizes. Standing the word of Heidegger or Kuki 
against real “authentic” cultural reality (for example, Pincus 77-8) creates a hierarchy in which inferior speaking 
recedes into the background of real culture. We cannot find a place to see how a thing becomes a thing within a 
matter. Standing “real” Japan against Heidegger’s ignores the value of “inauthentic” words. 
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shared now with others in favor of Dasein’s own now with Being. I suggest that the movement of 
speaking from a concern with logic in distinction to life (the problem Heidegger first tackles), to 
a concern with Saying in the face of absence and death (the Heidegger of the Dialogue) present 
the end stations the rhetorician must see between. As I have argued repeatedly, the rhetorical still 
remains.  Over  and  again,  I  have  referred  to  rhetoric  as  a  ground,  the  place  where 
phenomenological  destruction can go no further. For Heidegger,  the Greek translation of the 
German  Grund,  the  same  Grund  of  Grundbegriffe  der  Aristoschelein  Philosophie  (“basic 
concepts” as “ground concepts” of Aristotelian philosophy), is the  hypokeimenon. I have used 
the term “matter.” The matter is the place—in time and region, being and doing—in which the 
thing is first encountered and can thereby become a thing in time.52 
What if we posit the rhetorical as Heideggerian ground? The place in which the very 
problem of Being first  announces  itself,  before it  is  refined and clarified  in  the speaking of 
science, philosophy or even poetry, the sound of birds and wind and wandering against which 
silence arises? Heidegger in 1924 speaks of leaping from the rhetorical speaking of everydayness 
without return. However, all leaps, insofar as they leap at all and do not simply fall, return to the 
ground  in  landing.  The  phasis,  the  spoken  claim  against  which  Heidegger  formulates  his 
kataphasis or  counterspeaking,  remains  the  same  throughout  his  work.  In  1924,  Heidegger 
argues that the conceptual arises both from the ground of, and in  opposition to the rhetorical 
speaking of everydayness. Each iteration of Heidegger’s speaking grows out of and attempts to 
break  from  everydayness.  Heidegger  may  leap  off  into  a  radicalized  speaking,  name  that 
radicalized speaking philosophy, then poetry, then silence, but the problems that each mode of 
52 That the matter would be so easily rendered by most English translators as “subject” only serves to illustrate how 
speaking of being becomes a matter of logical procedure. Hypokeimenon as subject is rooted in Aristotle’s logic, the 
base material toward which a predicate refers, that is then read further through a Latinization. But the matter is that 
which has arisen in this case, here and now that is pressing and important—it is a matter that matters in its capacity 
to change. Inert “subject,” a placeholder in a logical system of organization, does not capture the temporal 
specificity of rhetorical matters.
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language address are  always problems of rhetoricity. The greatest problem, specifically, is that 
rhetoric returns to that from which it was born in everydayness, drawing all back into the present 
and public. In the rhetorical  is your  birth and death,  where Dasein meets both itself  and the 
Anyone. Even the Dialogue, aimed at it is in abiding with Being, may only abide with Being by 
first confronting everyday speaking.
Heidegger argues that the  hypokeimenon is that which persists in Being. What if what 
persists, initially, generally and for the most part, is its everydayness? Its origin and falling away 
into bandied-about speaking? Its movement in life? The rhetorical jumps out and returns, always 
moving—and where there is movement, there is life. Though the fundamental premise that first 
animates Heidegger’s reading of the  Rhetoric, that the human being  speaks the world, is later 
given up, the basic temporal structure of everyday speaking remains the same for Heidegger. He 
needs the structure to solidify the ground from which he leaps. It takes on different names: ethos, 
pathos and  logos;  concrete  given  basic  situation,  guiding  look,  prevailing  intelligibility; 
comportment,  disposition,  speaking;  understanding,  mood,  entanglement;  solitude,  finitude, 
world; mission, mandate, labor; message-bearer, message, and Saying. All maintain the same 
basic  structure  borne  by  the  same  Grundbegriffe.  I  part  from  Heidegger  in  the  leap,  and 
resolutely remain on rhetorical ground.
I will first establish the ground Heidegger builds from the Rhetoric in 1924 that underlies 
his  leap  to  Being  and  Time in  order  to  prepare  for  a  critical  reading  of  Heidegger’s  1954 
“Dialogue on Language,” arguing 1) the Dialogue demonstrates that a speaking aimed toward 
poetic ends still must use rhetorical means to engage with and call into question the prevailing 
speech  of  everydayness,  and  2)  that  while  the  Dialogue  moves  rhetorically,  its  culminating 
definition of the essence of language voids the ground for speaking in shared time. I close with a  
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discussion of rhetorical theory’s own recursive conversation regarding the nature of rhetoricity. I 
isolate a moment in rhetorical history and theory when scholars grappled with rhetoric in light of 
the existential and phenomenological turn, wherein the rhetorical thing emerges yet again as a 
problem in light of the global social and philosophical upheaval of the late 60s. I conclude with 
remarks toward the future of rhetorical theory. At each turn, the basic question remains the same: 
what  does  it  mean  to  call  something  rhetorical?  How does  rhetorical  speaking  make  things 
present here and now in shared time,  in such a way that those things bear both history and 
destiny?
From Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Heidegger formulates what he calls a structure of “indigenous 
conceptuality” to show how concepts emerge from a ground in everyday speaking. And, while he 
does  not  continue  to  use the  phrase,  the  structure  of  indigenous  conceptuality—how human 
beings  first  bring  things  into  words—remains  in  Being  and  Time  and  beyond.  Indigenous 
conceptuality solves a problem that Heidegger wrestles with very early on in his academic career
—the connection between the phenomenological world and the word.
Theodore  Kisiel  documents  the  concern  with  what  Heidegger  first  calls  “formal 
indication” in the 1919 KNS (or “war emergency semester,” during the end of World War I). As 
Heidegger  writes  in  his  lecture  notes  for  “The  Idea  of  Philosophy  and  the  Problem of  the 
Worldview,”
Seen in this way, from the pre-worldly, understood from life in and of itself, the 
formally objective is no longer a re-cept [Rück-griff] but already a con-cept [Be-
griff]. Radical displacement of the comportment that understands life-experience. 
Later  to  be  clarified  are:  re-cept (motivation),  pre-cept [Vorgriff]  (tendency), 
concept (object).  Pre-cepts  and  re-cepts  (“sight”),  prospective  grips  and 
retrospective grips (KNS 98, emphasis in original).
The  conceptual,  Heidegger  concludes,  must  arise  from  within  a  hermeneutic rather  than 
structured  formal  intuition  wherein  the thing is  grasped.  Note that  motivation,  tendency and 
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object map cleanly onto rhetorical pathos, ethos and logos. The thing is not just in its material, 
historical actuality or its formal aesthetic conceptuality,  but its possibility,  within a temporal, 
historical context moved by a pre-existing motivation toward the future: 
The empowering experiencing of living experience that takes itself along is the 
understanding  intuition,  the  hermeneutical  intuition,  the  originary 
phenomenological  back-and-forth  formation  of  the  recepts  and  precepts  from 
which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out. 
[…] Life is historical; no dissection into essential elements, but connection and 
context (KNS 99, emphasis in original, ellipses added).
As argued in chapter two, Heidegger searched for an account of phenomenological presence that 
could grasp a thing in time. The relationship between Dasein and its world had to intersect not 
just with time, but with language. Time is how we say there is movement, and we are first moved 
to intend and attend. Thus to begin an account of phenomenological presence with intending 
begins in the middle movement between end stations. Heidegger wants to know what calls us, 
and moves us, to intend in the first place and toward what that intention moves.
6.2.2 Returning the concept to the ground of speaking in life
The Rhetoric’s weaving together of speaker, hearer and matter within a context of changing time, 
all borne by language,  gave Heidegger the linkage he had been searching for. Even in 1919, 
Heidegger read Plato’s philosophy as a reaction to the Sophistic position “that man, indeed, man 
in regard to his sensory perception, is the measure of all things. For this reason knowledge is 
impossible. There is only opinion (δόξα), which changes with time and circumstances” (KNS 
16).  Plato finds his  own grounding in spirit,  and method in dialectic.  As Aristotle’s  critique 
described in chapter  three shows, however, Plato’s eidetic, dialectic turn cannot handle things 
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that in their essential being can be otherwise and in that mishandling renders the doxastic less-
than-being. 
Heidegger’s  structure  of  indigenous conceptuality  reinterprets  the art  of  rhetoric  as  a 
laying out of precept and recept in speaking of things that re-historicizes the thing while also 
grasping the thing’s possibilities. It is the way of speaking about these changeable things: “the 
possibility of seeing what at each moment speaks for the matter” (BCArP 78). The ability to see, 
in each given case, the available means of persuasion becomes for Heidegger the way that things 
emerge as capable of becoming conceptually definable in the first place—as things of speaking 
given in living and dealing with one another,  our realest  reality.  Heidegger interprets  “given 
case” as the concrete giving basic experience (recept, in the language above), the “ability to see” 
as  the  guiding  claim  (precept),  and  the  “available  means  of  persuasion”  as  the  prevailing 
intelligibility  from  which  the  thing  arises  and  returns  in  interpretation  (concept).  Each  are 
contained in the thing here now of which we speak, in the same way that the now itself contains 
before and after. 
The concrete given basic experience refers to existence in the world already underway, as 
it is made factically present to one. The experience, then, has a primary orientation toward the 
past—the situation is already here, the case already given, one is already attending. “Being-in-
the-world means having the world there in a certain way. Not only is the world had, but being-
there  has itself in  disposition” (BCArP 184). Dasein finds itself, first in disposition but also in 
habituated choosing and prevailing ways of speaking. Dasein finds itself while being confronted 
by things that leap out of everydayness and become pressing precisely because they are already 
capable of being otherwise, drawing greater scrutiny toward the everyday. Things are this way 
now because they became otherwise than they should be. Things are this way now but they could 
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become another. Things are this way now, but they matter more or less. In dealing with things 
that can be otherwise, Dasein confronts itself as something that can be otherwise.
The guiding claim projects outward into the future “in  the terms of which a being is 
addressed”  (BCArP 184-5). The guiding claim refers to the  sense of being—what makes the 
thing the thing, what makes the thing what it is. The Aristotelian teleological sense of being is 
“being-completed” or “being-present.”  For Aristotle’s rhetoric, the claim is made complete and 
present  in  being-decided—the  thing  is  not  decided  yet,  is  becoming  decided,  and  the  thing 
becoming-decided will do so differently depending on the temporality of the matter—whether 
the hearer  must  decide on matters  of the past,  present  or future.  The direction in  which the 
discourse moves, as we grapple explicitly over the thing’s being-character, is laid out “in the 
sense of the explicitness of everyday seeing, considering, discussing” (BCArP 185).
The prevailing intelligibility brings the word to the ear of others, and makes the speaking 
a present thing for the hearer, but its claim only holds to a certain extent. As that which changes 
in time, the rhetorical is “thoroughly governed by δόξα [doxa]” (BCArP 185, bracketed material 
added). The thing capable of being otherwise in shared time has broken with expectation and 
cannot  be fully  determined by the guiding claim.  In order to  be decided,  the  thing must  be 
brought into familiarity from the unintelligible. Thus the world emerges from speaking, breaks 
from  that  world  given  in  speaking,  and  comes  back  to  it:  “Familiarity  is  the  standard  of 
intelligibility that λόγος [logos] possesses, that proceeds from the νδοξονἔ  [endoxon] and returns 
to it” (BCArP 185, bracketed material added). Heidegger’s challenge is to construct a guiding 
claim capable of wresting the thing from its prevailing familiarity to its particular presence. This, 
Heidegger thinks, is the job of the philosopher.
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The  world  in  everyday  speaking  is  already  being  interpreted,  and  its  alreadyness 
maintains a temporal structure. The world is already here in fore-having, where Being is already 
within its world in “a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. Being-in-the-world 
is an already-having-the-world-thus-and-so” (BCArP 186) into which Being awakens and finds 
itself. We must then deal with the world already underway in a “definite way of addressing, in 
which the world is cared for, is discussed” (BCArP 186) as fore-sight which takes the world in a 
particular respect. In the face of unfamiliarity, the thing has already become problematic in both 
its fore-having and fore-sight (our normal business has been arrested and our common modes of 
dealing are made unsure). The unfamiliar is brought back into familiarity in expression with one 
another in terms of “the ποφαίνεσθαιἀ  [apophainesthai]—‘exhibited,’ articulated” (BCArP 187). 
Fore-grasp of the thing in its expression and prevailing intelligibility is articulated according to 
“a definite idea of a proof and of the conduciveness is guiding,” that is, a way of determining  
what  is  capable  of  speaking and dealing  with  the  thing  in  which  “[d]efinite  possibilities  of 
conceiving gain dominance; all others must be assimilated” (BCArP 187).
The  rhetorical  grounds  of  concrete,  basic  given  experience  and  its  fore-having  (the 
subject of Rhetoric Book Two—how the matter is already before the hearer), guiding claim and 
its fore-sight (the subject of  Rhetoric  Book One—toward what decision the speaker aims that 
prescribes certain ways of dealing) and the guiding intelligibility and its fore-grasp (Rhetoric 
Book  Three—the  prevailing  ways  of  speaking  that  circumscribe  how  the  matter  is  to  be 
articulated and the thing exhibited in presence) then give rise to conceptuality. As we have seen 
previously, the Greek emphasis upon speaking drew both Plato and Aristotle to develop modes 
of expression capable of pinning down the thing by determining what speaks for it and how it is 
to be spoken for. In its rhetorical form, the thing can be otherwise—it can be false. Both Platonic 
236
dialectic and Aristotelian logic establish frameworks for proper expression of the thing in the 
form  of  concept,  capable  of  determining  truth  and  falsity  and  banishing  its  possible 
otherwiseness. The legacy of concept formation that focuses on the procedure for expression 
bring us to Kant, concerned with the modes of expression for things, but restricting those modes 
to logical procedure.
The rhetorical, then, is the mode of speaking that brings things back to their context in 
spoken, interpreted time—its past, present and future—that stands behind and authorizes acts of 
conceptualization.  Rhetoric  deals with talk about things,  not talk about talk.  The  Rhetoric is 
valuable because in it, Aristotle directly addresses the fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasp of 
speaking of things. Aristotle places awareness of concrete given basic situation, guiding claim 
and prevailing intelligibility under the remit of choice and art rather than procedure and logic—
placing the speaking of concern under the remit of care. 
Fore-having,  fore-sight,  and  fore-grasp  are,  at  the  same  time,  possibilities  of  
something  genuine.  To  explicitly  appropriate  the  fore-having,  to  cultivate the 
fore-sight, and to carry through the fore-grasp, following this that is secured. The 
conceptual  is  not  something  that  comes  forth  from out  of  being-there  and  is 
somehow discovered  in  addition  to  it,  but  rather  the  proper  possibility  of  the 
conceptual is just the conceptual as apprehended interpretation of being-there 
itself (BCArP 188, bold added, italics in original).
The  basic  hermeneutic  of  Dasein  itself,  as  Heidegger  names  the  Rhetoric,  apprehends  the 
interpretedness of the world in word, prior to additional systems of definition and verification 
and thus logos prior to logic.  As it speaks, the Being of rhetoricity both calls forth conceptuality 
in  opposition  to  the  rhetorical,  but  also makes  the  concept  possible  in  the  first  place—a 
becoming aware of the act of interpreting from the doing and speaking itself, without system but 
not without art. Speaking lays the ground for thinking. 
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The Rhetoric, which takes speaking first and foremost as a problem—as something that 
itself  can be otherwise—addresses things  in their  pre-givenness and works through that  pre-
givenness toward a choice.
Since  the  possibility  of  error  exists,  the  fall  from  the  genuine  possibility  of 
exhibiting and having-there of beings, and insofar as living is in turn determined 
by προαίρεσις [prohairesis, choice], living can positively grasp the possibility of  
determining  the  being  that  is  there  in  the  way  that  it  is.  This  διανοε σθαιῖ  
[dianoeisthai,  for  Heidegger,  being-oriented.  More  commonly,  a  process  of 
thinking] as λέγειν τι κατά τινος [legein ti kata tinos, speaking of things or saying 
something  about  something53]  can  be  fulfilled  so  that  it  becomes  a  λέγειν 
καθ α τό  ᾽ ὑ [legein  kath’auto,  speaking  of  Being]  in  adapting  to  that  which  is  
genuinely  present,  to that which is posited in the right regard,  and so that the 
λόγος that is unconcealedly yields beings in their being, the concept springs from 
it (BCArP 190, bracketed material added).
If Heidegger wants to make the concept a problem, to show what stands behind the concept and 
allows it—and Being itself—to be, he does so by implicitly following the structure of rhetoricity 
in  order  to  then define  philosophy in opposition.  Heidegger  does  not  reject  the  concept,  he 
radicalizes the concept—this is as true in 1924 as in 1954. He cannot do so, however, without the 
apprehended interpretedness and temporal structure of spoken presence revealed in the Rhetoric.
And so, Being and Time is born. The structure of indigenous conceptuality becomes the 
speaking of care—our orientation and motivation toward the world. We are disposed to deal and 
care for the concrete given basic experience; we understandingly project in accordance with a 
guiding  claim;  we  are  entangled  in  the  prevailing  intelligibility  of  others.  If  indigenous 
conceptuality builds from the ground up,  Destruktion runs the philosophical  concept  back to 
ground. Note that such a maneuver, reversing the direction of conceptuality, implicitly treats the 
philosophical concept as a rhetorical thing, made in speaking in the face of possibilities laid out 
in accordance with a particular time and situation.  In doing so, the concept is stripped of its  
53 As Catalin Partenie (45) renders the phrase.
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unequivocal capacity to define what is, and is instead taken as what speaks for matters in and for 
the moment. 
What persists, in Aristotle’s, Descartes’ or Kant’s logics, are the traces of disposition, 
comportment  and  shared  speaking.  Thrown  into  reverse,  rhetoric  becomes  hermeneutics  (a 
movement even Schleiermacher  recognized),  from interpretation to interpreting to interpreted 
along the path of language.  Destruktion  gives the concept back to the thing in time, as it  is 
initially, generally and for the most part, and thus, Heidegger concludes, the Rhetoric acts as the 
fundamental hermeneutic of Dasein itself. I will now use the  Rhetoric’s hermeneutic to bring 
Heidegger’s attempt to escape logic back to its own roots in  logos, to take a speaking toward 
death back to a speaking from life.
In the Dialogue, Heidegger and his Japanese friend enact the difficulty of speaking. The 
Dialogue does not present a coherent theory of the nature of language so much as a meditation 
on what stands behind and enables our capacity to theorize or poetize at all. Think, then, of the  
critical reading to follow as a performance of reading out from rhetorical ground that attends to 
the projective comportment toward the thing that guides speaking, the disposition which first 
opens ourselves to the thing and moves us to speak, and the capacity of speaking to bring things 
to presence. What follows is a rhetorical encounter with the poetic word.
6.3 SPEAKING TOWARD DEATH
To read the Dialogue, I will follow the structure of rhetorical temporality worked out in chapters 
three,  four and five. First, what is the thing and its matter, and toward what does the speaking 
aim? The first question concerns comportment toward the matter and the hearer (for Heidegger, 
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the guiding claim), so that one may properly take up the matter and move the hearer in service of 
the aim. Second, how has the thing come to be taken in disposition? The second question deals 
with  what  precedes  the  decision  (the  concrete  given  basic  situation)  and  moves  us  to  be 
concerned about the thing at  all.  Third,  how is the thing brought to expression,  from out of 
expectation and toward the aim? The final question then explores how the act of speaking makes 
the matter present and manifest before the hearer (the prevailing intelligibility) as that which can 
be otherwise in shared time.
As the interpretation will not strictly follow the narrative flow of the Dialogue (though 
the arrangement and narrative will be addressed in terms of the third question, making things 
manifest in speaking), I will begin with a brief summary of the Dialogue. A Japanese scholar has 
come to visit Heidegger, and the two engage in a conversation about the nature of language, 
seeking to find a way to address the fundamental unspoken—and indeed, unspeakable—ground 
that both East and West share. For Heidegger, the Japanese language presents a challenge to the 
prevailing modern European ratiocentric mode of thinking because it does not so readily define 
that of which it speaks. Heidegger argues that any way of thinking about language that takes 
language as the object  (a speaking  about  language)  rather  than as that  which gives  rise—or 
indeed, refuses to give rise—to objectness (a speaking from language) misapprehends the nature 
of language. His argument to is not to reject objectness or indeed the very metaphysical system 
on which objectness relies, but to see it properly as one possibility among others, only one piece 
of a fuller picture. To relate the movement to Heidegger’s challenge to philosophers over the 
nature of language in  Being and Time, Heidegger contended that philosophers must approach 
language as broader than structures of grammar or procedures of logic—philosophy,  in other 
words, must be able to grasp language as it exists initially, generally and for the most part in 
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everydayness.  In the Dialogue,  the nature of language must be able to house many different 
everydays and many different houses of Being.
Why a dialogue? Looking to Plato for guidance, Drew Hyland argues that the dialogic 
form of philosophy allows for two possibilities of communication foreclosed by the traditional 
treatise.   First,  aporetic  dialogues,  which  leave  central  problematics  unresolved,  keep  the 
reader/hearer from forgetting to philosophize (Hyland 39-40). By creating an interaction between 
multiple  contradictory  views in  which no satisfactory  conclusion is  reached,  dialogue  draws 
readers  to  make  decisions  for  themselves.  Second,  dialogues  make  interpreting  the  text  as 
doctrine  more  difficult  (Hyland  40-41).  Both  aspects  of  aporetic  dialogues,  that  they  are 
unresolved and present no clear doctrine,  put the reader in the position of having to make a 
choice over the matter arising, as a matter, from a concrete and particular interaction, rather than 
rely on the writer  to claim what is.  As a result,  Hyland argues, the Platonic dialogue shows 
something beyond telling by eschewing doctrine and reminding the reader to philosophize.
The “Dialogue on Language,” I argue, aims toward the choice of refusal, absence and 
nothingness—to  choose  to  allow  the  thing  to  manifest  itself  in  a  clearing  from  out  of 
everydayness where no birds chirp and no wind blows. Such a choice cannot be asserted. The 
choice must arise from within the Dialogue, according to a particular temporality that unfolds 
throughout  the  conversation.  The  Dialogue  reveals  the  literally  “unspoken”  possibility  of 
refusing to decide and instead remaining silent. The Dialogue in this way is concerned not just of 
saying and what can be said, but with what is worthy of being said—of the things of which we 
speak. The past-oriented horizon stretches far back, while the future-oriented horizon remains 
close up, as Heidegger reflects upon his career in a way that unfolds slowly and cautiously. This 
temporal  relation  toward  what  stands  beyond  the  word  is  brought  forth  in  two  ways  in 
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expression: first in a heightened temporal focus on the moment, and the how of its dealing, in 
fear, and second in a long view of habituated choosing developed over a lifetime. Brought to 
word, the temporality is manifest in the recursive path of the Dialogue, which halts where the 
prevailing word fails the Being of language. The failing word is reapproached, opened up to 
otherwiseness and returned to the path of thinking. The result is a manifestation of language that 
speaks  with a  long (but  highly selective)  history,  revealed  in  fleeting  moments  as  a  hint  or 
gesture toward that which can never be fully spoken. In the point of refusal, Heidegger moves 
rhetorically to a moment where he may then renounce rhetoricity.
6.3.1 Toward the nature of language, away from what we say already
The  Dialogue,  as  a  whole,  is  concerned  with  building  a  particular  comportment  toward  the 
process of thinking and speaking that shows language at work instead of taking it as an object. 
The Dialogue leaves the definition unfinished and aporetic: language lets things appear, and in 
that appearance,  it shows itself:  a “speaking  from  language […] would be called  from out of 
language’s  reality,  and be  led  to its  reality”  (Dialogue  51).   As  argued  in  chapter  three,  a 
scientific comportment, by contrast, would seek to pin the thing down—the “it” of observation 
and definition, the predefined “reality” of the thing has been given in advance and is closed to 
otherwiseness. A traditional philosophical comportment, on the other hand, would foreclose what 
constitutes being—the “is” that constitutes the thing’s “reality” in philosophical definition. The 
former forecloses the “precept,” the latter the “recept.” In either case, the concept “language” in 
its predetermination would overwhelm the happening of language in speaking. By refusing to 
present the nature of language as concept, the Dialogue demands that the reader attend to how 
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the Dialogue speaks and not forget to philosophize. Precisely by refusing to name the “what” of 
the Dialogue, Heidegger keeps focus upon the “how.”
As  observed  in  chapter  three,  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric begins  with  the  question  of 
comportment that aims toward the end: how to come to a decision about this thing here now that 
can be otherwise in shared time. Because one cannot make any solid claim to the is-ness of the  
thing since one is confronted with different possibilities, one works backwards from the possible 
end to how it comes to appear this way. What is of concern in the Dialogue is the possibility for 
the nature of language to be at all in speaking, and how it can become this way. As Heidegger 
will say of the relation between language and Being at the end of the Dialogue, the message-
bearer comes from and has gone toward the message. The prologue to speaking in this way must 
await the nature of language in such a way that speaking can reveal this nature—we begin with 
the end, the thing seen in the moment of decision.
The matter must be brought forth in such a way that the thing appears capable of being 
otherwise and open to change in shared time.  The aim for speaking then is to move toward 
choice over the possibilities of the thing. The matter first arises in the light of a choice yet to 
come, from out of its origin in a need for speaking. What is this need, and who is to choose? The  
shared time of the Dialogue is two-fold, appropriately: the afternoon shared between the Inquirer 
and Japanese friend takes place in a larger moment of time in which the discussion partners  
struggle. The modern era, a vast expanse taking up everyone who speaks within it, demanding 
ceaseless possession and extraction, becomes the primary temporality in which speaking emerges 
and toward which  speaking bends.  We rush toward a  problem in the now, and give rushed 
solutions. The world is called for by, addressed according to, and validated by rushing in the 
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name of progress, all of which cuts off the temporal horizons of possibility of things and blinds  
us to otherwiseness.
Against  prevailing  temporal  speaking  of  things,  the  Dialogue  builds  its  oppositional 
stance. The discussion partners emerge in the speaking as thinkers, speaking in opposition to the 
larger public in which they themselves are implicated, and from which their own words have 
been born. In other words, the shared time of the Dialogue, in which the being of language first  
becomes  a  concern,  acts  as  counterpoint  to  the broader  shared time of the modern  era.  The 
conditions of the Dialogue are such that the participants have greater freedom to cut away the 
pressures of everyday life in order for the matter to slowly unfold and allow the thing to appear 
in the context of a particular conversation. Here we have a generality (the possible otherwiseness 
of the speaking of Being and the march of the modern era) encased in a particularity (Kuki’s 
struggle, Heidegger’s early lectures, the film  Rashomon) that maintains a disposed, composed 
concrete  facticity.  The juxtaposition between relentlessly progressing Eurocentric  temporality 
and the slower, back and forth temporality of the conversation opens space for language to be 
taken as otherwise. The rhetoricity of the Dialogue is the ground that both precedes and gives 
birth to its opposition.
The Dialogue both takes up and builds a comportment toward the Being of language—
takes  up  as  the  conversation  partners  deal  with  the  failure  of  their  speaking,  and  builds  in 
interaction by drawing together and falling apart. The speaking of the Dialogue is not cut off 
from its larger historical context. If it were so easy to compartmentalize authentic speaking from 
that of the everyday, the conversation would not be so difficult. Moving toward the aim demands 
a high level of circumspection, “weighing each word.” The comportment of speaking, and that 
toward which the speaking comports itself, guides the interpretation of that speaking.
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In  the  Dialogue,  Heidegger  quotes  from the  beginning  of  Friedrich  Schleiermacher’s 
Hermeneutics and Criticism to explain his own early hermeneutic research:
Hermeneutics  and criticism,  both  philological  disciplines,  both  methodologies, 
belong together, because the practice of each presupposes the other. The first is in 
general the art of understanding rightly another man’s language, particularly his 
written language; the second, the art of judging rightly the genuineness of written 
works and passages, and to establish it on the strength of adequate evidence and 
data (Dialogue 9-10).54
Recall that Heidegger applauded Kant in 1924 for recognizing that definition is a methodological 
question of interpretation, not a pronouncement of essence, but lamented Kant’s assignment of 
the method to logic. The being should lead the speaking rather than the other way around, which 
is  why the  Rhetoric  begins by establishing the matters  over  which rhetoric  presides and the 
things of which rhetoric speaks and the works outward. Schleiermacher himself maintains the 
connection between interpretation and speaking: “The belonging-together of hermeneutics and 
rhetoric  consists in the fact  that every act of understanding is  the inversion of a speech-act, 
during which the thought which was the basis of the speech must become conscious” (7). The act 
of interpretation follows what was said back to the initial horizons of speaking. As an inversion 
of the speech-act, hermeneutics follow the speaking back to the being, as the rhetorical builds the 
being out  of  the speaking.  Hermeneutics  and rhetoric  share a  single  movement  running two 
ways, with world and word standing as end-stations.
In  his  turn  to  Being and Time,  Heidegger  takes  the  basic  form of  hermeneutics  and 
follows the structure back to the Being: moving from the structure of time to that of care, and 
from speaking to Being. As Heidegger says in the Dialogue, “[i]n Being and Time, hermeneutics 
means neither the theory of the art of interpretation nor interpretation itself, but rather the attempt 
54 The wording above is from Peter D. Hertz’s translation of the Dialogue. It differs slightly from the version of the 
passage in Andrew Bowie’s translation of Hermeneutics and Criticism particularly over whether to render 
Kunstlehren as a “theory” or “methodology.” While “methodology” has heavy technical academic overtones, I think 
it more closely fits Kunstlehren as not just a theory, but a theory of art, taken broadly as a systematic guide for doing 
or making.
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first of all to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds” (11). From the speaking 
that  initially  and  generally  attempts  to  speak  to  the  changing  world  already  present  to 
interpretation in fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasp, Heidegger then theorizes the being that 
interprets in mood, comportment and understanding. Rhetoric takes the world as already a matter 
of interpretation, and then works through the process of interpreting with an aim toward decision.
A problem remains.  How does  interpretation  not  rig  the  game,  finding  only  what  it 
already knows? In other words, if  interpreting searches for the familiar  amidst unfamiliarity, 
would we not simply replicate what we have seen and done before rather than speak to the thing 
here and now? 
I:  I  shall  be  glad  to  do  as  you  ask  [to  offer  an  “authentic”  explanation  of 
Heidegger’s use of “hermeneutic”]. Only do not expect too much. For the matter 
is enigmatic, and perhaps we are not dealing with a matter at all.
J: Perhaps rather with a process.
I: Or with what-is-the-case. But such terms will quickly land us in inadequacies.
J: But only if we already somehow have in view what our saying would want to 
reach (Dialogue 11-12, bracketed material added).
The interrupted nature of the Dialogue slows interpretation in that it makes what speaks for the 
matter a problem. Beyond the obvious difficulty of attempting to understand the Japanese word 
for language without importing European conceptual baggage, circulated texts, half-remembered 
conversations, misreadings, hasty conclusions constantly call into question and bring to a halt the 
quick hermeneutic jump from unfamiliar to familiar.
In interpretation, we see language at work and in movement. Heidegger ties hermeneutics 
back to the Greek god Hermes, bringing “the message of destiny” (Dialogue 28) from the gods. 
Hermes does not speak directly. There is no conceptual system that bridges the abyss between 
the human and divine, only hints and gestures. The hermeneutic aim, then, is to make out what is  
being gestured toward from the gesture itself. The audience of the Noh play sees the mountain in 
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the actor’s upraised hand when looking toward its peak, as Plato saw time in the heavens and 
Husserl time in the moving hand’s comet-tail.
To speak to the otherwise, the rhetorical remains in the world of the hint or gesture. We 
believe, but do not know. The example hints—it bears the past we have already had forward as a 
possible guideline for understanding the present, as an incomplete suggestion. The enthymeme 
gestures  out  toward  the  future,  leaving the  hearer  to  see  that  toward which  the  enthymeme 
gestures. There is, in its “nearest nearness” which has in it both hint and gesture, an uncanny 
unfamiliarity “which we therefore quickly dismiss again from view, to stay instead with what is 
familiar and profitable” (Heidegger, Dialogue 12). Both require the beholder to see a mountain in 
an outstretched hand, to use an example from Heidegger’s discussion of Japanese Noh plays. The 
difference, then, is in the ultimate aim. The aim for Heidegger is to let that being be, and to see 
its essence in the moment. The rhetorical aim is to grasp at the thing for the sake of dealing with 
a larger pressing, shared matter of concern and return to the familiar.
All decisions are ultimately decisions made in the name of good—good for something 
that is itself  not yet,  justice as the restoration of good from what has been, and the good as 
worthy of being spoken here and now. The Dialogue, which addresses the present with an eye  
toward past and future, aims for what is nearest and most worthy of being spoken of: language 
itself. What is most worthy of being spoken of is that which brings us to speak at all: “in it [what  
is “originarily familiar,” and “entrusted to our nature,” “known only at the last there is veiled all 
that is worthy of thought as such and as a whole” (Dialogue 34). The very best is to acknowledge 
one’s own incapacity before Being, and accept one’s role as messenger for Being. “The will  to 
know does not will to abide in hope before what is worthy of thought” (Dialogue 13). We come 
to the thing in its moment not as judges but as messengers, grateful interpreters of hints and 
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gestures that herald the coming of Being. By awaiting such a coming, one bids farewell to the 
judge’s claim: “it is...” (Dialogue 54). Before the thing, the word breaks off.
The  rhetorical  comportment  of  the  Dialogue  consistently  recognizes  and  engages  in 
incompletion. The discussion partners, speaking in opposition to the prevailing talk of the time 
notice when their words are failing and respond by leaving the question open.  
I: The transformation occurs a passage…
J:…in which one site is left behind in favor of another
I:…and that requires that the sites be placed in discussion.
J: One site is metaphysics.
I: and the other? We leave it without a name (Dialogue 42).
A speaking of language that faces its own incompletion must enact that incompletion and yield 
to mystery to show the thing appropriately. To see the incompletion of language, we must take 
up a disposition that makes such incompletion matter.
6.3.2 Being-moved to speak from language, recoiling from shared time
In comportment,  Heidegger  has called into question the capacity  of inherited speaking (in a 
range  from the  specific  text  or  quotation  to  the  larger  tendency for  conceptual  speaking to 
smuggle in a host of presumed relations) to express the nature of language. In disposition, the 
Dialogue is moved by both fear and a hope toward that which came before. Fearing the pitfalls of 
conceptuality, reason or metaphysics does not imply total rejection. The waylaid paths of thought 
can be returned to, and old texts reapproached in new lights. Next, I will show how the Dialogue 
brings forth that which has come before in mood, habituated choosing and ways of speaking.
The challenge for the Dialogue is to present that which is very close and easily missed as 
heightened—pressing  in  time—and  magnified—prominent  in  the  context  of  the  matter.  By 
heightening the matter in time, that the capacity to speak the very nature of language itself is  
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something that can be lost to time in the name of progress, the Dialogue builds its impulsion 
forward. There is a sliver of hope that the conversation might escape from European rationality,  
but escape is only possible with the greatest  of care,  for the greatest  danger lies in our own 
speaking. In order to escape, we must focus the present field of view upon that which is best and 
most worthy of speaking, and ignore that which is unworthy of our precious time. Where the 
greatest danger is, the saving power also grows.55
The heightening of the problem of language lays itself out in the interplay of fear and 
hope. Fear and hope stand in relation to one another as markers of the extent to which we are 
capable of pressing out upon the world, and the extent to which the world can press back. As 
discussed in chapter  four, fear gauges vulnerability to the world and others who share in that 
world, wherein the future—even our own possibility to be—comes into question. Yet, because 
continued being is still a possibility, indeed an imperative, fear is attended by hope that one still 
possesses  some  sort  of  agency  to  persist  in  being.  In  the  heightened  moment,  one  fears 
destruction and hopes for salvation.
The Dialogue begins with a note of fear, of dying too soon before one’s time. Kuki has 
been arrested in the midst of his struggle to reconcile  East and West, leaving the matter for 
Heidegger and his Japanese friend. Heidegger’s own fear is that his time has not yet come—or 
that he will mistakenly,  again, think that his moment for speaking the being of language has 
arrived, only to be proven wrong again. We await time, and yet time does not wait for us. 
55 As Iain Thomson argues, 
“[t] the point of Hölderlin’s salvific insight, as Heidegger understands it, is not that it is always 
darkest before the dawn, but instead that the new day is discovered in another way of experience 
the greatest darkness. Midnight, seen otherwise, is dawn. That sounds paradoxical, but Heidegger 
believes that we discover what saves us precisely by deeply experiencing what most endangers us” 
(207).
If the greatest danger is Dasein’s ability to assimilate into the world and thus lose itself as the Anyone in rhetorical 
speaking that addresses the shared time and trade of everydayness, it is also the ground from which our alternative 
possibilities grow.
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Sharing time with Being requires reconciling its time with our time.  The macro-time of 
the modern era and its capacity to distort our relationship to language, resides in both the large-
scale  process  of  industrialization,  and in  the  micro-time of  over-eager  students  and thinkers 
seeking to possess the thoughts of others. 
J: In the face of modern technicalization and industrialization of every continent, 
there would seem to be no escape any longer.
I: You speak cautiously, you say “…would seem…” 
J: Indeed. For the possibility still always remains that, seen from the point of view 
of  our  Eastasian  existence,  the  technical  world  which  sweeps  us  along  must 
confine itself to surface matters, and…that…
I:…that for this reason a true encounter with European existence is still not taking 
place, in spite of all assimilations and intermixtures. (Dialogue 3)
The danger of the Dialogue twins the fears of ceasing to be in death and ceasing to be in life, 
through error, assimilation and intermixture. The danger speaks to the dark side of the two-fold 
of Being and beings—the prospect of Dasein’s own death and Dasein’s death in its being-with-
others. 
Hope, for Aristotle, is not a disposition, but a relation toward futural things that are not 
yet. Hope stands opposed to memory—both deal with the positive pressing presence of absence 
in different directions. As Aristotle observes, hope is concerned with the future as memory is 
with the past. In memory, something was and no longer is. In hope something may be and is not  
yet. For both, the question is not how someone stands disposed toward the present thing, but how 
the  absent  thing  is  given  a  kind  of  presence.  Memory  and  hope  mark  the  span  of  human 
temporality: things stand before the old in memory, before the young in hope.
Together,  in fear the moment is heightened,  and in hope it  is awaited.  The hope that 
language unites  Being across houses presses the  conversation partners  forward.  The hopeful 
await  preservation and salvation from danger. Initially,  conversation proceeds with difficulty. 
Kuki died, his project failed, Heidegger failed to understand Kuki, Kuki’s fellow students failed 
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to understand Heidegger. There has been no genuine encounter between East and West. As the 
conversation continues it eases, speeds up and begins sharing from one to the other. 
I: I’m surprised that you see so clearly.
J: When I can follow you in the dialogue, I succeed. Left alone, I am helpless; for 
even the manner in which you employ the words “relation” and “use”…
I:…or better, the manner in which I use them…
J:…is strange enough.
I: I don’t deny it. But it seems to me that, in the field in which we are moving, we 
reach those things with which we are originarily familiar precisely if we do not 
shun passing through things strange to us (Dialogue 33).
Through the process of speaking, the moment of understanding comes into view—yet only in 
view. It is still  awaited, not yet.  Heidegger calls this a constant prologue, as the thinker and 
speaker prepare to encounter language without ever being able to fully speak the name of the 
essence of language. It is a thing strange to us, of which we have only hints and gestures. 
For Heidegger, fear and hope name not only the disposition of the Dialogue, but more 
broadly of speaking to one another at all. The danger that we will be lost or misunderstood in 
speaking with others, or that we only hear what we expect and think what has been thought for  
us  is  attended  by a  hope that  we might  still  understand one another  after  all.  We may not 
understand completely, and our grasp upon being may be faulty, but there is in speaking always a 
promise of something better that awaits, and a salvation from what threatens.
Toward  others,  the  Dialogue  partners  are  disposed  to  admiration  and  contempt. 
Heidegger admires his interlocutor, Japanese language and art, and above all, language itself. His 
Japanese friend returns the sentiment. Admiration approaches the one who feels it from others. 
We  judge  ourselves  against  another,  and  find  in  the  other  something  missing  in  ourselves. 
Admiration projects—it is oriented toward what we are not yet, creating pain, but it also drives 
forward to surpass ourselves. The Dialogue’s speaking struggles to be worthy of language and 
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thinking. Admiration selects from the shared region of living, constricting but heightening the 
shared region to what matters most, which is very close yet still absent from grasp. 
Admiration  gathers  together  and  honors  while  contempt  exiles  and  derides.  The 
contemptible are unworthy of admiration, and should be forgotten and left behind rather than 
carried on in time. The modern era has bad taste, and pursues its ugly desires without grace. 
Public concerns are superficial  and should be disregarded. The definitional and hierarchizing 
capacities  of European conceptuality have within them an unspoken tendency to admire and 
contempt; European thinking enshrines reason as divine, in whose light all speaking and thinking 
that would do otherwise becomes irrational. “The idolization of that divinity [Reason] is in fact 
carried so far that any thinking which rejects the claim of reason as not originary, simply has to 
be maligned today as unreason” (Dialogue 15). The danger again arises that failing to properly 
value, “we let ourselves be led astray by the wealth of concepts which the spirit of the European 
languages has in store and will look down upon what claims our existence, as on something that 
is  vague and amorphous”  (Dialogue 2).  Allowing the  conceptual  to  define  what  is  real  and 
present only serves to alienate Being from its engagement with its world, making the realest real 
into vagueness.
Both admiration and contempt magnify the shared region of concern, while fear and hope 
heighten the temporality of concern. From the wide field of the present, admiration selects what 
matters here and now, as desired and worthy of our time and struggle in terms of magnitude. 
What  matters  is  the saying of  language.  Contempt  cuts  away  what  does  not  matter,  further 
narrowing the view. What does not matter is public speaking. 
Fear and hope sharpen the necessity of choosing well within the shared world, where my 
time and death are still  my own. Any speaking that  hopes to escape the limits  of European 
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rationality  must  be  undertaken  with  the  greatest  care  to  “weigh  each  word”  and  “examine 
whether  each  word  in  each  case  is  given  its—most  often  hidden—weight”  (Dialogue  30). 
Together, fear, hope, admiration and contempt construct a temporal and regional closeness, in 
which  Heidegger  seeks  to  make  the  nature  of  language  manifest  in  its  prevailing  form—a 
conversation between people.
There is one final key disposition that moves the Dialogue, and that toward which it is 
directed mark an important distinction between early and late Heidegger: kindness,  charis.56 In 
the Dialogue, Heidegger translates  charis as “graciousness,” which gestures toward  iki  as “the 
breathlike advent of the stillness of delight” (Dialogue 45) and  koto  shows the delight found 
within the event. As shown in chapter  four, kindness allows one to take up the time of others 
toward whom one has no responsibility or obligation. The measure of kindness is determined by 
time rather than by the magnitude of the act itself—the small act of kindness, rendered at the 
moment of greatest need, is greater than the expansive act rendered without heightened need. 
The relationship of kindness here is between the messenger and the message, rather than between 
the messengers to one another. In our everyday life, dwelling is difficult: “[O]ur dwelling today 
is  harassed  by  work,  make  insecure  by  the  hunt  for  gain  and  success,  bewitched  by  the 
entertainment and recreation industry.” The everyday, in other words, is “harassed by a housing 
shortage” (Heidegger, “Poetically Man Dwells” 213), leaving people to scramble for cover and 
comfort.
56 Critics of Heidegger assert that his description of Shuzo Kuki’s Structure of Iki is so off-base, having nothing to 
do with the aesthetics of Japanese courtesans, that he could not have actually read the piece (see, for example, 
Mikkelsen 116). The invocation of charis suggests that Heidegger is engaged in a much more sly reinterpretation of 
iki. The Charites, or Graces, are protectors of human fertility and flourishing. Young Aglaea is shining, brilliant and 
adorned with splendor. Middle Euphrosyne is joyful and laughing. Eldest Thalia shares her rich abundance. 
Compare to Kuki’s three main dualistic constituents of the courtesan’s sense of iki—splendid, beckoning coquetry, a 
dashing, courageous and witty spirit of pride and honor, and a resignation that understands her fulfillment comes 
from herself and not from men’s desire for the moment. Together, they unite in the courtesan’s own supreme grace 
and beauty of iki.
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Heidegger argues in “Poetically Man Dwells” that  charis marks the dwelling of Dasein 
with poetic language, where the human being reconciles its scramble against the unhurried—
indeed, timeless—divine and becomes at home in “dwell[ing] humanly on this earth” (229):
 [Charis] has come to the dwelling being of man, come as the claim and appeal of 
the measure to the heart  in such a way as the heart  turns to give heed to the 
measure. As long as this arrival of kindness endures, so long does man succeed in 
measuring himself not unhappily against the godhead” (“Poetically Man Dwells” 
229).
The capacity to expand one’s region of concern to include that of others becomes the capacity to 
include in that region the speaking of language, and to speak in turn. The expanded dwelling 
place of the poetic that invites in and gives, offers room for East and West to dwell together in  
gracious thanks to language.
The Dialogue takes place in the autumn of Heidegger’s life. His horizon toward the past 
is  now longer  than his future.  The Dialogue consistently recalls,  without  bitterness,  the past 
rashness of youth present now in memory. Impelled by the question of language and so eager to 
take it on that he underestimated its size and scope,  the young Heidegger went too fast and 
looked too far into the future, missing what was in front of him. Excited by the new possibilities 
of German philosophy, Kuki and his friends snapped up phenomenological concepts and set to 
work without  asking if  those concepts  were capable  of  expressing the things  at  which they 
aimed. Even across houses of being, youth lives in hope.
We cannot reject our youth as unworthy of us. For Heidegger, only in the audacity of 
youth  could  he  have  thought  himself  up  to  the  task  of  asking  the  question  of  language  or 
speaking the name of Being. Heidegger describes his young rashness, which aimed well but 
faltered in practice: “I knew only the most immediate short-range perspectives along the path, 
because they beckoned to me unceasingly,  while the horizon shifted and darkened more than 
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once” (Dialogue 6). Now older, Heidegger sees his early work as valuable insofar as it pursued a 
noble question, with a sharper eye toward the barriers that might limit his capacity to answer. As 
Heidegger quotes Hölderlin: “For as you began, so you will remain” (Dialogue 7). 
Age teaches that things often turn out badly. Each leap forward was a misstep, leading 
Heidegger  to  return  over  and  over  to  the  beginning,  the  initial  question  of  the  connection 
between word and world, and answer anew. 
I  only  know  one  thing:  because  reflection  on  language,  and  on  Being,  has 
determined  my path  of  thinking  from early  on,  therefore  their  discussion  has 
stayed as far as possible in the background. The fundamental flaw of the book 
Being and Time is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early (Dialogue 7).
The recursions of the Dialogue replicate the easing of youthful brashness into hesitancy “when 
slowness rests on shy reverence” (Dialogue 28), one that does not come all at once but rather 
arises slowly over continual attempts to rethink. Such a cycle of renewal, however, cannot go on 
indefinitely.  We  will  cease  to  be—and  in  the  autumn  of  life,  that  ceasing  becomes  an 
increasingly real, present possibility. Kuki died too soon, still in the midst of his struggle, and the 
unspoken possibility is that Heidegger will  die as well before answering the question he has 
pursued since he was a boy. As the possibility of ceasing to be becomes more real, the older turn 
to preserving things they have against changing time, so the thing stays when the person goes. 
The realm of shared time, particularly shared time that faces the future, constricts. Though the 
broad danger of European rationality looms across the globe, it is not the globe running out of 
time so much as it is Heidegger himself.
Heidegger’s ultimate aim, however, is not to answer once and for all. In the recursions 
through  an  eager  youth  to  a  pensive  middle  age,  Heidegger  slowly  eases  his  ardor.  His 
conclusion presents a resignation before the moment—that he will never say speak the nature of 
language entirely, and that such a desire would itself be not simply impossible but wrong. The 
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nature of language cannot be spoken in “theorems and cue words,” but reveals itself in its vast 
distance.  Heidegger  will  only  have  hints  and gestures.  The  memory  of  past  failure  tempers 
youthful hope before the moment. The moment too is something that can be lost and must be 
protected,  and the act of protecting itself through careful speaking honors the valuable while 
turning away from the unceasing movement and change of shared time.
Danger  and  hope  both  lie  in  speaking  that  has  come  before.  To  a  certain  extent, 
Heidegger  concedes,  the  tendency  to  see  things  as  already  pre-defined  by  language  is  an 
inevitable outcome of the basic movement of language to be able to solidify a contemporaneous 
region and time. The problem, instead, is that the European mode of conceptual thinking defines 
the world too sharply, resigning any counterspeaking to irrationality, and in so doing, cuts off the 
capacity to see things as possibly otherwise. Such defining and splitting off is further moralized, 
moving from what is to what ought to be. To stand against such speaking is to fight against 
goddess Reason. The origins of conceptuality and conditions under which logic first becomes a 
possibility are left behind, or reappraised in terms of the present without giving heed to what 
they meant in the past. In its backwards-facing movement, Heidegger attempts to both correct 
prior misunderstandings and to return the concept to its root, for example, challenging the easy 
metaphysical  split  between  appearance  and  reality,  and  then  reinterpreting  “appearance”  as 
phainomenon  to refer  to the clearing in which appearance arises,  thinking “what  the Greeks 
thought in an even more Greek manner” (Dialogue 38). 
The speaking emergent from the comportment and disposition of European conceptual 
temporality predetermines its future possibilities, present being, and past acts. Sure of its own 
possession of the world in its desirability, virtue and practice, European conceptuality contains 
within it its own rigid definitions not simply of truth (beings defined by logical procedure), but 
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of  beauty  (the  aesthetic  valuing  of  the  marketplace)  and  goodness  (the  triumphal  march  of 
civilizing progress). Understanding reason as a being of perfect order, it is assured of its own 
capacity to order perfectly. The modern era cares only for its own time.
Heidegger wonders if the prevailing way of speaking allows language to be anything 
more than a system of orders (logic) and labels (words). As he is aimed toward what is worthy of 
speaking,  and  that  speaking  is  present,  the  Dialogue  must  wrestle  with  itself—there  is  not 
something that has been lost and awaits finding, but something here and now, present with us. It 
is the thing from which we move and think (the inductive arche which begins with the thing and 
thinks  out  of  it).   That  movement  is  a  problem of  relation  in  time,  where  we  are  already 
underway and aimed toward something. To dwell with language is to see from what it has come 
and toward what it seeks to go. When language is boiled down to theorems and cue words, it 
loses the sense of relation between messenger and message and becomes inert and lifeless, an 
object only.
To bring language into  doubt,  the  Dialogue reverses  the movement  of  enthymematic 
speaking, in order to reveal what is missing and cannot be said rather than move the listener 
along quickly. At the moment when an enthymeme normally breaks off and allows the hearer to 
complete the speaking, the Dialogue suddenly halts. The missing cannot be filled in, and the 
distance cannot be leaped over. The speaking that completes the enthymematic movement fails 
to show what we mean. Such a shift radically changes the nature of temporality. Traditionally,  
the  enthymeme  moves  the  listener  along,  and  keeps  attention  to  what  “nearly  concerns  the 
audience,”  whereas the Dialogue trips up and resists the tendency for prevailing speaking to 
draw us away from the thing. 
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Such a movement is different from an enthymeme, but not alien: it is the movement of 
counterspeaking against enthymemes. Counterspeaking in these instances focuses on a particular 
point of contention rather than the whole of speaking, constricting the focus on the word as fear,  
hope, admiration and contempt constrict the time and region of concern. Each halting brings the 
unseen  movement  of  speaking  into  view  and  makes  that  movement  conspicuous.  The 
enthymeme does not perform logical magic—it succeeds or fails based on its accordance with 
the thing here now. The recursive structure of the Dialogue reveals where the speaking has failed 
to grasp that of which it speaks and becomes hesitant. 
To what is Heidegger against? Against the easy movement of definition (the apparent 
definition) that takes the thing for the word, missing the relation between the two in time. People 
misuse the dwelling-house as “a shelter erected earlier somewhere or other, in which Being, like 
a portable object, can be stored away” (Dialogue 26) when the emphasis is instead in the doing—
the dwelling within the house, the making-possible of Being in that which houses it. Ultimately, 
Heidegger is against the belief that not simply the concept, but the very word itself is capable of 
holding all of Being. Instead, language brings us into a relation with Being that acknowledges 
the distance between the word and the world. To founder before language is to also attest to the 
vastness, the great magnitude of language, and walk “the boundary of the boundless,” seeking 
“the boundary’s mystery” (Dialogue 41). In the final section of the analysis of the Dialogue, I 
will show how that mystery arises in the course of speaking.
6.3.3 Speaking the presence of language, being silent about silence
Giving to language means attending to how that language allows the thing to rise to attention and 
become  manifest  as  it  is.  Thusfar,  I  have  drawn  this  interpretation  of  the  Dialogue  from 
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comportment and disposition: how language, as something that can be otherwise in the shared 
time of Heidegger and his Japanese friend, is to guide our encounter with language in speaking, 
and how the present arises in the context of Heidegger’s struggles (and failures) to speak the 
nature of language in the past. I will close with a consideration of how the speaking itself draws 
together the futural aim and past ground to bring language to presence. Having explained toward 
what the Dialogue moves, and how it is moved to do so, we must address the movement of 
speaking itself.
Speaking first manifests things in the sound of the voice. The Dialogue gives us no true 
sound, of course, as a written text. As a dialogue, however, the text attempts to show language in 
the movement of speaking from person to person, in both how that shared speaking builds a 
world  and  in  where  the  speaking  leaves  off.  As  the  Japanese  friend  says  of  a  genuine 
investigation into the nature and essence of language, “a speaking from language could only be a 
dialogue”  (Dialogue  51).  Only  in  a  dialogue  could  the  struggle  to  speak  together  be  made 
manifest. The voice here prompts the discussion from without, drawing the conversation partners 
along, that itself cannot be said: 
J: It is that undefined defining something…
I: …which leaves unimpaired possession of the voice of its promptings.
J: At the risk that this voice, in our case, is silence itself (Dialogue 22).
Even the text itself gestures toward voices speeding up and slowing down, as seen above, where 
the inquirer and his friend begin to finish one another’s sentences. Voices raise and quiet, and in 
so doing take up the thing as moving in time and space, quickening and slowing, reaching far 
and coming close.
Yet  how to speak is up for grabs in the Dialogue. It has no solace in style, understood 
rhetorically as ways of speaking in a region that allow the thing to meet prevailing expectations. 
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Indeed, style is itself a problem, as the participants struggle to address the deceptive clarity of 
their own speaking. The Japanese students quickly take up hermeneutics and then realize that 
they  are  not  sure  what  it  means,  as  Heidegger  himself  realizes  he  has  little  sense  of  iki. 
Heidegger must make that which conveys clarity and makes the world sensible, which interprets 
at the most fundamental level when it turns world to word, itself unclear at the very closest  
quarters. 
Rhetorically, speaking of the present aims to illuminate that present, and so any distance 
or lack of clarity makes the speaking itself conspicuous and questionable. There should be no 
great departure from what is already expected by the hearer. Making the speaking conspicuous is 
precisely Heidegger’s aim. There is something broken off here, something more admirable and 
mysterious  that  surpasses  ourselves  and that  we must  honor.  By placing  two speakers  with 
radically different styles of speaking in dialogue, the space between houses and abyss between 
res extensa and res cognitans, is present as mystery—absent to present possession, not yet and 
maybe not ever, but still presently beckoning one to engage. 
Heidegger’s  moments  of  arrest  occur  where  the  styles  of  speaking  that  allow things 
spoken of to be present clearly and directly, as though there were no space between world and 
word, come into conflict. The thing can be otherwise, and it need not be decided. The German 
tendency to define falters before the Japanese willingness to leave the thing unsaid. We may 
linger in wonder before a mystery. We can follow hints and gestures without grasping onto what 
is here and now and forcing a decision (even a decision that remains revisable).
There is a bridging between styles first in simile, which allows for both sameness and 
difference by asserting a relation between different things. The clothes of Kuki and his wife bear 
hints that “made the Eastasian world more luminously present” (Dialogue 4). Quiet moments in 
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Rashomon, where a hand rests for a long time, bring stillness into the otherwise propulsive and 
demanding filmic  frame.  The movement  of a  hand in the  Noh  play that  reveals  a mountain 
gathers  world-making  meaning  in  a  small  gesture.  The  vastness  of  difference  and  extreme, 
focused presence in stillness are likened to “the intermingling scent of cherry blossom and plum 
blossom on the same branch” (Dialogue 53). 
The beckoning similes merge in metaphor, moving from hints of what language is like to 
a  gesture  toward  what  language  is.  Thus  the  naming  of  language  is  a  metaphor—itself  the 
building of new relations in language that extend its possibilities, and does not directly define but 
has at its heart an enigma that invites the hearer to think. 
J: But who today could hear in it an echo of the nature of language which our 
word Koto ba names, flower petals that flourish out of the lightening message of 
the graciousness that brings forth? 
I: Who would find in all this a serviceable clarification of the nature of language 
(Dialogue 53-4)?
The extension does not own the thing, and in the space in between we move back and forth 
between the known and the enigmatic, between the message-bearing and message. The naming 
then is also a performance of honoring language, and it is built in such a way so that one must 
have gone through the recursions before the speaking has enough room to be both knowable and 
enigmatic. The inviting enigma draws one “into the prologue to a messenger’s course” (Dialogue 
53). The course of the Dialogue severs old connections and rebuilds new relations that allow the 
central mystery of language to be. 
Metaphor spans a distance, but its range is not infinite. The further the distance between 
things—the thinner and more fragile the relation between them—the greater the enigma of that 
relation. The Dialogue’s metaphor spans the concrete aesthetic and the essence of language itself 
that  resides  beyond  speaking.  The  relation  connects  the  speaking  of  the  Dialogue  with  the 
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speaking of language it is designed to honor. The relation also spans temporalities, as the thing 
that is language becomes otherwise in speaking, changing from the initial, general everyday to 
something fleeting and blooming and exploding from out of the surroundings.  The petals falling 
from  blossoms  present  both  a  very  human  temporality—the  temporary  and  finite—and  a 
temporality that stretches out beyond us in the branch and tree that bring the blossom forth.
The metaphor, which here blooms as the speaking of the essence of language, grows from 
the preceding conversation. The Dialogue moves away from theorems and cue words toward the 
mystery of the blossom. In the rhetorical, metaphor draws the particular to a captureable moment 
of mystery, a sort of leading enigma. Here the metaphor links itself to something not quickly 
grasped. It is not a mystery to be solved or dealt with, but to be abided with—it is to be awaited 
rather than decided.
The metaphor must be beautiful and alive, suited to the eyes and showing the world at 
work—it is present to sense and life in movement and change. The blossoms bloom and unfurl, 
then the petals wither and fall away. Their scents mix together. There is a balance then between 
the according with expectation (even in sensorial terms) and the opening of a mystery at its heart 
that compels one to wonder at the here and now.  Yet alone, without the preceding conversation, 
the metaphor would be dead. Its hinted meaning beyond the general familiarity with flowers and 
blossoms on tree branches to the heart of language would remain entirely veiled to the hearer. To 
a certain extent, this is by design. Heidegger has already lamented the abuse of his phrase “the 
dwelling-house of Being.” Now he has given a new interpretation that cannot be easily excised 
and bandied about. A poetic rendering that emerges from dialogue does ensure that one goes 
along a way with the conversation, while the speaking of everyday concern with others does not 
have the luxury of whiling away time and abiding with mysteries. 
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Metaphors are no mere formal compositional figures, but are rather ways of illuminating 
things, here and now. Metaphors must show, in relation, the matter’s mattering (giving weight to 
the weighty and making light of the trifling),  disposition toward the matter  (attachments  are 
properly thick or thin) and comportment toward the matter (judging and speaking well).  The 
hearer moved by the Dialogue,  however,  is restricted and delimited,  not open to the general 
public who shares in traffic and trade. Both Heidegger and his Japanese friend give great weight 
to language, as a philosopher for Heidegger’s part, and as a translator of poetry for the friend, 
and are in this way also disposed to care about proper comportment toward the matter. 
The dialogic format allows the interlocutors to focus on one another, contrasted together 
against  the  Anyone,  giving  little  weight  to  public  concern  and  much  to  the  unfolding 
conversation in the present. I do not mean that the Dialogue ignores public concern, but that it is 
weighed, found wanting and then is stripped of its possession of speaking. The temporality of 
everydayness,  while  inescapable,  is  incapable  of  accessing  and  manifesting  the  essence  of 
language  due  to  its  quick  leaping  from pre-judged appearance  to  pre-given  expression.  The 
capacity of language to turn the thing into an object with each assertion of “it is” is less the fault 
of a specifically European rationality and more a property of language writ large.  Within the 
circumscribed shared time of the conversation,  Heidegger and his friend oppose speaking of 
things in their temporal everydayness in favor of awaiting the time for speaking. When faced 
with the pressing necessities of everyday life—the friend is due to catch a train to Florence—the 
trip is simply rescheduled. The interlocutors submit themselves to the time of the Dialogue. 
The rhythm of the Dialogue, first staccato with misunderstanding, then flowing between 
participants, reveals the speakers coming into accord. Coming into an accord is a process that 
unfolds  over  time.  Refusals become answers,  and the process  of  refusal  makes  manifest  the 
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incompletion of speaking in a movement between synthesis (gathering together) and division 
(the message bearer and the message). 
I:  Then,  man,  as  the  message-bearer  of  the  message  of  the  two-fold’s 
unconcealment, would also be he who walks the boundary of the boundless.
J: And on this path he seeks the boundary’s mystery…
I: …which cannot be hidden in anything other than the voice that determines and 
tunes his nature (Dialogue 40).
The two dialogue partners are able to speak to one another, and also remain silent as they listen 
to the voice of the message that “tunes his nature.” The hint and gesture play out the movement 
of accord and refusal. Each hint or gesture allow for a limited attachment to and illumination of 
the thing, but only to an extent. Both hints and gestures are significant in their incompletion and 
demand further thought. However, in its increasing accord, the Dialogue’s speaking loses a sense 
of life. In the time of life, there is a struggle to share time and place that drives us to make a 
choice.  In the awaiting,  abiding  time of  poetic  speaking of  things  may reveal  the  mysteries 
within  speaking,  but  it  does  not  address  the  mysteries  of  living.  The  conversation  partners 
struggling with such world-historical problems like the universal essence of language need not 
worry themselves about petty problems like the next scheduled train to Florence. The departure 
is  introduced  only  to  be  immediately  waved  away  as  a  false  problem.  How  easily  are  the 
difficulties of everyday life ignored, and movements of life stilled!57
Let us look at the arrangement of the Dialogue. The exordium sounds a keynote. From 
the opening, the time and region have been limited, heightened and magnified. The exordium 
introduces  a  direction  toward  the  end,  both  in  terms  of  the  struggle  with  language  and the 
particular attempt to understand iki. Heidegger’s admission that “[i]n my dialogues with Kuki, I 
57 Heidegger’s simple rescheduling of the train trip is arguably less interventionist in its pushing away of pressing 
concern than in a previous attempt at dialogue-writing. In Heidegger’s 1944 “ γχιβασίν: A Triadic Conversation onἈ  
a Country Path between a Scientist, a Scholar and a Guide,” the conversation participants wish to end the walk, as 
night is falling and the trail is becoming hard to follow. Miraculously, their way is literally illuminated by the 
strength of the speaking (CPC 46-7). 
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never had more than a distant inkling of what the word [iki]” (Dialogue 2) broaches the larger 
question: can a genuine encounter between European and Eastasian existence take place at all? 
The exordium makes the matter close, important, astonishing, agreeable, close to home—these 
are what matter in presence. It projects in importance, that the modern era has alienated Dasein 
from its house of Being and makes dialogue between houses impossible.  The exordium also 
reflects on something that is before and acts upon us—in the present, we are imprisoned by our 
own speaking and swept away by technicalization and industrialization.
Narratively, the Dialogue follows a recursive path, as I have argued, which begins with 
concern toward a problem, initiates an investigation of the possibilities therein, and then halts its 
progress in the face of misunderstanding. The two basic recursions of the Dialogue deal with 
language in  its  temporal  being:  that  which lies  before the thing and guides  interpretation  in 
advance in expression, and that which projects from interpretation and determines what one sees 
in  appearance  for  the sake of something.58 Interpreting  Japanese art  with European aesthetic 
concepts presumes that the object of aesthetic analysis can be split, for example, into sensuous 
content and suprasensuous form, and determines the thing’s reality out of an accordance between 
that content and form. In the first half, the Dialogue shows where our prevailing speaking fails to 
interpret  and behold Being in  expression,  and in the second, the Dialogue reapproaches  and 
refigures interpretation and appearance in such a way that a genuine encounter between houses 
of Being can take place. In the first, what has been said is an impediment to thought, in the 
second, a resource for thinking.
58 That the two major concerns for the Dialogue would be the interpretation of expression and appearance helps to 
explain one of the more baffling aspects of the Dialogue—that Heidegger would repeatedly misidentify one of his 
own lectures. Heidegger twice titles the seminar “Appearance and Expression,” and says it is from 1920, when the 
lecture is instead Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, and is from 1921. Heidegger is not identifying a 
particular course that happened at a particular time, but rather is marking a consistent concern—a way of thinking—
evident even in his earliest works.
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The  first  half  of  the  Dialogue  deals  with  the  tensions  between  interpretation  and 
appearance, and halts whenever the conversation begins to project into appearance that which it 
already presumes to know in interpretation. The conversation slowly strips away and undermines 
the prevailing European hermeneutic and aesthetic conceptual vocabulary. The hermeneutic is no 
longer  seen as a procedure for interpretation,  but  a gathering of a bearing toward the thing, 
shifting the emphasis from what the interpreted thing is toward how the interpreter is called to 
stand in  relation  with  the interpreted.  The interpreter  becomes  a  message-bearer  drawn to  a 
message revealed in hints. In turn, the aesthetic is no longer a question of what appears, but how 
the appearance bears itself toward the beholder revealed in gesture. Rather than rush forward the 
discussion partners hesitate, hint, gesture and question. 
At the midpoint of the Dialogue, Heidegger asks his friend what the Japanese word for 
language is—but it is too soon to give an answer. Heidegger leaves the question to ripen, and 
returns  to  the topic  of  hermeneutics.  In  returning,  first  to  hermeneutics,  then  to  appearance, 
Heidegger re-roots both terms in the Greek, then proceeds to radicalize each meaning—to think 
more Greek than Greeks.  Hermeneuein brings a message of tidings from the gods. The task of 
hermeneutics,  now, is  to  see that  message  of  Being in  the  beings  bearing  the  message.  We 
should, in other words, see hints of Dasein itself “in the presence of present beings” (Dialogue 
30). Phainomenon means not just appearance itself, but the clearing that gives rise to appearance 
and beckons Dasein to behold it. Rather than  familiarize, interpretation now hints toward the 
uncanny and mysterious, and rather than realize, appearance beckons and gestures from across a 
vast distance.
The disjoint in the presence of language, then, is between the capacity of hermeneutics to 
bear  the  message  and  the  capacity  of  appearance  to  show the  message.  The  danger  of  the 
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hermeneutic is one of assimilating unique Being into an alien vocabulary, and the danger of the 
aesthetic  is  one  of  assuming  that  presence  is  always  bifurcated  between  sensuous  and 
suprasensuous, reality and appearance. The tension, then, is between an interpretive process that 
acknowledges its incompletion and a presumption then that there is a realm of super-Being that 
the interpretation of appearance cannot reach. Used without care—when one goes too fast—
hermeneutics  presents  the  thing  in  the  shape  of  the  already-known  familiar,  and  aesthetics 
presents the thing as what it is in projection according to the rigid guide of transcendent principle 
or form that determine its reality. 
Heidegger’s metaphoric radicalizing of the concepts hermeneuin and phainomenon is not 
the same as a rejection of conceptuality. Recall that in BCArP, Heidegger argued that genuine 
originary conceptuality comes from a careful attendance toward comportment, disposition and 
speaking.  In  Heidegger’s  radicalized  telling,  a  speaking  from language  does  the  same—one 
attends to gathering a bearing toward the message (interpretive comportment), in being drawn to 
a beckoning radiance (aesthetic disposition), brought together in bearing the message of Being to 
and with beings (speaking from language).
I have spoken, you have heard, here is what is, now decide. Epilogue prepares for the 
final  saying,  in  disposition,  comportment  and  amplified  or  minimized  presence.  Epilogue 
temporalizes the final saying, establishing the now in alreadyness, aim and presence. The hearer 
must be brought to stand before the choice, and in that moment the whole temporal movement of 
the speaking, the thing in its temporalized matter, is brought into presence. Already engaged with 
the thing, the hearer is drawn toward and away through the course of speaking, finally faced in  
presence with a decision over what is here and now.
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The thing has “opened itself to the messenger’s course and shone upon it” (Dialogue 54), 
that is,  the dialogue has shown our comportment—our course—toward language through the 
speaking of language. The hearer standing before the speaking has learned to hear the “echo of 
the nature of language which our word  koto ba names” and is “drawn into the prologue to a 
messenger’s course” (Dialogue 54). Drawn to the course opened by the thing, the speaking now 
stands before what is: “the coming of what has been.” In the rhetorical decision, the movement 
of rhetoricity wherein the thing could be otherwise terminates in decision that lays claim to what 
is. In the Dialogue, however, the choice is one of letting go of “it is.” By taking “some steps 
along a course” (acting projectively toward the future),  having already been “drawn into the 
prologue  to  a  messenger’s  course”  (being-moved  retrospectively),  the  dialogue  partners  are 
within language in such a way that it is impossible to make a claim toward isness outside of 
language.  The being of language gathers  together  in speaking what  “endures as what  grants 
endurance”—our claims toward language are made possible by language.
Is there, however, not still a choice being made? Rather than understand the Dialogue as 
that which leads us to a choice over the being of language—to be able to say “language is”—the 
choice is instead to understand the relation between message and messenger. What endures is not 
the end-point,  the  it  is,  but is  instead the beginning-point  for following back to  what  grants 
endurance.  We  say  farewell  to  “it  is,”  and  pass  beyond.  Kuki,  his  friends  and  the  young 
Heidegger all rushed to claims of “it is,” either the is-ness of Japanese art or Dasein’s language. 
The choice is one of waiting and stilling anything that might press upon one to make a claim to 
being—the choice of refusal to speak.
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6.3.4 The break away from rhetoricity
Where has the rhetorical broken off in Heidegger’s “Dialogue on Language?” I want to look 
more closely at Heidegger’s metaphoric approach to language with an eye toward the metaphor’s 
specific sense of temporality. First, recall the metaphor for language. Language is moved by iki,  
“the pure delight of the beckoning stillness” (Dialogue 44) and “that which in the event, itself, 
that which uniquely in each moment comes to radiance in the fullness of its grace” (Dialogue 
45).  Within  the event  moves  “appropriating  occurrence  of  the  lightening  message  of  grace” 
(Dialogue  45).  From  its  radiant  occurrence,  the  message  brings  forth.  The  message  and 
messenger  come  together  in  “the  happening  holding  sway”  (Dialogue  47).  The  happening 
shelters  “all  that  flourishes  and  flowers”  (Dialogue  47).  And  from the  happening  stem the 
“flower petals that flourish out of the lightening message of the graciousness that brings forth” 
(Dialogue 53).
Begin with the flower petal. Tomio Tezuka explains that kotoba connects the happening 
of a matter. Koto is a matter that happens, with the multiplicity and denseness of leaves on a tree 
(Tezuka 60).59 The flowers are in the midst of becoming, flourishing and growing forth, but in 
their blossoming already begin the path to fallenness and decay. The blooms leap out from the 
surrounding, drawing in attention and causing one to stop and behold them, arrested by their 
appearance. The  beholder  both  attends  to  the  blossoms,  serving  their  beauty,  and  in  that 
59 The word brings to mind medieval drawings of Rhetorica, one of the seven liberal arts, from whose mouth both a 
flower and a sword grow. Reportedly, when Tezuka explained the meaning of kotoba, Heidegger replied “Very 
interesting! In that case, Herr Tezuka, the Japanese word for ‘language,’ kotoba can mean Ding.” Tezuka continues, 
“There was perhaps an element here of forcing the word in a preconceived idea, but I was not in a position to 
contradict this interpretation. ‘Perhaps one can say that,’ I replied. ‘In my opinion, it could mean thing [Ding] as 
well as affair [Sache] (60).” Tezuka’s response to Heidegger indicates that the heavy temporal emphasis of this 
dissertation, that a thing arises in a temporal matter, is closer to Tezuka’s own interpretation of kotoba than is 
Heidegger’s.
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attending acts toward the blossoms. In the flower petals, we are confronted by language that in 
its presence beckons and arrests. The beholder cedes time to the beheld and is moved by it.
In their flourishing, the flowers have come from that which precedes them: they follow a 
happening in advance and are enabled by the happening. Something has called the beholder to 
attend to the flower already, and in that attending the flower appears. That which has called is the 
“lightening message.” This message itself moves—it has a disposition that calls the beholder into 
that disposition. From kindness comes kindness. Kindness gives of another’s time in a moment 
of need. The flowering gives stillness to the beholder, a refuge from the homelessness in the 
modern  era  that  estranges  Being  from  speaking.  Language  beckons  us  to  the  world  in  its 
presence, but only if we still ourselves in response in order to hear what it Says.
The pure presence of the flowering in the now—present though not complete—brings 
forth.  What  does  it  bring  forth?  More  flowering,  an  ever-coming  now  where  kindness,  as 
Sophocles writes, ever brings forth kindness (cited in “Poetically Man Dwells” 266). A constant 
prologue. Each flower may fade, but a new grows. More arrest, more stillness. The beholder 
gives time to beholding, and the beholding in turn. We stay and await the message, to then bear 
that message in a continual flowering, in each unique moment. In these moments, Dasein’s full  
Being with language finds a home in which to dwell. 
The metaphor emerges near the end of the Dialogue, and we must take into consideration 
the  path  along  the  way.  The  progression  of  the  Dialogue  slowly  removes  prior  senses  of 
backward  and  forward-facing  orientations  toward  the  world.  Heidegger  strips  away  at 
hermeneutics, slowly rebuilding the concept as that which responds to the beckoning message, 
and appearance in the forward-facing, as that which makes a clearing for the thing to appear. 
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Perhaps  the  attentive  reader  already  heard  alarm  bells  go  off,  when  I  argued  that 
Heidegger’s argumentative recursions redefine hermeneutics away from the familiar toward the 
mysterious, and appearance away from the realizing (or, in the Aristotelian sense, actualizing as 
seeing in the movement of life) toward the clearing. For it is in familiarizing and “actualizing” 
that we gain purchase on the rhetorical thing that can be otherwise. In the moment of decision, 
the thing is judged in accordance with our reflective familiarity (what it has been) and projective 
possibility (what it could feasibly become) from out of our everyday experience feeling, dealing 
and speaking. 
To allow the metaphor to be in its pure presence as a beautiful mystery we do not seek to 
solve,  Heidegger has removed all  additional  content that would have otherwise anchored the 
metaphor in everydayness. He has asserted his claim upon the thing at the cost of any that might 
challenge it—others do not hear, unless they hear as he does. The radiant moment of appearance 
will occur only on his own terms. The temporality of the metaphor, therefore, is one oriented 
away from the time of life shared with others, toward the time of death, which is always Dasein’s 
own.
Each aspect of the rhetorical speaking of things—comportment, disposition and speaking
—has been shifted by the metaphor  from a  shared to a  singular and indivisible  temporality 
where there is no demand for speaking at all. In comportment, the beholder is defined in relation 
to the beheld. The beholder’s everyday concern is immediately eclipsed by the shining beauty of 
the flower, and the hold of that concern is ceded to the word. One stops, then waits. The ceding 
is a kindness to the thing, that gives its time back in return. Speaking then serves to bring the 
appearance into being, always coming. When one is arrested, there is no turning back, no return 
to the world of concern—indeed, it is only the stilling that saves one from the fearful danger of 
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the modern era. One has given oneself over to the message, and now the others who shared one’s 
world  are  known  only  in  their  capacity  to  themselves  serve  and  bear  a  message.   In  this 
movement, Heidegger moves from speaking in shared time to speaking in  its  time. To become 
more Greek than Greek, Heidegger turns his attention away from the appearance and toward the 
clearing that would let the appearance appear—the stillness beyond the noise of birds and wind.
Aristotle  answers:  we may speak Being in  different  ways,  but  an orientation  toward 
things  that  would  see  those  things  outside  of  their  messy,  noisy,  busy  matter  is  no  longer 
rhetorical. The rhetorical thing arises from its matter in the course of involvement and concern. 
That matter contains within it prior dispositions and experiences, various aims and desires, and 
disputes over how the matter is to be spoken of here and now. All of these jostlings are brought 
together in and for the moment in a revisable decision over how the thing appears to be. The 
thing, in turn, rises from within the “the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries 
and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard,  the Give and Take,  the wavering line of pressure and 
counterpressure,  the  Logomachy,  the  onus  of  ownership,  the  War  of  Nerves,  the  War”  in 
Kenneth Burke’s telling (23), relevant and worthy of speaking precisely because it changes. To 
look for what does not change obscures the most vital aspect of the rhetorical thing. 
6.4 SPEAKING FROM LIFE AGAINST DEATH
Comportment brings with it a way of seeing and determining a thing in its Being—Heidegger’s 
philosophico-poetic comportment sees Being in the always, the most worthy, and the awaited, 
and labors  his  entire  life  to  escape  the  changeable,  small  and demanding,  where  he can  be 
released  from shared  time  to  Dasein’s  own time.  He is  comported  toward  the  thing  in  that  
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moment before death.  Perhaps Schrag’s warnings about Heidegger’s philosophico-poetic turn 
now make more sense—with neither the resources nor the desires of shared time to anchor it,  
speaking loses its connection to culture, ethics and politics.60 In the final section of this chapter, I 
will look at Heidegger’s own rhetorical failure, and contrast his recursive dialogue that strips 
everyday life out of speaking, to a rhetorical recursive conversation that strives to bring life in.
6.4.1 Heidegger’s rhetorical failure
Now that we have seen life’s rebuke to Heideggerian ontology, I am finally ready to address a 
concern the reader surely has for this entire dissertation project, that hangs over Heidegger’s 
work: his collaboration with the Nazi party. I have waited so long not to ignore or minimize the 
problem, but to give it full weight in light of the preceding work. The answer to the question 
reveals  what I  believe is the fundamental  difference between my rhetorical  understanding of 
language and Heidegger’s later philosophy. I contend that Heidegger’s failure to situate the Nazi 
takeover in 1932 within a larger, shared ethical and political matter—his failure to understand 
what  the  event  signified  from  the  perspective  of  others  who  shared  his  time—inexcusably 
blinded  the  philosopher  to  the  horrors  to  come,  and  is  a  clear  sign  of  the  failure  of  his 
philosophical comportment and disposition toward shared time.
All those who would avail themselves of Heideggerian philosophy must, as ethical and 
political actors in their own right, answer three questions regarding his engagement with the Nazi 
party: 1) Was Heidegger a Nazi? 2) If so, does the motivation to collaborate with the Nazi party 
also shape his philosophy?  3) If  so,  is  that  philosophy redeemable? The answer to  all  three 
60 Heidegger’s failure to address culture and politics, and the shared speaking therein, is recognized by his own 
students. Hans-Georg Gadamer takes on everyday speaking in its shared cultural-hermeneutic capacity (its 
retrospective direction), and Hannah Arendt explores everyday speaking in its political-ethical capacity (its 
prospective direction). My concern is with everyday speaking in its rhetorical presence in the here and now.
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questions, I believe, is yes. Yes, he was a member of the Nazi party. Yes, his early sympathies  
illustrate a pervasive, fatal ethical failing of his work. And yes, if we resolve to maintain that 
matters of concern over things that can be otherwise in shared time are not only co-constitutive  
of Being, but are equally worthy of being spoken and are to be returned to rather than escaped, 
we can avoid Heidegger’s blindspot.
That Heidegger was literally a card-carrying member of the Nazi party as a matter of 
historical record is beyond doubt. He officially joined the party when he took up the position of 
rector at Freiburg. Was Heidegger, as a member of the Nazi party, an anti-Semite? No.  The most 
charitable response to Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism is that his rector’s address upon 
taking the position offers a vision of German education that rejects  Fascism.61 Heidegger,  in 
other  words,  sees  the  political  through the  lens  of  the  philosophical  and pedagogical.  He is 
awaiting an educational revolution, though it is not without a sense of foreboding. “So much is 
so dark and questionable,” Heidegger writes to Jaspers less than a month before the Rector’s 
Address, “that I sense more and more that we are extending into a new reality and that an age has 
grown  old”  (HJC  146).  Even  here,  Heidegger  stays  focused  on  the  path  of  philosophy: 
“Everything depends on whether we prepare the right point of engagement for philosophy and 
help it find the right words” (HJC 146).62 
The winter 1933/4 seminar “On the Essence of Truth,” taught during Heidegger’s brief 
rectorship,  provides  further  evidence  for  the  charitable  reading.  The  seminar  includes  an 
extraordinary moment that indicates his clear rejection of anti-Semitism. Heidegger’s lectures 
have an almost hermetically-sealed quality—when he refers to life outside the classroom at all, it  
61 See, for example, Richard Polt’s “Heidegger’s Secret Resistance” and John D. Caputo’s “Heidegger’s Revolution: 
An Introduction to  An Introduction to Metaphysics  .”  
62 Four months later, in August 1933, Jaspers sends Heidegger an urgent letter about the rising Nazification of 
Heidelberg, where he is being marginalized as a faculty member with a Jewish spouse, and watches while students 
run for university government on platforms of cleansing the student body of Jews and Marxists. Heidegger does not 
respond.
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is in very general terms. A walk to class, the sights on the street, the desk at which one sits, all  
stand in for everyday life. Specific contemporary events, particular matters of concern for the 
traffic and trade of those in the room, almost never arise. One day, however, things are different.
Heidegger begins by telling the students he will not address the subject for the day. He 
has something more important to say. The day before, January 29, 1934, famed German poet 
Erwin Kolbenheyer (author of Paracelsus) addressed the assembled student body and faculty of 
Freiburg  titled  “The  Value  for  Life  and  Effect  on  Life  of  Poetic  Art  in  a  People”  in 
commemoration of the first anniversary of the Nazi “revolution.” Kolbenheyer has not come to 
really talk poetry. He is speaking in his newly self-appointed role as evangelist for racial biology, 
a pseudoscientific justification for the biological superiority of the Aryan and inferiority of the 
Jew. Kolbenheyer argues that the Volk, defined not just by life but race, is what gives birth to the 
poet (Neubauer 502).
Heidegger  tears  into  Kolbenheyer,  scornfully  denouncing  the  poet’s  foolishness. 
Kolbenheyer knows nothing of philosophy, and worse, is a dangerous mouthpiece for the people 
in  whose  name he  speaks.  Being has  nothing  to  do  with  biology save  for  having a  bodily 
“supporting ground” that is not its “determining ground” (Heidegger, OET 161). Dasein does not 
reside  in  “gastric  juices,”  but  in  each  person’s  choices  to  confront  the  world  fully  and 
authentically. 
One thereby perverts decision-engagement-freedom-the courage for sacrifice into 
a process that is encumbered from the outside and fit into the biological reality 
which has been presupposed as the only definitive  reality,  without  seeing and 
grasping that in engaging oneself and enduring and sacrificing, a way of Being 
that is different in principle becomes powerful- different in principle from, say, 
the functioning of gastric juices and sexual cells and tending to the brood (OET 
161).
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No person, no race is born with less Dasein than others. Further, if Kolbenheyer is to be a leader 
of the people, the people and the revolution as a whole is lost. 
Heidegger closes the session with his own definition of human essence. Asking what the 
human being is guides in advance the answer. If it is biological, the human now is reduced to 
biology. If the human being is in its psyche, all is psychological. If it is in spirit, all is ethics. 
Better to ask who the human being is. Who gives the human being a world and a self—the human 
being is the being for whom its own capacity to be is a problem. Seeing the human being as the 
being  who  faces  decisions  reframes  what  Kolbenheyer  has  deemed  a  “revolution.” 
Understanding the human being in its historicity—its engaging and enduring and sacrificing—is 
what will create a true revolution.
Terminologically, I have designated this distinctive characteristic of man with the 
word "care"—not as the anxious fussing of some neurotic, but this fundamentally  
human way of Being, on the basis of which there are such things as resoluteness, 
readiness for service, struggle, mastery,  action as an essential possibility (OET 
164).
Heidegger concludes, “[o]n the basis of this question concerning the essence of man, his Being is 
revolutionized, the way he stands in relation to his historical tradition and historical mission is 
revolutionized” (OET 164).
After  resigning  the  rectorship,  Heidegger  gives  the  lecture  Logic  as  the  Question  
Concerning  the  Essence  of  Language  (LQCEL)  in  the  summer  of  1934.63 In  it,  Heidegger 
addresses Dasein’s relations to others as a people. The lecture, given ten years after BCArP in 
the shadow of expanding Fascism, remaps rhetorical publicness toward individualized, poetic 
ends.
LQCEL  expands  upon  Heidegger’s  definition  of  human  essence  in  opposition  to 
Kolbenheyer. First, the human being speaks. This speaking does not stand adjacent to things, but 
63 The lecture is mentioned in the Dialogue by title “Logic.”
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brings things to light.  To posit  language as a means leaves one to conclude that language is 
“always only that which is belated, that which is of secondary rank, hull and shell of things, but 
not their essence itself” (LQCEL 14). The radicality of logos lies in its capacity to question its 
own foundations, what Heidegger calls a fore-question. The fore-question paves a way, draws 
out in the question what matters about the thing, and leaps out from a prior path that stands 
before it.  The first “unlocks a realm” and launches,  the second leads to a “determination of 
essence,”  the third  poses  “concrete  questions” and guards  against  “haphazard answers.” The 
temporal structure of rhetoricity, its guiding look, concrete given basic experience and prevailing 
intelligibility, then turned to conceptual foresight, forehaving and foregrasp, has now become the 
groundwork  for  philosophical  questioning  that  always  leads  back  to  confronting  our  basic 
capacity to be. 
The  link  between  the  rhetorical  and  the  philosophical  is  alluded  to  in  Heidegger’s 
comparison between the great project of Dasein and the small-bore concerns of everyday life. 
The capacity  to question deeply is  not  simply constructed out  of will,  but  follows the same 
smaller impulses of everyday average living—“what is great in Dasein is also small” (LQCEL 
19) that the human being requires in order to exist in the everyday. Even the difference itself is 
rhetorical, based on the epideictic distinction between great and small:  “The great is retained 
only if the human being succeeds in magnifying the great,  that is,  in demanding severity of 
himself in face of the great” (LQCEL 19). Once trained upon the great, the severity of greatness 
demands that one not waste time on the small.
Having established the role of language in Dasein’s capacity to confront its own Being, 
and to choose between service to what is great and what is small, Heidegger goes on to ask who 
then is the  Volk, if the  Volk  gathers Dasein with others. Launching out, we are given certain 
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possibilities: We, You [plural],64 You, and I. The Volk, like the human being, is not a what but a 
who. The  Volk, Heidegger argues, is  we ourselves, “cut[ting] off once and for all that we ask 
about  types,  eras,  cultures”  in  sharp  distinction  from  Kolbenheyer  and  other  anti-Semitic 
propagandists (LQCEL 33).
The questions,  as  timeless  questions  that  endure  and in  whose  service  we must  also 
endure,  draw Heidegger  to  conclude  that  he must  choose  thinking in  service  of  Being over 
concerns  with action.  Some say that  now “is the time to free oneself  of reflection and start 
acting” (LQCEL 24) but to act without knowing who one is oneself robs one of choice. Who 
then, are the Volk, if the Volk cannot call us to act without our own choice in the matter? The 
Volk are we ourselves. With a quick pivot, Heidegger has seated the being of shared publicness 
back into Dasein in its own time. To be sure, Dasein is not an isolated subject, but it is because 
Dasein is already with others that it must break free in laboring and dealing, moved from the 
mandate of tradition and toward a mission. Dasein either chooses this labor or shirks it. 
Dasein heralds the great moments rather than the receding into everydayness:
That which is properly historical lies always in the heralding of the great moments 
and their power for revolution, which gathers the entire happening in it, but not 
where one commonly seeks out history: in the pacified abating of the moment, an 
abating  and fading away,  which one interprets  precisely as  development  from 
which the great moments look like interruptions and collapses (LQCEL 132).
In its everyday publicness, the notable is insignificant, a small interruption quickly put back to 
rights  by  “the  sensible  simplemindedness  that  stops  at  nothing  because  it  already  knows 
everything and better” (LQCEL 132). The rhetorical returns rather than awaiting, arrested by the 
moment.  Against  such smooth  abating  of  the  moment,  an eruption  of  that  which  cannot be 
reckoned, a mystery whose lore is “overpowering and inevitable,” provides the happening of 
history “in its very solidity.”  Now located in the genuine space of mystery so overpowering that 
64 This particular reading audience can substitute “Yinz.”
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it halts our lives, the genuine speaking of a people is given to poetry. The Volk are realized as 
Dasein searches for and serves these great moments of mystery,  but are lost to contemporary 
shared time: “the language of the poet is never of today, but is always in the manner of having 
been and futurally. The poet is never contemporary” (LQCEL 142).
The answer to question two is yes, there traces of Heidegger’s own blindness in his work. 
Heidegger has not necessarily ignored the historical and cultural milieu in which he speaks, but 
the answers he gives are incapable of dealing with speaking of things as matters of concern 
because he has selected out the worthy word at the cost of the surrounding matter. Heidegger has 
made his pronouncements from within his own time. In this time, the dark rumblings in the wake 
of the Nazi takeover are small  in comparison to a great moment that heralds a revolution in 
philosophy  and  education.  Heidegger  cannot  see  that  in  the  moment,  for  his  own  friends, 
colleagues  and  students,  their time  is  running  out.  Awaiting  a  revolution  in  thinking  when 
Dachau has already opened its  doors is  inexcusably foolish decision,65 and demands that we 
question the judgment leading to such a decision. Heidegger has missed what is happening here, 
now because he is never contemporary.
Finally, in answer to the third question, can his philosophy be rehabilitated? Yes, but only 
if we keep a close eye on things that can be otherwise in shared time. Heidegger’s philosophy 
offers  important  contributions  to  rhetorical  theory.  First,  his  systematic  working  out  of  the 
temporality of everydayness, of how things are to us in the present initially, generally and for the 
most part, is invaluable. Additionally, Heidegger is right that the Being of rhetoricity will not be 
revealed in key words or theorems, and cannot be easily dissected into speakers, hearers and 
matters in isolation. The rigid definition of the thing, what it  is, does not stand adjacent to its 
65 Heidegger took up the rectorship on April 21, 1933. Dachau opened as a concentration camp for political 
prisoners on March 22, 1933.
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speaking, and we do not talk of speaking alone but rather we speak of things. Our world opens up 
in appearance, and that appearance folds things within matters as we are called to attend to and 
deal  with  those  matters  in  conjunction  with  others  who  share  our  time  and  concern.  The 
rhetorical thing can only be grasped in its appearance in the matter,  marked by time, and its  
speaking reveals the basic hermeneutic of Dasein itself.
Should our own comportment turn away from the everyday, however, or should it allow 
the everyday to dim in comparison with “real” persistent Being, we will lose orientation toward 
speaking as a mode of being with others toward things, gathered together in matters. Rhetorical 
speaking is called from out of everyday dealings with one another in order to address those 
dealings because they already matter, not simply to us, but to those with whom we live. It is a 
choice  to  place  speaking  in  the  service  of  life.  In  order  to  show the  future  prospects  for  a 
rhetorical theory oriented towards speaking about things as they arise in everydayness,  I will 
now describe an unfolding, recursive rhetorical conversation that keeps in dual consideration 
both the occasions and things of which we speak, as well as a concern for how we who speak and 
hear are to orient ourselves toward things that become otherwise in shared time.
6.4.2 The recursive rhetorical conversation
Rhetoricians engage in constant conversation over the relation between rhetoric’s objects and 
practices,  but the mode of their  conversation differs sharply from Heidegger’s philosophico-
poetic  recursion.  The  system  cannot  be  settled  and  built  upon  as  a  solid  foundation.  The 
rhetorician is painfully aware of his or her insecurity because the things toward and from which 
s/he speaks are insecure in their very being. We ask over and over what speaks for the matter in 
the moment because we deal in matters that demand speaking. I close with an illustration of one 
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such recursive conversation, based on a series of essays first initiated in, and later reacting to, the 
1970 Wingspread conference on rhetoric.  In doing so, I hope to reflect back upon the question 
first raised in chapter one about the prospects for rhetorical research, now situated within the 
context of a particular historical discussion.
Rather than offer an exhaustive review of each essay, I want to focus on a handful of 
moments in which participants question the ground of rhetorical theory. First, I will discuss the 
motivating problem that Wingspread participants addressed, as embodied by Henry Johnstone’s 
essay “Some Trends in Rhetorical Theory,” and a voiced concern made by Carroll C. Arnold in 
the  conference’s  closing  session.  I  will  then  examine  Carole  Blair  and  Patricia  Bizzell’s 
responses to  Wingspread in  the 1996 Rhetoric  Society of America’s  conference proceedings 
Making and Unmaking the Prospects for Rhetoric. Finally, I will close with an investigation of 
the relation between this dissertation’s arguments and two contemporary positions from 2010’s 
Reengaging the Prospects of Rhetoric, the first by Steven Mailloux and the second by Barbara 
Biesecker.
Both  revaluations  (in  1996 and 2010) of  The Prospects  of  Rhetoric observe  that  the 
Wingspread conference is marked by its moment in time. The assembled scholars struggle to 
understand their discipline in light of a moment in which “[o]ur campuses were on fire” (Black 
24). Perhaps the greatest marker of the moment is itself an absence in the face of death. As the 
introduction to The Prospects of Rhetoric notes, Professor Phil Tomkins of Kent State University 
had been invited as a participant to the follow-up Pheasant Run conference in May 1970 but was 
unable to attend in the aftermath of almost unthinkable tragedy: four students dead at the hand of 
their own government (Bitzer and Black vi). The book of essays emerging from Wingspread and 
Pheasant Run is marked by the moment in which the word meets the gun.
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Henry Johnstone  addresses  the  1970 Wingspread  conference  from his  perspective  as 
editor of  Philosophy and Rhetoric. As Steve Fuller points out in his 2010 response, Johnstone 
begins on a note of humility—he comes as a philosophical interloper only newly familiar with 
rhetoric—but proceeds to offer some rather pointed pronouncements for the future of rhetorical 
study (Fuller 69-70).  Johnstone’s essay contains  a note of exasperation.  Faced with massive 
political and concomitant philosophical upheaval taking place both in America and Europe, the 
traditional forms and practices of social and intellectual discourses seemed to scramble to keep 
up. 
Johnstone expresses anxiety over being called to make projections for rhetorical theory 
when so much is already in flux:
Trying to see ahead to rhetorical theory a decade from now is like trying to see 
infrared rays. The conditions for visibility to not yet exist. By this I mean that the 
problems  that  rhetorical  theory  ten  years  from  now  will  have  to  cope  with 
probably have not arisen yet. And they are problems that cannot even make sense 
to us until their time has come (80).
Nevertheless, Johnstone speaks to the problems of his own time. The rhetoric of the New Left 
troubles Johnstone in its refusal to engage in traditional,  expected argument.  The struggle to 
articulate  a  moral  valence  of  rhetoric  indicates  to  Johnstone  a  reaction  to  increasing  use of 
technocratic judgment that calls itself value-free. From a technocratic posture arise attempts to 
scientize the rhetorical, a tendency Johnstone finds ominous. In response, Johnstone advocates 
attempts to reframe rhetorical ontology in such a way that it is not the imperfect reflection of a 
perfectly computer-like rational world. A phenomenological rhetoric, Johnstone suggests, might 
be able to speak to the intersection between the physical/material and symbolic. To grasp the 
phenomenon of rhetoric, one would have to then enfold its means of transmission, extending 
rhetorical  theory to  mass  communication.  And finally,  argumentation  must  be able  to  speak 
282
across  these  areas  of  study—from  unruly  protest,  to  moral  decision-making  in  the  face  of 
technoscientific  discourse—in a way that encapsulates  both the reality and possibility of the 
things with which argument deals, in the environments in which it deals. 
In  a  rather  touching  biographical  epilogue,  Johnstone  indicates  that  this  disciplinary 
anxiety is twinned with his own personal shift in thinking. After nearly 30 years of philosophical  
study, Johnstone no longer believes that logical procedure has full purchase on being, living and 
speaking. If, philosophically,  Johnstone advocates a position of pluralism—that things can be 
otherwise—his analytic posture cannot be a slave to logical consistency: 
My own view of the nature of philosophical argumentation itself has also shifted in 
the last decade. […] My rationalism has accordingly been unstable and precarious. 
On several occasions I have attempted to buttress it, but the attempts were mere 
stopgaps. I think it is now a thing of the past (87-8, ellipses added). 
Johnstone himself suggests a Heideggerian turn, in which rhetorical agency is seated in Dasein’s 
self-disclosure,  as  a  being that  moves  and is  moved in the world,  and in  that  moving must 
confront itself (88). In light of Johnstone’s confession, his questions take on a different tone: not 
combative but plaintive—what counts now? How am I to judge? The ground has been yanked 
out from beneath him.
Johnstone’s anxiety follows along with what was, by participant accounts, a vital theme 
of  conversation between scholars at  the conference  but  appears  in  a  fleeting  moment  in  the 
transcript  from  the  conference’s  final  session.  If  we  turn  to  phenomenology,  what  is  not 
rhetorical?  Lloyd Bitzer later recalled a particular interaction: 
After a morning session at which the notion of “rhetorical phenomena” has been 
considerably expanded,  [Lawrence]  Rosenfield—in the afternoon conference—
returned to the expansive notion and remarked, with seeming exasperation, “So 
far as I can tell,” the notion of rhetorical phenomena “includes everything but 
tidal waves.” [Richard] McKeon’s immediate quip was “Why not tidal waves?” 
(19-20).
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In Wingspread’s final meeting, Samuel Becker, chair for the group tasked with summarizing the 
Conference’s proceedings and building recommendation for Pheasant Run’s follow up in May, 
summarized the group’s conversation and then asked if there should be anything added to the 
record. Carroll Arnold spoke up:
I can think of only one thing to add relative to the last question. It is the problem 
of how we shall even think about the rhetorical process if we adopt some of the 
phenomenological  and  existential  observations  about  the  nature  of  rhetorical 
‘logic’  and the mode and methods of observing it.  That’s  where our heat and 
excitement  developed  in  discussion.  So  I  think  this  is  certainly  an  especially 
important issue. It was reported as just one item in the agenda, but it occupied our 
whole  last  hour  of  discussion,  and it  could  be the most  fruitful  of  questions” 
(Bitzer and Black 181).
In  his  follow-up essay,  Arnold  broaches  a  version  of  the  Kantian  dilemma.  Arnold  is  most 
interested  in  the discussion of rhetoric  as  method and thus “a way of looking at—a way of 
interpreting—issues and meanings” (198, emphasis in original) Yet Arnold refuses the Kantian 
mistake  of  relegating  active  interpretation  to  structured  logic,  wherein  the  speaking  cannot  
address matters of rhetoricity:
It  was said that  when subjects,  data,  and their  meanings  can be interpreted as 
assented to simply by distinguishing facts from nonfacts the ‘method of rhetoric’ 
is  inapplicable,  but  issues  on  which  meanings  cannot be  determined  by  fact-
nonfact judgments are precisely those on which decisions can be reached only 
through rhetorical considerations of the  choices available to men (Arnold 198, 
emphasis in original).
In  other  words,  the  rhetorical  thing—that  which  one  can  properly  claim  as  rhetorical—is 
precisely the thing that is inexpressible in terms of logical procedure. In turn, of the rhetorical 
thing is not bound by fact-nonfact judgment, “that in humanistic and social studies fact-nonfact 
judgments simply cannot yield final determination for critical questions” (Arnold 199, emphasis 
in original). 
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Arnold gives two directions for rhetorical research. Comprehensive rhetorical scholarship 
expands  the  categories  of  beings  considered  rhetorical.  Penetrating  rhetorical  scholarship 
interprets  rhetorical  transactions  phenomenologically,  existentially  and  traditionally.  In  the 
interaction between defining the being in the context of life,  and drawing from these beings 
revisable  ways  of  determining  rhetoricity,  Arnold’s  recommendations  describe  a  constant 
returning to things from theory, and constant rebuilding of theory from things.
In order to determine the direction for rhetoric in the face of shifting political discourse 
and position of the university in civic life, participants confronted dual questions: rhetoric what 
and rhetoric how? What did new forms of rhetoricity mean for scholarly theory and practice? 
Note, already, how procedural interpretations of rhetoric, marked off by concepts and practices, 
are  suddenly  themselves  called  into  question  by  that  which  falls  outside  of  the  traditional 
parameters  and demands study and response.  The shifting being of rhetorical  engagement  is 
drawn  directly  out  of  the  shocking  and  painful  upheaval  of  life.  Opening  rhetoric  to  the 
phenomenon provides a broader field for what can be taken as rhetorical and what cannot, but 
that  broadening may come at  the cost of  either  redefining or  destroying traditional  classical 
rhetorical concepts. What counts now? How are we to judge? Why not tidal waves?
The recursion in 1996’s Making and Unmaking the Prospects for Rhetoric turns from a 
what question—what are the prospects of rhetoric—to a who question—who speaks and listens. 
In the wake of intellectual  renewal already underway in 1970 and itself  coming into power, 
rhetoricians ask “who counts now? How do we judge?” Respondents,  beginning in Roxanne 
Mountford’s  framing  essay,  specifically  note  the  lack  of  women  and  minorities  in  the 
conversation,  though the Wingspread conference does deal  with the rise of popular  identity-
based  movements  (Mountford  7).  Below,  I  argue  that  the  question  “what  things we  call 
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rhetorical” may help to clarify two important concerns about the range of rhetorical theory and 
practice  identified  by  Carole  Blair  and  Patricia  Bizzell.  Blair  asks:  toward  what—or  more 
sharply, toward  whose—end is the rhetorical speaking aimed? Bizzell: from where and whom 
does the rhetorical emerge? One questions the ground with an orientation toward what is to be, 
the second questions with an orientation toward what already is.
Blair worries that the post-structural turn to symbol-construction leaves rhetorical study 
with  a  “jack  of  all  trades,  master  of  none”  problem.  Blair  contends  that  a  focus  upon  the 
symbolic leaves us batting at signs and symbols while remaining mute on the material conditions 
that demand action. “Symbolicity diverts us from rhetoric’s fundamental capacity to do things, 
rather than simply mean something” (Blair 32). We must move, in other words, from a concern 
with theory to one centered on practice. Rhetoricians should see as practitioners. 
Rhetorical  practice,  Blair  says,  “still  has  material  consequences”  (33).  I  agree,  but  I 
would not leave the material as a  consequence of rhetorical practice. Instead, in the being of 
rhetorical speaking, the material  is already consequent. It has already called forth speaking. A 
determination of material  essence cannot solve this problem—there are no materials  that are, 
strictly speaking, in and of themselves rhetorical. Rather, the consequent aspects of that material 
are drawn out and solidified in rhetorical engagement—i.e., there contains in rhetorical speaking 
a determination of what matters about the thing in the context of this matter, and it is in the light 
of these relevant aspects that one engages in practice. Such a concretizing of concern marks the 
thing in time—it is consequent in its material capacity to become otherwise in shared time. In 
other words, rhetoric do not just “do things,” but does things with, toward and about things—and 
the things we  do are determined through struggling over the things that demand our attention 
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because  they could be otherwise.  The limit,  in  turn,  is  not  in  formal  disciplinary or  logical 
categories of being, but in how that being is taken in time.
If Blair is concerned with the rhetorical in light of what speakers and hearers do, Bizzell 
is concerned with who speakers and hearers are. The post-structural subject is called forth by and 
respondent to the event or situation, within institutional and ideological regimes. Bizzell worries 
that a focus on the subject as the “subject of” something, say power, may occlude the capacity of 
speaking (and for that matter hearing) to constitute agency,  say  empowerment. “I accept that 
sense is not created by individual choices autonomously,” Bizzell writes, “but it seems to me that 
sense for the individual emerges in large part from the personal and communal histories that 
converge  in  her”  (40).  Bizzell  seeks  an  understanding of  the  post-structural  self  that  would 
authorize  speakers  and hearers  to  act  toward matters  without  presuming  that  each  have  full 
autonomous agency:  “the subject can become critically aware of, though not distanced from, 
these  histories—and  the  more  historical  consciousness,  the  more  potential  to  bring  the 
individual’s unique creative energy or serendipity to bear on the mix” (40).
With regard to Bizzell’s position, I avoid talk of subjects, objects and agents given my 
Heideggerian phenomenological bent. Dasein always exists simultaneously as a being that moves 
and is moved (a perspective with which Bizzell in principle, if not vocabulary, agrees). At each 
turn,  from  rhetorical  speaking,  to  philosophical  concept-formation,  to  poetic  world-making, 
Dasein is called forth from its world and those within it already underway as history, and in that  
calling forth confronts its own possibilities to choose and act. Dasein first finds itself in its being-
moved, becomes an actor only in patiency. 
Reorienting the rhetorical toward things enables a better perspective for understanding 
the relation between subjectivity and agency—otherwise, we are stuck simply trying to locate a 
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position  between  poles  (actor/patient;  speaker/hearer)  without  reference  to  things  with  and 
toward which people are subjected or acting. The  Rhetoric begins with things. The speaker as 
agent moves toward a particular desired decision over the thing, and can only do so by keeping 
the hearer close, understanding both oneself and the thing as subject to the hearer’s history and 
desire. The hearer follows the speaker along and confronts a decision over the thing between 
possibilities that the speaker has brought to light, but still maintains the ultimate power to decide. 
Both speaker and hearer have a share of agency and patiency, and come into being in speaking, 
hearing and dealing with things that can be otherwise in a time both must share—what is here, 
now, in this moment for us.
The  relation  to  materiality  becomes  far  more  pressing  in  2010’s  Reengaging  the 
Prospects of Rhetoric, both in terms of institutional material resources and traditions, and the 
relation  of  communication  to  material,  scientific  and  political  life  and  knowledge.  In  the 
recursive conversation, a what-question (what is the ground?) becomes a who-question (who are 
we that speak and hear each other?) becomes a how-question (how are speaker, hearer and matter 
to relate?) As Fuller writes,
What to an establishmentarian scientist might look like an eclectic mish-mash of 
ideas and practices, on closer inspection constitute a principled and discriminating 
selection,  designed to  contribute  to  a  specific  way of being in  the world […] 
However much we continue to rely on scientific expertise for what we believe and 
do, we ultimately bear the brunt of the consequences of our beliefs and actions 
(82).
How is the tradition to inform both what we are now and what we will become? How is speaking 
related to materiality? From what do we come, and toward what do we aim? Stephen Mailloux 
offers a tentative answer to the first question, Barbara Biesecker an answer to the second. The 
third is my own.
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In response to Edward P. J. Corbett’s 1970 essay “Rhetoric in Search of a Past, Present 
and  Future,”  Mailloux  asks  again  how  traditional  rhetorical  concepts  are  to  speak  to 
contemporary contexts.  Mailloux’s  questions for  consideration  are temporal—how are we to 
bring  together  what  we  might  call,  using  Heidegger’s  language  from  LCQEL,  rhetoric’s 
traditional mandate, its mission toward the future and its labor in the material present?
How much does today’s newness owe to classical rhetorical traditions? How does 
the  translation  of  those  traditions  work?  […]  What  are  the  historical,  social, 
economic,  institutional,  geographic,  technological,  and other  conditions  of this 
translation process? What does this rhetorical translation process tell us about the 
contingencies  of  the  past,  the  needs  of  the  present,  and the  prospects  for  the 
future? (Mailloux 176).
Rather than evacuate the present for that which remains the same and in that sameness fulfills 
history and destiny (becoming what it always was), Maillioux’s questions indicate that the now 
becomes a site for both reflection and projection. Rhetorical theory must reread its own past and 
future through the now, and return to it in renewal.
As  referenced  in  my  introductory  chapter,  Maillioux  highlights  Heidegger’s  Basic  
Concepts  of  Aristotelian  Philosophy as  one  example  of  possible  site  for  further  rhetorical 
theoretical  and  historical  research.  BCArP,  for  Maillioux,  presents  a  moment  that  both 
undergirds the post-structural turn and provides an example of rereading rhetoric’s tradition in a 
contemporary context (176). This dissertation is, then, a response and fulfillment of Maillioux’s 
call  to  think  theoretically,  instrumentally  and  transactively  (179-180).  Theoretically—
prospectively—we have explored  the  structures  and delimitations  of  rhetoric  read  through a 
hermeneutic, phenomenological philosophical comportment. Instrumentally—conceptually—we 
have seen how the resources of rhetorical theory can be extended through a focus on temporality, 
while marking off the limits of that extension. Transactively—retrospectively—we have looked 
back  at  how  the  foundational  concepts  of  rhetorical  study  through  an  re-interpretation  of 
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Aristotle’s  Rhetoric in  light  of  early  Heideggerian  phenomenology,  and  a  re-valuation  of 
Heidegger’s late philosophy from a rhetorical perspective.
I find the most affinity with my own work in Barbara Beisecker’s “Prospects of Rhetoric 
for the Twenty-First Century: Speculations on Evental Rhetoric Ending with a Note on Barack 
Obama and a Benediction by Jacques Lacan.” Though we use different theoretical vocabularies, 
our  conclusions  are  roughly  the  same.66 In  Biesecker’s  terms,  the  Real  towards  which  the 
rhetorical grasps—what the thing  is—can never be fully accessed in language. “The Real is, 
then,  quite  simply  Lacan’s  name  for  the  lack  in  the  Symbolic  with  respect  to  which,  it  is 
significant to note, all ideologies labor tirelessly” (Biesecker 26). It is not simply that words and 
things are different, therefore words about things are incomplete. Rather, the very entrance into 
language necessitates a cutting off from pure presence from the beginning, “the acceptance of a 
primordial symbolic pact” that still affirms “the capacity of speakers to do real things with words 
on the condition that those words open onto the Real” (Biesecker 25). Even when our speaking 
does things, our speaking is removed from those things in a way that cannot be bridged. What 
66 The affinity between Lacan and Heidegger is not accidental. Lacan reads the Freudian “das Ding” through a 
Heideggerian linguistic turn. Lacan’s use of “Das Ding” in Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, resonates 
with the rhetorical thing’s pressing reality that still stands beyond us. Das Ding is at the heart of the split between 
nature and culture—that which one desires with deep need but, once entered into language, cannot have because 
possession would leave nothing more to desire. For the rhetorical, it is the reality of the thing of which it speaks and 
toward which it aims but cannot possess:
What one finds in das Ding is the true secret. For the reality principle is a secret that, as Lefevre-
Pontalis pointed out last time, is paradoxical. If Freud speaks of the reality principle, it is in order 
to reveal to us that from a certain point of view it is always defeated; it only manages to affirm 
itself at the margin. And this is so by reason of a kind of pressure that one might say, if things 
didn’t, in fact, go much further, Freud calls not ‘the vital needs’—as is often said in order to 
emphasize the secondary process—but die Not des Lebens [the “need” or “necessity” of life] in the 
German text. An infinitely stronger phrase. Something that wishes. ‘Need’ and not ‘needs.’ 
Pressure, urgency. The state of Not is the state of emergency in life (46). 
[…]
Das Ding is that which I will call the beyond-of-the-signified. It is the function of this beyond-of-
the-signified and of an emotional relationship to it that the subject keeps its distance and is 
constituted by primary affect, prior to any repression. […] It is then in relation to the original Ding 
that the first orientation, the first choice, the first seat of subjective orientation takes place” 
(Lacan 54, bold added).
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full evental speaking must do is acknowledge that distance between speaking and things, in the 
course of still trying to do things.
We may desire full communion with things in their complete presence, but we will never 
fulfill that desire. “Full, evental” rhetoric confronts the Real, however, when the speaking faces 
its own incompletion,  as only a fragmented gesture or hint of a conversation that must keep 
coming.  “[T]he  failure  of  representation—the  utter  impoverishment  of  the  sign  into  mere 
signifier—is full speech’s and evental rhetoric’s positive condition” (Biesecker 27). Thus does 
the rhetorical  simultaneously claim and deny the simple symbolicity of its  being.  It  is  as it  
appears  for  now to  us,  but  can  in  its  deepest  and most  needful  Being be otherwise.  As an 
example, Biesecker points to Barack Obama’s 2008 inaugural address—though in this moment, 
here  I  take  the  office  of  the  Presidency,  this  campaign  is  about  you  the  People.  Not  you 
essentially, but you as you desire and must labor to be, and you as you have been as a people that 
brings change to Washington. Both the Presidency and the People have been voided and given to 
movement and change. They become in the moment what they always were—but this contains 
within it a lack. It was incomplete and is still to come.
Such an approach looks similar to Heidegger’s unveiling of Being in hints and gestures, 
but unlike Heidegger’s position in the Dialogue, Biesecker concludes that holding out for pure 
presence waits for a time that will not come. That time is a fantasy that can never be fulfilled,  
only  traversed.  There  is  no  practice  of  speaking  that  overcomes  the  distance  between  the 
symbolic and the real. The place of rest, stillness, and complete being is not something that can 
be attained or possessed, but rather only appears as a consolation before the ultimate reality of 
death.  Full  evental  rhetoric  acknowledges  its  own lack,  and in  that  lack presses  on without 
expectation  of completion:  to  do things that  will  never  be finished,  claimed or  persistent  to 
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things we will never fully grasp beyond their capacity to be otherwise. Biesecker closes with a 
Lacanian anecdote. Faced by the god of thunder, the Devas recognize the power of the word, 
their speaking to each other and the power from beyond: Da, da, da. We hear.
In view of such a rhetoric directed toward things in their reality though always outside, 
let us raise again the rhetoric-of problem. As argued in chapter one, the rhetoric-of problem has 
two rough forms. The rhetoric-of deals with talk about the thing, and the rhetoric-of deals with 
the process of talking that produces the thing. Now we can see the dual horns of the Kantian 
dilemma,  the fate  of  Aristotelian  research.  In  the  former  case  prevails  a  Husserlian/Platonic 
eidetic consideration of formal composition of the logos (deconstructive, transgressive and anti-
hegemonic though it may be) from which meaning arises and the thing becomes a thing. In the 
latter  prevails  a  Diltheyian/Sophistic  psychological  consideration  of  mental  compositional 
process of the logic (situational, historical and emotional though it may be) from which the thing 
arises and becomes a thing. In either case one misses the connection between thing and speaking 
in time, and fails to see between the poles. The thing precedes the saying of it, and projects out 
of it, bound in the now. To understand the relation between word and thing, we must focus on 
how it arises in a matter taken under concern in shared time. The thing does not stand outside the 
speaking, waiting to be found by the right word, nor is it more perfectly emergent from proper 
procedure. It is with us in its change, as something that can be otherwise.
Perhaps  it  is  now  time  to  confront  the  same  fantasy  of  complete  speaking  myself.  
Rhetorical theory returns to the question of its essence and origin again and again, so often that it 
seems almost nervous and is ashamed of its constant uncertainty in comparison to its disciplinary 
peers (Mailloux 177).  Why aren’t  we more like…What’s  so special about us? Such constant 
return is not a neurosis. It displays the rhetorician’s care toward a world that changes in time, and 
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a confrontation with the rhetorician’s own self in response. As Thomas Slone observed in 2010, 
looking back on Wingspread, 
For in their social context the words seem to belittle the importance—or, to use a 
word heard much in that period, the  relevance—of the conferences, centered as 
they were on the rhetoric of all things. Yet by its nature as the study of effective 
speech,  rhetoric  necessarily  involves  the  study  of  contemporary  and  ongoing 
developments (and revolutions, for that matter) in the ‘real world’ (Sloane 2). 
How do we find ourselves? We keep finding ourselves in our own upheaval. 
The claim that I have named the nature of rhetoricity—what it  really is—itself seems 
deeply hubristic.  Look,  though,  at  the definition  I  have  repeatedly offered:  speaking of  that 
which is capable of being otherwise in shared time. In other words, it is what it appears to be to  
us for now. What things are, and who we are, will change. What stays the same is that as things 
change and we change with them, we will again ask questions of our tradition and our destiny in 
light  of the moment.  We enact  the movement  of the  Rhetoric—where Aristotle  works from 
speaking’s  insecurity rather than its security in logic—and in this way,  we become what we 
always were. I mean to mouth no empty platitude but to suggest that rhetorical theory, having 
defined itself  in the context of its relation to things in changing time, take the structure and 
movement of things in expressed, shared time seriously as a way of gathering together disparate 
interpretations of events.
My claim to the rhetorical thing’s essence is aimed at its capacity for change, its before 
and after held within the now. The rhetorical is a thing that can be otherwise than it is, and its 
Being is in the movement and change of life and time. I am not dodging a totalizing ontological 
claim; I am making such a claim as strongly as possible. What is indeed  most relevant, what 
marks the thing as it is, is the capacity to change in the here and now, contoured by how it has  
come before us and for the sake of which it is aimed, gathered together in the speaking we share 
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in  a  region  of  traffic  and  trade.  That  we  have  been  having  a  recursive  conversation  is  an 
extension of rhetoric’s nature. It is a speaking from rhetoric.
6.5 A FEW NON-FINAL WORDS
I  first  read  the  Dialogue  on  Language  nearly  a  decade  ago,  and  have  spent  much  of  the 
interceding time in pursuit of its meaning. Now asking in retrospect, what motivated the pursuit? 
What made this thing a matter of concern? There was something—still at the time undefined—in 
Heidegger’s metaphor that accorded with my own sense of life, and yet there also sounded a 
deeply  discordant  note.  I  was  hearing  something,  but  did  not  know  yet  what.  Ignoring 
Heidegger’s own admonition to leave mystery be, I pursued the enigma.
What accords? For Aristotle, metaphor rings true when it shows us something that speaks 
vitally of life—both in what we know and what remains obscure and enigmatic—in its doing and 
making and dealing as a thing in time. In the moment, which is fragile, fleeting and uncertain,  
there  is  in  our  speaking a  showing of  our  own Being and that  of  others,  and that  showing 
(phainomenon, appearance) is the business of rhetoric. It is the rhetorical thing. I then searched 
for how rhetoric could do so: what kind of thing is in appearance? The capacity for rhetoric to 
manifest things had to be read through what it does—when it is enacted, undertaken and at work. 
It is there already, as time is already in our saying of time: before, after and now, and marks 
movement in a world already underway.
Next, I searched for the rhetorical from the basic ground of life, in the speaking of things 
that could be otherwise in shared time. The  Rhetoric had guided my thinking since I was an 
undergraduate  debater  learning argument  from the classics,  and I  read the Dialogue with an 
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already Aristotelian ear. I went back again to the Rhetoric, searching for the things of which we 
speak in time. I found in the  Rhetoric an architecture of spoken temporal presence. The thing 
appears in the now and becomes present in aim, disposition and speaking, and each of these 
temporal directions contains a relation to speaker, hearer and matter, each with a share in the 
moment of decision. Rhetoricity arises from and addresses those who share time in the traffic 
and trade of everydayness.
Having found the accord, I was ready to address the discord and offer a counterspeaking. 
To be faithful to the Heideggerian demand to define the Being of things from those things rather 
than an external system of signification, I would have to reject a second demand. Rather than 
stand resolved before Being against the flux of concern in everydayness, I would have to stand 
resolved before everydayness against the silent persistence of Being, to take the rhetorical as it 
is.  For  Heidegger,  Aristotle’s  Rhetoric  provides  the  ground  from  which  he  will  leap  into 
philosophy—not just in 1924, but in 1934, 1944, 1954.67 Again and again he leaps away. But if 
one must stand resolved before Being, I would stand resolved as well, and hold that the origin of 
speaking is rhetorical. I would stand before the decision and refuse to jump. Back again to the 
Dialogue.
The discord was now clearer than ever. For Heidegger, the revelation of Being is so great 
and demanding that all small things shrink away in its presence, like a thousand distant stars 
blotted out by the sun. For this very reason, the Dialogue is sterile. Small things are a part of life
—indeed, they are the initial, general and prevalent parts of life. Small things that come and go 
give life its liveliness.  In contrast  to Plato’s vibrant cast  of characters,  Heidegger’s dramatic 
characters  never  have  full  lives  already  underway.  They  have  few  investments  or  distinct 
67 1924: Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy; 1934: Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of  
Language; 1944: Introduction to Philosophy: Poetizing and Thinking; 1954: “The Dialogue on Language.”
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perspectives,  and as a result  do not struggle to share things in time with one another.  Train 
schedules (to Florence, to Dachau) pale in comparison to the importance of speaking in the time 
of Being. In Heidegger’s Dialogue, no wind blows, no birds chirp, and there is no other voice to 
challenge his own—both men speak with one voice.
Goethe’s silence, as Adorno described, is a brief consolation for the end of life—a lovely 
parting gift, if you will. You will have a moment all your own, subject to no claim of others, but  
that  moment will  be your  own death,  or more benignly before sleep.  Held in service to the 
question of Being and a death that is all his own, Heidegger is consistently blind to the light of 
Being  in  the  shared  time  with  others,  and he  scorns  anyone  that  would  see  possibilities  of 
greatness in the small things of shared talk. To while his time awaiting, in the splendor of the  
moment, Heidegger must still all small things living and dealing with the concerns of everyday 
life. Nothing presses him to choose here and now. It is the uncanny stillness and silence that I 
find  so discordant  with the  noisy sharing  of  everyday  life.  Strictly  and phenomenologically 
speaking, for the human being, there is no true silence, perhaps save before sleep and death. 
Even in sensory deprivation chambers, one hears the beat of one’s own heart.
J. Robert Cox observes in “Cultural Memory and Public Moral Argument” that in public 
memory, those gathered in a region of concern have opportunities to engage in repetition and 
confrontation with its own history. The recursive conversation brings with it the tools of tradition 
and trade, raised again when the common patterns of life have been disrupted. 
Despite the will to forget, a common identity appears in our anticipation of “a time 
when.” The strength of painful memory lies in this perception of difference: the 
vision of what is ‘not yet,’ Thus what is remembered is radically different from 
what  is; it exists in the present, nevertheless, as a hope or promise. Because our 
time is not the end of evil, memory also becomes a rhetorical obligation, a need to 
preserve the image of an ‘other’—freedom, an end to war, peace (Cox 13). 
296
Cox’s description of memory as the dialectical site of negotiating our shared space—of sharing 
time  with  one  another  not  accidentally  but  as  mourned  in  loss,  awaited  in  promise  and 
maintained in speaking—captures in the moment of speaking a repetition that nevertheless opens 
history up to change. Things can be otherwise.
Let me close with a personal example of such a light of Being shining from a small 
moment that ties back to both the Wingspread conference and its revaluations. In the summer of 
2000, just home from my first year of college, I listened to the radio in the kitchen with my 
father.  The 30th anniversary of  the Kent State  massacre  had recently passed,  and a piece  in 
remembrance played while we went about our household chores. I noticed that my father, a 49-
year-old mild-mannered moderate liberal, was upset by the report, angrily spitting curses under 
his breath aimed at anyone who tried to rationalize the shootings.
“Jeez Dad, you’re  still  angry about  Kent  State?” I  asked with the sense of unearned 
worldliness  mastered  by  18-year-olds.  My father  was  19  on  May 4,  1970,  a  sophomore  at 
Virginia Tech. He turned around and stared at me,  as his expression changed from angry to 
deeply sad.
“You don’t understand, Cate. They were shooting at us.” He gestured toward himself. 
“They were shooting at us.” Words failed; he shook his head. I saw tears shining in his eyes for a 
moment, and looked away in shame—because shame lives before the eye. We went back to work 
in silence.
These were not four dead kids in Ohio for my father, or an entry in the history books as  
they  were  for  me.  Though  he  knew  none  of  the  victims  and  witnessed  the  horror  only  in 
mediated accounts, these students  were (not  were like) his friends. They were  him and  us. He 
shared their time so vitally that 30 years later, as a grown man, he would be moved to tears by 
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the presence to memory,  and could moved me to shame that I did not honor his time as he 
honored theirs—even when we were so much alike. 18, 19, 20, 21, protesting in pursuit of the 
noble, not yet knowing that things turn out badly. He listened to me make something small out of 
something great, heartbroken. No wonder scholars after Wingspread reacted so strongly against 
original  participants’  seeming  distain  toward  flower  children’s  unruly  speech.  They  were 
shooting at us.
The destructive pull of the Anyone is matched in strength by the constructive capacity to 
take on another’s time. Seen from a rigid position that demands Dasein always take up its own 
time, taking on another’s time brings with it a share of “inauthenticity.” The concern for culture 
and politics brings with it a share of inauthenticity. Speaking with one another about everyday 
concerns,  or  through  technologically  mediated  environments,  brings  with  it  a  share  of 
inauthenticity.  Life is dealing with inauthenticity, ceding to the possibility that our time is not 
entirely our own, and we share things in time with others. Of course speaking and things are not 
the same—that is why we talk so much, because that which has been, may be, and is here now 
could be otherwise than we say. Yet, if we want to not make something small into something 
great, then a share of inauthenticity that allows us to care about matters of concern to others is 
small compared to the glimmers of Being inside, and the work of making our shared lives easier 
to bear.
In 1963, Heidegger was visited by a young Buddhist monk from Bangkok. According to 
Petzet’s account of the meeting, Bhikku Maha Mani taught philosophy and psychology at the 
University  of  Bangkok  and  worked  with  the  national  radio  system  to  produce  educational 
programs. The monk came to interview Heidegger for a program on the German Southwestern 
Radio Network television channel. Before the broadcast, Heidegger and the monk spoke for two 
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hours about the relationship between East and West, and the philosopher was so impressed by 
the monk’s thoughtfulness that he allowed the very rare television appearance.68
Heidegger pressed Bhikku Maha Mani on the question of technology, asking whether the 
monk  thought  it  possible  to  bring  about  a  shared  understanding  of  something  so  deep  and 
difficult as Being and Nothing through mass technological means. The monk, untroubled, replied 
“[w]e never say no to a thing in advance” (Petzet 173). The monk asked why Heidegger refused 
to “go to the people” of Germany as he would to the people of his own village—they were, after 
all, Heidegger’s countrymen too (Petzet 179). Heidegger became agitated—people are too closed 
off. They are predisposed to avoid thinking. The monk replied like a rhetorician, “perhaps it 
depends on precisely these individuals—and that they are everywhere” (Petzet 179). Heidegger’s 
objection, interestingly, is based less on a rejection of technology in itself, and more a rejection 
of the doxa inevitably produced thereby: “Still, Heidegger insists that television is not a genuine 
means, because what is said in it is not binding and is subject to distortion” (Petzet 179). 
The  monk  abandoned  his  attempt  to  persuade  Heidegger.  Without  any  sense  of 
dissonance,  Heidegger  has  claimed  that  technological  communication  with  the  public  is 
impossible  because the hearers are predisposed toward being closed to  possibility,  yet  when 
questioned, he too is absolutely closed to possibility and has said no in advance. Heidegger and 
the monk parted, and afterwards Heidegger remarked to Petzet that he thought the young monk 
bright, but foolishly naïve regarding technology. 
The anecdote closes on a mean-spirited note. Petzet writes, “Heidegger was right. A year 
(or perhaps more) after this meeting with the monk, he phoned to tell me something sad: The 
monk had left his orders and taken a position at an American television company” (181). The 
68 Today video of the interview survives on Youtube thanks to user “Thai Philosopher,” which would distress 
Heidegger to no end. See “Interview: Martin Heidegger and Thai Monk Bhikku Maha Mani.” 
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monk, who so clearly and quickly grasped Heidegger’s own saying, is reduced to the butt of a 
joke, a fool led astray by naiveté. The story does not have quite the triumphal ring Petzet wishes. 
So single-mindedly revolted by the modern era and its petty people, Heidegger would shut out 
anyone who was sullied by participating the time, its people and its technology—even one who 
so  quickly  understood  what  Heidegger  had  been  saying  all  his  life  (Petzet  178).  Like  the 
Japanese  friend,  the  monk  is  present  only  as  a  figure  supporting  what  Heidegger  already 
believes, and any dissent is dismissed out of hand as ignorance. It is Heidegger who comes off 
making something great out of something small.
My father first saw himself in those dead students at Kent State through an American 
television company. Our conversation was sparked by a program on an American radio station. 
Yet through all those supposed layers of remove, in the moment, there took place an absolute 
sharing of another’s time—or shame at failing to do so. You don’t understand, Cate. They were  
shooting at us.
Heidegger wrote a letter to Karl Jaspers, his old friend and eventual accuser, in 1950 to 
finally  admit  his  own failings.  Heidegger  claims  that  he  cut  off  his  relationship  to  Jaspers 
because he was too ashamed to look Jaspers’ Jewish wife Gertrud in the eye. “Since 1933, I no 
longer came to your house, not because a Jewish woman lived there, but  because I simply felt  
ashamed” (HJC 186, emphasis added). Shame is the disposition that brings Dasein to confront 
itself in the eyes of others in whose world Dasein shares. Others judge us to be less than what we 
should be, and with great pain we accept that judgment and see our own failure. 
Heidegger failed Gertrud, in the same way his rector’s address failed his students and 
colleagues. Rather than meet their eyes, he consoled himself with solitude and silence and turned 
his own eyes toward Being. Despite spending years searching for the presence of Being in time, 
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Heidegger could not see what mattered in the moment because he was blind to the time of others: 
“even as I said yes [to the rectorship] I did not see beyond the university and did not notice what 
was actually happening” (HJC 186). Do not let Heidegger off the hook. If Dasein is its choices, 
Heidegger chose to see what he wanted to see and look away from those who stood in mournful 
accusation. He chose not to confront himself in the light and eyes of others, or to attend to things  
in time he shared with others.
The rhetorician should not look away from life as it presents itself to us, in the things 
shared with one another in the time of our common traffic and trade. To advocate for a turn 
toward things is not to reject the relation between speaker and hearer—for it is with these things 
that speaker and hearer create a shared region of concern. But these things are projection neither 
of consciousness nor conscience, and are not made of discourse alone. These things are shared in 
public, by those everyday others in a region of concern on whom, as the monk says, matters in 
shared  time  depend—precisely  because  these  people  are  everywhere.  We  do  not  say  no  in 
advance but da da da, “yes yes yes.” We must look instead at the decisions we face together over 
the things and time we share. We must look to what is here now, and how it is, for the how is 
what matters.
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